CHANCERY DIVISION
MANCHESTER DISTRICT REGISTRY
1 Bridge Street West, Manchester M60 9DJ |
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B e f o r e :
SITTING AS A JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
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COLM GERARD CORRAN |
Petitioner |
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- and - |
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SIMON VICTOR BUTTERS MARK ROBERT BUTTERS ENERGY EXPRESS LIMITED GREENDEALEXPRESS LIMITED HAUS LIVING LIMITED |
Respondents |
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Mr Gregory Pipe (instructed by Rollits Solicitors LLP, Hull) for the First and Second Respondents
(The Third – Fifth Respondents did not appear and were not represented)
Hearing dates: 13, 14, 15, 16, 19, 20, 21, 22 June 2017
Oral closing submissions: 20 July 2017
Draft judgment circulated: 31 July 2017
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HTML VERSION OF JUDGMENT
Crown Copyright ©
His Honour Judge Stephen Davies
Contents:
No | Section | Para. no. |
1 | Introduction & Summary | 1 - 12 |
2 | The witnesses | 13 - 19 |
3 | Outline history | 20 - 106 |
4 | Relevant legal principles | 107 - 129 |
5 | A quasi-partnership? | 130 - 188 |
6 | Wrongful exclusion? | 189 - 196 |
7 | Failure to wind up the companies? | 197 - 222 |
8 | Wrongful payment of management charges and pension to the Butters brothers instead of dividend? | 223 - 241 |
9 | Wrongful lease of the Hall? | 242 - 271 |
10 | Benefits wrongfully conferred upon the Butters brothers and their businesses? | 272 - 302 |
11 | Wrongful retention of debenture? | 303 - 307 |
12 | Overall – conduct unfairly prejudicial to Mr Corran? | 308 - 310 |
13 | Relief – if any - to which Mr Corran entitled? | 311 - 318 |
14 | Conclusion | 319 |
15 | List of Abbreviations | 320 |
1. Introduction & Summary
(1) Mr Corran's primary complaint is that he was wrongfully excluded from the management of the companies in February 2015. I am satisfied that he was justifiably excluded by the Butters brothers due to his still being an undischarged bankrupt and hence unable to play a full part in the management of the companies as he was required to do. I am also satisfied that he cannot complain that he was not given the opportunity to perform some lesser role until such time as he was able to obtain his discharge from or annulment of his bankruptcy. I am also satisfied that it would not be proper for the court to conclude that his exclusion was unfairly prejudicial to him.(2) Mr Corran's secondary complaints relate to the conduct of the affairs of Greendealexpress and Energy Express by the Butters brothers after his exclusion. In short, whilst I reject for the most part his complaints I do accept that in some very limited instances the Butters brothers have acted in disregard of their duties as directors of those companies. I am satisfied that in those limited respects Mr Corran has demonstrated that he has been unfairly prejudiced.
(3) However, I am also satisfied that it would be wholly wrong to conclude that the appropriate relief would be to order the Butters brothers to buy out Mr Corran's shareholding in Energy Express, whether with or without any discount for his status as a minority shareholder. I am satisfied that in the circumstances I should order lesser relief in one respect only, namely the payment by Greendealexpress of pension contributions to the Butters brothers totalling £64,000, which has the effect of putting the companies back into the position they should have been in but for the breaches of duty by the Butters brothers.
2. The witnesses
3. Outline history
(a) The shareholding was to be 51% to Butters brothers and 49% to Mr Corran and Mr Gunning. This, together with the provision that the latter should be appointed directors "as soon as practicable" and the further provision that Mark Butters should become chairman and enjoy a casting vote, meant that ultimate control of the company would remain with the Butters brothers. There was to be a meeting of directors at least once every 2 weeks to address trading and financial matters.(b) There was to be an initial 2 year trading period during which time Mr Corran and Mr Gunning should be "employed" as managers and the Butters brothers should be "employed" as directors. Within this period there was also to be a "no dividend" policy. Mr Corran and Mr Gunning were however to receive a salary ("net of any statutory deductions") of £25,000 after 6 months rising to £50,000 after 12 months, subject to there being sufficient in the bank account to do so. The payment provisions in relation to the Butters brothers were somewhat contradictory, since clause 7(b) stated that they should receive payment of £25,000 after 12 months rising to £50,000 after 18 months, whereas clause 7(c) stated that they should receive no salary payment for being employed as directors during the trading period.
