England and Wales Lands Tribunal

[2000] EWLands LCA_88_1999 (07 February 2000)

LCA/88/1999

LANDS TRIBUNAL ACT 1949

COMPENSATION – Disturbance – rehousing following Closing Order – claim for disputed items – kennelling costs – loss of garden equipment & plants, cooker and fridge, use of garage – loss on forced sale of car – temporary accommodation –– increased travel costs - interest on loans – expenses – Land Compensation Act 1973 Section 38. Compensation of £400 awarded.

IN THE MATTER of a NOTICE OF REFERENCE

BETWEEN JACQUELINE ADAM Claimant

and

WOKING BOROUGH COUNCIL Respondent

Re: River House, Pyrford Place, Pyrford, Surrey

Tribunal Member: P.R. Francis FRICS

Sitting at: 48/49 Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1JR

on

10 January 2000

The following cases are referred to in this decision:

Nolan v Sheffield Metropolitan District Council [1979] 38 P.&C.R. 741. LT.

Allen v Doncaster Metropolitan Borough Council (1997) 73 P.&C.R. 98.LT.

Glasgow Corporation v Anderson 1976 S.L.T.225. Ct. of Sess.

Harvey v Crawley Development Corporation [1957] 1 QB 485.

Service Welding Limited v Tyne & Wear County Council [1979] 250 EG 1291.

Barker v Hull City Council [1985] 275 E.G. 157.

Bryce v Motherwell District Council [1980] RVR 282.

Miss Jacqueline Adam, the claimant, appeared in person.

Miss Lorna Bowry, assistant solicitor representing the Borough Secretary and Solicitor, Woking Borough Council for the respondent.


 


DECISION

1. This is a reference, heard under the Simplified Procedure (rule 28, Lands Tribunal Rules 1996), to determine items of compensation for disturbance payable by Woking Borough Council ("the Council") under Section 38 (1) of the Land Compensation Act 1973 to Miss Jacqueline Adam ("the claimant"), following the issue and implementation of a Closing Order on River House, Pyrford Place, Pyrford, Surrey ("the subject property") in July 1995.
2. The claimant appeared in person. The Council was represented by Miss Lorna Bowry, assistant solicitor, on behalf of the Borough Secretary and Solicitor.
3. The parties had not prepared a statement of agreed facts, although the Council produced a chronology of events, this serving to usefully summarise the circumstances giving rise to the claim and the actions leading to this reference. However, elements of this chronology were disputed by the claimant, and a response was lodged with the Tribunal prior to the hearing. From this information, the claimant's and respondent's submissions, and oral evidence given at the hearing I find the following facts:

3.1. The subject property comprised a self-contained flat (one of three) in a Grade II listed brick and tiled summerhouse, located on a riverbank within the grounds of Pyrford Place, itself a large former Manor House set in approximately ten acres of grounds. The flat contained hall, living room, kitchen/breakfast room, bedroom, bathroom and store. There was an area of private garden together with a garage in a separate block to which the occupier had exclusive use.

3.2 The claimant had occupied the subject property as a protected tenant for some 13 years. In 1990 the whole estate was sold to developers who obtained planning permission for the demolition of Pyrford Place and the construction of fifteen flats. Redevelopment of the subject property along with the adjacent summerhouse was also considered, but was not possible then due to the tenancies.

3.3 Following the Council becoming aware, in 1993, that the property (and the adjacent Riverside Cottage – which was also let to a protected tenant, Miss Thompson) had become unfit for human habitation, and after the serving and subsequent withdrawal of Repairs Notices, a Closing Order was made on 7 July 1994 and served upon the landlord who then served Notices to Quit upon the claimant and Miss Thompson.

3.4 The claimant objected to the Order, and the Council was advised, in September 1994, of her intention to apply for a judicial review. On 27 September 1994, the Council's Special Projects Adviser wrote to both the claimant and Miss Thompson outlining the re-housing options available. These options included Council rented accommodation, the opportunity to buy into a shared ownership scheme (for which an ex-gratia payment of £7,500 in addition to home loss and disturbance payments was available), or private rented accommodation. Miss Thompson accepted the shared ownership option, the ex-gratia payment being used towards the purchase. Home loss and disturbance payments totalling £2,500 were paid direct to Miss Thompson. The Council wrote to the claimant again on 14 October 1994 and she responded to the letters on 20 October 1994 stating that "it would be sensible if I contact you once my legal proceedings are concluded".

