Case No:1109 of 2014
Neutral Citation Number: [2015] EWHC 2634 (Ch)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
CHANCERY DIVISION
LEEDS DISTRICT REGISTRY

The Court House
Oxford Row
Leeds LS1 3BG

Before :

His Honour Judge Saffman sitting as a Judge of the High Court 
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Between :

	Christopher Wood

(As Trustees in Bankruptcy of Keith Lowe)
	Applicant	
	-	and –
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	(1) Keith Lowe
(2) Anne Elizabeth Lowe
(3) Joanna Mary Lowe	

Respondents	

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Mr S Passfield for the Applicant
Mr D Cochran for the Respondents

Hearing date: 29 and 30 April 2015
Circulated in Draft to Parties 22 May 2015
Handed Down 18 September 2015
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JUDGMENT
Introduction

1.	This is an application by the Trustee in Bankruptcy of the First Respondent, Mr Keith Lowe for a declaration as to the extent, if any, of the Bankrupt’s proprietary interest in some of the items set out in a document headed “Further Inventory” which, for the sake of clarity, I attach to this judgment as Appendix 1. The application concerns only the items that are not highlighted in yellow  the Trustee having decided not to dispute the Bankrupt’s assertion that he does not have such an interest in those so highlighted. However, the Trustee emphasises that that assertion is not necessarily accepted. His position is merely that pursuing a claim in respect of those highlighted items would not be a proportionate exercise.

2.	There is an ancillary application for permission to seize those goods that are found to be owned by the Bankrupt either in whole or in part in order that they can be sold to realise funds for creditors.  All but the first four items on the schedule are situated in either the Bankrupt’s home at Springwood Hall, Priesthorpe Road, Farsley, Pudsey, Leeds or in a nearby property known as Lower Grange The Grange, Priesthorpe Road or in outbuildings attached to Lower Grange, These properties are registered at HM Land Registry in the Bankrupt’s sole name.  Additionally some of the items other than the first four are in a large Barn on land to the north of Springwood Hall which is registered at HM Land Registry in the name of the Third Respondent. The first 4 items are already in the hands of the Trustee.

3.	The Second and Third Respondents are respectively the wife and a daughter of the Bankrupt and have been joined into these proceedings because they assert ownership (either wholly or partly) of some of the items in dispute.  

Concerns

First Concern

4.	It is one of the many matters in this case that is unsatisfactory that other persons who assert ownership of some of the items have not been joined into the proceedings. As well as the Second and Third Respondents, the Bankrupt’s other daughter Emma Lowe Marshall, his son-in-law Stephen Marshall and his father-in-law Lawrence Ratcliffe also assert that they have proprietary rights in some of the items.  Their absence as parties is a significant omission which I was at pains to point out to counsel at the commencement of this hearing. Because at least Emma Marshall Lowe and Stephen Marshall as well as the Second and Third Respondents were to give oral evidence in any event and Mr Ratcliffe had filed a witness statement and the parties were anxious for the hearing to proceed, not least because significant costs had been incurred in connection with it, and the parties were anxious for the position to be resolved, I was persuaded to hear the application but on the basis that it could not compromise the position of those who have not been joined in but should have been namely Emma Lowe Marshall, Stephen Marshall and Lawrence Ratcliffe.  

5.	I am conscious of the fact that this is far from ideal and may well significantly compromise the finality of this judgment. It may for example be the case that I find that the Bankrupt may have had the sole proprietary interest in a particular item and that the Third Respondent had none. That would however not prevent her sister, Emma Lowe Marshall from asserting that she owns that item and that thus it does not form part of the Bankrupt’s estate.  As I made clear, the fact that she appears as a witness cannot in my view provide a basis for a court to determine the extent of her ownership in an item.  As a witness she has no opportunity to question witnesses as she would have if the question of determination of interests were dealt with as one would have expected, viz where every putative owner is a party.  

6.	In his final submissions Mr Cochran, counsel for all the Respondents draws attention to the ramifications that findings about the Bankrupt’s interest in various items may have on Non Party witnesses.  I had hoped that my observations in court and the steer I gave as to what a recital to the order must contain to protect the rights of Non Party witnesses would have met any concerns in so far as it was possible to do so without losing the hearing, an eventuality that the parties did not want. I trust that paragraph 5 above makes it clear what the position is. 

7.	Lest it be thought otherwise, I appreciate that this may lead to inconsistent determinations.  In the example I quote above, as a result of this hearing the bankrupt may be found to own an item (which therefore vests in his Trustee) and the Third Respondent does not yet in subsequent proceedings it may be found that he does not own the item and it is owned by Mrs Lowe Marshall. That is unfortunate but if that is how the evidence pans out as a result of questioning of the witnesses on behalf of Mrs Lowe Marshall then that is how it pans out. In that event the later determination must take precedence in so far as it affects those who are not respondents to this application because that is the one reached in circumstances where the person asserting ownership is actually a party.       

Second Concern

8.	A second significant concern about this case is related to the number of items about which the court is asked to make a determination. The schedule initially contained 213 items, some of which are generic for example item 144 is “assorted electrical hand tools” which description itself actually encompasses a variety of individual tools some apparently owned by different people.  Even in its abridged form the schedule runs to 102 items not including subcategories. 

9.	The parties appear to have envisaged that this could be dealt with in 2 days when, as it turns out, there appears (subject to some exceptions) to have been no easy way of categorising items by identifying say a sample item where a determination about that would apply equally to others in the same category.  The effect is that the written closing submissions from Mr Passfield, counsel for the Trustee run to 35 pages of which 20 relate to submissions on the items by reference to the schedule while those of Mr Cochran run to 63 pages of which 41 relate to submissions on each item.

10.	The fact is that no time at all was devoted by counsel in the course of questioning the parties to many of the items about which a determination is expected and only a cursory amount of time was spent on others. The point is made by Mr Cochran in paragraph 18 of his closing submissions that the

 “Court has simply not had adequate time to deal with each item properly at the hearing” 

and, at paragraph 19 that; 

“(the process) is a wholly inadequate basis for what the applicant requests: in effect summary judgment against the Respondents’ property rights”.

11.	Nevertheless, no application was made by Mr Cochran either at the outset of the case nor during it for an adjournment, even an adjournment part heard and indeed at the conclusion of the evidence he was as clear as Mr Passfield that ideally he expected the Court to make a determination on each item. Both counsel may have gleaned that their expectation that every item would be dealt with was met by me with some surprise, hence my observation to both counsel that if they expected that then I would expect the closing submissions to address each item.

Third Concern

12.	A third area of concern arises from Mr Cochran’s observations in paragraph 45 to 47 of his closing submissions. I have referred above to his concern that the court has had insufficient time to deal with this matter justly. At paragraph 45 to 47 he suggests that the respondents have not had enough time either.  It is helpful to reproduce what he says 

“45. As noted earlier, the Respondents have been severely disadvantaged by the manner in which this application has been conducted.  The Respondents have conducted a considerable amount of this litigation without the benefit of legal advisers and have only had the services of Counsel for the present hearing.

46.  By the order of HHJ Raeside QC on 5 March 2015, the Respondents had until 31 March 2015 to file and serve evidence from any party asserting a right in the Taken Items or the Inventoried Items.  When the order was made, the Respondents and the Non-Party Witnesses faced a schedule of over 180 items to tackle and a limited amount of time to provide their evidence accordingly.  It was only on the afternoon prior to the hearing, long after their evidence was due in, that the Applicant decided to reduce the scope of his enquiry.

47.  The result of this has been that the Respondents have had limited time to bring forward evidence of ownership of the goods in question- the task facing them on 5 March 2015 was truly enormous.  It is no great surprise that the Respondents have not provided more receipts, particularly when many of the goods in question are of modest value and are years- or even decades- old.  Notably, despite having full access to the Respondents’ documents and electronic records and extensive resources, the Applicant has also provided a paucity of invoices and receipts to demonstrate their case that the First Respondent (and consequently the Trustee in bankruptcy’s) owned the goods in question.

13.	I feel constrained to remark once again that at no time was I presented with an application to adjourn because the manner in which the application had been conducted by the Applicant or his advisers had caused insuperable difficulties for the Respondents.  As I remarked in paragraph 4 above, the impression I derived was that indeed I should hear the case notwithstanding my concerns about the absence as parties of relevant players in it.

Fourth Concern

14.	The fourth area of unease about this case, raised initially at the beginning of the case was that it came before me when no effort had been made to value the items on the schedule.  I am aware that ownership is not dependent on value and that there is no rule that states that items of less than a certain value do not vest in the Trustee on his appointment.  Nevertheless it is most surprising that no effort has been made to ascertain what this argument is worth if for no other reason than that it may have helped to pare down the schedule even more, even if it had not disposed of the litigation altogether.  

15.	The Trustee argued that no valuation had been undertaken because he has no funds to commission one because there have to date been no realisations. In fact however he confirmed that to date the expenses of the bankruptcy are about £0.5m. One might have thought that the cost of a valuation in these circumstances is a drop in what seems to be an ever-expanding ocean. I observe that the Trustee’s evidence about this matter filed in support of his application is his 17th witness statement in this bankruptcy. I appreciate that the Trustee’s position is that the bankrupt has consistently been evasive, dishonest and obstructive and it is this that has given rise to the need for numerous applications and an inability to deal with matters without recourse to the Court. Nevertheless, in my view there ought at the very least to have been a valuation of the items.  Its absence is a highly regrettable omission.

 Fifth Concern

16.	There is a fifth area of unease. Mr Passfield asserts that there is a presumption that the items on the schedule belong to the Bankrupt because the four that have been taken away by the Trustee and those that remain at Springwood Hall or Lower Grange are or were, before removal, situated in one or other of those properties and he is the sole proprietor of those properties. 

