CO/1595/2006 
Neutral Citation Number: [2007] EWHC 2650 (Admin)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION 
DIVISIONAL COURT 
Royal Courts of Justice 
Strand
London WC2A 2LL 

Thursday, 18th October 2007
 
B e f o r e:

LORD JUSTICE RICHARDS 

MR JUSTICE OPENSHAW 
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Between: 
HM ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Claimant

v 

JAMES WILLETT 
Defendant 
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Computer‑Aided Transcript of the Stenograph Notes of  
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Mr Steven Kovats (instructed by the Treasury Solicitor) appeared on behalf of the Claimant
The Defendant did not appear and was not represented
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J U D G M E N T
1.	MR JUSTICE OPENSHAW:  In this case the Attorney General had sought a declaration under section 42 of the Supreme Court Act 1981 that Mr James Willett be declared a vexatious litigant.  In fact, in the circumstances which I shall relate, the Attorney General has come to the conclusion that the public interest does not require that this application be pursued to adjudication and she has discontinued those proceedings.  There is no provision in the rules which requires the court's leave for that step to be taken and, on the researches that we have been able to make this morning, it seems to us that the Attorney is entitled to discontinue proceedings without the leave of the court.  However, in the general course of events, discontinuance of an action engages order 38.6, by which: 
"Unless the court orders otherwise, a claimant who discontinues is liable for the costs which a defendant against whom he discontinues incurred on or before the date on which notice of discontinuance was served on him."
So, properly analysed, the hearing today is in fact an application by the Attorney General to the court to make an order that she is not liable to pay the costs of Mr Willett.  
2.	The case has a very long history.  It can be summarised, I think, quite shortly.  Mr Willett owns a bungalow at 24 Bishops Road, Teignmouth in Devon.  He engaged the Energy Action Guarantee Partnership (that is the EAGA) to install cavity wall insulation.  The work was done under a Government initiative called Warm Front, funded by grants from the Department of the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs.  A dispute arose as to the work done and the price owing on the contract and the damage which Mr Willett alleged resulted from the negligent installation.  Eventually he agreed to the appointment of an independent expert, Professor Hollis, with power to make a binding decision.  Professor Hollis awarded Mr Willett £8,377.  There was a further dispute as to who was liable to pay that sum but in due course EAGA paid Mr Willett the sum owing under that award.  
3.	Mr Willett remained dissatisfied and what should have been a simple case simply resolved has spawned a host of claims all having their origin in this original grievance.  He has in turn successively sued the solicitors who acted for him.  He has sued a company called Instafoam for conspiracy to cause fraudulent misrepresentation, misrepresentation, negligence and breach of contract in that they provided a false report to the Arbitrator.  He has sued Warmhome for fraudulent misrepresentation, negligence and breach of contract in doing the work incompetently and in giving false evidence to the arbitration.  He has sued the EAGA for conspiracy to cause fraudulent misrepresentation.  He then issued further proceedings against the EAGA for further acts of alleged negligence and breach of contract.  That, of course, was a duplication of actions he has already issued.  Later, he issued claims against Professor Hollis himself for negligence, alleging that the work he did was amateurish and incompetent.  He then sued the Cavity Insulation Guarantee Agency for negligence and for various alleged breaches of his human rights.  He then sued various other agencies, all arising out of the same matter.  He has taken proceedings against the Government for breaches of his human rights in connection with these matters.  He has sued other solicitors who were acting for him.  He has sued the Bar Council for various perceived acts of negligence.  He then turned his fire against the Royal Institute of Chartered Surveyors and against Teignbridge District Council for negligence.  He has taken proceedings against an individual surveyor for misrepresentation, negligence and breach of contract.  
4.	Each of these actions has been prosecuted with the same relentlessness.  It is plainly demonstrated to my mind that Mr Willett has become obsessed with this matter and with these actions and it is not only the number of actions which he has commenced or sought to commence but the entirely oppressive way in which each case has been pursued with endless attempts to appeal each and every adverse ruling so that each case has required numerous appearances and hearings.  In my judgment, the Attorney General was quite obviously justified in starting his action to have Mr Willett declared a vexatious litigant.
5.	Meanwhile, on 20th October 2003, HHJ Overend, sitting in the Torquay and Newton Abbot County Court, made an extended civil restraint order for two years.  That prohibited Mr Willett from taking any action: 
"... in respect of proceedings in Devon or Cornwall concerning any matters involving or relating to or touching upon or leading to any issues arising from: 
 (a) the installation of cavity wall insulation in the property known as and situate at 24 Bishop's Road, Teignmouth, TQ14 9BN by Warmhome Ltd,
 (b) the independent expert determination that determined Warmhome Ltd's liability in relation to that installation, and 
 (c) the legal proceedings that were issued against any party in relation to matters (a) or (b)."  
That was extended on 30th September 2005, the current order expires on 29th October this year, a fortnight hence, and a further application is due to be made to the county court for its renewal before that date.  