3.5 In May 1995 the Council was advised that the landlord had been successful in obtaining an Order for Possession against the claimant, and in June 1995 the claimant's newly appointed solicitors advised the Council that her earlier application for a Judicial review had been dismissed, and requested that the Council confirm they have a duty to re-house their client. This was confirmed, the Council accepting they had a residual duty under Section 39 (1) of the Land Compensation Act 1973 ("the 1973 Act").

3.6 In June 1995 the claimant was advised that the shared ownership option was no longer available, and on 20 June, was offered a one bedroom, first floor flat at 123a Dartmouth Avenue, Sheerwater, Surrey, about three miles from the subject property, and which would be available to view from 27 June. This was the only property available (other than smaller bed-sits) at the time. The claimant viewed the property on 6 July 1995, two days after vacating the subject property to temporary accommodation, and advised the Council it was not acceptable due to the fact that she had asthma and her dog, which was arthritic, would not be able to climb the stairs. She required a ground floor property with a garden, but such was unavailable.

3.7 On 11 July 1995, the claimant's solicitors confirmed to the Council that she would accept the flat, but due to problems over unpaid electricity bills from the former occupier, it was not ready for occupation. The claimant moved in on 17 July, the tenancy commencing from that date.

3.8 A home loss payment of £1,500 was paid to the claimant on 1 August 1995, and in April 1999 compensation for various items of disturbance was agreed at £1,732.57 plus statutory interest, ninety per cent (£1,551.31 plus interest) being paid in May 1999.

Issues

4. The issues for me to determine in this reference relate to nine disputed heads of claim for disturbance, set out below. However, the claimant also provided a considerable amount of evidence relating to the events leading up to her dispossession from the subject property, including reference to legal proceedings and an application to the Local Government Ombudsman. Much of this was not relevant to my determination and other than brief reference to certain events in sub-paragraphs 3.1 to 3.8 above, to outline the background to the claim, and where appropriate in evidence, I exclude comment thereon.
5. The disputed heads of claim are:

5.1 Kennelling costs

5.2 Loss of garden equipment

5.3 Costs of temporary accommodation

5.4 Loss on forced sale of car

5.5 Loss of cooker and refrigerator

5.6 Increased travel costs

5.7 Loss of garage

5.8 Disbursements/expenses

5.9 Interest on loans

6. The Council has offered the sum of £150 in respect of general expenses (5.8) and £250 in respect of all the other disputed heads of claim.

Kennelling costs.

