CO/2909/2002
Neutral Citation Number: [2002] EWHC 1962 Admin
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE 
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT 
The Royal Courts of Justice
Strand
London WC2

Thursday 8th August, 2002 
B e f o r e:
HIS HONOUR JUDGE WILKIE QC 
(sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge) 

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DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS 
Appellant 

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PAUL BROOMFIELD 
Respondent 
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 (Computer-aided transcript of the Palantype Notes
of Smith Bernal Reporting Limited
190 Fleet Street  London EC4A 2AG
Tel:  020 7404 1400
Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)
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MISS J TALLENTIRE (instructed by CPS Bristol, Bristol BS1 2DJ) appeared on behalf of the Appellant
THE RESPONDENT did not appear and was not represented

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J U D G M E N T
1.	JUDGE WILKIE: This is an appeal by the Director of Public Prosecutions by way of case stated against the decision of Mr Recorder Parroy QC sitting with justices on 18th April 2002 at the Crown Court at Bristol, which upheld an appeal by Mr Broomfield against his conviction by the Bath/Wansdyke Mendip Magistrates' Court on 15th January 2002 for breach of section 172(3) of the Road Traffic Act 1988. 
2.	Mr Broomfield is not present in court, nor has he been represented. Miss Tallentire, who has very fully and fairly presented the case on behalf of the Director of Public Prosecutions, has indicated that I am not requested, if I find in her favour, to remit this matter to the magistrates, but simply to answer the question posed in the case stated in such a way as effectively reverses the determination of the Crown Court. 
3.	The issue is one of considerable practical importance. It concerns the extent of the obligation on those who receive a requirement to provide information to the police as to the identity of the driver of the vehicle of which they are the registered keeper when that vehicle has been caught on camera either speeding or going through a red light. 
4.	I am told that Avon and Somerset Constabulary issue some 100,000 of these notices per annum, and of course throughout the whole country that will amount to many hundreds of thousands a year. 
5.	The case stated sets out a number of findings of fact as follows. On 28th August 2001 PC Greenhalgh saw a Rover motor car, index F848 CYC, being driven in excess of the speed limit on Winterstoke Road in Weston-super-Mare. 
6.	The notice of Intended Prosecution dated 4th September was sent to the registered owner of that vehicle, Mr Broomfield, and Mr Broomfield received that Notice of Intended Prosecution. 
7.	That notice took the usual form. It offered the recipient, if he was the driver, the option of submitting to a fixed penalty. If that were his choice, he would send the form signed to that effect in an envelope provided to a specific address, the Fixed Penalty Office in Taunton. 
8.	However, there was an alternative course, which was to provide information required under section 172 of the Road Traffic Act. In either case, the form highlighted at page 2 that the recipient must reply to the notice within 28 days otherwise they may be prosecuted and their driving licence may be endorsed. 
9.	Page 4 sets out in a series of printed boxes a number of options as to the information which was required to be provided, depending upon whether the person was at the time the owner, keeper, hirer of the vehicle, whether that person was or was not the driver. The significance of this form, however, is that in each case the person providing the information was required to do so in a specific written form and to sign the information that was provided. 
10.	On 18th October 2001 Mr Broomfield telephoned the Camera Processing Unit of the Avon and Somerset Constabulary and had a conversation with an operator called Susan Lewis, who made a contemporaneous note summarising that conversation. A copy of that note was before the court, and it was agreed that the substance of the conversation was that Mr Broomfield did not have both parts of his driving licence and that both parts were to be needed if he were to accept the fixed penalty option. Further, that he would need to telephone the DVLA to enquire whether he would need to apply for a new driving licence or simply a new counterpart. This information had not been before the justices who had convicted Mr Broomfield initially. 
11.	The Crown Court further found that the Notice of Intended Prosecution was not completed, signed and returned to the police by Mr Broomfield, whether or not within 28 days or at all. The evidence of a witness whose statement was read to the court was that by 5th November no reply had been received from Mr Broomfield. 
12.	As a consequence of his failure to reply to the notice, he was prosecuted under the offence of section 172(3) of failing to comply with the requirement under subsection (2), subsection (2) imposing the following requirement:
“Where the driver of a vehicle is alleged to be guilty of an offence to which this section applies- [and it was common ground that the offence observed was such an offence] 
(a) the person keeping the vehicle shall give such information as to the identity of the driver as he may be required to give by or on behalf of a chief officer of police, ...” 
13.	The Crown Court concluded on the evidence that it was implicit in the telephone conversation of 18th October that Mr Broomfield was the driver of the Rover on 28th August 2001, and that therefore he had provided that vital piece of information to the police in the course of that telephone conversation. They therefore allowed the appeal. 
14.	The questions posed for me in this case are: firstly, whether they were correct in finding that the provision by the respondent of the following information:
(i) that he was the registered keeper of the vehicle; and.
(ii) that he was the driver of the vehicle on the relevant occasion,