17.	He cites South Staffordshire Water Company v Sharman [1896] 2 QB 44 and Re Cohen [1953] Ch 88 as authority for the proposition that there is a presumption that chattels on premises belong to the owner of the premises. His position therefore, repeated in paragraph 11 of his closing submissions, is that

 “where any other person claims a proprietary interest in any of those items the burden is on that person to rebut that presumption”

18.	On the basis of paragraph 10 of his closing submissions, Mr Passfield is under the impression that Mr Cochran accepts that that presumption is applicable in this case and that accordingly the Trustee need prove nothing other than that the items were in the Bankrupt’s home (or Lower Grange) at which point the burden shifts to the other members of the family to prove their ownership. In fact it is clear that Mr Cochran’s position is that South Staffordshire and Re Cohen are of no great assistance in this case.

19.	In South Staffordshire the question was whether 2 gold rings obviously lost by an unidentified third party on land belonging to the Water Company were owned by the finder of the rings or the Water Company.  The court held they belonged to the water company as owner of the land.  

20.	In Re Cohen bundles of money had been secreted away in the home of Mr and Mrs Cohen. Mr Cohen died. The home passed to his wife. Ultimately she died and the money was found. In whose estate did the money repose? The husband’s or the wife’s? The court held that it must belong to the wife’s estate because the property in which it was found was hers.  It was a decision that the court reached with obvious reluctance.  At page 94 Vaisey J said:

Nobody can say, as between the husband and the wife, to which of them the lawful possession must be attributed; and it is suggested and submitted that the principle which I have indicated, which depends, I think, largely upon the authority of the South Staffordshire case, strange though it may appear and slight as may be the straw which has to be grasped by the swimmer in this sea of ambiguity, must determine the issue in the matter, as there is nothing better to depend on.

I adopt this principle with reluctance, because it seems to be a somewhat inhuman way of approaching the problem… As I have said, we know nothing of the facts; (my emphasis) but, in any case, the notes were in the flat when the wife died; and if they were placed there in the husband’s lifetime then they were placed by one of two spouses on and in the property which belonged to one of them; and I think that I must decide that these notes and coin were the property not of the husband but of the wife.

21.	Mr Cochran distinguishes both these cases from the instant case. In South Staffordshire it was a question of who had better title between a finder and a landowner and in Re Cohen the court was forced into adopting the principle because the court “knew nothing of the facts” and could not discern them because both protagonists were dead.  He argues that it is far removed from this case where the court is in a position to discern the facts.  Accordingly, at paragraph 70 of his final submissions Mr Cochran submits that: 

The Court must determine for each item whether the Applicant or the Respondents have produced the better evidence to establish the identity of the true owner; the Court will not need to fall back on a presumption based on the ownership of the Property”

22.	He also raises a further point in his closing submissions, not raised earlier so far as I have recorded, to the effect that even if, contrary to his primary position, there is a very weak presumption, as he describes it in paragraph 69, then it can only be of relevance in respect of the items in the properties owned by the Bankrupt at the date of his bankruptcy on 13 November 2013 and not at the date that the Trustee searched the property and found the scheduled items in it, namely 21 January 2015.  

23.	It is a matter of concern to me that counsel may, as it turns out, therefore have been approaching this matter at cross purposes in that Mr Passfield has been under the impression that, as regards those items that were not discussed in evidence in any detail then, by virtue of the presumption, the Trustee is entitled to a declaration that these were the Bankrupt’s immediately before his bankruptcy and so vest in the Trustee whereas Mr Cochran’s position is that there is no basis for making such a declaration where no evidence has been adduced to suggest that the particular item in question actually belongs to the Bankrupt and/or it has not been established that the items were in the Bankrupt’s property at the date of his bankruptcy.

24.	Let me say about the presumption that I see much merit in Mr Cochran’s observations that South Staffordshire and Re Cohen are of minimal relevance.  The circumstances of both these cases are very distant from the circumstances of this. 

25.	I find it hard to accept that for example where a family live in a house owned by say the father there is a presumption that everything in it is owned by him. I appreciate the argument that Mr Passfield makes that it is an easily rebuttable one so for example, the presumption that he is the owner of his wife’s wardrobe of clothes is readily rebutted by the fact of the nature of the clothes.  I also appreciate that in this case many of those who assert an interest do not actually live in the house. However, there are other scenarios which are less obvious in respect of which such a presumption could lead to injustice.  If A lends a valuable book to B who refuses to return it is it open to B to say that the very fact that it is at his house gives rise to a presumption that it is his? I apprehend the court would be exclusively concerned with the evidence about the provenance of the book, why it might have been lent etc and would decide the matter on the evidence rather than falling back at all on such a presumption.  

26.	In any event, even if I am wrong and there is such a presumption in this case I have concluded that it is indeed a very weak one and that the question of ownership in such circumstances as this is, as Mr Cochran suggests at paragraph 70 of his closing submissions, dependent on whether the Applicant or the Respondent have produced the better evidence to establish the identity of the true owner.

27.	However having said that I acknowledge that Mr Passfield may have felt that he had no need to offer more than a brief justification for the presumption if he felt that that was common ground. He will, no doubt, make such representations as he feels appropriate (and proportionate) before this judgment is handed down if he takes the view that the interests of the Applicant have been materially compromised by his possibly misplaced belief that the presumption was common ground.   A close analysis of the conclusions I reach may, I hope, cause him to conclude that such representations need not be made. 

28.	Finally, having drawn attention to the many areas of this case which I find unsatisfactory I should at least give credit for the fact that the Trustee has endeavoured in the schedule to identify the parties’ respective positions in respect of each relevant item even though in a great many cases that position was not tested by questioning.

The Background

29.	I do not intend to dwell on the background because it is set out at length in Mr Passfield’s skeleton argument. Briefly, the bankruptcy order was made against the bankrupt on 11 November 2013 on his own petition.  I am not clear what the deficiency is as regards creditors but it appears that HMRC seek to prove for over £2.67m and there are significant other creditors.  The Bankrupt asserts that there are no material assets.  

30.	The Trustee was appointed at a creditors’ meeting at which the creditors who were members of the Bankrupt’s family voted for an Insolvency Practitioner other than the Applicant and the Applicant was appointed by virtue of votes of unassociated creditors. Since then the administration of the bankruptcy has been dogged with application and counter application including an unsuccessful one by the Bankrupt for the removal of the Trustee.  

31.	This application is only the most recent and stems from an application by the Trustee for permission to enter the Bankrupt’s home and make an inventory of the contents and take possession of books and records. The inventory forms the basis of the schedule about which I am concerned.

32.	The bankrupt has been involved in insolvency proceedings in the past.  He has been disqualified as a director, he has previously been adjudicated bankrupt and so is a second time bankrupt.  In Re Heating Electrical Lighting and Piping Ltd [2012] EWHC 3764 HH Judge Langan QC held that Mr Lowe had a

 “determination not to cooperate with (the Trustee) as liquidator and manifests an intention to resist such proper enquiries and claims as (the Trustee) might feel bound to make in carrying out his duties”.  

In the same judgment he found that Mr Lowe did 

“everything in his power to delay, block, drag out or frustrate” (the Trustee’s claims)”.  

The liquidator in that case was Mr Wood, the Applicant in this application. 

33.	The Trustee argues that the Bankrupt has brought the same mindset to his dealing with the Trustee in this bankruptcy and that he has been obstructive, dishonest, contentious and uncooperative.  He contends that in the circumstances it is appropriate to treat the Bankrupt’s evidence with some scepticism.  

The Law

34.	I have already considered the effect of South Staffordshire and Re Cohen. I turn to other principles which are germane to this application.

35.	The starting point is s283(1) Insolvency Act 1986 which defines the bankrupt’s estate as 

“all property belonging to the Bankrupt at the commencement of the bankruptcy”. 

36.	However, by s283(2) there is excluded from the definition 

“such tools, books, vehicles and other items of equipment as are necessary to the Bankrupt for use personally by him in his employment, business or vocation”

and

“any clothing, bedding, furniture household equipment and provisions as are necessary for satisfying the basic domestic needs of the bankrupt and his family.

37.	In the context of the first exception to the general rule namely tools etc of the trade, Mr Cochran argues that certain items on the schedule meet that definition in any event.  It is argued that until his bankruptcy the bankrupt was a director of Capital Design Build Ltd (CDB) and actively participated in construction work as well as being involved in management. He would wish to continue to use tools in connection with his employment, business or vocation in the future, when his health permits.

38.	In the context of the second exception, Mr Passfield draws my attention to the use of the word “basic” in the context of clothing etc.  His argument is that property which may satisfy reasonable needs is not excluded. The test is whether it satisfies basic needs.

39.	Re Bishop (Deceased) [1965] Ch 450 is authority for the proposition that the mere fact that something is purchased from a joint account does not mean that an item purchased is owned jointly by the account holders.  If a joint account holder draws on the account to purchase a chattel for his own benefit the chattel belongs to him solely.  If however one of two spouses draws on the account to make a purchase in joint names the chattel belongs to them jointly.

40.	Mr Passfield prays this authority in aid of his contention that in so far as any of the scheduled chattels may have been purchased by the bankrupt out of a joint account that in itself would make no difference to the ownership as long as the court was satisfied that he purchased it for his own benefit.  Mr Cochran questions the relevance of the case because there was in fact no evidence from which a conclusion can be formed as to whether any scheduled items were purchased via a joint account or not.

41.	Possibly of more relevance in this case is the law relating to the manner in which ownership is acquired by gift. It is common ground that there must be an intention on the part of the donor to make the gift but there must also be delivery of the gift to the donee.

42.	In Re Cole [1964] Ch 175 Harman LJ suggested that: 

“the English law of transfer of property, dominated as it has always been by the doctrine of consideration, has always been chary of the recognition of gifts”.