7. Miss Adam said that due to the fact the property offered to her by the Council was unsuitable for her ageing and arthritic German Shepherd dog, she had no alternative but to firstly leave it with an acquaintance who lived some five miles away, at cost of £10 per week for board, travel costs to visit and telephone calls. Then in May 1996 she had to move the dog to a kennels, where the boarding costs were £6.30 per day, to which travel and telephone costs had to be added. This arrangement continued until June 1997, when the dog died. The total claim under this head was £2,870.
8. Miss Bowry said that this head of claim does not come within the statutory definition of a disturbance payment because the costs did not arise as a natural and reasonable consequence of the claimant's displacement from the property. She referred to Nolan v Sheffield Metropolitan District Council [1979] 38 P.&C.R. 741. LT., Allen v Doncaster Metropolitan Borough Council (1997) 73 P.&C.R. 98.LT., and Glasgow Corporation v Anderson 1976 S.L.T.225., and said there is no case law relating to kennelling charges. Miss Bowry also said that despite the fact the Closing Order was made in July 1994, and the claimant had been offered the opportunity to buy into a shared ownership scheme (which could have been a ground floor property) on the same terms as those offered to, and accepted by, Miss Thompson, she had not done so. Miss Adam had not responded to the Council's offers of accommodation, and it was only three weeks before the eviction under the terms of the Closing Order was actually to take effect that she indicated she required re-housing assistance from the Council. Thus the claimant had had a whole year to find a suitable alternative property, that could have accommodated her requirements for the dog, and had therefore failed to mitigate the loss.
9. The Council had assumed that, as Miss Adam had not pursued the options that might have been available when first offered in September and October 1994, she had made private arrangements. It was only when they were approached again by Miss Adam's solicitors in June 1995, by which time the situation regarding the availability of accommodation had drastically changed due to the demands placed on the Council by the Care in the Community Scheme, that it became clear she needed re-housing. A property had been found (the only one available) and thus, Miss Bowry said, the Council had discharged its residual duty under the Act. The fact that, as the claimant submitted, it was unsuitable and in no way could be said to replace that from which she had been evicted was not relevant. Miss Bowry said that under the Council's allocations policy all they were required to do for a single person was to provide one bedroom accommodation, and that is what they had done. There was no provision in that policy for pets.
10. The claimant said that she had been under the impression that the offer of a shared ownership property and the ex-gratia payment was open ended, and was surprised to learn, in June 1995 when the legal proceedings in which she had been embroiled were concluded, that the Council's attitude had changed, and they were now only prepared to offer her one unsuitable flat. Even then, she said, she was led to believe that even if she took it she would be able to move as soon as something else more appropriate became available. In that regard, she produced the affidavit of Martin Bailey that related to a telephone conversation between the claimant and the Council's Special Projects Officer in June 1995. In that conversation the Council had advised Miss Adam that she could take the first floor flat at Sheerwater until such time as a suitable shared ownership property became available. Miss Adam said that the claim for the costs relating to the dog had come about as a result of the Council going back on its word, and not providing her with a suitable alternative property. In fact, she said, she is still living in the same flat.
11. Miss Bowry said that the Council were under no duty to find the claimant more suitable accommodation following the provision of the flat at Sheerwater, and re-iterated that the ex-gratia payment that was initially offered (and which Miss Thompson had accepted) was made at a time when shared ownership properties were available, and was proffered in an attempt to get the matter of re-housing the tenants cleared up at that early stage. She denied that the Council had done anything to indicate that the ex-gratia offer was open-ended. As to the specific costs being claimed in respect of kennelling, Miss Bowry said that no receipts had been produced in respect of the cost of phone calls, and the travel (fuel) costs had also been claimed elsewhere.

Decision

12. In Harvey v Crawley Development Corporation [1957] 1 QB 485., Romer LJ said:

"any loss sustained by a dispossessed owner (at all events one who occupies his house) which flows from a compulsory acquisition may properly be regarded as the subject of compensation for disturbance, provided first that it is not too remote and, second, that it is the natural and reasonable consequence of the dispossession of the owner".

There is also the duty to mitigate. The principles for recovery of damages at common law in relation to this are set out in McGregor on Damages as:

a) a claimant must take all reasonable steps to mitigate the loss to him consequent upon the eviction and cannot claim compensation for avoidable loss;

b) the onus is on the acquiring authority to prove that the claimant has failed reasonably to mitigate his loss;

c) a claimant is only required to act reasonably and the standard of reasonableness is not high;

d) a claimant will not be prejudiced by his financial inability to take steps in mitigation.

13. So far as the above principles relate to this claim, whilst I accept the Council's submissions that there is no case law specifically referring to boarding costs for pets, I do think it could be successfully argued that the claim is a natural consequence of the dispossession, and is not too remote. However, sympathetic as I may be to the claimant's seemingly enforced separation from her pet dog, this head of claim must fail on the grounds that, from the evidence, she has clearly failed to mitigate those losses.
14. Miss Adam was offered the opportunity to enter into a shared ownership scheme, and to receive an ex-gratia contribution of £7,500 towards the cost. According to the Council, that could have been a ground floor property that would have alleviated the need for her dog to be housed separately. The claimant said that she did not like the area in which that property was located, in that it had a reputation for crime, but instead chose to fight the closing Order by seeking a Judicial review, and then went on to refer her claim that she had been unfairly treated, by comparison with Miss Thompson, to the Local Government Ombudsman. It seems she did not seek to discuss her accommodation requirements with the Council, despite its offers, until those matters had been resolved. By the time they had, the Council's position had changed and it was no longer able to offer anything more, in the short time available, than the first floor flat in which Miss Adam currently resides.
15. Had the claimant not left the subject of her requirement for alternative accommodation until the last minute, the sums claimed under this head would, in my judgment, not have been incurred.
16. This part of the claim therefore fails, and I award nil.

