CO/5043/2014 
Neutral Citation Number: [2014] EWHC 4147 (Admin)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT 
Royal Courts of Justice 
Strand
London WC2A 2LL 

Wednesday, 19 November 2014
 
B e f o r e: 

ALEXANDRA MARKS
(Sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court) 

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Between: 
HEALTH CARE PROFESSIONAL COUNCIL 
Applicant

v 

TAYLOR 
Respondent 
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Computer‑Aided Transcript of the Stenograph Notes of  
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Mr C Catsambis (instructed by BDB Solicitors) appeared on behalf of the Applicant
The Respondent did not attend and was not represented
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J U D G M E N T
1.	THE DEPUTY JUDGE:  This is an application brought by the Health Care Profession Council, to which I will hereafter refer as HCPC. The respondent is Nichola Taylor, a registered social worker.  The application is for an extension of an interim suspension order (“ISO”) which expires on 20 November this year, following a previous extension granted by this court.
2.	The background to the case is that the respondent was working for Salford City Council (“SCC”)from July 2012 on a one year fixed term contract. A few months into the contract, SCC became concerned about the respondent’s health. Following advice from HCPC, SCC remained in close communication with HCPC and, on the basis of advice, invited the respondent to take sick leave.  After some considerable period on sick leave, the respondent was advised that it would be appropriate for her to return to work on a phased basis, which she did between March and June 2013.
3.	During that period, the respondent was subject to a probationary review by SCC, which indicated a number of concerns.  The respondent’s one year fixed term contract expired soon afterwards so she left the employment of SCC in June 2013 (accrued leave making up the rest of the one year term until July 2013).  
4.	It was only after the respondent’s departure from SCC that application was made by HCPC for an ISO - explained to me today by counsel on the basis that it was thereafter no longer possible for the respondent to work under close supervision.  On 20 August 2013, a HCPC panel imposed an ISO for a period of 12 months.  
5.	I make no comment on the panel's decision, save to observe that there appears to have been no reference to the respondent’s phased return to work for a period of three months before that order was made. There was also very little in the way of direct evidence as to the respondent’s health, which was surprising as it was an issue which much concerned the panel. There was not, nor in fact could there have been, reference to the consultant psychiatrist’s letter (dated 23 August 2013) because it post-dated the panel hearing.
6.	The respondent wrote soon afterwards to HCPC stating that her mental health was fine, that she was not experiencing any symptoms, and pointing out various inaccuracies in the bundle of documents before the panel, stating that no concerns had been disclosed directly to her.  
7.	However, the respondent did not seek formal review of the ISO.  On 11 November 2013, HCPC wrote to the respondent stating that, at a meeting on 8 November 2013, a case to answer had been found against her, on the basis of an allegation of impairment to her fitness to practise as a result of her health.  
8.	HCPC’s reasons for this finding are, unfortunately, not included in the document which has been supplied to the court. However, the court bundle includes the outcome of various reviews of the ISO on 4th February 2014, 2 May 2014, and 29 July 2014.
9.	I will not repeat what was said by Mostyn J when he considered an application for extension of the ISO in this case which came before him on 30 July 2014. I share many of the concerns that he expressed.  I have already made clear concerns of my own about the way in which this matter has been handled throughout by HCPC.  
10.	In particular, I am concerned that decisions were made on the basis of evidence - indeed the evidence brought before the various panels appears to have been - not only out of date but also involving a considerable degree of hearsay.  
11.	While it could be said that the respondent had the opportunity to challenge those decisions, it seems from subsequent events - namely, when offered the opportunity to attend at a venue more convenient to her, she accepted that invitation  - that she did not realise that such was open to her. 
12.	Given that this respondent has acknowledged the difficulties she has experienced and is not represented in the proceedings before HCPC, it might have been rather better had the HCPC been somewhat more supportive of her to establish whether she wished to attend or be represented than appears to have been the case.