43.	In Bridge on Law of Personal Property First edition paragraph 8-25 it is suggested that the courts have required clear evidence of sufficient delivery of control from donor to donee.  In Re Cole itself for example (which was a case in which the court was required to determine issues of ownership between a bankrupt and his wife) the Court did not recognise a gift of the contents of a house even though it accepted that the donor had said to the donee that it was “all yours”.  The Court held that there had been no unequivocal act of delivery. In the same paragraph the editors of that work suggest that “judicial scepticism may be especially marked in cases where the donor has subsequently become bankrupt and the alleged gift is challenged by the Trustee in bankruptcy” 

44.	Mr Cochran points out that the courts are flexible as to what constitutes an act of delivery. He cites Thomas v Times Book Club Co Ltd [1966] 1WLR 911.  That concerned the ownership of an original manuscript of Under Milk Wood. Dylan Thomas told a Mr Cleverdon that he could keep the manuscript if he could find it and suggested a number of public houses where he (Thomas) may have left it. Mr Cleverdon trawled the said establishments and found the manuscript.  Following Thomas’s death his executrix denied that the manuscript was gifted to Mr Cleverdon. One of the arguments she marshalled in support of that contention was that there had been no delivery. The court did not agree.  The fact that Mr Cleverdon had obtained possession from the place where Thomas said he may have left it and had obtained that possession with Thomas’s consent was a sufficient delivery to perfect the gift. 

45.	Where the goods are too bulky for actual delivery then symbolical delivery is sufficient. Equally where the intended donee is already in possession of them than a declaration that they are gifted is sufficient. Re Stoneham [1919] 1 Ch 149 is authority for that principle but of course it must be considered in the light of Re Cole where handling some of the contents in the presence of the purported donor fell short of even symbolic delivery because I think there was no evidence of transference of control.

The witnesses

46.	I have heard from 4 witnesses for the Applicant namely the Applicant himself, Keith Tordoff, Gloria Tordoff and Alexander Tordoff.  I have heard from all three respondents and, on their behalf, from Emma Lowe Marshall and Stephen Marshall.  All have filed witness statements, as has Mr Lawrence Ratcliffe who is of very advanced years and did not give oral evidence.  I propose to make some general observations on the evidence.

The Applicant

47.	His written evidence touching on the issues with which I am concerned is at Volume 1 page 31 and Volume 4 page 969 of the trial bundle.  Of course he is not in a position to give direct evidence of ownership of the scheduled items. He simply points out some inconsistencies in the evidence put forward from time to time by the respondents as to who owns some of the items and comments on some of the paperwork that touches upon the scheduled items.  In that connection however it is one of Mr Cochran’s points that the Applicant has had access to vast swathes of documentation by reason of previous applications yet has found none that gainsays the evidence of the respondents and their witnesses. 

48.	He accepts that in connection with the issue of ownership he is very reliant on the evidence of the Tordoff family.

Keith Tordoff

49.	He has filed 1 affidavit and a witness statement at 2/469 and 4/1143 respectively.  The essence of his evidence is that he and his wife were good friends of the Lowes and frequently visited Springwood Hall.  It is I think uncontroversial to say that relations between the Tordoffs and the Lowes have cooled to the extent that they are now glacial but even so Mr Tordoff volunteers at paragraph 32 of his first affidavit (2/477) that between May and December 2014 the Bankrupt was engaged in heavy construction and refurbishment work at a property owned by Mr Tordoff in Pateley Bridge.   This is relevant to the question of the “tools of the trade” exception.

50.	The aspect of Mr Tordoffs written evidence upon which reliance is placed by the Trustee is essentially that Mr Tordoff has seen many items on the schedule in the possession of the bankrupt and the bankrupt has indicated that he owned them.  It has to be said however that his written evidence was not specific as to when conversations were had in which he was told by the bankrupt that he owned various items. The picture painted by the written evidence was merely that he “regularly” told him.  

51.	His oral evidence however went much further at least in respect of some items. He spoke of attending at Springwood Hall for Christmas Dinner on Christmas Day 2013 and being given a tour of the Hall and its contents and that in connection with many of the items on the schedule, as and when they were brought to Mr Tordoff’s attention or Mr Tordoff commented on them the bankrupt actually said, in terms, in respect of the item being discussed, that he owned it.  Mr Tordoff’s evidence was that the bankrupt actually said in each case “I own it”.  Since his evidence was filed in connection with resolving the sole issue of who owns these goods it is surprising to say the least that such important evidence did not find its way into either of his statements.

Gloria Tordoff

52.	Mrs Tordoff stated that she accompanied her husband in this grand tour on Christmas Day 2013 and confirmed what her husband had said about the bankrupt’s declarations of ownership on that occasion.  Once again it is not evidence contained in her only affidavit at 2/537.  That of course is no less surprising than its omission from the written evidence of her husband. She suggested that it was not mentioned in her statement because “it was not mentioned to us (that it should be)”. It was not a convincing reason.

Alexander Tordoff

53.	As Mr Cochran points out, Alexander Tordoff’s written evidence at 2/519 is directed more to the existence of the items in Springwood Hall rather than questions of ownership albeit that his affidavit does speak of the Bankrupt telling him for example that the Beatles memorabilia that forms items 1-4 on the schedule and is currently held by the Trustee was part of “his” collection, as indeed were some of the items on the schedule that are currently still in the Hall.  His affidavit suggests that his view that the Bankrupt owned these items was greatly influenced by the bankrupt’s use of the possessive pronoun (my) when discussing them with Alexander Tordoff.

54.	He was candid in his oral evidence that he had never been told expressly by the bankrupt that he owned any item and he was not at the Christmas dinner where the bankrupt apparently made that clear to Mr and Mrs Tordoff.

Overview of the evidence of the Tordoffs

55.	I simply do not accept that it is likely that a host showing anybody round his home would expressly specify that the proprietary interest vests in him in respect of items that are under discussion– however big a braggart that host was. Mr Cochran suggests in paragraph 35 of his closing submissions that it is “absurd to imagine a host punctuating his descriptions (of items of interest in his home) with the words “and I own it”. I agree and the fact that this evidence does not appear in the written evidence is yet a further impediment to its credibility.  

56.	So too is the fact that this supposedly compelling evidence evolved in oral evidence especially in the evidence of Mr Tordoff.  Initially Mr Tordoff was more eager to explain that the Bankrupt had made it clear that his children were not interested in for example the Beatles memorabilia and that he hoped the youngest generation of the family would be more interested.  He suggested that this was evidence that the bankrupt saw himself as the owner.  Thereafter he said that the fact that the Bankrupt obviously took a great deal of interest in these items was evidence of his ownership. Then he argued that the Bankrupt’s use of the possessive pronoun was telling before then asserting that there had been various declarations of ownership from time to time until finally he dropped in this evidence that the bankrupt had, on that Christmas Day, unequivocally asserted ownership.

57.	I therefore reject that evidence in its entirety other than that I accept that it is feasible and indeed likely that Mr and Mrs Tordoff will have been shown these items during their visits with a view to admiring them. I fundamentally disagree with Mr Passfield who says at paragraph 15(a) of his final submissions that the evidence that Mr Lowe explicitly expressed ownership of these items has the ring of truth. In my view, the way that it emerged, the fact that it was not presaged in the written evidence and the evidence itself chimes for the opposite conclusion.  

58.	It has to be said that this conclusion causes me to regard the evidence of Mr and Mrs Tordoff as unreliable generally as well as with regard to specifics.  I emphasise that is not the view I formed of Alexander Tordoff.  His evidence was far more measured and he was prepared to concede that the Bankrupt had never said he owned items, it was merely a case of Alexander forming that view by implication from the use of the words “my” or “mine”.  I accept that evidence but in my view it takes the matter no further. I read nothing into the fact that the bankrupt may have preceded a reference to some items by the use of the possessive pronoun anymore than I would take a reference to somebody referring to “my bus” or “my local shop” as meaning that they own the bus or the local shop.

Keith Lowe

59.	Of the 4 witness statements to which I was referred it seems to me that that at 3/851 is the most relevant since it is this that focuses on the itemised schedule and equally relevant is a Response to Inventory to be found at 4/988.

60.	In his examination in chief the bankrupt contended that while he was now unemployed he had until last year actively been engaged in construction both physically as well as from a management perspective.

61.	Mr Passfield took Mr Lowe to an examination conducted on 24 April 2015 before District Judge Shepherd, a matter of days therefore before this application.  He drew attention to a number of occasions in that examination when Mr Lowe had been unable to recall information about events in the quite recent past but apparently remembered with clarity events surrounding the gifting of items many years earlier to members of his family.  The Bankrupt’s response was that mentally he was not in a good place on 24 April.

62.	Mr Passfield also drew attention to inconsistencies in evidence in particular that initially it had been thought, indeed by all the Lowe family who have given evidence on this, that item 2 on the schedule of items taken namely the montage of the Beatles and the guitar signed by Paul McCartney belonged to Mr and Mrs Lowe whereas in fact the oral evidence was that it belonged to Joanna Lowe, the third Respondent having been gifted to her in 2007.  The signed John Lennon print and gold disc described as item 1 on the schedule of items taken was in fact the item owned by Mr and Mrs Lowe, it had been purchased in the USA when they were there with their daughter Joanna.

