IMPORTANT NOTICE
This judgment was delivered in private.  The judge has given leave for this version of the judgment to be published on condition that (irrespective of what is contained in the judgment) in any published version of the judgment the anonymity of the child and members of their her family must be strictly preserved.  All persons, including representatives of the media, must ensure that this condition is strictly complied with.  Failure to do so will be a contempt of court.

Case No:  NE14C00141
IN THE FAMILY COURT
SITTING AT NEWCASTLE-UPON-TYNE
	The Law Courts
The Quayside
Newcastle-Upon-Tyne
NE1 3LA
 
IN THE MATTER OF THE CHILDREN ACT 1989
AND THE ADOPTION AND CHILDREN ACT 2002
AND IN THE MATTER OF:  Z (A CHILD)

Friday, 5th June 2015

Before:

HIS HONOUR JUDGE SIMON WOOD

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Re:  Z (A Child)

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Counsel for the Local Authority:  Miss P Moulder
Counsel for the Mother:  Miss A Miller
Counsel for the Father:  Miss E Lugg
Counsel for the Child:  Miss S Woolrich
Counsel for MC:  Miss E Callaghan

Hearing dates: 26th-29th  May, 1st and 5th June 2015
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APPROVED JUDGMENT

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JUDGMENT
HIS HONOUR JUDGE SIMON WOOD:
1.	The court is concerned with the welfare of Z, a girl born on 16th July 2014 and is therefore now approaching 11 months old.  South Tyneside Council seeks a care order with a plan of permanence outside the family by way of adoption via a placement order, a plan which is supported by Z’s children’s guardian, Ms Aileen Firth.  
2.	The plan is opposed by Z’s parents, her mother, M, born in 1992, now aged 23 and her father, F, born in 1982 and now aged 33.  Whilst their initial case had been for Z to be permitted to grow up in their care a point was reached, and the precise date of that point is a controversial question, where they recognised that Z would be better placed in the care of the mother’s cousin, MC, born in 1989 and who is 26 tomorrow.  She is the mother of Y, who is almost 3, and the plan would be that, along with the help of her non-residential partner, CP, they would care for Z.  The parents say that this would be a permanent placement for Z’s minority, but that too is a controversial claim so far as the local authority is concerned because it maintains that the parents’ real intention is to seek to care for Z once, as the parents put it, they have proved they can do so safely.  There are no other options so if an order is required, and it is not in dispute that it is, the stark options are placement with MC or placement outside the family by way of adoption.  
3.	I want to make it plain at the outset that nothing whatever is known against MC.  The opposite is in fact the case, that she is a decent, wholly competent and meritorious young mother.  The issue is whether, despite her obvious good qualities, Z could have a secure childhood with her, uninterrupted and unharmed by the actions of her parents and particularly her father.  It has therefore been a narrow issue, but one of profound importance to Z and her family and not one that is entirely easy to decide involving, as it does, assessment of the magnitude of the risk posed, the ability to mitigate that risk and the extent of the harm that Z might suffer were the risk to materialise.  But before I consider that it is necessary to set the scene and explain why it is the case that the threshold for intervention is not in dispute.
4.	Although the focus has acutely been on the father it is appropriate to begin with the mother.  Still young, but not the youngest of mothers in this type of litigation, Z is her first child, a much loved and much wanted child she having planned the pregnancy by having her contraceptive implant removed.  Born and brought up in South Tyneside the older of two children she appears to have had a reasonably happy and uneventful childhood until she was 5 or 6.  Her parents then separated, the mother having found her own mother cheating on her father. A direct consequence was parental separation with the mother remaining in the care of her mother and her mother’s new partner, who then became her husband, whose relationship was a drink fuelled one to the point that the children’s needs were lost.
5.	The mother describes suffering physical abuse at the hands of her step-father, abuse witnessed by her mother who, in her drunken state, was powerless to protect.  Whilst school was described as a safe haven for her, she complained that her own father’s home, which she regarded as another safe place, was effectively out of bounds to her by virtue of the actions of her mother.
