BUSINESS & PROPERTY COURTS IN MANCHESTER
INSOLVENCY AND COMPANIES LIST (Ch D)
AND IN THE MATTER OF THE INSOLVENCY ACT 1986
1 Bridge Street West, Manchester M60 9DJ |
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B e f o r e :
SITTING AS A JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
IN THE MATTER OF TPS INVESTMENTS (UK) LIMITED (IN ADMINISTRATION)
AND IN THE MATTER OF THE INSOLVENCY ACT 1986
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MARK GRAHAME TAILBY & TYRONE SHUAN COURTMAN (as joint administrators of TPS Investments (UK) Limited |
Applicants |
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- and - |
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HUTCHINSON TELECOM FZCO |
Respondent |
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Avtar Khangure QC (instructed by Moore & Tibbitts Solicitors, Warwick) for the Respondent
Katie Longstaff (instructed by Nelsons Solicitors, Nottingham) for the Interested Parties
Hearing dates: 29 31 January 2018
Draft judgment circulated: 9 February 2018
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Crown Copyright ©
His Honour Judge Stephen Davies
Contents
A. Introduction
C. The relevant legal principles
D. The joint administrators' permission application and Hutchinson's permission application
F. Conclusions
A. Introduction
B. Parties and Background
The relevant legal principles
"35. In my judgment, the acknowledgment by the Administrators in March 2010 that there was unlikely to be a payment in full to the secured creditors (and indeed, that all of the assets to be sold would be covered by fixed charges) had significant consequences for the manner in which the Administrators ought subsequently to have approached any application under paragraph 71.Paragraph 71 gives administrators of a company an important and valuable power to apply to the court for permission to sell assets subject to fixed charges as if they were not subject to those charges. This possibility is a significant interference with the rights of the holders of fixed charges to realise their security at a time and in a manner of their own choosing. It is accordingly subject to a number of safeguards and conditions, the most obvious of which (apart from the need to seek a court order itself), are the conditions (i) that the court needs to be satisfied that the disposal of the property would be likely to promote the purpose of the administration in respect of the company (see paragraph 71(2)(b)), and (ii) that the net proceeds of the disposal of the property, together with any additional amounts needed to bring those proceeds up to market value, are paid towards discharging the secured debt (see paragraph 71(3)).36. In a typical case, an application might be made by an administrator under paragraph 71 in order to achieve a sale of a company's business as a going concern, thereby fulfilling the purpose of achieving a better result for creditors as a whole than would be likely if the company was wound up. If, for example, a company operates from premises which are subject to a fixed charge, the administrator may wish to sell the business as a going concern and in situ, and will need to be able to convey the premises free of the fixed charge in order to do so. In such a case, an order of the court necessarily involves a balancing exercise. On the one side are the interests of the holder of the fixed charge, who has rights to seek a sale of the charged property for himself and may, for example, prefer a deferred sale with vacant possession. On the other side are the interests of the holders of floating security and the unsecured creditors, who are likely to benefit from an immediate sale of the business as a going concern. The administrator seeking an order under paragraph 71, and the court in considering whether to make it, will be required to balance the prejudice that will be felt by the secured creditor if the order is made, against the prejudice that will be felt by those interested in the promotion of the purposes specified in the administration order if it is not: see Re ARV Aviation Ltd [1989] BCLC 664 at 668h-i per Knox J.
37. In the instant case, however, where the sole purpose of the administration was to achieve a return to secured creditors, where the Administrators took the view that all of the assets to be sold were covered by fixed charges and that those secured creditors would not be repaid in full, and where the Company had no continuing business as such, the reality was that in seeking to sell the Company's rights in respect of the films, the Administrators had no, or no material, constituency to serve other than the secured creditors. In my view, the Administrators' attitude towards the secured creditors and their approach to any sale proposals leading to an application under paragraph 71 ought to have reflected that fact."
(1) The person seeking leave has always to make out a case.(2) If granting leave to an owner of land or goods to exercise his proprietary rights as lessor and repossess his land or goods is unlikely to impede the achievement of the purpose of the administration, leave should normally be given.
(3) In other cases where a lessor seeks possession, the court has to carry out a balancing exercise, weighing the legitimate interests of the lessor against those of the company's other creditors.
(4) In carrying out the balancing exercise, great importance is normally to be given to the lessor's proprietary interests: an administration for the benefit of unsecured creditors should not be conducted at the expense of those who have proprietary rights.
(5) It will normally be a sufficient ground for the grant of leave that significant loss would be caused to the lessor by a refusal. However if substantially greater loss would be caused to others by the grant of leave, that may outweigh the loss to the lessor caused by a refusal.
(6)(8) These paragraphs list the various factors to which the court will have regard in assessing the respective losses under heading (5). These include: the financial position of the company, its ability to pay the interest, rentals or other charges (both arrears and continuing charges), the administrator's proposals and the end result sought to be achieved by the administration, the period for which the administration has already been in force and that for which it is expected to continue, the prospects of success of the administration, the likely loss to the applicant if leave is refused, and the conduct of the parties.
(9) The above considerations may be relevant not only to the decision whether or not to grant leave, but also to a decision to impose terms if leave is granted.
(10) The court may, in effect, impose conditions if leave is refused (for instance, by giving directions to the administrator), in which case the above considerations will also be applicable.
(11) A broadly similar approach will apply in many applications for leave to enforce a security.
(12) The court will not, on a leave application, seek to adjudicate upon a dispute over the existence, validity or nature of a security unless the issue raises a short point of law which it is convenient to determine without further ado.