(c) Within that initial trading period in certain specified events, which included "bankruptcy" and "vacating employment with the Company for whatever reason" and "the wish to effect a voluntary sale", a departing shareholder would be obliged to make a written offer to sell his shares to the others for no more than the outstanding balance of the loan made by him to the company, whereas after 2 years the others would be entitled – but not obliged – to acquire his shares at a value to be ascertained by the company accountant. In short, the shareholders agreement clearly envisaged that anyone leaving the company within the first two years would receive effectively nothing for his shareholding. This was not therefore a "bad leaver" provision but rather an "early leaver" provision.
(d) Other relevant provisions were that: (i) the shareholders' obligations were to last so long as each remained a shareholder (clause 10); (ii) the shareholders agreement was to trump the articles of association in the event of conflict (clause 11); (iii) the parties were to act and to vote so far as they could to procure that the company performed and observed the shareholders agreement (clause 12); (iv) under a clause headed "good faith" the parties undertook with each other to do what they reasonably could to give effect to the spirit and intent of the shareholders agreement (clause 14(b)); (v) the shareholders agreement was not to constitute a partnership (clause 14(f); (vi) there was a standard form of clause stating that the entire agreement was contained in the shareholders agreement, stating that the parties acknowledged that they had not relied upon any representation or warranty and stating that to be effective variations had to be in writing and signed form (clause 14(d)).
'Termination of Employment
I write further to our meeting on 16 February 2015 during which your employment was terminated with immediate effect. As you are aware, there has been a significant downturn in work over the past six months and the Company is currently losing money, As a result, your position is no longer sustainable and your employment has been terminated.….
… Going forward, you should not represent yourself as being employed or engaged by the Company in any capacity.'
'As your employment has concluded with Greendealexpress … we expect that you cease in any way to promote Greendealexpress or any companies that the Directors of Greendealexpress are involved with.This includes contacting Greendealexpress clients regarding Greendealexpress related matters.
We are happy for you to attend shareholders meetings held from time to time but request that you do not visit the Beverley offices for any other reason or attempt to manage the Greendealexpress employees.
…
The next shareholders meeting is to be held Monday 9th March 8am -10am we look forward to seeing you then.'
'I am a little bemused by the below, I am getting mixed messages again. Please can you clarify 100% your position and therefore enabling me to get on and use my time productively.In the meantime I will continue to work on the solar project as this is bringing in revenue for Greendealexpress (this is in my interest being a shareholder), the solar project is only being facilitated by Greendealexpress and therefore I'm not promoting or managing aby companies that you may be a director of."
'For clarity please do not conduct any activity that may be deemed as promoting Greendealexpress or companies associated with the directors.This means no external meetings, conversations with clients, meetings at the office or general promoting of Greendealexpress.
Please do not hold or attend any meetings at the Beverly office other than shareholders meetings.'
Greendealexpress a/c 1: £1,030,485.92
Greendealexpress a/c 2: £599,375.49
Energy Express a/c: £5,011,850.95
(a) In the first [TB5/465] he complained about the ongoing expenditure in relation to the occupation of the Hall, stating in terms that there was no lease in place and that it was "commercial suicide" to carry on paying rent at £140,000 pa for space which was not needed given that there were only 10 staff then employed.
(b) In the second [TB5/466] he asked Mrs Scaife to invoice for the work done for Unicom which Greendealexpress had paid and also to invoice the other Butters brothers' businesses for the use of Greendealexpress' "infrastructure" such as offices and staff.
There was no reply to either of these emails. Whilst it is true that other correspondence and contact from Mr Corran at that time was inappropriate in its terms and intensity, that complaint could not be made about these two emails for which there was no justification for ignoring.
Energy Express: net current assets £5,012,177; net assets/shareholders' funds £5,013,322;
Greendealexpress: turnover £12,774,899; pre-tax profit £2,112,235; net current liabilities £1,018,649; net liabilities £1,854,369.