6.	The local authority first intervened when the mother was about 5 and then, at about the time that her father took the law into his own hands by beating up the mother’s step‑father, the mother, then aged 6, went into foster care until she was 14 or 15, remaining in touch with her carer until her death, sadly last year.
7.	All did not go well though because the mother describes some terrible experiences, including being raped by a friend of her grandfather, having been plied with cannabis first.  Her father, to whom she went when she came out of care, was also a drinker.  She was eventually suspended from school.  She began fighting, drinking and experimenting with controlled drugs.  She first came to the attention of the police in 2006, aged 14.  She has eight convictions for twelve separate offences between then and 2013 as well as several cautions following a total of 22 arrests.  Those convictions and cautions include several for assault, drunkenness and theft.  Her last conviction was on 2 June 2014 for an offence of street robbery to which she pleaded guilty and was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment, a sentence from which she has been released just today and during the course of which she gave birth to Z.
8.	I will have to return to the robbery because, although he was acquitted, the local authority invites me to find that the driving force behind it and an active participant was the father and that the circumstances of, and surrounding, the offence are directly relevant to the risk that these parents pose.
9.	Reverting to the mother, the local authority chronology has no fewer than 179 entries from her birth to the discharge of a care order in 2008, 16 years later.  It presents a fairly comprehensive picture of a disrupted, fractured and neglectful childhood with the associated onset of increasing behavioural problems, including antisocial behaviour.
10.	The mother had a number of relationships before she met the father.  A pregnancy when she was 15 resulted in a termination.  Subsequent relationships were characterised by heavy drinking and one of them, a man ten years her senior, is described as controlling and violent and she suffered a broken jaw at his hands. 
11.	She met the father when she was 19 and he was 29, perhaps inauspiciously, in a mental health ward of a local hospital where she was visiting a family member.  It was a relationship again founded on drinking from the onset, but the mother maintains, and the father agrees, that it is a positive relationship, mutually supportive and they say lacking in any violence.  A conviction acquired by the father for battery in November 2012 involved the mother as the victim in what the prosecution described as a drink fuelled assault.  Both parents deny the correctness of that conviction which they say only occurred because the father failed to attend court for his trial.
12.	The local authority asked me to determine the truth of that and at the issues resolution hearing I concluded that it was neither proportionate nor necessary to do so.  At one level that is, I accept, unsatisfactory but I indicate that despite having at least read some evidence that would support the correctness of the conviction I intend to disregard it in my analysis in favour of the parents.
13.	The local authority and the guardian therefore characterise this mother as young and vulnerable against a background of neglect, instability and a lack of positive role models, all compounding with her own lifestyle including a significant history of troublesome drinking and choice of partners.  This background has resulted, it is said, in little insight into the risks that the father or she would pose to Z, quite apart from her obvious inexperience as a parent.  Having made the decision that she now has, that Z would be best placed with MC, she maintains that neither she nor the father would in fact pose any risk to that placement having undertaken extensive courses in prison relating to parenting, to drinking and to domestic abuse.  She maintains she is addressing her issues and has changed her lifestyle.  She believes that the father has done so as well and thus maintains that Z would be perfectly safe and secure with MC recognising, of course, that it has not been tested outside prison and therefore she accepts she cannot properly contend that she should care for Z.
14.	As I have said, the focus is acutely on the father and I need to explain why.  He told me he was first received into care at the age of 7 and, although he returned to his family, there was local authority involvement thereafter.  He entered residential education at the age of 10 due to emotional and behavioural difficulties, a matter of some resentment according to his report to a psychologist in 2007 when he described how he felt left out of his family.  
15.	Described as starting at primary age, he developed increasing antisocial behaviour with inevitable consequences.  Noted to be “a very violent young man who seems to thrive on confrontation,” he was first convicted in 1998 and thereafter began a pattern of offending increasingly seriously, such that at the present time he has been convicted of over 95 offences in the course of more than 45 court appearances, albeit he maintains there is some evidence of tailing off.  He was last released from prison on 27 March this year having been sentenced to a total of 20 months in July 2014.  He has therefore been at large for just two months of Z’s life thus far.