Loss of Garden Equipment.

17. Miss Adam is claiming the sum of £500 for the loss of a wrought iron gate, a quantity of fencing and York stone paving, various plants, pots and hanging baskets, a lawnmower and some garden tools. To arrive at the claim figure, she produced an estimate from a local garden centre (adjusted to 1995 prices) and copies of advertisements from local newspapers. She said that as the flat that the Council provided had no garden, she was unable to remove these items for which she had paid. Miss Adam said that the gate had been stolen.
18. She referred to Nolan where E.C.Strathon FRICS awarded compensation for the loss of some rose bushes (which in that case had been stolen from the property from which the claimant had been dispossessed within two days of him removing to another property, and before he had had the opportunity to collect them). She also referred to the Scottish Lands Tribunal cases of Beattie v Monklands District Council LTS/COMP/1991/1 and Cahill v Monklands District Council LTS/COMP/1991/2. In both of those, she said, the situation had been reversed in that the claimants were moving to properties with gardens, whereas formerly they had had none, and were thus claiming the cost of new garden tools.
19. Miss Bowry said that there were no invoices or receipts to justify the claim, but there was a receipt from the lockkeeper for £50 in relation to some items that Miss Adam had sold. Therefore she had received value for money, and the claim should therefore be reduced by at least this amount. As the gate had been stolen, the Council could not be held liable for criminal acts by third parties, but, Miss Bowry said, not only was the home loss payment designed to cover this, but the Council's offer of £250 also included an allowance for those items.

Decision

20. This part of the claim can be dealt with in short order. In response to a question from me, Miss Adam advised that virtually all of the items for which she was claiming under this head were taken by the lockkeeper, and were included in the fifty pounds paid. I therefore accept the Council's submission that value for money had been received and the claimant cannot be compensated twice. This principle was established in Service Welding Limited v Tyne & Wear County Council [1979] 250 EG 1291., where Bridge LJ said:

"when an occupier, whether residential or business, does, in consequence of disturbance, rehouse himself in alternative accommodation, prima facie he is not entitled to recover, by way of compensation for disturbance or otherwise, any part of the purchase price which he pays for the alternative accommodation to which he removes, whether that accommodation is better or worse than, or equivalent to, the property from which he is being evicted. The reason for that is that there is a presumption in law, albeit a rebuttable assumption, that the purchase price paid for the new premises is something for which the claimant has received value for money. If he has made a good bargain and acquired premises which have a value in excess of what he has paid for them, that is not something for which the acquiring authority is entitled to any credit. If the claimant has made a bad bargain and has paid a great deal more for the new premises to which he is moving than they are really worth, that is not something for which the acquiring authority can be properly charged".

The parallel to this claim will be evident. As to the claimant's reference to the Scottish cases, I fail to see the parallel as, in those cases, it had been held that the claimants could have chosen to move to properties without gardens and the need for the tools was therefore an exercise of choice, and not a consequence of the displacement.

21. It follows that I do not allow this head of claim, and award nil.

Temporary Accommodation.

22. The claimant alleges that due to the fact the property being offered by the Council was not ready when she left the subject property (4 July 1995), she had to move to temporary accommodation until she moved in on 17 July. She said the Electricity Board needed about a week to sort out the power, and the property also needed redecorating. She could not do the decorating as she was asthmatic. There was also the problem with the dog to consider. She said she took a holiday cottage cancellation for 2.5 weeks at a cost of £400, and had to pay storage costs of £50, and was claiming the difference between the cost of the temporary accommodation and the rent payable on the flat. However, she accepts the Council's point that she had value for money, and thus quantifies this element of the claim at £200.
23. Miss Bowry said that if the claimant had viewed the property when it was first available (27 June), and had not left it to confirm her intention to proceed until her solicitor's letter was received by the Council on 11 July, the property could have been made ready in time for her to move in on 4 July. Indeed, she had not even looked at it until two days after she moved out of River House. She said that the Council had to chase Miss Adam for a decision, as it could not hold the accommodation indefinitely due to demand. It was ready for occupation by 14 July, as the Council had made arrangements for the electricity to be reconnected by then. As to redecoration, Miss Bowry said that decoration vouchers were available.