63.	Neither however had been declared by the bankrupt to the Official Receiver on the bankruptcy whether it was the one in which the bankrupt actually had an interest according to him (item (1) or the one in which he initially thought he had an interest (item 2). It is the case that both these items together with others are offered for sale for $160,000 in April 2014.  In August 2014 in response to questions from the Trustee the bankrupt actually said in terms that he had no Beatles memorabilia of any value.  This is within 4 months of his seeking to sell memorabilia in which even he accepts he had an interest for $160,000.  His evidence is that while he accepts he owns some of the memorabilia it is of minimal value because the signatures that would have given it a value of $160,000 are not genuine. He argues that that was not known in April 2014 when he was offering the items for $160,000 but was by August when he replied to the Trustee’s questions because Bonhams had broken this news to him by email in May 2014.  It is difficult to see how this helps him. In December 2013 on his bankruptcy when he was obliged to disclose assets to the Official Receiver he was obviously under the impression that the memorabilia in which he now concedes he had an interest was of significant value yet it was not disclosed. I remind myself that when it was put to him that he did not disclose these items to the Official Receiver in 2013 he said it was because he did not own them.  It is now his evidence that he clearly owned some of the memorabilia.

64.	On 10 February 2014 he is seeking to sell a movie script for A Hard Days Night.  He describes it in an email as an item “I am selling” and “a very, very rare item indeed with absolute provenance”.  He now says that Mr Marshall, his son in law owns it even though he accepts that he (the Bankrupt) may have bought it.  On 11 March 2014 he appears to offer this item to a different trader, here he says that the collection is “my family’s” and he says that “for tax reasons” and that he has “several items in storage”.  This latter representation he dismisses now as “gilding the lily” to use his expression.

65.	In an article in the local press in December 2012 he actually talks to the press about his collection of Beatle memorabilia.  He had apparently lent his collection to a dental surgery for whom CDB worked as part of a campaign about cancer awareness.  He passes this off merely as poetic licence. 

66.	In his witness statement he states that a piano (item 1 of the retained items) is owned by Joanna and was gifted to her by himself and Mrs Lowe in 2007.  In his oral evidence in chief he corrected that and said that it was given to Joanna and Emma jointly in the 1980s.  Emma said that it had been adorned with a bow, in effect a symbolic wrapping to show it was a present. 

67.	In the Response to Inventory he says of item 13 (a Singing Towers jukebox) that it belongs to Mrs Lowe, himself and Lawrence Ratcliffe and that item 25 (a Wurlitzer 850 Jukebox) belongs to Mrs Lowe and Joanna Lowe.  This is not the evidence in his witness statement at page 3/853 and 854.  In that statement Mrs Lowe is the sole owner of item 13 and Joanna owns item 25.   

68.	Mr Passfield argues that this is an example of the unreliability of the bankrupt and that he trips himself up with his own web of deceit.  Mr Cochran argues that all it demonstrates is a person trying hard at short notice, under pressure and without papers that may have assisted to make sure that his evidence is right and the court is not inadvertently misled.  

69.	On 13 April 2014 the bankrupt sent an email to a Dave Fleming in which he says 

“I have a few jukeboxes for sale.  One is a very nice 850 all original….”

70.	He says that he was selling this for Joanna to whom it had been given in 2002/3 and evidence of the delivery to her was that a ribbon had been tied round it - to show it was a present to her.  It is surprising that if he remembers tying a ribbon around this jukebox to signify that it was a gift to Joanna he made the initial mistake of thinking that Mrs Lowe had a continuing interest in it. In addition the similarity and convenience of this symbolic wrapping and that of the piano cannot be overlooked.

 Anne Lowe

71.	Her evidence was that many of the items in dispute were purchased by her but it was difficult to see where she derived the funds to do so.  Other than a 4 year period between 2002 and 2006 when she says that she earned about £30,000 per year working “in administration” for a property company in which Mr Lowe had an interest, it appears that her sources of income were sporadic and not overly significant.

72.	She agreed in her evidence that she had had an input into the preparation of the Response to Inventory but in various respects it does not accord with her witness statement of 30 March 2015.  Mr Cochran contends that that is because further thought about matters led to the view that the Response to Inventory may inadvertently contain errors which Mrs Lowe, in common with her husband and the rest of the family, had no wish to perpetuate.

73.	There are emails to which reference was made in the evidence which relate to items in dispute, in particular the Beatles memorabilia which are purportedly sent by her to various traders.  They emanate however from her husband’s email account.  She acknowledged that he may well have had a significant hand in drafting them. Albeit that she purported to have a proprietary interest in this memorabilia she admitted that her husband may well not have discussed with her the sale of the memorabilia (which included that to which she was entitled) for $160,000.

74.	She contended that she herself was the owner of a great many of the tools and plant including commercial vehicles that figure on the schedule of items in issue and that she uses them, in other words that she gets her hands dirty in looking after the Hall and the farm attached to it.

Emma Lowe Marshall

75.	The bankrupt and Mrs Lowe are her parents.  She explained that the family tend to regard possessions as belonging to them all, essentially “what is mine is yours and what is yours is mine”. That was the philosophy by which the family broadly operated.  In answer to Mr Passfield however she did accept that her parents could sell items but would have hoped that that would have been after a family consultation.  In answer to a question from Mr Cochran in re-examination however she felt that if an item such as those in the schedule were to be sold she would expect her parents to approach her and her sister for permission.

76.	 Notwithstanding that, she was clear that the Piano (item 1 if the retained items) was given to her and her sister as a Christmas present in 1989. At that time Emma was having piano lessons and so could play but her sister could not.  She mentions that it was adorned with a bow to show that it was a gift. It still remains at Springwood Hall albeit that Emma has lived elsewhere since 2003 and indeed her sister Joanna is primarily based in Ireland as a student and has been since 2006.  She also contends that for example the Shooting Range (item 45) was gifted to her.

77.	There is an obvious tension between the declared communitarian philosophy that was apparently adopted by the family where everything is essentially treated as if it is owned by everybody and the giving of a gift which itself appears to recognise a proprietary interest as a prerequisite to the transfer of that interest.

78.	There is equally something of a tension in my view between this philosophy and the fact that when Emma Lowe Marshall proposed an IVA in 2011 the bankrupt was cited as a creditor to the tune of £188,600. That included money that she apparently owed him for rental of land, the cost of a holiday and the cost of renting a car.  Mrs Lowe Marshall was herself prepared to concede that it was surprising that her father would only lend her money and (apparently keep a clear record of what was lent) but adopt a communitarian approach to the chattels in the house.

Joanna Lowe

79.	It is interesting that Miss Lowe’s evidence is that item 2 on the list of items removed belongs to her.  It is not clear how this for example reconciles with Mrs Lowe Marshall’s description of this communitarian philosophy. This item (a montage of the Beatles and a signed guitar) was apparently on the wall at Springwood Hall and yet when it was gifted to her it was she says “physically passed to me” and she touched it to signify this change in ownership.

80.	 She said that item 25 (the Wurlitzer 850) was also gifted to her in about 2002 or 2003. She said that that was subject to the same symbolic delivery in that it was adorned with a ribbon and Mr Lowe formally gave it to her and she touched it to signify this change of ownership.

81.	Small items in which she asserts ownership have never been removed from the house and displayed in her accommodation in Ireland because apparently it is not usually permitted to hang anything on the walls of rented property in Ireland.

Stephen Marshall

82.	Much of his evidence focussed on the script for the film “A Hard Days Night” which I refer to at paragraph 64 above and which Mr Lowe said that he had gifted to Mr Marshall.  It does not figure in Mr Marshall’s witness statement at all. In his oral evidence he contends that Mr Lowe gave it to him to display in his games room at his (Mr Marshall’s) property but that he never took much notice of it nor much interest in it. 

83.	He gave it back to Mr Lowe to sell because he (Mr Lowe) was having money problems and his evidence was that he would have let him keep the money.  

84.	Other than this item, Mr Marshall’s brief evidence related to the ownership of some tools and revolved around the assertion that albeit Mrs Lowe may have bought many, he believed that some had been given to him or he had them on some kind of indefinite loan while others had been purchased by him from Anne Lowe who got them for him in the USA at his request and he had repaid her the cost.

Lawrence Ratcliffe

85.	Mr Ratclife did not give oral evidence because of his advanced years but his witness statement is at 3/967.  Mr Passfield does not necessarily accept the evidence but felt that it was disproportionate and inappropriate to put Mr Ratcliffe through the ordeal of giving evidence.  It is hearsay however and I must attach to it the weight I think appropriate taking into account the matters referred to in the Civil Evidence Act including that it has not been tested by cross examination.

Overall view of the evidence by and on behalf of the Respondents.

86.	Having heard Mr Lowe and taking a careful note of his replies I have to say that I did not find him to be any more impressive than Mr and Mrs Tordoff.  Indeed I am driven to take a similar view about his evidence to that expressed by HH Judge Langan QC to which I refer in paragraph 32 above.  It was, in my view, contradictory and where difficulties with it were drawn to his attention, his responses were unconvincing and obviously self serving. Notwithstanding the arguments made by Mr Cochran in paragraph 53 to 56 of his final submissions this evidence is, in my judgment, evidence that positively attracts the judicial scepticism that I refer to in paragraph 43 above.

87.	Mrs Lowe equally was not fundamentally convincing.  I agree with the observations of Mr Passfield at paragraph 15(d) of his closing submissions that she did indeed appear to be dominated by her husband not least because emails were clearly written by him from his email account but in her name. As regards for example the memorabilia, he was clearly the one who primarily enjoyed it and wanted to show it off to friends.  I was also unclear where her income derived from to make expensive purchases, at best she was earning no more than £30,000 per year for a 4 year period and yet she says that big purchases were made by her.

88.	I also found Miss Joanna Lowe less than convincing.  I simply do not accept that it is likely that parents and daughter would have gone through any exercise of symbolically making a transfer of ownership by this touching of the item to which she referred.  It is simply incredible and the clear implication to be drawn from the evidence is that Miss Lowe, an obviously educated person, is somehow conscious of the need for the court to be satisfied that there has at least been some symbolic delivery of a gift before it can, in law, be seen as perfected. 