Energy Express: net current assets £5,002,567; net assets/shareholders' funds £5,003,722;
Greendealexpress: turnover £443,010; pre-tax profit £180,595; net current liabilities £1,093,867; net liabilities £1,714,750.
Greendealexpress a/c 1: £337,779.55;
Greendealexpress a/c 2: £113,498.97;
Energy Express a/c: £2,511,120.41.
4. Relevant legal principles
The claim under s.994 Companies Act 2006
(a) the conduct he complains of is the conduct of Energy Express' affairs, or an act or omission of Energy Express (including an act or omission on its behalf); and(b) his interests as a member of the company must have been:
(c) prejudiced, and
(d) unfairly so.
"61. From Lord Hoffmann's speech [in O'Neill v Phillips [1999] 1 WLR 1092] one can deduce the following principles:(1) The concept of unfairness, although objective in its focus, is not to be considered in a vacuum. An assessment that conduct is unfair has to be made against the legal background of the corporate structure under consideration. This will usually take the form of the articles of association and any collateral agreements between shareholders which identify their rights and obligations as members of the company. Both are subject to established equitable principles which may moderate the exercise of strict legal rights when insistence on the enforcement of such rights would be unconscionable;
(2) It follows that it will not ordinarily be unfair for the affairs of a company to be conducted in accordance with the provisions of its articles or any other relevant and legally enforceable agreement, unless it would be inequitable for those agreements to be enforced in the particular circumstances under consideration. Unfairness may, to use Lord Hoffmann's words, "consist in a breach of the rules or in using rules in a manner which equity would regard as contrary to good faith": see p.1099A; the conduct need not therefore be unlawful, but it must be inequitable;
(3) Although it is impossible to provide an exhaustive definition of the circumstances in which the application of equitable principles would render it unjust for a party to insist on his strict legal rights, those principles are to be applied according to settled and established equitable rules and not by reference to some indefinite notion of fairness;
(4) To be unfair, the conduct complained of need not be such as would have justified the making of a winding-up order on just and equitable grounds as formerly required under s.210 of the Companies Act 1948;
(5) A useful test is always to ask whether the exercise of the power or rights in question would involve a breach of an agreement or understanding between the parties which it would be unfair to allow a member to ignore. Such agreements do not have to be contractually binding in order to found the equity;
(6) It is not enough merely to show that the relationship between the parties has irretrievably broken down. There is no right of unilateral withdrawal for a shareholder when trust and confidence between shareholders no longer exist. It is, however, different if that breakdown in relations then causes the majority to exclude the petitioner from the management of the company or otherwise to cause him prejudice in his capacity as a shareholder."
"A lot of the jurisprudence refers to the applicability of the jurisdiction where there is a "quasi-partnership". A certain amount of effort in this case has gone into establishing whether the facts of this case fall within that description or not. I do not propose to spend much time in considering that particular pigeon-holing exercise because the existence of a "quasi-partnership" is not determinative of the question of whether equitable constraints on the exercise of legal rights apply."
"45. In my view, neither equity nor the jurisdiction under section 994 sweeps away contractual arrangements; at most, the exercise of contractual rights is subjected to equitable restraint if it would be unconscionable, or unfairly prejudicial. If the exercise of the legal right would not be unconscionable, the consequences of its exercise must be permitted to follow.46. Furthermore, in the particular circumstances of the case, I am not persuaded that there is anything inconsistent between the understandings invoked by Mr Collingwood and the provisions of the contractual documentation: Mr Moxon's real complaint (so it seems to me) is not so much as to the provisions but as to the harshness of their effect.
…
52. More particularly, the provisions for removal of a director and the deemed transfer of his shares at a price depending on the circumstances of his removal, do not seem to me to be offensive to the nature of the Company as a small body corporate based on personal relationships, nor indeed inconsistent with the understandings which Mr Moxon asserts. That is especially so where, as in this case, there has been provision made and satisfied for distributions of distributable profit in each year, so that it is not a situation where the deemed transferor loses all the intermediate benefit of his participation.
53. I have not been persuaded that Mr Moxon was entitled, or even can reasonably have expected to be entitled, to remain in executive office even if in good faith found guilty of gross misconduct; and I am not persuaded either that there was any intention or understanding (whether express or implicit) that the contractually agreed consequences should not follow.