16.	His behaviour, he maintains, is attributable to the misuse of alcohol and drugs, the problem that he invites the court to accept he has been addressing since the end of 2012 with beneficial effect, albeit he accepts that he is still on the way to rehabilitation as opposed to having completed the process.
17.	He first fathered a child born in 1998 with whom he has no contact but, from about 2004, his significant relationship was with FP, born in 1982.  Between 2005 and 2009 they had four children ranging in age now from 4 to 10 years.  They are, A, B, C and D.  After concerns dating back to A’s birth in 2005 in November 2009 all four children were removed from the care of their parents, A and B for the second time.  Each child had experienced disrupted care giving from birth with frequent changes of address, moving between South Tyneside and Cumbria, often exposed to violence and conflict between their parents and other adults, antisocial behaviour and police involvement.  The evidence suggests that life was often very stressful and frightening.  The harm each child suffered was considerable.  A and B had to be separated in foster care due to A’s sexualised and aggressive behaviour, she describing being made at home to watch DVDs “and people were doing things”.  It manifested itself in A’s sexualised language and the enactment of sexual behaviour with B.  In B’s case there was also sexualised behaviour albeit he did not describe any sexual harm.  His behaviour was characterised as reactive, likely to be related to his experience of neglect, emotional abuse and possible sexual harm.
18.	On 19 October 2010 the court made care orders in respect of each of those children based on a threshold reflecting those and other concerns, orders that neither parent actively opposed.  As I have indicated, these were the second set of proceedings.  The first, in 2006, resulted eventually in a return to the parents with no order in respect of A and B on the local authority and the court being persuaded that it was safe to do so on the basis of evidence of potential change.
19.	The evidence from the later proceedings, however, points to concerns of a continuing kind and indeed a recurring pattern of general domestic chaos, homelessness, domestic abuse, drug use, inappropriate lifestyle and serious and repeated criminal behaviour.  Reflected in each of their cases are traumatic childhoods resulting in risk taking behaviour with its many consequences and a failure to prioritise their children despite attempts by the authorities to provide support, support rejected by the father and FP, whose dealings with the authorities were neither open nor honest.
20.	The consequences for those children have been profound.  C and D were adopted in 2012.  Fortunately they were young enough to have been spared the extent of the damage suffered by A and B.  Despite being aged just 4 and 3 on removal not only could A and B not be adopted, they could not be placed together because of their behavioural issues and accordingly they will continue to spend, having spent the period thus far, the greater part of their childhood in foster care, separated from each other and from their family.  A is a particularly troubled young person.  When the local authority belatedly applied to revoke the placement orders, orders granted early in 2014, neither child wanted any contact with either of their parents.  They are fortunately settled in a very good supportive and now longstanding foster placement separately, but with all the disadvantages inherent in such an arrangement.
21.	Thus, on the local authority becoming aware of this father fathering another child it is not surprising that it immediately took a close interest.  He had not long before, between September 2013 and January 2014, been assessed for the possibility of being reintroduced at his request to A and B, an assessment which concluded that he continued to pose a significant risk to their emotional welfare.  The local authority was tipped off by an anonymous referral about mother’s pregnancy.  On the pregnancy being confirmed it was not a promising start that the father did not disclose to the midwife his previous involvement with the local authority, merely the fact that he had one child, not five, with whom he did not have contact, or when meeting the children’s guardian to enable her to prepare her report in respect of contact with A and B failing to disclose to her that the mother was then pregnant.
22.	There was an early child protection conference in April 2014 and the unborn baby was made subject to a child protection plan under the category of neglect.  Both parents agreed to engage with the plan and a pre-birth assessment.  In fact both were in prison before that work could be completed, the mother on 4 June, the father on 8 July. 
23.	It is right to say they shared a high level of motivation to work with the local authority and other agencies indicating that they had each put their pasts behind them and had made positive changes.  The local authority was dubious.  The robbery in respect of which the mother pleaded guilty was a particularly nasty and sustained street robbery, in daylight, of a 44 year old woman.  The event was caught on closed circuit television.  A prolonged attack by the mother with the victim being dragged in the street and then hit over and over again about her face and body, it was described by the trial judge in the Crown Court as truly shocking.  I have seen it and I agree.  It is sustained and vicious.