13.	I appreciate that the HCPC has a number of cases and cannot, as it were, spoon‑feed respondents, but this does seem to be a case which cries out for special treatment.
14.	Having said all that, I remind myself that the duty of this court is not to consider the case on the merits, but to consider the seriousness of the allegations. I am taking it, although you have not referred to it, Mr Catsambis, that you would accept that the Court of Appeal guidance in General Medical Council v Hiew [2007] EWCA Civ 369 is equally applicable to the regulatory jurisdiction of HCPC. 
15.	Therefore the principles set out in that case are to be applied when considering whether a requested  extension is to be granted; namely the gravity of the allegations; seriousness of risk of harm to patients, or in this case, service users; reasons why the case has not been concluded; and the prejudice to the practitioner of an interim order being continued.
16.	It is also stated in Hiew that the onus is on the regulatory body to satisfy the court of those criteria, and that it is not for the courts to make findings of fact but to ascertain whether the allegations (not whether they are true or false) justify prolongation of the interim order.  
17.	Having considered the application of these principles very carefully, I must say I find this much more finally balanced than usual. I am not entirely convinced that the allegations themselves justify prolongation of the interim order, on the basis that they seem rather flimsily based on somewhat distant hearsay, the panel having seemingly disregarded evidence in more direct form, namely the more the recent assessment undertaken by Dr Colgan, who was actually appointed by HCPC for that very purpose.
18.	However, if what I am told is true (and of course I have no reason to doubt it), when the HCPC panel convened to hear this case in October 2014 (within the duration of the ISO extension granted by Mostyn J), it considered - of its own motion - whether it would be appropriate to make appropriate directions to enable the respondent to attend the hearing.  
19.	Enquiries of the respondent were made there and then.  It was thus established that the respondent would wish to attend were the venue to be one more convenient to her; and she was willing to comply with directions that a more up-to-date medical report be prepared, with all that involved. Significantly, the respondent also indicated that she was willing to accept some delay if it meant she could attend the hearing in person and/or perhaps be represented.  It is that reason alone that satisfies me that it is appropriate, but only just, to grant an extension of the ISO in this case.
20.	I am still concerned about the proposed length of the extension to the ISO: I am keen that there is sufficient pressure on HCPC to proceed with this matter with expedition.  
21.	Given the delays that have taken place so far, I bear in mind that were extension to the full extent requested now granted, over 3 years would have elapsed since concerns were first brought to HCPC's attention about the health of this respondent in the autumn of 2012.  
22.	I also bear in mind that the concerns about this respondent arose from her health - which I think we would all hope quite apart from the reason of this hearing have been addressed with some considerable success since then - rather than any alleged misconduct on her part.  
23.	It seems unfortunate indeed that the respondent has been unable to pursue her chosen profession as a result of matters over which she has - certainly in recent months - had very little control.  
24.	However, having said all that, I am prepared to grant an extension of the ISO.  I am not prepared to grant it for as long as 12 months.  I appreciate that HCPC may therefore be put to additional expense of a further extension, but I hope that the disincentive of that will itself encourage HCPC to proceed with all speed to conclude the hearing of this matter. I am prepared to grant an extension of 6 months.
25.	I think you have to hand a draft order, Mr Catsambis, which I am prepared to sign on that basis.
26.	MR CATSAMBIS:  My Lady, I am grateful, with adjustment just to be made to the date.
27.	THE DEPUTY JUDGE:  Thank you. I think that means the extension will last until 20 May 2015, if my maths is right.
28.	MR CATSAMBIS:  That is correct, my Lady.  I will just check what day that is.  My Lady, that is a Wednesday.  
29.	THE DEPUTY JUDGE:  Thank you.  I am grateful to you for you noting my comments, Mr Catsambis. I see that your client has been making voluminous notes as well.  I very much hope that what I have said will make its way back to HCPC so that similar issues may be avoided in the future.