Decision

24. I accept the Council's evidence. It appears to me that the Council acted swiftly and expeditiously once the claimant had confirmed that she required the accommodation, and the Council should not be penalised for the fact that the claimant did not even carry out an inspection until after she had moved into temporary accommodation. I therefore award nil against this head of claim.

Loss on Forced Sale of Car.

25. Miss Adam said that she had had to sell her car in a hurry to raise some money to pay for the temporary accommodation, and had received only £700 against a value of about £1,400. She said that she had been forced to take the temporary accommodation as she was ill, and could not move into the Council flat any more quickly.
26. Miss Bowry said that Miss Adam would not have had to sell the car if she had accepted the Council's accommodation sooner. There was also no evidence that the car was worth what she said it was, such as a valuation, and there was no receipt for the sale.

Decision.

27. In response to a question from me, Miss Adam advised that she replaced the car with another one in August, approximately one month after selling the old one. She had borrowed money to facilitate this. Miss Bowry said, following a question from me as to why the Council had not paid for temporary accommodation, that the Council might have paid bed and breakfast costs if the claimant had applied for it, but reminded me that the Council were unaware of the claimants exact circumstances at the time she moved out of the former property.
28. In my judgment, the element of the claim relating to the forced sale of the car is too remote, and does not represent a natural consequence of the dispossession. Furthermore, no evidence was adduced to substantiate the claim, in monetary terms. In Bollans v Surrey County Council (1968) 20 P. & C.R. 745. LT., which was a claim for compensation following the refusal of consent to fell trees, R.C. Walmsley FRICS said (in respect of a specific head of claim for loss of amenity):

" …… I am unable to award any compensation under this head. This Tribunal concerns itself, and can only concern itself, with "damage" which is susceptible of quantification in money terms".

and later in the decision, dismissing a claim for costs relating to an appeal said:

"….but I would add that the claimant failed to produce any details, or supporting evidence such as receipted accounts, to substantiate that the stated expenditure had in fact been incurred".

Miss Adam had no evidence to support her contention that, as a result of a need to sell her car very quickly, she lost £700.

29. I also reject the suggestion that the car had to be sold to pay for the temporary accommodation, as the family loans she referred to could surely have been used for this purpose. I therefore award nil in respect of this head of claim.

Loss of Cooker and Refrigerator.

30. The claimant said that a cooker and fridge were provided in River House, but there were neither in the flat. She referred to Glasgow and Nolan. In the first case, which was an appeal to the Court of Sessions in Scotland from a Scottish Lands Tribunal Case (where a contribution towards the cost of a new cooker had been awarded), she said that Lord Cameron had stated:

"that the disturbance payment may include reasonable expenses, reasonably incurred as a direct and natural consequence of, and in, the compulsory removing, in addition to the expenses strictly referable to 'the removal' itself. In applying the subsection, the question of whether a particular expense claimed is or is not within the ambit of the disturbance payment will be one of circumstance and degree"

31. In Nolan, Miss Adam said that the Tribunal had accepted Lord Cameron's construction in Glasgow and had awarded compensation beyond the actual cost of removal. She said that, at River House, the cooker and fridge were part of the tenancy, and she could not remove them. Therefore, she needed to purchase replacements, and in her view, and from the cases mentioned, the second hand cost of such was a justifiable head of claim. She produced a newspaper cutting from 1995 which indicated, she said, a figure of £150 per item, or £300 in total for this element of the claim.
32. Miss Bowry said that whilst case law indicated this head of claim might be justifiable, no receipts had been produced, and in any event, the sums claimed were too high.

Decision.