6.	Since these orders have been made, with some exceptions which we will come to in a moment, Mr Willett has not commenced any further actions and the Attorney General therefore takes the view that the existing civil restraint orders and, on the assumption that it will be continued in a fortnight, future civil restraint order will make any further application under section 42 unnecessary.  It is true that during the interim Mr Willett has not been wholly quiescent.  He has filed numerous lengthy submissions, accompanied by extensive citation of ancient authority in which he seeks to justify his conduct.  On 27th June of this year, Sullivan J refused an application by Mr Willett to invite the Attorney General to appoint an advocate to assist the court both before and after this hearing.  Mr Willett has bombarded the court with these and similar requests, failing entirely to appreciate that under our system it is for the parties to make their own arrangements for representation.  But he has not started any further actions and so it was, on 2nd November last year, that this court, Latham LJ and Fulford J presiding, adjourned this case to see whether it was necessary for the action to proceed to hearing and, on 27th September this year, since it appeared that the defendant was continuing to comply with the civil restraint order, the Attorney General advised the court that she was seeking to settle the matter on terms that she discontinued the action with no order for costs.  The Treasury Solicitor wrote a letter to Mr Willett that day making that offer.  This was to my mind an obvious, fair and sensible way to deal with the matter.  
7.	Mr Willett did not see the matter so clearly.  He has fired off a series of more strident and prolix letters, attacking the good faith of the Attorney General, the Treasury Solicitor and its staff and indeed of this court and its staff and, for that matter, its judges.  He has a particular and apparently unrelated grievance against the Government of Norway which is added to many of his letters, but the connection with this case is that apparently he has sought political asylum in Norway on the grounds of psychological torture which he claimed had been used against him in connection with these and related proceedings.  So he did not consent either to the action being discontinued or that it should be made with no order as to costs.  To put the matter beyond doubt, he returned the consent form endorsed "permission denied" decorated with what he no doubt thinks to be humorous doodles.  The tone and nature of the correspondence is such that one fears that events may show that possibly the Attorney General may have been unduly generous to Mr Willett.  Indeed, only a fortnight ago he applied to the County Court for permission to commence proceedings against three named judges, whom he claimed to be in a complicity to conspire to pervert the course of justice.  No doubt that application will be refused and it will be established that the protection granted by the civil restraint order has been shown to be effective.
8.	It is plain to me from this short review of the history of this matter that the application by the Attorney General was properly and reasonably brought and indeed properly and reasonably continued.  It is understandable that in the event it is thought that the extended civil restraint order may continue to give effective protection against potential defendants and indeed to the court and its processes.  Accordingly, it seems to me, although one can well understand that the proceedings have been discontinued, it would be entirely wrong that the Attorney General should pay the defendant's costs because, as I have said, the proceedings were properly brought, properly continued and properly discontinued.  Accordingly, I would make the order sought under order 38.6 that the action is discontinued without any order as to costs.  It may be necessary at the end of the hearing to deal with the costs of today, which may have been needlessly caused by Mr Willett's unreasonable refusal to agree with the Attorney General's suggestion that the matter be settled with no order for costs.  
9.	It is perhaps important to stress, before concluding this judgment, that, if Mr Willett does attempt to bring any further actions which are without merit, then it is inevitable that the Attorney General will bring another application with every prospect of success.  It may be helpful if the transcript of these judgments, or at least a note of this judgment, is put before the County Court judge when he considers the application to extend the existing restraint order, a hearing due to take place in the next couple of weeks.
10.	LORD JUSTICE RICHARDS:  I agree.  I should mention that we were satisfied that Mr Willett had received notice of the Attorney General's application and of today's hearing.  He did not appear at the hearing but had provided no explanation for his absence and had not sought an adjournment.  Indeed, he had sent under cover of a letter to the court dated 14th October 2007 a written addendum to the written reply already made to the Attorney General's application.  In the circumstances, we were entirely satisfied that the hearing could properly proceed in Mr Willett's absence and should do so but we have taken full account of the written material which he has had submitted to the court.
11.	MR KOVATS:  My Lords, I am not applying for the Attorney's costs of today but I do make an application that the court direct an expedited transcript of today for the reason given by Mr Justice Openshaw, namely the transcript could be put before HHJ Griggs when he comes to consider extending the extended civil restraint order at the end of this month.  
12.	LORD JUSTICE RICHARDS:  Yes, we will direct an expedited transcript.  
13.	Can we consider the terms of the order that should be made?  Is it simply this: an order that (1) the proceedings be discontinued and (2) there be no order as to the costs of the proceedings? 
14.	MR KOVATS:  Yes.
15.	LORD JUSTICE RICHARDS:  Or of today's hearing?  Or will that not be needed?  "No order for costs of proceedings" will cover it.  (3) An expedited transcript.
16.	MR JUSTICE OPENSHAW:  Thank you very much. (pause) 
17.	THE LORD JUSTICE RICHARDS:   The Attorney wants a transcript of this judgment?  
18.	MR KOVATS:  Yes.
19.	LORD JUSTICE RICHARDS:  So the question is raised whether the Attorney will be paying for the transcript? 
20.	MR KOVATS:  My Lord, I understand that that is the position, that generally where a party applies for an expedited transcript it is at the expense of that party.  (pause) 
21.	LORD JUSTICE RICHARDS:  Well, I think that is the way in which it would normally be dealt with by the Attorney General in any event and there is an additional reason why it should be done quickly, so that is fine.  We are very grateful to you for your assistance.