89.	As for Mrs Lowe Marshall, as Mr Passfield acknowledges her evidence may be broadly more credible than that of her sister and parents but even so I have already pointed out the tensions revealed in her evidence between this apparent communitarian philosophy on the one hand and the conscious exercise in actually transferring ownership of specific items and indeed that philosophy against the commercial approach that Mr Lowe appears to have adopted to his daughter in other respects including proving in her IVA for the money given to her and her husband for  a holiday and car hire.

90.	Mr Marshall seems to me to have been quite straight forward in his evidence and the way he gave it and did not attempt to embellish this evidence at all in my view.  On the other hand, his evidence was brief and considerably less extensive in nature than that of the other members of the family.

91.	Against this background I now turn specifically to the schedule. I do so taking account of the legal principles enunciated earlier and the observation at paragraph 43 above that “judicial scepticism may be especially marked in cases where the donor has subsequently become bankrupt and the alleged gift is challenged by the Trustee in bankruptcy”. 

92.	I have attached to this judgment as Appendix 2 my findings in relation to the items in the schedule.  In reaching my conclusions I repeat the concerns that I have expressed above. 

APPENDIX 1

The attached schedule

APPENDIX 2

Findings in relation to the Schedule

Items Removed from Springwood Hall

Item 1,2 and 3 Beatles Memorabilia

First, the ownership of these items is asserted only by respondents to the claim and not by non parties.  Issues with regard to the rights of non parties therefore do not arise.

Having considered the evidence and notwithstanding my rejection of the evidence of Keith and Gloria Tordoff, I am satisfied that these belonged to Mr Lowe at the date of his bankruptcy and that accordingly they vest in the Applicant as his Trustee.

In reaching that conclusion I have had regard to the changing nature of the Respondents’ evidence summarised in Mr Passfield’s closing submissions at paragraphs 16 to 19.  I do recognise that genuine errors in recollection can occur and that in such circumstances correction of them should not be held against the witness. However the fact is that the changing nature of the evidence must undermine confidence in its final accuracy.  

However the changing nature of the evidence is by no means the pivotal reason for my conclusion.   I am satisfied that it was Mr Lowe who was the real Beatles fan and that it was he who predominantly had the wherewithal to make the purchases of these expensive items in order to build up a collection that was his and in which no doubt he took great pride – as evidenced by his willingness to interact with the media about it.

The emails that were written when a sale was contemplated including one of 11 March 2014 suggesting that these items were owned by others i.e “my family’s” and “for tax reasons” appear to me to be contrived and I am equally satisfied that he wrote these emails rather than his wife.  I note that they are written from an email address entitled keithanne@icloud.com. I recognise that as such it was an email account to which it may be presumed his wife had access but the fact is that the username at the head of the email is the Bankrupt’s and the email itself states that “Anne my wife will send the rest of the photos”.  This clearly suggests that he is the writer of the email.

In my view the fact that emails emanate from an account which includes Mrs Lowe’s name and is signed off as being from the Bankrupt and Mrs Lowe itself suggests that he was attempting to muddy waters. I cannot accept that Mrs Lowe would not have been able to operate her own email account if she was genuinely involved in these issues.  She had after all been an administrator in his business for 4 years until 2006 earning £30,000 year and she asserts the computer at 63a is hers.

Additionally the invoices for some of these items were addressed to Mr Lowe.  I am not prepared to accept that that is simply because, fortuitously, his access badge to the exhibition where they were bought was used and it could just as easily have been Mrs Lowe’s.  In any event she has produced no evidence that the invoice was paid by her.

As regards the contention that item 2 was gifted to Joanne Lowe, I do not accept that.  She may well have been present when it was purchased in the USA but I do not accept that subsequently an active decision was taken to give it to her.  It did after all remain exactly where it had been located before this alleged gift namely on a wall in Springwood Hall to form a conversation point for Mr Lowe and his guests.  

In any event, even if there was an intention to gift some of this memorabilia to Joanne Lowe I am satisfied that such a gift was not perfected.  The Beatles montage and the Paul McCartney guitar remained where they were.  In so far as it is suggested that symbolical transference is enough I simply do not accept that the artificial contrivance that Miss Lowe suggested whereby the item was touched to show the transference of ownership actually occurred or indeed, that even if it, did it would have been enough to transfer ownership.   

Nor do I think that Re Stoneham comes to the aid of the Respondents even if there was an intention to make a gift.  The headnote to that case makes it clear that the principle applies where the chattels in question have been delivered to the donee before the gift has been made and are in the donee’s possession when the gift is made.  That is not the case here.  I am satisfied that it cannot be said, even if words expressing a gift were used, (which I do not accept) that there was any transfer of control.  

Item 4  Rose Watch

The ownership of this item is not in dispute.  Mr Lowe accepts that it is his property albeit that it is of minimal value.

Items Retained at Springwood Hall

Item 1  Yamaha Disklavier

The respondents’ position is that this is owned by Joanna Lowe and Emma Lowe Marshall jointly. My remarks about this piano are subject to the general caveat in paragraph 5 above and that of course applies equally to any other item in which a non party asserts an interest.

Subject to that reservation I do not accept that the evidence before me supports the contention that title in this piano was transferred to Emma and Joanna in 1989. 

First, that was not originally Mr and Mrs Lowe’s contention. Originally in his questionnaire to the Official Receiver Mr Lowe said it was his.  Then Mrs Lowe later said it was Emma’s. Then still later Mr Lowe said it was Joanna’s.

In any event, it is difficult to see why a joint present of a piano should be given to the girls in any event when only Emma played it. In any event I do not accept her evidence that it was adorned with a bow, a detail that Emma remembers though she was only about 8 at the time (and does not figure in her written evidence) or that Mr and Mrs Lowe would give the girls a Christmas present that was in fact something they had the use of in any event or that Joanna in fact had no use for because she was not learning piano at that time and did not thereafter for many years.

Also, tellingly this piano has remained where it was even though the girls have been away from home for many years and Mr Lowe appears to use it as a pianola at least to amuse his friends. 

I do not overlook the written evidence of Mr Ratcliffe. It is not clear how he knows this was a Christmas gift.  He makes no reference to it being adorned with a bow for example.

I am satisfied on balance that this was simply a piano in the house for use by the girls particularly Emma and that Mr Lowes first response to the OR is likely to be the most accurate.  

Since it is no longer asserted that Mrs Lowe has an interest in the piano, that issue has become academic.

Items 3, 5-7, 9-10 and 12 Assorted Pottery 

I shall be corrected if I am wrong but these were not considered in the course of the oral evidence.

The written evidence of Mr and Mrs Lowe is that they belong to Mrs Lowe and there has been no evidence put to challenge that other than the contention that their evidence is intrinsically unreliable.

It strikes me however that it is not unlikely that pottery was an interest of Mrs Lowe’s just as Beatles Memorabilia was an interest of Mr Lowe’s and that in the same way that he bought items in pursuance of his interest she bought items in pursuance of hers. 

There would possibly be some illogicality in holding that Mr Lowe owned say the Beatles memorabilia because that was his interest but the pottery items in which Mrs Lowe had an interest were jointly owned.

In the absence of any evidence or even positive submissions by the applicant as to these items I am not prepared to hold that Mr Lowe had an interest that now vests in his Trustee.

Items 4, 13 and 25 Jukeboxes

It is now contended by the respondents that items 4 and 13 are owned by Mrs Lowe and item 25 by Joanna to whom it was gifted.  It is right to say that previous assertions of ownership have been different in that Mr Lowe and indeed Mr Ratcliffe had had an interest in item 13 and Mr Lowe an interest along with Joanna in item 25.

It is interesting to note that Mr Ratcliffe’s witness statement does not mention that he ever had a share in item 13 albeit that item 13 is mentioned. He merely asserts that it was gifted to Mrs Lowe but does not assert by whom.

The consistent evidence has been that Mrs Lowe bought item 4 for herself in Chicago in 1999 but there is no evidence in the form of any receipt to that effect. The Singing Towers Jukebox (item 13) was apparently given to Mrs Lowe presumably by Mr Lowe and Mr Ratcliffe.  There is no evidence as to what prompted this example of largesse or why or how Mr Ratcliffe acquired his interest in this item. 

The fact is that Mr Lowe has sent the email to which I refer in paragraph 69.  That email is signed by him and does not even purport to come from Mrs Lowe. This is a man who on other occasions and in respect of other items has been careful to give the impression that items he is selling are family items. An example of that is referred to in paragraph 64 above.

Furthermore, these items all remain at Springwood Hall.

Having considered the matter carefully I am satisfied that these jukeboxes were in the ownership of Mr Lowe at the time of his bankruptcy and that his email to that effect of April 2014 accurately reflects the position. As with the Beatles memorabilia I got the clear impression that this pop memorabilia was his hobby and obsession and that he will have bought these items and they remained his.

It follows therefore that I do not accept that item 25 was gifted to Joanna. I do not accept that it was given to her just because she liked it and that it was tied in a ribbon but even if I am wrong I am satisfied that any gift was not perfected by delivery – for the same reasons as I refer to in connection with the Beatles montage and the McCartney guitar. And for the same reasons as I refer to in that connection the case of Re Stoneham does not assist her.

Item 16 Automaton Wall Clock

It is contended that this was bought by Mr Lowe and gifted to Mrs Lowe after it was restored.

Mr Passfield reminds me in paragraph 46 of his closing of Mr Tordoff’s evidence about this and how Mr Lowe made it clear to him that he had always wanted one and he “owned it”.  If I accepted that evidence it would of course be compelling but I have already indicated that I do not accept that Mr Tordoff or Mrs Tordoff can be regarded as reliable in this connection.  So what other evidence is there as to ownership?