24.	The father was acquitted, he readily agreed, on a technicality.  In the CCTV footage a man is seen throughout at the side of and encouraging the mother in the attack.  The evidence from the injured person describes how that particular male was shouting “Go on M”, “M, left and right her”, “Go on M, stamp on her head.”  The prosecution said that this male was the father.  He denied it.  Each of the parents gave no reply in the course of their interviews.  The quality of the television footage was adjudged not good enough for positive identification of anyone in the Crown Court.  The prosecution had relied on evidence that this mother and father “are both nearly always together” from one police officer who, with another, had purported to identify the father on the footage, as well as the fact that this incident happened just outside the place where the father was living.  But the father continued to say he was not guilty and when I say “not guilty” that is all he said because he has never offered an explanation or specific defence to the allegation.
25.	On being questioned in this court about it, having been warned appropriately, he declined to answer any questions on the basis that he did not wish to incriminate either himself or anyone else.  The local authority says that if it was not possible for the prosecution to prove to a criminal standard of proof in the Crown Court that it was him this court can nevertheless be satisfied on the balance of probabilities standard that it was indeed him.  
26.	Whether I can or not, and I will come to it, I can be sure that immediately following the mother being sentenced he embarked on a campaign of intimidation of the daughter of the victim of the robbery who was, herself, a witness.  The father accepted that he had sought and obtained both her Facebook details and a mobile phone number for her and, beginning with Facebook, issued some chilling threats to a young teenage single mother.  It started in the middle of the day on 8 June on Facebook.  At 13.24 hours she received this message:  “I will be at [your home] very soon.”  She reported it immediately to the police but it was followed by this message: 
“Everyone knows that my lass knows where you live, ha, ha.  Just a bit of friendly advice.  You need to move today and not to your mam’s ‘cos they know her address as well and you can tell the police I’ve inboxed you.  You grass.  I’m not threatening you.  I’m just telling you what I know so hopefully you will learn that grasses always get what they deserve.  Sweet dreams.”
27.	That evening the witness’s mobile phone rang.  The father gave his name as F and he said this:  
“I’m going to come after.  I’m going to stab you as many times as I can until you beg me to stop.  I’m going to laugh while I do it and when I make you scream I’m going to douse you in petrol and ask you what your last words to your daughter are and then throw a lit match at you.  Burn, cos grasses always get what they deserve.”
28.	There were several other calls including:  “You are going to get exactly what U [that is the victim of the robbery, the witness’s mother] got off me.”  The calls finished at 22.14 hours that night.  So that is to say that these messages, some of which I have quoted, were sent over a period of about eleven hours.  To use her phrase, W said that these messages made her “shit scared” as well they might.  For this offence of witness intimidation, which had occurred in breach of a suspended sentence, and an offence of theft, he was, on 7 July sentenced to 20 months’ imprisonment, as I have indicated.
29.	So it was that Z was on 16 July born when both of her parents were serving prisoners.  The mother’s application to the prison to be allowed to parent Z within the confines of the prison in a mother and baby unit was refused because of the nature of her offence.  The local authority declined to place Z with MC because, despite the father also being in prison, it assessed the risk posed by him to Z, to MC and to her child, Y, as too great.  Accordingly Z was discharged from hospital to foster care where she has remained and thrived ever since.  She is a healthy baby with no issues other than the need for a permanent, secure and safe home where she can be cherished and grow up achieving whatever potential she may have.  She is already forming an attachment to her foster carer and the local authority says that her next move must be her last.
30.	The mother has had regular contact to her in prison.  It has been surrounded by all sorts of restrictions.  She has to remain seated throughout. There is no privacy.  It has, I do not doubt, been as difficult and distressing an experience as one can imagine for any mother, particularly a first time mother.  The father likewise sought contact.  On his release an agreement was drawn up and he has had regular contact since, described as being of good quality, entirely appropriate, with no issues.
31.	MC was the mother’s birthing partner but has had no contact with Z since she was born.  Although she made a move to seek contact, she did not press it for the reasons she gave at court, that she had received advice and was concerned that a bond might be formed that might have to be broken.  So from mid January she told me that she had made a conscious decision to await the outcome of this hearing and therefore, as matters stand, there is no relationship at all between Z and her.