54. I do not see the need to determine whether or not there was a "quasi-partnership". The label is apt to be misused, and I doubt it is apposite in this case, given the choice of a body corporate ab initio, the commercial nature of the investments by Mr Cook and Mr Kulesza and the preference shareholders, and the careful, bespoke documentation as to the relevant relationships. But in any event, as indicated above, in my judgment, the provisions I have adumbrated are not inconsistent with partnership, provided they are invoked in good faith (which is expressly required by the Shareholders' Agreement as previously stated): see Kelly v Denman [unreported 15 May 1986 Ch D, Rimer J].
55. Put shortly, in my judgment, there is no overriding reason not to give effect to the arrangements, including those for dismissal and removal of a director and the sale of his shares, comprised in the agreements (to the extent valid in law), albeit they should be strictly interpreted, exercised in good faith and not permitted to be used "for unworthy purposes" (on account of the abuse which may be made of them, and of concern of the court to see that powers of expulsion are not used for improper purposes) Blisset v Daniel (1853) 10 Hare, 493."
7-200: It is clear that in determining the issue of unfair prejudice, and indeed the appropriate remedy, the court will take into account not only the conduct of the majority but also that of the minority. But the court does not "sit under a palm tree", denying relief to a petitioner such because it may disapprove of his conduct: the unfair prejudice remedy does not usher in a regime where judges make up corporate standards "on the hoof"; "Justice is not administered on the basis of tit for tat": per Arden LJ in Re Tobian Properties [2013] Bus LR 753 at [41], discussed below.7-201: Courts of equity have developed principles which are to be applied in determining whether a claimant is to be denied relief in equity by virtue of his own misconduct: the "clean hands" doctrine. Whilst it was held in Re London School of Electronics [1986] 1 Ch. 211 at 221–222 that a petitioner for relief on the statutory unfair prejudice ground is not seeking relief in equity and therefore the equitable doctrine of "clean hands" is not directly applicable, nevertheless that principle will provide useful guidance, particularly where the petitioner is relying upon equitable principles, borrowed from the law of partnership or elsewhere, to establish grounds for unfair prejudice. …
7-202: Applying the "clean hands" doctrine, the court is not engaged in a balancing exercise of weighing one side's misconduct against the other, but the petitioner's misconduct is relevant if it has an immediate and necessary relation to the unfairly prejudicial conduct of which complaint is made.
"It is established that wrongdoing on the part of a petitioner seeking relief under section 994 can be relevant in two ways. The first way is that the petitioner's wrongdoing may make the prejudicial conduct of the respondent not unfair. The second way is that the petitioner's wrongdoing may justify the court in refusing to grant relief to the petitioner or may influence the choice of any relief which is granted. These propositions are established by Re London School of Electronics Ltd [1986] Ch 211 at 222 B-C, Richardson v Blackmore [2006] BCC 276 and Grace v Biagioli [2006] BCC 85."
Directors' duties
"51.1.To act in accordance with the Companies' respective Articles (as provided by s.171(a) of the Companies Act 2006 ("the Act"));51.2. To exercise their powers for proper purposes (as provided by s.171(b) of the Act);
51.3. To exercise their powers in good faith to promote the success of the Companies for the benefit of their respective members, including having regard to the likely consequences of any decision in the long term, the need to foster the Companies' business relationships with suppliers, customers and others and the need to act fairly as between members (as provided by s.172 of the Act);
51.4. To exercise their independent judgment (as provided by s.173 of the Act);
51.5. To act with reasonable care and skill (as provided by s.174 of the Act); and
51.6. To avoid situations in which they had, or could have, a direct or indirect interest that conflicted, or might conflict, with the interests of the Companies (as provided by s.175 of the Act)."
Bankruptcy
Misrepresentation; non-disclosure; mistake; illegality
(a) For a contract to be avoided on the grounds of a common mistake, such mistake must be fundamental in terms of rendering the agreed contractual performance impossible, and relief will only be granted if the parties entered the contract under a positive belief which was incorrect, rather than merely not having thought about a particular issue ; and(b) Contracting parties generally owe no duty to disclose material facts to each other, but as between partners (or proposed partners) in the strict sense, a duty to disclose 'all material facts of which he has knowledge' has been confirmed – Conlon v Simms [2008] 1 WLR 484.