33. The decision in Nolan which followed the Glasgow case, is in my judgment correct, and I intend to follow its principle. Miss Adam advised me, in response to a question, that she had not replaced either the cooker or fridge, having been unable to afford them. She had borrowed a small table-top cooker from a friend. I am of the opinion that a claim for the second- hand cost of these items would be justified, but accept the Council's submission that £150 for each is excessive. However, in any event, I am unable to award a specific sum against these items, as the costs have not actually been incurred. Nevertheless, I note that the Council has offered £250 to cover this, and the other disputed heads of claim (apart from the expenses), and am certain that serviceable, second hand items could be acquired well within this figure.

Increased Travel Costs.

34. Miss Adam said that as a result of her enforced move, her duty of care to undertake twice-weekly visits to an elderly and infirm relative meant she had to travel an extra five miles in each direction. At 20 miles per week, or 1040 miles per annum, there was an increased fuel cost that she estimated at £100 a year, and for four years, from 1995 to date, this amounted to £400. In support of this claim, she referred to Barker v Hull City Council [1985] 275 E.G. 157 where a claim for additional travelling expenses had been accepted.
35. Miss Bowry said that this head of claim does not come within the definition of disturbance, and that the Council was not under any duty to provide the same type of property as the one from which she had been displaced, or within the same immediate area. The claimant's suggestion that she was under a duty of care to visit this relative was not recognisable in law, and in any event, Miss Adam had been willing to move within a fairly wide area as she had subsequently advertised for an exchange property in any area. Also, any additional costs the claimant might have incurred in respect of this one particular journey was balanced by the fact that her new accommodation was close to local shopping facilities and Woking town centre.
36. If I were minded to accept this head of claim, Miss Bowry said, she suggested I consider the multiplier used in the Barker case that had served to reduce the compensation awarded.

Decision.

37. Whilst acknowledging the decision in Barker, I am persuaded by the Council's submission that any extra costs relating the specific instance outlined by the claimant would be balanced by her new property's closer proximity to local facilities. I therefore award nil against this head of claim.

Loss of Garage.

38. The claimant said that whereas she formerly had exclusive use of a garage at River House, she now had to park her car on the road, and as a result had suffered damage to the vehicle by vandals or passing road users. The cost of repairs was not quantified. She said that she had received conflicting advice as to whether or not this was a justifiable head of claim, and had thus not quantified it. She referred me to Cahill and Bryce v Motherwell District Council [1980] RVR 282. In Cahill the claimant had sought the cost of erecting a new garage at the property to which he had removed, to replace one which he had previously leased separately from the house he formerly occupied. Taking into consideration the findings in Glasgow, the Tribunal had concluded that the cost of building a new garage cannot be regarded as an expense of removing from the claimant's former accommodation. Conversely, in Bryce, the direct costs of removal of a garage situated close to the former property, to the new one, had been allowed.
39. Miss Bowry said that, again, this element of the claim was not within the scope of disturbance, and no expense had been incurred in respect of the garage. Also the Council was not bound to provide a garage within its residual duty to re-house. The home loss payment was designed to compensate for losses such as the use of the garage, and she referred me to the decision in Nolan where it had been held the replacement of a fish pond which could not be removed to the new property was not allowable. As to the damage to the car, this was too remote.

Decision.

40. It was apparent from Miss Adam's submissions that this was a somewhat speculative element of the claim. I find myself in agreement, again, with the Council and do not find the decisions referred to by the claimant helpful in this case. In reality it would be impossible for the Council to put the claimant in exactly the same position as she had formerly been, both geographically and in respect of the accommodation and facilities afforded by the property from which she had been displaced. The claimant contends that the damage to the car was as a result of not being able to garage the vehicle, but in my judgment this argument is too remote. Furthermore, no receipts or other evidence was adduced to substantiate the loss that allegedly occurred. I therefore award nil against this head of claim.

Disbursements/Expenses.