There is the evidence of Mr Lowe that he and his father in law restored it and gave it to Mrs Lowe saying “its yours”. There is no evidence from Mr Ratcliffe to that effect in his witness statement.  

I do not accept that evidence that it was specifically given to Mrs Lowe.  I have insufficient faith in the evidence of Mr and Mrs Lowe to believe that that is likely to be what happened and, as I have said, it is not expressly supported by Mr Ratcliffe who had the opportunity in his witness statement to comment on item 16 but failed to do so.

Having said that, even if I were satisfied that the item had been gifted to Mrs Lowe then I am not satisfied that the gift was perfected by delivery.  It never moved from the location it had occupied before the gift, there was no transference of control in my view and the principles in Re Stoneham are not engaged for the reasons already set out.

Item 17 Cutlery Set

This is clearly jointly owned by Mr and Mrs Lowe.  To that extent the Trustee has a 50% interest in the cutlery subject to any contention that it is caught by the second exemption in s283(2) IA 1986 about which I heard no evidence or submissions.  

Item 21, 22 and 29 Bracket Clock, Ewers and Candelabra  

The contention is that these belong to Mrs Lowe.  Both she and Mr Lowe were at pains in their written evidence to point out that they were purchased prior to 1996. Quite what the significance of 1996 is was not clear, even to Mrs Lowe.  

Nevertheless I cannot see that there is any basis to conclude that these were not purchased by her and belong to her.  If it is right to find that some items that have been in the house for many years continue to belong to Mr Lowe and therefore form part of the estate to which his Trustee is entitled it is right to recognise that Mrs Lowe too probably owned other items personally and there is no evidential basis for taking the view that these items do not fall into that category.

Item 26 Bronze Tiger

It is alleged that this was a present from Mr Lowe to Mrs Lowe in about 2002.

This is to be distinguished form items 21, 22 and 29 above because this was said to be a gift and so involves the transfer of ownership by Mr Lowe to Mrs Lowe.  It is therefore subject to the observations about “judicial scepticism” to which I refer in paragraph 43.

One might have expected some evidence as to the circumstances of the gift. Was it a birthday or Christmas present for example?  No such evidence has been forthcoming nor any in connection with how the gift was perfected.

On the other hand other items on the schedule which have allegedly come into the ownership of Mrs Lowe in the same way are not being pursued for example item 27.  That item is said by Mr Lowe to be of minimal value but he only attributes a value of £120 to this tiger. 

On balance therefore I find that there is simply insufficient evidence to find that this was not bought specifically for Mrs Lowe and is therefore hers.

Items 40-42, 48, 67 and 70 Miscellaneous Memorabilia, Bagatelle and Jukebox Charging Units 

The contention by the respondents and Emma Lowe Marshall is that these are owned by Mr and Mrs Lowe and their daughters jointly.  That is indeed the evidence of all those people.

Mr Passfield recognises in paragraph 55 of his final submissions that there is no clear evidence about ownership and that the court may be forced to fall back on the presumption that they belong to Mr Lowe because they are in the property of which he is the registered proprietor.

I have already observed that I think that that presumption has no or at best very little applicability here.  

At best therefore, on the basis of the evidence before me these are owned by 4 people and Mr Lowe’s interest in them amounts to a quarter of what might be and, on his evidence is, a small amount. 

I find therefore that that is the position and these items are owned 4 ways.  It is fortuitously fortunate that as it happens such a finding actually also has the benefit of not adjusting the rights of Emma as a third party.  Having said that I should make it clear that I base my decision on the fact that there is actually no evidential basis for gainsaying the respondents’ evidence other than that they are not wholly reliable.  On the other hand though, the Applicant does not assert that there is evidence which I can prefer and which disputes the respondents’ account. 

Items 43 – 44 Games Machines

The respondents say that Mrs Lowe owns these, Item 43 was a gift from her father and she herself purchased item 44.

It is not the evidence of Mr Ratcliffe in his witness statement that he gifted item 43.  That is significant in my view.  

As for item 44, Mrs Lowe produced an alleged receipt at 3/943 supporting her assertion that she bought that machine. It is a very unsatisfactory receipt in particular it gives no details of who sold it to her.

The failure of Mr Ratcliffe to substantiate the evidence that item 43 was a gift from him and the wholly unsatisfactory nature of the receipt, coupled with my concern about the reliability of the evidence of Mr and Mrs Lowe generally cause me to conclude that these are items that belonged to Mr Lowe and fall into his estate.

Items 45-47 Miscellaneous Items

These are asserted by the respondent to be owned by the daughters having been bought for them by Mr and Mrs Lowe as gifts.

Initially Mr Lowe’s position in the Response to further inventory was that the daughters and he and Mrs Lowe owned these jointly.

Of course once again, these items remain at Springwood Hall notwithstanding that that is not the home of Emma Lowe Marshall and only the home of Joanna Lowe on her vacations from University in Ireland. Some of these items appear to be quite portable and capable of being taken away by the daughters if that was their inclination.

There is also no evidence of the circumstances in which these items were gifted.  It is difficult to understand why Mr Lowe would ever have thought these items were owned 4 ways if the contention that they were a gift purchased for his daughters was true.  

In addition I find it odd that other items of miscellanea such as 40 -42 48, 67 and 70 are apparently said to be jointly owned but these apparently were specifically given to the daughters.

On balance therefore, taking everything into account I do not accept that they were gifted and that since it is not alleged that, like the items at 40-42, 48 67 and 70, they are owned by all 4 members of the family, they are more likely than not to have belonged to Mr Lowe at his bankruptcy.  This it appears to me is commensurate with his propensity to collect miscellanea particularly juke boxes and other items from or associated with the mid 20th century. 

Item 49 Sword

Mr Marshall asserts that this belongs to him. Because I did not have the same reservations about his evidence as I did with that of others I can find no proper basis for not accepting that.

Item 50 Lucille Ball signed photograph

This is said by the respondents to be Joanna’s.

It is still at Springwood Hall notwithstanding that it is portable but then again Joanna Lowe is in a house she shares with others.  I was given sufficient consistent detail with regard to this item to be satisfied that it belongs to Miss Lowe.

Items 57, 61, 66, 75, 103, 110 119, 120 Clocks, Table, Television Painting of Sir Winston Churchill

It is submitted that these are jointly owned by Mr and Mrs Lowe.  That appears to be an assertion from which the Applicant does not demur (see closing submissions paragraph 67). Accordingly I accept that to be the position and the Trustee therefore has an interest in one half of the value.

Item 58 Candelabras

Mrs Lowe says that this belongs to her I see no reason to treat this item differently to the candelabra at 29.  Accordingly it does not fall into Mr Lowe’s estate.

Item 63a Imac desktop computer and table.

These are said by the respondents to be Mrs Lowe’s having been purchased by her.  There is no documentary evidence to support such an assertion.  In the applicant’s witness statement he asks that authority be given to him to approach the Apple store to see if they can produce a receipt that would determine this issue.  That request has been unheeded.

I do not think that this item was specifically considered in oral evidence but Mr Lowe was asked in his private examination about such hardware purchased in 2011.

Mrs Lowe’s position is that this computer was purchased in 2013. This is a 2 year old second hand computer. On any view it is of minimal value.  As with other items, I am surprised not to say a little frustrated that it survives as a matter for determination especially when even the applicant recognises that a finding about it is his favour will require directions to deal with confidential or privileged information.  

As regards the table, merely because Mr Tordoff saw computers on tables at Springwood Hall being used by Mr Lowe is of no assistance in deciding whether Mrs Lowe has her own computer and her own computer table. I am not prepared to find that this particular computer and table was Mr Lowe’s at the time of his bankruptcy.

Items 64 and 65 Shooting Game and Pinball Machine

It is contended by the respondents that these items have been owned by Mrs Lowe Marshall and Joanna Lowe since prior to 1996.

Once again, it was not clear what the significance of 1996 was.  Once again these are items that are still at the Hall albeit that they are apparently owned by the daughters.

I have to say that I have difficulty in appreciating why this shooting game would be treated differently to item 45 or the pinball machine treated differently to other slot machines such as 43 and 44.  I concluded that those items belonged to Mr Lowe at his bankruptcy. I am satisfied that these did too.  They were in Springwood Hall and had been for years after the girls’ departure.  They were items of the sort that clearly Mr Lowe was interested in. In my view for the purpose of this hearing they fall into his estate but without prejudice to Emma Lowe Marshall asserting otherwise in proceedings in which she is actually a party.

Item 88 Gramophone

Asserted to be Mrs Lowe’s having been purchased as a gift in 2005.  There is no evidence upon which I can hold that Mr Lowe owns this.  It is not an item that naturally or obviously falls within the purview of Mr Lowe’s collection interests.  I decline to hold that this forms part of his estate.

Item 109 Air Rifle

It is acknowledged that this falls into the estate although, as with so many items, whether it is worth the bother is open to question.

Item 112 French Style Clock

This is asserted to be owned by Mrs Lowe having been purchased by her at a fair in 2007. Despite my caution about her evidence, I see no reason to doubt that, it appears to be an item of broadly the same nature as other items that I have found belong to her. 

Item 118 Elvis Guitar

This is asserted to belong to Mrs Lowe.  I do not accept that.  This is much more in the nature of the sort of collectables in which Mr Lowe was interested.  Accordingly I am satisfied that this was not purchased for Mrs Lowe but falls into Mr Lowe’s estate.  

Item 128, 131, 133, 187 Tools 

Mr Lowe does not dispute that he owns the tools in question but it is asserted on his behalf that they are exempt under s283(2) as tools of trade.

Mr Passfield in his final submissions at paragraphs 78 to 82 contends that they are not exempt because Mr Lowe no longer works with his hands.  However even the Applicant’s evidence suggests that he did so until recently.  In this connection I refer back to paragraph 49 above.