32.	In addition to the evidence of the local authority and the guardian on 17 October I granted MC’s application to instruct an independent social worker, Mr Paul Greenhalgh, for an independent assessment of her ability to provide the care that Z needs throughout her minority.  By then the local authority had concluded that a placement with her could not guarantee Z’s safety, a decision which MC said, and repeated through her counsel in this final hearing, was presaged by the first contact that the local authority had with her and went on to present a child protection review conference before Z was even born that she would not be able to protect.
33.	The application for an independent social worker was opposed by the local authority but the guardian expressed her disappointment that it had not revisited MC and it seemed to the court that there could be little confidence of a fair and objective assessment of a person who appeared to have been ruled out at the outset yet whom all parties agreed is rightly a positively assessed good mother against whom nothing is known.  
34.	Mr Greenhalgh assessed her and did so without seeing the parents.  He reported on 27 November.  The background to his report was his belief that the parents still sought Z being returned to their care.  His assessment of MC was, like that of the others, entirely positive but his conclusions were that, for Z to be placed with her, her case would have to remain open to the local authority to monitor and manage the situation. What was really essential for it to succeed was for the parents to give it their full support.  If they did not offer that, particularly if they opposed the placement, then he considered that the safest option was adoption to afford Z the level of stability and security that belatedly the court has sought to achieve for the father’s older children.
35.	As I will explain, notwithstanding the parents’ ostensible acceptance of a placement throughout her minority, Mr Greenhalgh, on being given the most up to date information at court, was decidedly less enthusiastic when he came to give his evidence.  Miss Callaghan, on behalf of MC, invited the court to call him so that she could cross-examine him and, in short, based on the written report of the guardian which described a meeting with the father in March, he questioned how genuine the position of the parents really is and in those circumstances he confessed that he had ultimately come to the same conclusion as the local authority and the guardian that adoption was in fact the only realistic option.  Accordingly all the professional evidence ultimately supported the local authority care plan.
36.	At this hearing I heard from the key social worker, Ms Storey.  I also heard from the father’s present probation officer, from Mr Greenhalgh, as well as the guardian who supported the local authority position and on the other hand I heard from the parents and MC.
37.	The narrow issue I have identified therefore is for the court to make its own assessment of the parents and MC in order to determine whether, as the parents would contend, they really have turned a corner or done so sufficiently at least such that there can be enough confidence that placement with MC is a realistic and safe option given its obvious attraction of affording Z the chance to be brought up by her birth family, or whether the professionals’ assessment of risk necessitates a much more draconian course.
38.	In order to do so it is necessary to make some findings of fact and to assess the weight to be attached to the risk factors to determine how great they are.  I will do so in accordance with the well established principle that the burden of proof rests on the local authority and that the standard to which facts must be proved, in accordance with the leading authorities of Re: H & R and Re: B, to what has been called the stringent standard of the balance of probabilities, that is to say, where the court is satisfied that the occurrence of the event in question was more likely than not.  I have clearly in mind Lord Hoffmann’s exposition in Re: B by reference to a binary system.  I do not think it is necessary for me to set it out in this judgment.  
39.	In reaching conclusions on matters of fact I note that both parents gave evidence.  They thereby assumed no burden to prove anything.  Furthermore I recognise that in giving evidence in the stressful circumstances in which they find themselves it is important not to assess them solely by their behaviour in the witness box.  I emphasise that I am not bound by the opinions of others and form my own views drawn from all of the evidence, a great deal of written evidence, the evidence of professional witnesses who have had dealings with them and my own assessments of the parents and MC in court, suitably taking into account the emotional heat of this type of hearing.
40.	The local authority relies on a composite schedule of findings, only one part of which is in dispute.  First, the mother was convicted of robbery and sentenced to two years in 2014.  Second, the father was convicted of battery in December 2012 and he has a history of violence against a previous partner.  Third, both parents have a history of criminal offending.  Fourth, the father was convicted of intimidating a witness on 7 July and received a 20 month sentence.  Fifth, the father’s oldest children were subject to contested care proceedings which concluded with care orders and placement orders being made in October 2010.  Sixth, the father was significantly involved in the mother’s offence of robbery in that he encouraged the mother to commit the offence.  