41. Miss Adam claims the sum of £650 for various items of expenditure including telephone calls, stationery, advertising for alternative accommodation and exchanges, petrol costs associated with the claim and other incidentals, and submitted copies of receipts. She also said that she had incurred costs relating to seeking advice from surveyors and other experts (principally telephone calls and fax charges), but no invoices or receipts were produced.
42. Miss Bowry said that with the exception of the alleged fuel costs, most of the items claimed for related to the claimant's ongoing dispute with the Council, and her dissatisfaction with her current accommodation. The dates on the receipts which were produced ranged, in the main, between 1997 and 1999, and therefore could not be considered to be directly related to the costs of the removal, which had taken place in 1995. As to the fuel receipts, although some were for 1995, most were dated 1999. She said that the Council had offered £150 to cover Miss Adam's expenses in respect of her displacement.

Decision.

43. I note from Miss Adam's submissions that items claimed include such things as typing ribbons, sellotape, ring binders, page markers, local newspapers, and even costs of carrying out searches at Companies house. There are also a number of additional items which are not specifically costed, but for which an all-encompassing estimate (of £150) has been made. These include arranging board for German Shepherd, contacting services and notifications to friends and relatives.
44. There can be no doubt that many of the costs claimed can only be considered to be far too remote from the events for which compensation could rightly be payable. Those for which the global estimate of £150 were made appeared to relate more closely to costs that might actually have been incurred as a direct result of the move, and I note that this corresponds, presumably coincidentally, with the offer made by the Council. In my judgment, particularly bearing in mind my earlier comments relating to the claimant's failure to mitigate her losses, I consider the Council's offer to be fair and reasonable, and thus award £150 under this head of claim.

Interest on Loans.

45. The claimant said that she considered she was entitled to reimbursement of interest that she had incurred on a bank overdraft and loans as a result of her displacement. She said that funds were needed to cover expenses resulting from her enforced removal such as fuel and telephone costs, and removal van. She said she was claiming £581, £200 in relation to interest charges on her bank overdraft, and £381 to cover interest on her Access account, this latter sum having been confirmed by her bank as the interest charged over the period April 1995 to April 1998.
46. Miss Bowry said that this claim was not a natural and direct consequence of the removal. Also, she pointed out that the home loss payment of £1,500 had been paid soon after the claimant moved, and she had subsequently received 90 per cent of the compensation (and interest) payable on the agreed heads of claim. If the claimant had used the home loss payment to clear her overdraft, the interest for the period between the date of eviction and when the payment was made (1 August 1995) would amount to about £6.25. Miss Bowry said that the interest being claimed on the Access account was the full amount for a three year period, so could not be related to the removal, and the copy statements provided (of which there were only three) showed fuel purchases which could not be quantified as relating to the removal.

Decision.

47. I agree with the Council. This element of the claim is, to my mind, totally unfounded and cannot, in any quantifiable way, be related to the enforced removal against which compensation for disturbance can be payable. I therefore award nil against this head of claim.
48. As has been explained earlier in this decision, the principle relating to disturbance payments under S 38(1)(a) of the Act is to compensate the claimant for quantifiable losses and costs associated with the removal. All losses are recoverable that are (1) not too remote and are a reasonable and natural consequence of the dispossession, (2) there is a causal connection between dispossession and the loss and (3) the duty to mitigate has been discharged. The determinations set out above are based upon those principles and, apart from the decision relating to disbursements and expenses, where I have concluded that the Council's offer is fair, there is only one head of claim – that relating to the cooker and fridge, where I consider a payment justified.
49. The Council has offered £250 to cover all the heads of claim (other than that relating to expenses) and in my judgment such a sum would be more than sufficient to allow the claimant to purchase serviceable, second hand equipment in accordance with the claim for loss of cooker and fridge. I do not propose suggesting that the Council's considered offer of £250 should be reduced following my determination that compensation is only payable against one of the heads of claim against which that offer had been made. I therefore award the sum of £250, in acceptance of the view that the Council's offer, overall, was fair.
50. In conclusion, I determine that the Council shall pay to the claimant, additional compensation for disturbance to that already offered and agreed, in the sum of £400.
51. This decision determines the substantive issues in this reference. In view of the provisions of Rule 28(11) of the Lands Tribunal Rules 1996, I make no award as to costs. Rights of appeal under section 3(4) of the Lands Tribunal Act 1949 and order 61 rule 1(1) of the Civil Procedure Rules will come into operation from the date of this decision.

DATED:

(Signed) P.R.Francis FRICS.