Case No. CO/1882/2008 
Neutral Citation Number: [2008] EWHC 3520 (Admin)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT 
Royal Courts of Justice 
Strand
London WC2A 2LL 

Date: Friday, 10 October 2008
 
B e f o r e: 

MR JUSTICE STADLEN 
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Between: 
THE QUEEN ON THE APPLICATION OF LONDON BOROUGH OF 
HAMMERSMITH AND FULHAM 
Appellant
v 

FOOD CITY EXPRESS LTD 
Respondent
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Computer‑Aided Transcript of the Stenograph Notes of  
WordWave International Limited
A Merrill Communications Company 
190 Fleet Street  London EC4A 2AG
Tel No: 020 7404 1400 Fax No: 020 7831 8838
(Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)
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Miss Sheikh appeared on behalf of the Appellant
The respondent was not represented and did not attend
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J U D G M E N T 

1.	MR JUSTICE STADLEN:  This is an appeal by way of case stated,   pursuant to Section 111 of the Magistrates' Court Act 1980, by the London Borough of Hammersmith and Fulham against a decision of District Judge Philips on 8 November 2007.  On that day the district judge heard an appeal by the applicant Food City Express Ltd against a decision of the borough's licensing sub‑committee held on 4 July 2007 by which the committee had allowed, only in part, an application for a premises licence.  The decision under appeal was a decision by the district judge to remit the appeal back to the sub‑committee for what he described as a true inter‑partes oral hearing.  
2.	The background of this appeal is as follows.  The respondent to this appeal Food City Express Ltd made an application to the borough for the variation of a premises licence which it held for its property at 28 Shepherd's Bush Green, London.  The application was made to extend the  existing opening hours in respect of the supply of alcohol ‑  which were 0800 to 2300 hours Monday to Saturday and 1000 until 2230 hours on Sundays with a variation for Christmas Day and Good Friday ‑ to Monday to Sunday 0000 hours to 2400 hours, in other words 24‑hour opening.  
3.	Representations objecting to the application were received by the borough from the Metropolitan Police and the Public Protection Service of the council.  As a result of those representations, the council convened a licensing sub‑committee under the Licensing Act 2003 to consider the application.  
4.	The hearing was fixed for 4 July 2007.  The respondent Food City Express Ltd was served with written notice of the hearing, including the date and time thereof, and indicated that a representative would attend.  The representations received by the Metropolitan Police and the Public Protection Pollution Service were included in [the] sub‑committee report.  The respondent responded to those representations and sent a letter to the police, the Public Protection Pollution Service and the council as licensing authority on 17 June 2007.  Those were included with the sub‑committee  report.  When the allocated time to commence the hearing, of which the respondent had been notified, was reached the respondent had not appeared.  The sub‑committee allowed further time and waited for the respondent.  After waiting ten minutes the sub‑committee sought legal advice as to whether the application could be heard in the absence of the respondent.  I shall refer to that advice below.  
5.	The respondent's representations were before the sub‑committee and the sub‑committee decided to continue with the oral hearing in the absence of the respondent.  When I say "respondent" I mean respondent to this appeal.  Food City Express Ltd was of course the applicant in front of the sub‑committee.  
6.	The representative of the Metropolitan Police attended the sub‑committee and made representations to the effect that the police maintained their objection to the grant of a 24‑hour licence on the basis that it would cause public nuisance.  They indicated that they would not object to an  increase in hours for the supply of alcohol at the premises on Friday and Saturday until 1 am the following morning.  The Public Protection Pollution Service withdrew its objection to the application and the sub‑committee decided, as recorded in its decision letter, that having regard to all the relevant guidance and the representations and all other material considerations before it the sub‑committee granted [to grant] the application to vary the hours but on only in part with conditions to allow the sale of alcohol between 0800 to 2300 Monday to Thursday, 0800 to 0000 Friday and Saturday and 1000 to 2230 on Sunday.  