(i) does public policy require that the claimant, in the circumstances which have occurred, should be refused relief to which he would otherwise have been entitled with respect to all or part of his claim?(ii) and, in the event the contract is illegal and unenforceable, do the facts justify the granting of some relief (other than enforcement of the contract) to either of the parties to the contract?
5. A quasi-partnership?
(a) The initial relationship and the relationship following the 2014 re-organisation [131 - 138].(b) The arguments based on misrepresentation; non-disclosure; mistake; illegality [139 - 149].
(c) Did Mr Corran notify the Butters brothers of his bankruptcy in September or in November 2014? [150 - 170].
(d) The implications of my finding that Mr Corran did not inform the Butters brothers until November 2014 of his bankruptcy [171 - 188].
(a) The initial relationship and the relationship following the 2014 re-organisation
(b) The arguments based on misrepresentation; non-disclosure; mistake; illegality
7-178 Partnership
The fundamental duty of every partner is to show the utmost good faith in his dealings with the other partners. In Conlon v Simms the Court of Appeal held that in negotiating a partnership agreement: " … a party owes a duty to the other negotiating parties to disclose all material facts of which he has knowledge and of which the other negotiating parties may not be aware."
…
7-179 Analogous Agreements
A duty of disclosure may arise as an implied term of an agreement which is not a partnership but which has "elements of joint enterprise or joint venture", but: "… wider duties will not lightly be implied, in particular in commercial contracts negotiated at arms' length between parties with comparable bargaining power, and all the more so where the contract in question sets out in detail the extent, for example, of a party's disclosure obligations."
"[Counsel for the claimant] submitted that the relationship between Dr Dewji and Mr Banwaitt was such that Dr Dewji owed Mr Banwaitt a duty of disclosure like that owed in a contract uberrimae fidei. He referred me to Chitty on Contracts, 31st edition, paragraphs 6-170,171 and to the judgment of Briggs J in Ross River Ltd v Cambridge City Football Club Ltd [2008] 1 All E R 1004 commencing at paragraphs 196 and 197. [Counsel for the defendant] did not accept that a duty of disclosure arose in the facts here, but neither did he dispute it. I accept that a duty of disclosure arose because Dr Dewji was the orchestrator of the venture, was inviting Mr Banwaitt to join and persuading him to do so, and he knew that Mr Banwaitt was totally reliant on him ...."
(1) As I have found, Mr Corran did not know of his status as an undischarged bankrupt at the time of entry into the shareholders agreement. This is relevant to an assessment of his culpability and, hence, to the illegality issue.(2) His status as an undischarged bankrupt did not prevent him from acquiring shares in Greendealexpress. It is true that the OR would have been entitled to assert a claim to the shares as after-acquired property but, in real terms, that would never have been activated within the first 2 years given the forced sale provision in clause 8. Nor was it likely to have been invoked subsequently unless the OR thought the shareholding was of sufficient value to justify doing so.
(3) Whilst Mr Corran's status as an undischarged bankrupt meant that he could not become a director or be involved in the central management of the company, contrary to the expectations of the shareholders agreement, that status was neither permanent nor necessarily of long duration. It would all depend on the circumstances of his bankruptcy and whether he was able to obtain a discharge or an annulment in short order. He could have applied for an order permitting him to act as director pending the determination of those applications. In any event the obligation to become a director was subject to a qualification that he should do so "as soon as practicable". In the meantime, whilst he could not - I accept - have been involved in the central direction of the company affairs and, hence, could not have taken part in the central decision making function at the weekly meeting, he could nonetheless have been employed as a manager undertaking the "operational" role envisaged by the shareholders agreement. It is important to bear in mind that this was not the usual bi-partite contract, so that in the meantime Mr Gunning could still have become a director and taken part in the management meetings with the result that it could not be said that the whole object of the shareholders agreement as between the four participants would have been frustrated or incapable of being performed.
(4) Moreover, as Mr Maynard-Connor submitted, although he would be committing an offence and becoming personally liable if he did become involved in the central management of the company affairs, nonetheless decisions taken involving him and acts undertaken by him would not in any way be invalid and the other parties would not be committing any offence or taking on any personal liability unless they knew of his status and allowed him to carry on acting in that manner.