I do not think that the exemption ceases to apply because a bankrupt is unable to use the tools for a time due to ill health.  There is no evidence that Mr Lowe at some future date may not be able to use them.  The exemption is there so that a bankrupt is not deprived of earning power. It appears that Mr Lowe used them to that purpose as recently as December 2014 and I am not satisfied that it is unlikely that he will do so again.

Furthermore, even if I am wrong, subject to representations by counsel that may convince me otherwise, I do not see the exemption in s283(2) as requiring that the bankrupt himself physically uses the tools in any event. A bankrupt may for example set up a small business (as long as he is not a director or shadow director of a company and as long as he is aware of the restrictions on taking credit etc) in which the tools may be used by another.  They still provide the bankrupt with the facility to earn, which is the rationale of the exemption.

In my view these are exempt.

Item 129 Punch Bag

Mrs Lowe asserts in her written evidence that this is hers. It was not discussed in oral evidence.  It appears to have been acquired in July 2014, after the bankruptcy.  I am concerned with which items vested in the Trustee under s306 IA 1986.  I am not concerned with items acquired by the Bankrupt since the commencement of the bankruptcy.  That is a matter dealt with by s307. It is a matter for the Trustee as to whether he takes the view that it is appropriate to serve a s307 notice. 

Item 130 Tile Cutter

If this belongs to Mr Marshall, as alleged it is obviously excluded. If it belongs to Mr Lowe it is exempt under s283(2).  I imagine that such an item is in any event of minimal value and, like many items about which I am obliged to make a determination, I do not understand why this is not an item that has not been deleted from the schedule.

Item 132 Clarke Pillar Drill

Once again, if this is owned by Mr Lowe (which he denies) it is exempt as a tool of the trade.

Items 134 and 135 Cart and Metal Trolley

I do not know what these are. They did not figure in the oral evidence.  If they are tools or receptacles on which tools are carried to enable the tools to be used more efficiently then they are exempt.  If they are not then, for what they are likely to be worth, they are property which forms part of the bankrupts’s estate since they are conceded by Mr Lowe to belong to him.

Item 137 and 140 Ladders and Scaffolding

These are alleged to be owned by Mr Marshall and Mr Ratcliffe although what a 90 odd year old man wants with ladders and scaffolding is hard to contemplate. 

As I have said, I did not form an unfavourable impression of Mr Marshall and am inclined to accept his evidence unless its reliability is undermined by other evidence.  On that basis these items do not form part of the bankrupt’s estate but even if they did, they would be exempt in my view as tools of the trade.

Item 143f-g, 144, 185-186 Tools

For reasons set out above I am satisfied that the items that Mr Marshall states that he owns are his and do not form part of the bankrupt’s estate.  As for the rest, many of these appear to me to be the sort of items that somebody involved in the small scale construction industry may well own but here those not owned by Mr Marshall are alleged in the main to be owned by Mrs Lowe.

I have already indicated that I regard her evidence with caution but even if I disbelieve her and these are owned by the bankrupt then I am satisfied that many, if not all, are tools of the trade and exempt on that basis.

Unless I am persuaded by counsel that it is appropriate and proportionate to do so I decline to give further analysis to these items. I have no evidence but I imagine that they are not likely to be of sufficient value to have any meaningful effect on the dividend to creditors.  

I hold that they are not property falling into the bankrupt’s estate. 

I now turn to the ownership of a number of vehicles.  Despite the fact that, sadly, I do not have any valuations I appreciate that these are potentially valuable items.  The time devoted to them in court (if any) and I apprehend in the run up to the hearing was obviously affected by the fact that the breadth of the hearing was so enormous and included items which are unlikely to have much value at all and probably an infinitesimal effect on the outcome to creditors.  In my view that is regrettable. I refer to my observations in paragraph 8 to 11 above.

Item 147 Nissan Cabstar

It is asserted by Mr Lowe that this belongs jointly to himself and Mrs Lowe but that his interest in it is confined to 20% while hers is 80%.  That arises because it was acquired by a part exchange arrangement where the part exchange vehicle belonged to Mrs Lowe but the balance was paid from a joint account.  Mr Lowe does not assert that this item is exempt under s283(2).

Mrs Lowe confirmed that she did indeed own the part exchange vehicle but her oral evidence repeated the Response to Inventory in which it was said that that she was the sole owner. However, she accepted that the vehicle was used by Mr Lowe as well as herself.  

I am satisfied that on the principles in Re Bishop to which I refer at paragraph 39 above this is an asset owned by them jointly and equally.  Even if the deposit came from a vehicle owned by Mrs Lowe I am satisfied that the intention of both parties, evidenced by the fact that the balance was drawn out of a joint account, was that it should be jointly owned.   I appreciate that the mere fact that money comes from a joint account does not make the item bought with it a jointly owned item but this was an item used by both for family purposes, the obviously more likely conclusion is that they both saw it as a joint asset, equally owned and it was purchased on that basis irrespective of where the deposit came from.

50% of its value therefore falls into the bankrupt’s estate.

Item 148 Dumper/Tipper

Mrs Lowe asserts that this belongs to her having been purchased in 2003/2004.

There is no evidence to gainsay this and so I find that this falls outside the bankrupt’s estate. I have had regard to Mr Passfield’s comments at paragraph 98 of his closing submissions but do not feel able to come to a different conclusion merely because, 10 years after purchase, supporting documentation to show that Mrs Lowe purchased it has not been produced. 

Item 149 Mercedes Elegance 

It seems that Mr Lawrence Ratcliffe asserts that he owns this vehicle which was purchased with the benefit of finance taken by Mrs Lowe in 2009.  

The finance agreement and invoice have been produced and are in the court bundle from 3/945.  They are indeed in Mrs Lowe’s name. It is a pity that the vehicle registration document appears not to be available.  That is odd.

Mr Passfield however makes no observations about this item in his closing submissions.  There is sufficient evidence to conclude that this vehicle falls outside the bankrupt’s estate.

Item 150 Suzuki Swift

In fact this is academic for 2 reasons. First the vehicle registration document at 3/953 shows that it was acquired by Mrs Lowe in May 2014, after the bankruptcy.  It is therefore outside the ambit of this hearing which is not concerned with after acquired property.  Secondly, it has in any event been disposed of, the applicant says in breach of an undertaking. 

Item 160 Loading Shovel

Mrs Lowe states that this belongs to her having purchased it in 2009.  In fact the invoice at 3/956 is clearly in the name of K Lowe. This is clearly inconsistent with her evidence that she bought this shovel.  

It is reasonable to presume that the invoice accurately reflects the position unless evidence is produced to rebut that.  In this case that could have been say evidence that the balance of £6,282 came from her account or that the items given in part exchange were hers.  No such evidence, or indeed other evidence, has been forthcoming.  All I have is the oral evidence of Mrs Lowe which I treat with caution.

I find that this item does fall into the bankrupt’s estate.  It is not suggested that it is exempt under s283(2).

Items 161 Kawasaki Mule and 162 Mower

These are alleged to be owned by Mrs Lowe.  Her evidence is that she bought them in the USA out of the proceeds of sale of an American property which had been jointly owned by her and her husband.  On the sale of that property the money went into a joint account from which these items were purchased. Her evidence was however that it was purchased for her benefit and that thus is hers under the principles in Re Bishop.  She agrees that Mr Lowe was with her when they were purchased.

In summary her evidence is that she drew on an account in joint names in which had been placed funds from the sale of a jointly owned property to purchase items intended to be used on properties in which Mr Lowe had an interest and which were purchased in his presence and yet she intended that these items were for her own use and benefit and were purchased with “her share of the money” and not out of Mr Lowe’s share of the money.

I do not accept that as being credible.  I find that these are jointly owned items in which at the date of his bankruptcy Mr Lowe had a 50% share.

Item 164 Grass Cutter

In her written evidence Mrs Lowe asserts that this is hers, as does Mr Lowe.  In their witness statements both attach a copy of an invoice for the purchase of this item in June 2010.  The invoice shows EMC Ltd as the purchaser, there is no documentary evidence as to how ownership came to be transferred from EMC to Mrs Lowe or when or on what basis.

This is all too vague.  Assuming that the grass cutter is no longer owned by EMC and the question is whether it is owned by Mr Lowe or Mrs Lowe or both of them, I am satisfied that it is owned jointly by them.  It is a piece of gardening machinery and in my view there is no basis for treating the question of its ownership any differently to item 162.

Item 165 Tipping Trailer and 166 Ride on Mower

These were yet further items that were not specifically considered in the oral evidence.

In her written evidence Mrs Lowe says that she owns these items.  She said that she bought the trailer for cash on 27 April 2011. Both she and Mr Lowe produce a receipt from one MJ McNally but it does not identify the purchaser. As for the lawn mower there is no receipt but Mrs Lowe says she purchased it for cash.

I am assuming that the trailer is for use in the garden. If that assumption is misplaced I shall expect to be told that before judgment is handed down.

If it is not then it seems likely that these items are jointly owned in the same way as the other gardening equipment and they should be treated in the same way.  On that basis therefore the bankrupt has a 50% interest in them and they fall into his estate to that extent.

Item 170  6 Desk Chairs

Mr Passfield makes no comments on these at all in his final submissions and Mr Cochran’s are cursory.

Unsurprisingly they were not considered in oral evidence.  I feel unable to make any finding in relation to them.  Since essentially the applicant is seeking a declaration of ownership so that the property vests in him under s306 I am not able to make such a declaration. 

Item 178 Watch Brochures

Mr Cochran observes in his closing arguments that it is “truly remarkable that the Applicant contends that these have a substantial realisable value”.