7.	The respondent appealed against that decision.  The matter came before the district judge.  The grounds of appeal were: (1) the decision was made in the absence of the applicant; (2) there were no exceptional reasons to depart from the guidance issued under Section 182 of the Licensing  Act 2003 to justify restricting the hours for the sale of alcohol from the normal trading hours; (3) there was no evidence to justify departing from paragraph 5.6 of the council's Statement of Licensing Policy; and (4) the conditions offered by the applicant were adequate to promote licensing objections.  
8.	As recorded in the case stated, it was agreed by the parties that (a) on 4 July 2007 a sub‑committee of the London Borough of Hammersmith and Fulham convened under the Licensing Act 2003 to consider Food City Express's application at 10.30 am; (b) notice of the convening of the sub‑committee was sent to Food City Express's agents who advised that Mr Mohammed Salim would attend the hearing to make all representations in support of his application; (c) the sub‑committee convened at 10.30 am.  Mr Salim was not in attendance and after waiting ten minutes the [sub‑]committee were advised it was lawful to proceed in Mr Salim's absence.  Mr Salim arrived in time to hear the decision of the sub‑committee being handed down.  
9.	In the case stated the district judge said the following:
"5 I am not a local resident though I have sat in the area for over 9 years.  To have the first oral inter partes hearing by a judge and not the local authority sub‑committee seemed to go against the spirit of the legislation especially where it had been made clear that Mr Salim would attend and did attend.  I had in mind the case of R v Camberwell Green ex p Ibrahim [1984] JPR 402 where Taylor J described a 45‑minute wait before commencing a criminal case in absentia as 'precipitate' although in court I could not actually locate the decision.
6 In law, the sub‑committee was entitled to act as it did.  However after 18 years on the bench, common sense has taught me that given London's traffic problems, parking problems and transport problems ten minutes is not long enough to wait before proceeding in absence especially where a person's livelihood is involved.  (I was told that the lateness was due to child care problems.  That does not depart from the generality of the above.)
7 Counsel for the London Borough of Hammersmith and Fulham was unable to cite any case in support of their contention that I had actually to decide the appeal (that is to hear all the evidence and submissions) before I could remit for a re‑hearing.  I was however referred to paragraph 12.6 of the guidance issued under Section 182 of the Licensing Act 2003 by the Department of Culture, Media and Sport.  Since I have decided the council's process was flawed and the legislation was designed to put the decisions in the hands of the residents, I decided to remit the appeal to the sub‑committee for a truly inter partes oral hearing.  I also held that the time before commencing the hearing in absentia ‑ 10 minutes ‑ was so short as to make a fair hearing impossible under Article 6."
10.	The district judge then identified the question for the opinion of the High Court as being:
"(1) Was I correct in deciding I had the power to remit the case under Section 181 of the Licensing Act 2003 without hearing the evidence and submissions and thus determining the appeal?
 (2) If the answer to (1) is yes, was I correct in deciding that ‑ given the prevailing road and rail problems in the borough ‑ ten minutes was insufficient time to wait before proceeding when counsel was aware that a representative from the company signified their intention to attend, thus right to have remitted the case?
 (3) Was I right that Article 6 demands a longer period to wait than ten minutes where a person who  wishes to be heard has signified an intention to attend?"
11.	In the decision letter by the council's sub‑committee which was the subject of the appeal to the district judge the following was included:
"In response to [the Metropolitan Police and the Public Protection Pollution Service's] representations, the applicant's agents (J & H Licensing Consultants) sent a letter to the police, Public Protection Pollution Service and the licensing authority on 17 June 2007, a copy of which was included in the sub‑committee report.  The applicant's agents suggested an additional condition which was included in the sub‑committee report.  The applicant's agents also stated that the premises are already open 24 hours a day which is not currently reflected on the existing licence.  When the allocated time to commence the hearing was reached the applicant had not appeared.  The sub‑committee allowed the applicant further time to attend before requesting legal advice as to whether the application could be heard in the absence of the applicant.  Heath Robinson ‑ solicitor for the council ‑ advised the sub‑committee that Regulation 20 (2) of the Licensing Act 2003 (Hearings) Regulations 2005 states as follows:
'(2) If a party who has not so indicated fails to attend or be represented at a hearing the authority may ‑
 (a) where it considers it to be in the public interest to adjourn the hearing to a specified date, or  
 (b) hold the hearing in the party's absence.'.