(5) Finally, and importantly, the shareholders agreement contained a provision which allowed the other shareholders to address the problem which might arise in such circumstances, which was to invoke the forced sale option provided for by clause 8.
(c) Did Mr Corran notify the Butters brothers of his bankruptcy in September or in November 2014?
(d) The implications of my finding that Mr Corran did not inform the Butters brothers until November 2014 of his bankruptcy
6. Wrongful exclusion?
7. Failure to wind up the companies?
8. Wrongful payment of management charges and pension to the Butters brothers instead of dividend?
Management charges
Pension payments
Failure to sanction payment of dividend?
(1) The power to pay dividends is a matter which is normally regulated by the articles, although it may also – as it was here – be the subject of provision in a shareholders agreement. The decision is ultimately one for the shareholders in general meeting;(2) A failure by the directors to perform their duty to consider payment of reasonable dividend or to recommend payment of adequate dividend may amount to unfair prejudice;
(3) However that is a difficult case to make out if the decision not to pay dividend is one which is made in good faith for what the directors reasonably consider to be in the best interests of the company. That is particularly so where it is not coupled with the payment to themselves of excessive remuneration. The court should accord weight to the commercial judgment of the board.
9. Wrongful lease of the Hall?
(1) The email from Mark Butters of 12 October 2013 and subsequent correspondence makes it clear that it had always been the Butters brothers' aspiration for there to be a longer term lease.(2) In his comments to Rollits on Mr Corran's email dated 10 March 2015 Mark Butters did say that "there is 5 years remaining on this lease" which clearly demonstrates that Mark Butters believed at this stage that there was a 5 year lease obligation in place.
(3) In his witness statement as clarified in examination in chief Mr Jones said that in a discussion he had with Mr Corran in around September 2014 Mr Corran expressed himself in terms which showed that he was aware of the "proposed lease", by which Mr Jones explained that he meant the formal lease which was entered into in June 2015. I do not accept Mr Pipe's submission that this in itself is evidence that Mr Corran knew of or agreed to there being a formal 5 year lease, since that is not what the witness statement as written and signed said and even in examination in chief Mr Jones did not say that he remembered that it was specifically mentioned on that occasion that the lease was to be a 5 year lease. However, his evidence, which I accept, is consistent with there having been some agreement or understanding at the time that a lease of some kind should be entered into in relation to the Hall. This would not make sense if all that was being discussed at that stage was simply a renewal of the existing one year lease.
(4) The formal lease itself is consistent with an agreement having been reached in autumn 2014, since it grants a 5 year lease from November 2014 at £140,000 pa. Although it was Mark Butters' evidence in examination in chief that this was a simple mistake, I suspect given in order to support his case that the agreement had been reached earlier, in late 2013, in my view it is more consistent with an agreement for a 5 year lease having been agreed in autumn 2014.
10. Benefits wrongfully conferred upon the Butters brothers and their businesses?
Haus
Unicom
Unicom employees
Express Capital
Summary
11. Wrongful retention of debenture?
12. Overall – conduct unfairly prejudicial to Mr Corran?
(1) The Butters brothers would never have agreed to go into business with Mr Corran in the first place had they known of his status as an undischarged bankrupt. I accept however that Mr Corran did not know he was an undischarged bankrupt at the time and on my findings is not legally culpable nor culpable in a wider sense for not informing them at that time.(2) By the time of the 2014 re-organisation the relationship between the parties was such that the Butters brothers were not entitled to exercise their rights under the articles of agreement or under the shareholders agreement other than in good faith and for proper motives.
(3) By the time of the 2014 re-organisation the business had enjoyed spectacular success and Mr Corran and the Butters brothers had done extremely well out of the ECO trading, receiving substantial payments on account of dividend as well as regular management fees. However that business was drying up and, to survive and prosper, the business needed to make a success of its former key business objective of Green Deal provider work as well as diversifying into other profitable areas of work. All would involve the full time and attention of Mr Corran in a central management role equivalent to a shadow director.
