This judgment was delivered in private. The judge has given leave for this version of the judgment to be published on condition that (irrespective of what is contained in the judgment) in any published version of the judgment the anonymity of the child and members of the family must be strictly preserved. All persons, including representatives of the media, must ensure that this condition is strictly complied with. Failure to do so will be a contempt of court
In the Family Court at Bristol
		BS17C01550
	
		27th February 2018	
B e f o r e:
HHJ Wildblood QC
____________________
Between:

	A Local Authority 	Applicant	
	- and -		
	MJ	First Respondent	
	-and-		
	X ( a child, by his guardian)	Second Respondent	
____________________
Lara Allen for the Local Authority 
Amanda Sawyer for the mother
Melody Brown for the child. 

	HHJ Wildblood QC:
1.	I typed this judgment during a very short adjournment to record the conclusion of these proceedings at the Issues Resolution Hearing on 27th February 2018.
2.	This is another heart-breaking case in which I am asked to make the most serious orders that a Family Court can make - orders by which a child is placed for adoption against the wishes of his mother.  The Local Authority and guardian both recommend that the orders should be made. The mother, who has an IQ of under 55, is represented by the Official Solicitor because she lacks litigation capacity both in relation to the application for a care order and the application for a placement order.
3.	On her behalf the Official Solicitor does not oppose a finding that the threshold criteria are fulfilled. Further he does not oppose a finding that the welfare of the child requires that the mother’s consent to adoption be dispensed with and an adoption order be made. Thus he does not oppose the making of the orders sought by the Local Authority. Nor does he consent.
4.	This mother deserves every sympathy. She had a wretched childhood and has had to face the adult world bearing the burdens of the past and also being constrained by her own limitations, those limitations being none of her fault. She has a history of making relationships with men who have their own extensive difficulties and who cannot give her the support and happiness that she needs. She is now thought to be involved in such a relationship and has no fixed home.
5.	The child concerned is X who is a very young baby boy. Attempts were made to see if the mother could care for X after his birth but those attempts failed. Then attempts were made to see if X could be brought up by his maternal aunt, the mother’s sister, but that has proved not to be possible. 
6.	So, the wretched position now is that the mother cannot care for X and there is no one in his natural family who can. The putative father of X has not engaged in these proceedings at all or in X’s life. 
7.	Nature, law and common sense require that it be recognised that the best place for a child to live is with a natural parent unless proven and proportionate necessity otherwise demands. Care and placement orders should only be made when no other solution compatible with the child’s welfare presents itself. Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights and the statutory scheme under our domestic law are fully engaged; they create a high barrier that must be surmounted by applications for orders of this nature.
8.	I very much regret to say that the threshold criteria in section 31 of the 1989 Act are plainly fulfilled in the terms that have been agreed. Referring to the welfare checklist in section 1(4) of the 2002 Act, X’s needs can only be met through adoption. Adoption will give him the best short-term and long-term benefits throughout his life. He is young and is of an age where, if orders are made now, the risk of long-term emotional harm and of placement breakdown is minimalised. Unfortunately there is no one else who can offer him the childhood he needs save for adopters.
9.	In those circumstances I conclude that care and placement orders are legal, proportionate and necessary. They are also the only orders that are available to promote X’s paramount welfare throughout his life. I therefore dispense with the mother’s consent to the placing of X for adoption under section 52(1) (b) of the 2002 Act on the grounds that X’s welfare so requires. I make the orders sought.
10.	It is recognised by all that, on making of those orders, the mother should only have indirect, or ‘letterbox’, contact with X twice a year.
11.	I have enquired into the support that will be made available to this mother after this devastating hearing. I ask that all those that are involved commit themselves to trying to help her as much as possible. I have made various suggestions to her solicitor. This mother’s welfare matters too.

HHJ Stephen Wildblood QC
27th February 2018