Heath Robinson also advised the sub‑committee that Regulation 20 (3) of the Licensing Act 2003 (Hearings) Regulations 2005 states as follows:
'(3) Where the authority holds the hearing in the  absence of the party the authority shall consider at the hearing of the application the representations or notice made by that party.' 
The sub‑committee ‑ after noting the legal advice given ‑ decided to hold the hearing in the applicant's absence.  The sub‑committee considered at the hearing of the application representations or notes made by the applicant."
12.	It is necessary to have regard to the statutory framework governing applications before the sub‑committee.  Section 9 of the Licensing Act 2003 provides as follows:
"(1) A licensing committee may establish one or more sub‑committees consisting of three members of the committee;
 (2) Regulations may make provision for ‑ 
 (a) the proceedings of licensing committees and their sub‑committees (including provision about the validity of proceedings in forum meetings);
 (b) public access to the meetings of those committees and sub‑committees; 
.....
 (3) Subject to any such regulations each licensing committee may regulate its own procedure and that of its sub‑committees."
13.	Section 183 of the Act provides:
"(1) Regulations may prescribe the procedure to be followed in relation to a hearing held by a licensing authority under this Act and in particular may ‑
 (a) require a licensing authority to give notice of hearings to such persons as may be prescribed;
 (b) make provision for expedited procedures in urgent cases;
 (c) make provision about the rules of evidence which are to apply to hearings;
 (d) make provision about the legal representation at hearings of the parties to it;
 (e) prescribe the period within which an application in relation to which a hearing is being held must be determined or any other step in the procedure must be taken."
14.	Pursuant to the powers conferred by Section 9 (2) and Section 183 (1), the Licensing Act 2003 (Hearings) Regulations 2005 was promulgated.  Regulation 20 provides as follows:
"(1) If a party has informed the authority that it does not intend to attend or be represented at a hearing the hearing may proceed in his absence;
 (2) If a party who has not so indicated fails to attend or be represented at a hearing the authority may ‑
 (a) where it considers it to be necessary in the  public interest adjourn the hearing to a specified date; or 
 (b) hold the hearing in the party's absence.
 (3) Where the authority holds the hearing in the absence of a party the authority shall consider at the hearing the application, representations or notice made by that party;
 (4) Where the authority adjourns the hearing to a specified date it must forthwith notify the parties of the date, time and place to which the hearing has been adjourned."
15.	Schedule 5, Part I, paragraph 1 of the Act makes provision for appeal.  It provides:
"Where a licensing authority ‑
 (a) rejects an application for a premises licence under Section 18;
 (b) rejects in whole or in part an application to vary a premises licence under Section 35;
 (c) rejects an application to vary a premises licence to specify an individual as the premises supervisor under Section 29; or 
 (d) rejects an application to transfer a premises licence under Section 44 the applicant may appeal against the decision."
16.	Section 181 sets out the powers of the Magistrates' Court hearing such an appeal.  It provides as follows:
"(1) Schedule 5 which makes provision for appeals against decisions of licensing authorities has effect;
 (2) On appeal in accordance with that schedule against a decision of a licensing authority the Magistrates' Court may ‑
 (a) dismiss the appeal; or  
 (b) substitute for the decision appealed against any other decision that could have been made by the licensing authority; or 
 (c) remit the case to the licensing authority to dispose of it in accordance with the direction and may make such order as to costs as it thinks fit."
