FAMILY DIVISION
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
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FATHER | Applicant | |
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MOTHER | Respondent |
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Mr Teertha Gupta QC (instructed by JMW Solicitors) for the Respondent
Hearing dates: 11 12 June 2020
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Crown Copyright ©
Covid-19 Protocol: This judgment was handed down by the judge remotely by circulation to the parties' representatives by email and release to Bailii. The date and time for hand-down is deemed to be 10.30am on 3 July 2020
Mrs Justice Lieven DBE :
Background
[23] The overriding consideration for the court in deciding whether to allow a parent to take a child to a non-Hague Convention country is whether the making of that order would be in the best interests of the child. Where (as in most cases) there is some risk of abduction and an obvious detriment to the child if that risk were to materialise, the court has to be positively satisfied that the advantages to the child of her visiting that country outweigh the risks to her welfare which the visit will entail. This will therefore routinely involve the court in investigating what safeguards can be put in place to minimise the risk of retention and to secure the chart's return if that transpires. Those safeguards should be capable of having a real and tangible effect in the jurisdiction in which they are to operate and be capable of being easily accessed by the UK based parent.
[25] [After referring to what Thorpe LJ had said in Re K] applications for temporary removal to a non-Convention country will inevitably involve consideration of three related elements:
(a) the magnitude of the risk of breach of the order if permission is given; (b) the magnitude of the consequences of breach if it occurs; and (c) the level of security that may be achieved by building into the arrangements all of the available safeguards. It is necessary for the judge considering such an application to ensure that all three elements are in focus at all times when making the ultimate welfare determination of whether or not to grant leave."
In his written reports, Mr Edge expressed his opinion about the likely efficacy of the "mechanism" of an agreed order being made in Dubai in a number of different ways. In his first report he said that: "The success of the mechanism ultimately lies in the integrity of the parents and the parents' families and the English court's willingness to accept that all the relevant persons will comply with the agreement". If one of the parents later sought to challenge the order "it is not entirely certain how a Middle East court would react" although he also said that if an agreement had been "confirmed by a local court judgment then it should prove difficult for either party to undo the provisions". There had been "very few cases in the UAE where breach of such agreements/consent judgments have been challenged or even considered by the courts to my knowledge".
23. Mr Edge clarified that he has been "involved in many 10s of cases since" the decisions of Re T and Re A (supra) in which "the mechanism has been suggested". Of these, "about 10" related specifically to Qatar. He was aware that this had been "used and accepted" by the courts in the UAE but was "not aware" of whether orders had been made by the court in Qatar. He could only say that he had not "heard that a Qatari court has refused to apply the mechanism" although, because of his more limited experience, he acknowledged that there was "an element of conjecture involved". He also said more generally that, although he had never been "told of a case in which the local court had refused to accept" an agreement, "this does not mean it has never happened". He was, however, aware of cases in the UAE in which the wording had had to be changed before the court would agree to make the order.
24. In his oral evidence, Mr Edge was asked a number of questions concerning the efficacy of agreements. He repeated that he was aware of cases in which the proposed mechanism had been used in the UAE but made clear that he was not aware of any case in which the agreed order had later been challenged. His evidence was similar in respect of Qatar in that he "hasn't seen a case involving such an agreement" which had later been challenged in court.
25. Mr Edge again expressed his opinion as to what would happen in such a situation in a number of different ways but he was clear that he was not saying that they would be effective. There "must be a question mark as to how the local court would" respond to a challenge; it was "difficult to decide what exactly will happen". He also said that if "goodwill dissolves we enter territory of some uncertainty". In a more positive vein, he said that "in normal circumstances [the court] would be expected to enforce it" but he could not "pinpoint a case where such an agreement has been made, challenged, gone to [court] and enforced". In answer to Ms Eaton, he said that, "once the court has accepted it and turned it into a local court order, I think one has quite a certainty that that should then be enforceable". Additionally, in respect of Dubai, Mr Edge said, if contested proceedings took place and the mother was unable to enter Dubai, she would be in a "severely compromised position in defending a case in court".
26. Mr Edge gave more details of his direct experience of agreements and agreed orders in both Qatar and the UAE. He has experience of 12 or "possibly" a few more in Qatar and many more in Dubai. He had given advice in 100/200 cases and had drafted agreements in, "certainly", 20/30 cases. He repeated that he had never been informed of an agreement and order not being effective but, again, accepted that this did not mean that they had not.
Conclusions