When I am obliged to decide on the ownership of watch brochures it does cause me to wonder (and not for the first time) whether perhaps the wood is not being lost in the trees.  Nevertheless Mrs Lowe does not assert ownership of these. They are brochures for mens’ watches.  I think it likely that they belong to Mr Lowe and thus fall into his estate.

Item 181 Vinyl Records

Mr and Mrs Lowe and Mr Ratcliffe say these are owned by them all. 

Initially, in the Response to Inventory Mr Lowe contended that they were owned by those three and the daughters and Mr Marshall.

There is no suggestion that this is a valuable collection rather than just old records discarded when new technology comes out or when tastes change and consigned to the eaves (where apparently the Trustee found them).

There is a ring of credibility in the contention that each person’s collection of records may be discarded in such a way that they gather dust altogether in the eaves. I am prepared to accept therefore that all three own these jointly.  For reasons already articulated, it is not in my view appropriate to fall back on the assumption that because they are in a property owned by the bankrupt they must be presumed to be his.

Item 182 Memphis Scimitar Newspapers 

The contention is that these are jointly owned by the whole family including Mr Marshall and Mr Ratcliffe.  That is supported by the written evidence of Mr Ratcliffe and Mr Marshall. It was not however Mr Lowe’s original evidence in his Response to Inventory.  There he said that they were jointly owned by himself and his wife.

Mrs Lowe Marshall gave some evidence about how it came to be that the ownership was spread more thinly.  She said that Mr Lowe had dished out the newspapers to each person saying they could have one each. Of course Mr Lowe’s evidence is that he still has an interest in these newspapers along with the rest of his family.  That does not seem to me to reconcile with Mrs Lowe Marshall’s recollection of his distributing these to the family as an exercise in largesse. Furthermore, the fact is that albeit these are clearly very portable items they remain at the Hall at which the daughters and Mr Marshall do not reside. The implication being, if Mrs Lowe Marshall is right, that after being handed out they were then given back.

Mr Passfield suggests that this would mean that the gift was not perfected. I do not agree.  If an item is physically given to a donee as a gift and he then hands it back for safe keeping the gift in not negated.  There has been delivery of the gift, the donee has merely decided to commit the custody of what is now the donee’s property to the donor for safe keeping.

However, the fact is that Mr Marshall was not actually challenged about his assertion as to ownership when he was in the witness box. In the circumstances I am satisfied that the position is as he and Mr and Mrs Lowe and Mr Ratcliffe assert and that the bankrupt’s interest in these items is 1/6th.

Item 183 to 184  Empty Boxes 

I simply decline to make any finding about the ownership of empty boxes unless either counsel indicates prior to the handing down of judgment that it is necessary to do so to permit a proper administration of the bankrupt’s estate.

I note that Mr Passfield omits to bother with these in his closing submissions

Item 185 to 186 Tools

Mrs Lowe says she owns items 185 and 186. I decline to make a determination as to whether that is so. Even if they are owned by Mr Lowe they are exempt in my view pursuant to s283(2).

Item 188 and 189 Wooden Chests

Item 188, which was located in a bedroom in Springwood Hall, is said by Mr and Mrs Lowe to be jointly owned. I have no idea if it contains anything or is simply an empty wooden chest. 

As I understand it, I am expected to make a finding simply about the ownership of the chest itself. If that is so I see it as a piece of furniture in the home. In that sense it is more likely than not to be jointly owned and I so find.

As for item 189, Joanna Lowe seems to think that it is her old toy box while Mr Lowe thinks it was Emma Lowe Marshall’s old toy box. Both think that it was bought by Mr Ratcliffe but he fails to confirm that in his witness statement indeed he does not refer to this at all.

On this occasion I am prepared to accept that the discrepancy in the evidence of Joanna Lowe and Mr Lowe as to who owns it is explicable. The fact is that both recall it as a toy box belonging to one or other of the girls.  I accept that and find that it does not form part of the estate.

Item 193 Beatles signed picture

Nobody asserts ownership of this in their witness statements although in the Further Inventory it is said to be owned by Mrs Lowe or Mr Ratcliffe. Neither Mrs Lowe or Mr Ratcliffe assert that in their statements however.

I find in the circumstances and in the absence of any assertion of ownership by others that this belongs to Mr Lowe and such a finding is in keeping with the fact that he is obviously a collector of Beatles memorabilia.

Item 194 Signed Star Trek Memorabilia

Mr and Mrs Lowe say this is jointly owned. From paragraph 114 of his final submissions it does not appear that Mr Passfield suggests otherwise.

Accordingly I find that the bankrupt has a 50% interest. Whether that amounts to anything of value to the creditors is a different question.

Item 195 Harry Potter Movie Montage 

Joanna asserts ownership.  She says it was bought by her in 2007. She left Springwood in 2006 to go to Ireland albeit that she sees it as her English address to which she returns when not in college. Nevertheless it is surprising if this item was purchased by her for $1000 yet simply left for 7 years at Springwood Hall.  On the other hand, as I have remarked, she lives in shared accommodation in Ireland.

The invoice for the purchase is not in her name. Her evidence was that she transferred the $1000 to her parents but there is no evidence of that. One would have thought that if there was a transfer from one bank account to another that a record could be produced or alternatively some explanation would be forthcoming as to why that was not possible.

I must consider this against the fact that Mr Lowe was clearly an avid collector of memorabilia and that I have my concerns about the reliance that I can place on Miss Lowe’s evidence.

On balance I find that this is an item owned not by Joanna Lowe but by Mr Lowe. If it were otherwise I would have expected to see evidence of the transfer of $1000 into Mr Lowe’s account or alternatively, at the very least, some indication from the bank that such evidence is no longer available.

Item 196 Picture

In the initial Response to Inventory Mr Lowe said that this belonged to himself and Mrs Lowe. In her witness statement Mrs Lowe said the same.  In his statement however Mr Lowe contends that it is owned by a dealer and is merely on loan.

There is no evidence from this dealer or why Mrs Lowe or indeed originally Mr Lowe should have been wrong to initially assert that they owned it. 

In the absence of any evidence form a dealer that he/she owns this picture and in the light of my view as to the reliability of Mr and Mrs Lowe as witnesses I am satisfied that it is jointly owned and that 50% falls into the bankrupt’s estate.

Item 197 Albert Einstein signed picture

It is asserted by Mrs Lowe that she owns this.  

It was purchased at the same time that the Harry Potter montage was bought.  The invoice refers to Keith Lowe.  I see no reason to treat this differently to the other items purchased on this occasion from the exhibition in Miami.  

I do not overlook the evidence that the name on the invoice is fortuitous and was simply because Mr Lowe rather than Mrs Lowe was issued with the exhibition pass. Nevertheless the evidence suggests that Mr Lowe purchased it and to do so was very much in keeping with his interest in collecting.

I find that this belongs to him and falls into his estate.

Item 198  Signed Paul McCartney picture

The initial Response to Inventory was completed on the basis that this was owned by Mrs Lowe. Mrs Lowe stated in her witness statement that it is jointly owned. Mr Lowe in his witness statement did not make any comment on ownership. He merely asserted that it has no value.

I agree with Mr Passfield at paragraph 118 of his closing submissions that it is likely that this item is solely owned by Mr Lowe on the basis of his obvious interest in Beatles memorabilia.

Item 199 Signed picture of Bing Crosby

In the response to inventory this was said to be jointly owned by Mr and Mrs Lowe yet they now assert in their statements that it belongs to Mrs Lowe having been gifted to her.  

The circumstances of how it was acquired and thereafter gifted are not provided, nor is the change in evidence explained.  One would have thought that Mr Lowe would have initially remembered if this had been genuinely gifted to his wife.

I am satisfied that this is Mr Lowe’s and was acquired in pursuance of his interest in collectibles.

Item 200 Elvis Presley ticket

It is contended that this is jointly owned, Mr Passfield appears not to challenge this in his paragraph 120. I therefore need go no further.  It is jointly owned.

Item 204 Camera Equipment

Mr Lowe in his statement does not say who owns this and neither does Mrs Lowe in hers. This is in distinction to the response to inventory where it is said that it is jointly owned. Since Mrs Lowe does not claim ownership I find that it is owned by Mr Lowe and falls into his estate.

Item 205 Signed Margaret Thatcher picture

It is contended that this is included in item 42. In those circumstances I refer back to my conclusion in respect of that item.  If this item is actually not included in item 42 then I expect counsel to so indicate before judgment is handed down and I shall look at this again if I am persuaded that to do so will affect in any meaningful way the administration of this bankruptcy.

Item 206 Sanos Sound System

Both Mr and Mrs Lowe assert that it is jointly owned. Mr Passfield does not seem to challenge this in paragraph 122 of his closing. I find it is jointly owned.

Item 207 to 213 iPhones and MacBook Pro

It is asserted by Mrs Lowe in her written evidence that she bought the MacBook pro in 2007 and was given the four iPhone 5 and two iPhone 6 mobile phones were given to her for agreeing new contracts.  Mr Lowe supports that contention.

There was no cross examination on this issue but in so far as the written evidence appears to suggest that the iPhones were an incentive for buying a Macbook Mr Passfield points out in his closing submissions that the iPhone 5 was released in September 2012 and the iPhone 6 in September 2014.  That was not put to Mrs Lowe.

On the other hand it is very difficult to credit that Mrs Lowe would have been given 6 iPhones for signing up to buy a Mac computer and I am concerned therefore that hers and Mr Lowe’s contention in their witness statement is simply carelessly drafted and fails to convey what they actually assert.  

Once again therefore, and since this was not addressed I think in the oral evidence, I decline to make a finding.  I will do so following further representations immediately prior to the handing down of this judgment if the parties require me to do so on the basis that such a determination will have a meaningful effect on the administration of the bankruptcy.