17.	The grounds of appeal against the district judge's decision include the following:
"(1) It is contended that the district judge exceeded his jurisdiction and erred in law in remitting the appeal back to the licensing sub‑committee for a re‑hearing.  He accepted ‑ see paragraph 6 of the case stated ‑ that the licensing sub‑committee acted lawfully in hearing the application in the absence of Mr Salim in circumstances where he had failed to attend the hearing despite the sub‑committee waiting ten minutes for him to arrive.
 (2) Having accepted that the sub‑committee was entitled in law to act as it did, he was not permitted to remit the application for a re‑hearing because he considered the process was nonetheless flawed because the sub‑committee had proceeded in Mr Salim's absence without waiting for some indeterminate time for him to arrive (paragraph 7 case stated).
 (3) Once the district judge acknowledged as he had to ‑ having regard to the legislation and the proceedings before the sub‑committee ‑ that it had acted lawfully, he exceeded his powers by remitting the matter back for a re‑hearing because he personally (?) considered despite the lawfulness of the sub‑committee's actions that it was desirable to wait longer than the sub‑committee had, in its judgment, done so.
 (4) In the circumstances the district judge was required to hear the substantive appeal against the decision of the sub‑committee and not to judge or go  behind the exercise of discretion of a properly constituted sub‑committee acting lawfully.
 (5) The district judge further erred in applying his own yardstick as to how long the sub‑committee should wait.  The question of the exercise of the sub‑committee's discretion and conduct of its proceedings was not a matter for him, first, because he accepted that it had acted lawfully and, second, because in any event such an act should have been challenged by way of judicial review if it had been considered that there was any basis for doing so which there was not.
 (6) It was unreasonable and outside the scope of his jurisdiction to remit the matter for re‑hearing because he would have exercised his own discretion differently if he had been required to await the applicant's attendance.  The sub‑committee was entitled to act in the way that it did.  The district judge was not entitled to interfere with the workings of local government in such circumstances.  Furthermore in the circumstances of this case he had regard to irrelevant considerations.  The question of traffic and such issues were not advanced by the applicant as the cause of his delay and he had not indicated he would be late.  The sub‑committee had not had any intimation as to why he had not attended on time.  The sub‑committee nonetheless waited ten minutes for him to arrive.  Significantly even at the hearing before the district judge the applicant did not rely on traffic difficulties but child care concerns (see paragraph 6 of the case stated).
 (7) The district judge erred in his application of Article 6 of the ECHR.  The Licensing Act (Regulations) allowed the sub‑committee to proceed in the absence of the applicant.  There is no requirement by the statute or policy that its sub‑committee must wait a particular period of time before proceeding in the absence of the applicant.  The appeal before the district judge was a de novo hearing.  Any deficiencies considered to exist were capable of remedy through the hearing to be dealt with before him.  In the circumstances he was not entitled to remit the matter for a re‑hearing for the reasons he contended in his decision.  The decision of the district judge was flawed.
 (8) In respect of each of the questions posed in the case stated, we respectfully submit the answer is no."
18.	I should say that the respondent was not represented and did not appear before me.  I was told by Miss Sheikh, who appeared on behalf of the appellant borough, that the respondent had been notified of the time and date of this hearing.  No submissions or skeleton argument or evidence was received by the court from the respondent.  
19.	In the course of argument I raised with Miss Sheikh the question of whether Regulation 20 (2) imports with it a duty on the part of the relevant committee to consider whether it is necessary, in the public interest, to adjourn the hearing where a party who has not indicated that he does not intend to attend fails to do so or to be represented at the hearing.    Although it is not necessary in order for me to decide this appeal to answer that question, in my judgment, there is such a duty.  