(4) Having discovered that he was still bankrupt, Mr Corran concealed that from the Butters brothers prior to entry into the 2014 re-organisation. Had he disclosed it they would not have entered into the 2014 re-organisation at that time and matters would have been left as they were in November 2014, which is that he needed to obtain his discharge or annulment sooner rather than later and in the meantime step back from the business at least openly. As in fact happened, he would have failed to obtain his discharge or annulment in three months and the Butters brothers would have decided not to continue in business with him and to take the further action – which they could not take post the 2014 re-organisation – of invoking the forced share sale procedure in the shareholders agreement as well as terminating his management role.
(5) Having regard to his failure to obtain his discharge or annulment in three months and having regard to the consequences upon the business going forwards the Butters brothers were reasonably entitled to terminate his management role as conducted since May 2013 in accordance with the agreement and understanding between them, on the basis that he could not have continued performing that role without breach of the law and putting them at risk as well. It was reasonable for them in all of the circumstances to decide to terminate his management role on a permanent basis rather than to allow him to perform some lesser role either for 12 months until he obtained his discharge or for some lesser period to see if he could obtain an annulment within that lesser period. The Butters brothers would have been entitled to make that decision regardless of whether he had concealed his bankruptcy from them since he first became aware of it in September 2014, but were all the more entitled to make that decision given that he had chosen to conceal that discovery from them for a period of 2 months at a critical time both for the business and for their relationship with each other.
(6) The Butters brothers were reasonably entitled to continue to pay themselves the agreed £5,000 monthly management charge notwithstanding that Mr Corran was no longer receiving his £5,000 management charge because of his removal from his previous role. They were not however entitled to cause Greendealexpress to make further pension payments of £32,000 to each of them and not to Mr Corran in circumstances where that had previously been agreed and paid purely as a tax-efficient alternative to payment of dividend without commitment to doing so every year without further consideration of the profitability of the business. That was a decision which was unfairly prejudicial to Mr Corran.
(7) The Butters brothers were reasonably entitled to conclude that it was not necessary or indeed appropriate to put the companies into some form of insolvency procedure. They were reasonably entitled to conclude that it was appropriate to continue with the Green Deal provider business and to investigate other further business areas and to resolve both the BG and other major energy supplier claims as well as resolving the mess in which the company accounts had been discovered to be. Even though not a pleaded allegation, there can be no reasonable criticism of their decision not to recommend or to declare or pay dividend over the same time period.
(8) The Butters brothers were also reasonably entitled to continue with the lease of the Hall on the terms as originally agreed and as varied by subsequent agreement, and to enter into a formal 5 year lease of the Hall in June 2015. They were also reasonably entitled to cause Energy Express to guarantee that lease even though had not been previously agreed.
(9) There is no basis for criticism of the Butters brothers as regards benefits conferred by Greendealexpress upon Haus. The only basis for criticism of the Butters brothers as regards Unicom and Express Capital is the failure to ensure that the time spent by a limited number of employees was invoiced and paid before these proceedings were issued.
(1) Their causing Greendealexpress to make further pension payments of £32,000 to each of them and not to Mr Corran.
(2) Their limited failures as regards the invoicing and payment of staff time in relation to Unicom and Express Capital.
13. Relief – if any - to which Mr Corran entitled?
Abbreviation | Full description | First para ref |
APOD | Amended Points of Defence | 4 |
BG | British Gas plc | 35 |
Butters brothers | Mark Butters and Simon Butters | 1 |
CA 2006 | The Companies Act 2006 | 107 |
CCJ | County Court judgment | 214 |
CDDA 1986 | The Company Directors Disqualification 1986 | 123 |
EA 2011 | The Energy Act 2011 | 21 |
ECO | The Energy Company Obligation | 34 |
Energy Express | Energy Express Limited | 1 |
FCA | Financial Conduct Authority | 22 |
Green Deal Agreement | The Green Deal Arrangements Agreement | 21 |
Greendealexpress | Greendealexpress Limited | 2 |
Haus | Haus Living Limited | 3 |
IBG | Insurance Backed Guarantee | 24 |
OR | Official Receiver | 56 |
Regulations | The Green Deal Framework (Disclosure, Acknowledgment, Redress etc) Regulations 2012 | 21 |
Solar JVs | The Solar Joint Ventures | 51 |