	to an employee of the constabulary in the course of a telephone conversation outside the 28-day period was sufficient to meet the requirements of section 172 of the Road Traffic Act 1998; and (2) whether they were correct to allow the appeal in those circumstances.
15.	Section 172(7) is relevant for these purposes. It provides:
“A requirement under subsection (2) may be made by written notice served by post; and where it is so made-
(a) it shall have effect as a requirement to give the information within the period of 28 days beginning with the day on which the notice is served, ...”
16.	It is right to say that nowhere in section 172 is there any express requirement that the information should be given to any particular officer or department within the constabulary, nor is there any indication as to how that information should be given; that is to say, whether it has to be in writing or may be given orally on the telephone or in some other way. 
17.	The decision of the Crown Court was to the effect that there was sufficient compliance with the duty under section 172 when the information was given orally. The Director of Public Prosecutions argues that that is wrong, and that it is implicit in the scheme under section 172 that where the requirement is made by written notice pursuant to section 172(7) and where the written notice specifies how the information is to be given, then the information must be given in that way if the requirement as to how the information is to be given is a reasonable one. 
18.	The question whether there is to be implied any such provision has been considered by the Divisional Court in connection with a similar provision in the case of Boss v Measures [1990] RTR 26. The provision in issue was section 112 of the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984, which applies in respect of different principal offences. But section 112(2) provides that:
“Where the driver of a vehicle is alleged to be guilty of an offence to which this section applies-
(a) the person keeping the vehicle shall give such information as to the identity of the driver as he may be required to give- ...”
	and subsection (4):
“... a person who fails to comply with the requirements of subsection (2)(a) above shall be guilty of an offence ...”
19.	The sole difference between section 112 and section 172 is that there is no provision equivalent to subsection (7) in the statutory scheme under section 112, and therefore there is nothing explicitly stated as to the time within which information should be given if the requirement is to be made in a specific form. 
20.	That latter point was the subject of a specific statement by the Divisional Court, which decided that clearly there must be a requirement to provide the information within a time which is either specified by the requesting authority or within a reasonable time, because otherwise there would never be a situation where an offence would be committed. 
21.	However, the Divisional Court went on to consider the question whether the requirement for the information to be given needs to be in any specific form, notwithstanding the fact that there is nothing express in that section. At page 31F of the report Woolf LJ (as he then was) says as follows:
“In my view, as the section is silent as to what information can be included in the requirement, whether the requirement be oral or in writing, what Parliament intends is that there should be a power in the requesting authority -- whether it be the police or the local authority -- to include in the requirement reasonable instructions as to the manner in which the information requested is to be provided. There could therefore, and indeed in my view should, be included in the request the information as to whom it is to be provided, where it is to be provided, when it is to be provided and by what means it is to be provided. 
As long as the request is a reasonable request, then it is a lawful one.” 
22.	Saville J (as he then was) agreed. He said:
“... it must be implicit in section 112 that the local authority, or the chief officer of police as the case may be, can require information as to the identity of the driver to be given within a reasonable time and by reasonable means.”
23.	In my judgment, this statement of the law as it applies to section 112 is equally applicable to the virtually identical section 172. There is a further reason to support this conclusion. That is that by section 12 of the same Act, concerning proof in summary proceedings of the identity of the driver of the vehicle, it is provided that:
“Where on the summary trial in England and Wales of an information for an offence to which this subsection applies-
(a) it is proved to the satisfaction of the court, on oath or in manner prescribed by rules made under section 144 of the Magistrates' Court Act 1980, that a requirement under section 172(2) of the Road Traffic Act 1988 to give information as to the identity of the driver of a particular vehicle on the particular occasion to which the information relates has been served on the accused by post, and 
(b) a statement in writing is produced to the court purporting to be signed by the accused that the accused was the driver of that vehicle on that occasion,
the court may accept that statement as evidence that the accused was the driver of that vehicle on that occasion.”
24.	Thus the requirement in the Notice of Intended Prosecution that the information should be given in written form and signed by the accused is not merely a whim of those who produce the form, but is specifically directed at enabling that document to be accepted as evidence that the accused was the driver of the vehicle on that occasion. 
25.	In my judgment, therefore, the Crown Court at Bristol were wrong in finding that the provision of information orally was sufficient to meet the requirements of section 172 of the Road Traffic Act 1988, and they were therefore wrong to allow the appeal in those circumstances. 
26.	As I have indicated, there is no request that this matter be remitted to the court. Therefore I simply content myself with determining the questions in that manner. 
27.	Thank you.
28.	MISS TALLENTIRE: Thank you, my Lord.