20.	It is not necessary to decide this point for two reasons.  First, as was pointed out by Miss Sheikh, the sub‑committee in its decision letter indicated or recorded, as I have set out, that having allowed the respondent further time to attend it then requested legal advice as to whether the application could be heard in its absence and recorded that the council's solicitor specifically drew its attention to Regulation 20 (2) including the reference in Regulation 20 (2) (a) to its power ‑ its discretion ‑ to adjourn where it considers it to be in the public interest.  The reasons letter further records that the sub‑committee decided to hold a hearing in the respondent's absence after noting that legal advice which had been given.  
21.	Miss Sheikh submitted, and I accept, that it is implicit in that that the sub‑committee, in deciding not to have an adjournment but to hold the hearing in the respondent's absence, did take into account the question whether it was necessary in the public interest to adjourn the hearing to a specified date and must, by inference, have concluded that it was not.  
22.	I also raised in argument with Miss Sheikh the question as to what is meant by "fails to attend" in Regulation 20 (2).  For example, such questions arise as to whether if a party is not present one second after the time which has been notified does that constitute a failure to attend such as to trigger the power of the authority under Regulation 20 (2) (b) to hold the hearing in the party's absence.  
23.	It is not necessary, in my judgment, to make any findings or to reach any conclusions on that question because the district judge in his case stated explicitly held in paragraph 6 that in law the sub‑committee was entitled to act as it did.  In other words, the district judge must, by inference, have held that the failure of the respondent to attend at the hearing ‑ of which it had been notified both as to its date and as to its time ‑ at the allocated time and then not to appear for ten minutes thereafter constituted a failure to attend within Regulation 20 (2).  The contrary was not argued before me by the respondent who I have indicated was not represented and did not appear.  Nor was the contrary suggested anywhere in the case stated by the district judge.  
24.	In those circumstances I have to proceed on the basis that the respondent failed to attend the hearing within the meaning of Regulation 20 (2) and accordingly that the sub‑committee's discretion to hold the hearing in its absence ‑ provided always that it did not consider it necessary in the public interest to adjourn ‑ was triggered.  
25.	In argument, Miss Sheikh submitted that it is the established practice on appeals against decisions of licensing authorities heard by the Magistrates' Court that the hearing takes place as a re‑hearing and in particular  that there are ‑ as a matter of general practice on such appeals where there are appeals in respect of findings of fact and where it is so desired by one party or the other ‑  oral hearings, including oral evidence.  
26.	For the proposition that that practice ‑ the existence of which I accept from Miss Sheikh ‑ is lawful, Miss Sheikh relied on the decision of the Court of Appeal in Sagnata Investments Ltd v Norwich Corporation [1971] 2 QB 614.  Although that was a decision under the Betting, Gaming and Lotteries Act 1963, Miss Sheikh submitted that the principles are the same when considering the nature of an appeal against a decision of a licensing authority pursuant to the Licensing Act 2003.  In that case the Court of Appeal held, Lord Denning MR dissenting, that an appeal to Quarter Sessions against a refusal by a licensing  committee was a re‑hearing.  Lord Justice Phillimore at page 639 G held:
"I must however for a moment turn to the question of the appeal to Quarter Sessions.  What sort of appeal is it?  Is the recorder to look at the reasons of the committee and to give effect to them unless they are so lacking in ground or so obvious on the face of them that certiorari would lie?
The position seems to me to be so well established that it is not susceptible of a little subtlety.  The hearing of an appeal at Quarter Sessions is a re‑hearing.  It cannot be less so if the decision from which the appeal is brought is an administrative decision by the committee of a local authority ..... before which no one took an oath or was cross‑examined.  After all, any appeal to the Court of Appeal is technically a re‑hearing.  New evidence can be adduced and the whole conduct of the hearing in the lower court supervised ..... I think that the recorder must hear evidence; all the more so because none was called before the committee.  I think he must give effect to that evidence and reach what he regards as a just conclusion." 