" where the court's intervention is sought by an existing client ... a fiduciary cannot act at the same time both for and against the same client, and his firm is in no better position. A man cannot without the consent of both clients act for one client while his partner is acting for another in the opposite interest. His disqualification has nothing to do with the confidentiality of client information. It is based on the inescapable conflict of interest which is inherent in the situation."
"The law was helpfully reviewed by Warren J in SISU at [91]-[120] and considered by the Privy Council in Parmalat Capital Finance Ltd v Food Holdings Ltd [2008] BCC 371 and Newey J in Re York Gas Ltd [2011] BCC 447. The considerations / principles may be summarised as follows:a. In the context of large group insolvencies, the appointment of a common office-holder is prima facie likely to be in the interests of the general body of creditors for it will be more efficient and less costly: SISU at [103];b. This approach is not limited to large group insolvencies and it is not unusual for office-holders to be appointed to related companies, even though the dealings between them may throw up a conflict of interest, as it also avoids expense: SISU at [105]; Parmalat at [13];c. The courts have approached the issues of such conflicts in a common sense and pragmatic way (i) noting that licensed insolvency practitioners are professional men who are well used to dealing with conflicts, (ii) in general it is in the interests for there to be a single office-holder and for any conflicts to be managed if and when necessary, (iii) a variety of approaches may be taken to managing conflicts and (iv) these may include taking independent legal advice, the appointment of an additional partner from the same (or a different) firm: SISU at [103]; York Gas at [11]-[17];d. They may also include applying to the court for directions: Parmalat at [13]-[16];[1]e. If the correct approach is to allow individuals to act where there is a potential conflict, but to ensure that the conflict is managed if and when it becomes an actual conflict, an existing actual conflict of interest should not preclude an appointment rather than providing for it to be managed assuming that it can be: SISU at [108] & [115];f. If an actual conflict arises then the management must be put place immediately, if it can be, or if it cannot be, then the office-holder will have to relinquish one (or all) of his conflicting appointments: SISU at [112];[2]g. Even if the conflict concerns the office-holders' interests in their personal capacities in securing payment of their fees, it may be possible to deal with that actual conflict by management of the type described above: Parmalat at [16]."
108. if the correct approach is to allow the same individuals to act where there is potential conflict but to ensure that the conflict is managed if and when it becomes an actual conflict, I do not see why an existing actual conflict should preclude an appointment rather than providing for it to be managed assuming of course that it is capable of being effectively managed."112. Where there is already an existing conflict, the management must be put in place immediately, if it can be, or if it cannot be, then the administrator will have to relinquish one, if not both (or more), of his conflicting positions "
D. The joint administrators permission application and the Hutchinson permission application
(i) Does Hutchinson have valid security over Lighthouse View and/or Turnhouse Road and if so for what indebtedness?(ii) What purpose of the administration would have been served by allowing the joint administrators to have conduct of the disposal of Lighthouse View and what purpose of the administration would be served by allowing the joint administrators to have conduct of the disposal of Turnhouse Road?
(iii) The relevance of the Alpha trust claims.
(iv) The joint administrators' costs and expenses.
(v) Application of Atlantic Computers guidelines.
(vi) Conclusions in relation to the permission applications.
(i) Does Hutchinson have valid security over Lighthouse View and/or Turnhouse Road and if so for what indebtedness?
(ii) What purpose of the administration would have been served by allowing the joint administrators to have conduct of the disposal of Lighthouse View and what purpose of the administration would be served by allowing the joint administrators to have conduct of the disposal of Turnhouse Road?
"[40] [Turnhouse Road] has a significant realisable value believed to be in the region of £4 million, according to [FHP], but this could rise to as high as £6.3 million once the due diligence has been carried out. Steps have not yet been taken to market [Turnhouse Road] as further expenditure is likely to be required to maximise the potential sale value."
"[24] It is incorrect to state that the [joint administrators] have done nothing to realise the land at [Turnhouse Road]. There appears a company email from [FHP] in respect of this land and the court will see that the realisation strategy to maximise value is complicated and potentially requires funds to be spent or a joint venture partner to be found. The lack of cooperation from [Hutchinson] with regard to a sensible realisation strategy has hindered this and it also emphasises why it is considered imperative for [the joint administrators] to retain control of the marketing and sale of the properties to ensure that the best value is achieved."
(iii) The relevance of the Alpha Trust claims
(iv) The joint administrators costs and expenses
(v) Application of Atlantic Computers guidelines
(vi) Conclusions in relation to the permission applications
E. The removal application
The complaint in relation to the contact between the joint administrators and Howes Percival and the Alpha administrators
The complaint in relation to the TUV claim
"That strong likelihood [of the joint administrators having to apply for relief in relation to the TUV claims] gives rise to a scenario where the [joint administrators] would have to make best efforts to remove assets from companies in which they are also administrators. Their duties to each company come into conflict and are irreconcilable they cannot carry out their duties independently and fairly for all of the relevant companies. Whereas their solicitors, Howes Percival, also face the same scenario, at least they may be able to ameliorate the effects of such conflict by setting up internal Chinese walls (although there is no indication that they have yet considered doing so) no such option is available to the [joint administrators]."
Discussion
F. Conclusions
Note 1 A good example of this type of approach to conflicts is shown by the case of Re Parkside International Ltd [2010] BCC 309 where there was a possible preference claim between companies within the same group and the court gave directions on the administrators application. [Back] Note 2 A pragmatic approach would also suggest that a refusal to appoint in the first place should require less overwhelming grounds than a decision to remove an office-holder who has been in position and carried out work which would be required to be duplicated at expense and delay to the detriment of creditors. [Back]