27.	Section 181 (2), on its face, provides the Magistrates' Court with a discretion whether to dismiss an appeal or to substitute for the decision appealed against any other decision that could have been made by the licensing authority or to remit the case to the licensing authority to dispose of it in accordance with the direction of the court.  On its face therefore the submission that the district judge exceeded his jurisdiction ‑ which was one of the grounds of appeal in remitting the case to the licensing authority ‑  appears to be in conflict with the language of Section 181 (2).  On analysis, in my judgment, the real sting of the council's complaint and the basis of its challenge to the decision of the district judge is not one based on excess of jurisdiction but rather one based on the wrongful exercise of discretion.  Miss Sheikh submitted ‑ and in my judgment rightly ‑ that under Section 181 the Magistrates' Court has the power to hold a re‑hearing, that is to say to consider evidence afresh.  
28.	The question therefore arises: what was the reason why the district judge declined to exercise that power and instead to exercise the power to remit the case back to the sub‑committee?  
29.	In principle, it would not seem to me objectionable in a particular case for the magistrate to decide that having regard to all the circumstances of the case it is appropriate that factual disputes that have not been resolved should be resolved in the first instance by the primary finder of fact under the system, namely the local authority and, in this case, the sub‑committee.  That, after all, is the structure of the system that findings of fact are made in the first instance by the sub‑committee or the authority.  There is some hint that some such thought was in the district judge's mind because in paragraph 7 he said:
"Since I decided the council's process was flawed and the legislation was designed to put the decisions in the hands of the residents, I decided to remit the appeal to the sub‑committee for a true inter partes oral hearing (emphasis added)."
30.	In my judgment it is clear from the totality of the case stated that the real reason why the district judge decided to exercise his decision to remit rather than to proceed by way of re‑hearing was that in his view, as he put it, common sense had taught him after 18 years on the bench that ‑ given London's traffic problems, parking problems and transport problems ‑ ten minutes is not long enough to wait before proceeding in absence, particularly where a person's livelihood is involved.  
31.	In my judgment there is an apparent contradiction between the district judge's explicit holding that in law the sub‑committee were entitled to act as it did and his decision ‑ that notwithstanding ‑ to exercise his discretion to remit the matter back to the sub‑committee for rehearing on the basis that in his view they had exercised their discretion in a way that offended common sense.  
32.	Section 9 (3) of the Act provides that subject to any regulations promulgated pursuant to the Act each licensing  committee may regulate its own procedure and that of its sub‑committees.  The only relevant regulation by which that general power to regulate its own procedures is qualified is Regulation 20 which explicitly confers a discretion on the committee or the authority to decide either to hold the hearing in the party's absence or to adjourn the hearing to a specified date, if it considers that to be necessary in the  public interest, where the party who has been notified fails to attend.  
33.	In my judgment where, as is accepted by the district judge to have happened in this case, an authority or a sub‑committee acts lawfully within Regulation 20 in deciding  not to adjourn but to hold a hearing in the party's absence it is then for the authority to make up its own mind how to proceed.  In effect, what the district judge in my judgment  by his decision was doing was to say that although, as he found, the sub‑committee had exercised its discretion to proceed in the absence of the respondent lawfully, nonetheless it was bound ‑ by his decision to remit ‑ to hear the application again.  The effect of that, in my judgment, is to substitute for the lawful exercise of its discretion by the sub‑committee the judge's own different exercise of the discretion that was not conferred on him but was conferred on the sub‑committee.  
34.	Miss Sheikh submitted to me that if allowed to stand the effect of that decision would be to create uncertainty on the part of the council and its sub‑committees in future hearings on future applications.  It would not, for example, know whether if it proceeded after ten minutes with a hearing in the absence of the applicant or indeed any interested party ‑  albeit that it was acting lawfully ‑ the whole of its proceedings would be rendered nugatory and liable to a direction from the Magistrates' Court that there should be a re‑hearing if the magistrate took a different view.  
35.	Further it was submitted by Miss Sheikh that the borough in those circumstances, through its sub‑committee, would not know how long it had to wait before the magistrate would not exercise his power to remit.  For example, she pointed out in paragraph 5 of his reasons the district judge referred to Ibrahim where Mr Justice Taylor described a 45‑minute wait  before commencing a criminal case in absentia as precipitate, the implication being ‑ albeit not explicitly stated ‑ that even a delay of 45 minutes might not be sufficient to protect the sub‑committee against a decision by a magistrate that waiting that long, albeit lawfully, nonetheless made it liable to reconsider the application at a re‑hearing because a magistrate took a different view.  
36.	So far as the Article 6 point is concerned, in my judgment, it is not necessary for me to determine the question of whether for a hearing to proceed ten minutes after the notified time if a party has not attended breaches of Article 6 of the Convention.  The reason for that is that, in my judgment, it is clear that in circumstances such as this the Article 6 rights of the parties are protected provided that on an appeal to the Magistrates' Court the procedures required so as to be compliant with Article 6 are complied with.  In this case there is no suggestion that such procedures were not complied with in front of the Magistrates' Court and no complaint to that effect is made.  
37.	In my judgment, although the district judge had a  discretion and a power under Section 181 to remit the case to the sub‑committee to dispose of it in accordance with directions that he might have given, on the facts of this particular case he exercised that discretion unlawfully by taking into account a matter which was an irrelevant matter,  namely his own personal view as to whether ten minutes was too short to wait.  
38.	In my judgment what he should have done and what he should now do ‑ or if not him some other magistrate ‑ is to proceed to hear the appeal in the ordinary course.  In paragraph 5 he stated:
"To have the first inter partes hearing by a judge and not the local authority's sub‑committee seemed to go against the spirit of the legislation especially where it had been clear that Mr Salim would attend and did attend."
In my judgment that is an incorrect way of looking at what occurred.  If he had proceeded to have an oral inter partes hearing that would not have been the first oral inter partes hearing because the fact that Mr Salim ‑ or that the respondent through Mr Salim ‑ was not present did not deprive the hearing in front of the sub‑committee of the characteristics of an oral inter partes hearing.  
39.	When I come to look at the questions posed on the case stated, as I indicated in argument to Miss Sheikh, in my judgment they are unfortunately worded in that they do not really adequately address the legal challenge and the basis of the legal challenge mounted by the borough against his decision to remit.  The true nature of the challenge, and in any event the correct nature of the challenge, was not whether the district judge had the power to remit under Section 181 but rather whether his exercise of his power or discretion to remit was exercised lawfully.  
40.	Accordingly, in answering these questions it is necessary for me to bear that in mind and to indicate what, in my view, is the effect of the error of law that he has made.  Question 1:
"Was I correct in deciding I have the power to remit the case under Section 181 without hearing the evidence and submissions and thus determined the appeal?"
In my judgment the answer to that question is that yes he was correct in deciding that he had the power to remit the case,  but that is subject to the further holding which I make that he was not correct in deciding that it was a lawful exercise of his discretion so to do for the reasons which I have given.
41.	Question 2:
"If the answer to 1 is yes, was I correct in deciding that given the prevailing road and rail problems in the borough ten minutes was insufficient time to wait before proceeding when the council was aware that a representative from the company had signified an intention to attend and thus right to have limited the case?"
As I indicated in argument, it struck me that that is really, as formulated explicitly, an irrelevant question insofar as the relevant decision that he made was not a decision that ten minutes was insufficient time, which was not a matter he was required to decide.  The relevant decision for him was whether or not to exercise his discretion to remit.  
42.	In my judgment if the question had been "was I correct in deciding to remit the case to the licensing authority because of my view that given the prevailing road and rail problems in the borough ten minutes was insufficient time to wait before proceeding when the council was aware a representative of the company had signified an intention to attend?" my answer to that question would be "no, you were not correct.  You did not act lawfully in exercising your discretion in that way."  If question 2 can be read as meaning "was I correct in deciding to remit because I decided that given the prevailing road and rail problems in the borough ten minutes was insufficient time to wait?" then I would answer that question no.
43.	Question 3:
"Was I right that Article 6 demands a longer wait than ten minutes where a person who wishes to be heard has signified an intention to attend?"
I decline to answer that question as posed because, as posed, it is plainly referable to the decision of the local authority sub‑committee.  As I have indicated, in my judgment there is no requirement for a longer wait than ten minutes in respect of a hearing of the local authority provided that ‑ and given that ‑ there is an effective and adequate appeal to the Magistrates' Court.  If by question 3 was meant "was I right that Article 6 demands a longer wait than ten minutes at a hearing of a licensing committee where a person who wishes to be heard has signified an intention to attend?"  then I would answer that question no for the reasons I have given.  
44.	I am not unsympathetic to the considerations which underlay the district judge's findings and decision.  Had it been the case that because of being ten minutes late somebody whose livelihood depends upon a licence being granted, renewed or varied, was disentitled to a licence, a variation or a grant of it to which he would otherwise have been entitled, it would be a matter of concern if, in such circumstances, there were no redress.  However in my judgment that does not arise in this situation because under Section 181 there is provision for an appeal at which somebody who has missed the hearing ‑ whether for traffic reasons, child care reasons or other reasons ‑ can have determined the merits of his application.  
45.	In those circumstances, in my judgment, where it is accepted that the local authority has acted lawfully on the particular facts of this case in proceeding to have the hearing in the absence of the respondent, there would be no injustice to the respondent in the matter having proceeded before the magistrate on appeal  by way of a re‑hearing at which it could have adduced such evidence as it wished and have had a determination on the merits of the facts by the magistrate.  
46.	For all those reasons in my judgment this appeal must be allowed.
47.	MISS SHEIKH:  If I could ask my Lord make an order for the matter to be remitted back.
48.	MR JUSTICE STADLEN:  In my judgment it seems to follow inevitably from my judgment that I should also order that this matter should now be referred back to the Magistrates' Court for it to proceed with the hearing of the appeal that was first  before the district judge in November 2007.
49.	MISS SHEIKH:  I am very grateful.  I have an application for costs.
50.	MR JUSTICE STADLEN:  Against whom?
51.	MISS SHEIKH:  That is precisely the point that I have debated with my instructing solicitor.  In the end I took the view that I would simply put the matter to your Lordship to determine in your discretion as to what should be done.  The case is against Food City Express in that they were the ones who appeared at the Magistrates' Court, and in the ordinary   way it would be the respondent against whom we seek costs.
52.	MR JUSTICE STADLEN:  They have not resisted your appeal.
53.	MISS SHEIKH:  They have not.
54.	MR JUSTICE STADLEN:  It seems to me quite wrong to order that they should pay your costs.  Can you think of anybody else who might?
55.	MISS SHEIKH:  I can.  It could be the district judge or Treasury.
56.	MR JUSTICE STADLEN:  I do not suppose you mean the district judge personally.
57.	MISS SHEIKH:  Not the district judge personally, no.
58.	MR JUSTICE STADLEN:  What do you mean?
59.	MISS SHEIKH:  In some circumstances it can be the Treasury Solicitor.
60.	MR JUSTICE STADLEN:  I think if you want to make an application for costs against the Treasury Solicitor you would have to give the Treasury Solicitor notice.
61.	MISS SHEIKH:  I think that must be right.  I put the application to your Lordship.  I recognise the difficulties and I have discussed those with my instructing solicitor.
62.	MR JUSTICE STADLEN:  I think you have done very well, Miss Sheikh.  I think that costs against the party who has not been represented or notified of this hearing would be perhaps a bridge too far.
63.	MISS SHEIKH:  They were notified for the record; not the Treasury Solicitor, they were not notified.  That would have been a matter for the district judge if he had wished to involve them but no they are not.
64.	MR JUSTICE STADLEN:  No, I make no order to costs.
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