41.	The only responses I need refer to at this stage are these.  The mother says of the robbery that she was so intoxicated she can remember very little about it but otherwise accepts full responsibility for it and the father continues to deny that he was involved, and that is the finding I am asked to consider making.  Having mentioned the conviction for battery I have already indicated how I propose to deal with it, that is to say I do not take it into account although I recognise it is there.
42.	This is a lengthy enough judgment as it is and I am certainly not going to repeat the evidence.  I am going to discuss parts of it in detail where they concern the more contentious parts in due course in my analysis.  I propose to confine myself to a few remarks about the witnesses at this stage.
43.	Ms Storey has been the key social worker.  Her evidence and assessment can be summarised very shortly as being the combination of the mother’s vulnerability and the risk posed by the father, recently reassessed by the local authority when he sought contact to A and B, all taken in conjunction with the recent convictions which caused the utmost concern.  Set against that there is the parents’ demonstration of a high level of motivation to work with the local authority and assertions of positive change.  The local authority concluded in its initial assessment that in fact there was a long history of unaddressed issues and neither had insight into them despite the work the parents had done. 
44.	She said that whilst MC was identified as a good potential carer in June, the risk posed to the placement with her needed more assessment then and when that took place in August it concluded that she and her partner were unrealistic as to their ability to manage.  A subsequent risk assessment of the parents highlighted their defensiveness, externalisation of blame and she found that the determination to change was not in fact evidenced in practice.  She characterised it as lip service, pointing to the father’s assertion to her that he was “ticking all the boxes”.  She was worried about the father’s pattern of relapsing into neglectful parenting or worse and considered it was likely to recur, particularly as neither accepted the extent of the problem.
45.	Her view was confirmed in her final evidence, underlined by parental determination to remain a couple, which in turn pointed to the mother’s emotional dependence on the father and her denial, justification and excusing of the father’s behaviour.  The risks they posed outweigh the positives offered by MC and she characterised those risks as unmanageable.
46.	Challenged by Miss Miller on behalf of the mother, she conceded the mother’s engagement, at least after the initial concealment of the father’s past from the midwife.  She recognised the many courses done by both parents and the mother’s clear drug tests in prison as well as abstinence from drink for some time, although she challenged the premise that solving addiction cured the underlying problem.  She gave credit for the good work the mother had done in prison around drink particularly and agreed that there was little more that she could have done within that controlled environment.
47.	Challenged by Miss Lugg on behalf of the father it emerged that she had in fact only seen the father once substantively in August last year and no additional work had been done with the parents around whether they really would support a placement with MC once that decision had been taken.  Whilst she accepted that she had been told in May 2013 that both parents wanted to get on top of their addictive behaviours and that there was no evidence of substance or drink misuse since 2013, that is to say in the first six months of 2014, she did not accept the premise that this was the sole explanation for his problematic behaviour.  
48.	She conceded that she had warned the parents at the outset of the process that the history was a formidable obstacle to a successful outcome albeit she denied that she was thereby saying that there was no chance.  She confirmed that the father’s attempt to attend a domestic abuse perpetrator’s programme had been thwarted originally by a pending prosecution and possibly more recently by the conditions of his licence.  She would not accept that the father’s acceptance of what had happened to his older children, in a document that has been called an admission to which I will come shortly, demonstrated insight because she said it was a case of history repeating itself.
49.	She justified her assessment that the father was not motivated to change by reference to his default position of blaming everyone but himself, the local authority, the guardian, the police, even his lawyers.  Also, even when he did appear to acknowledge a shortcoming, as she put it, he then went on to threaten a witness, “so how do you rely upon it?”
50.	She said these factors were relevant to the security of a kinship placement and she maintained that the past remained the best indicator of future conduct absent evidence of sustained change.  She pointed to the long history of breached orders and declined to make the distinction she was invited to make between orders in criminal proceedings and those in the Family Court.  She said that a written agreement would not be worth the paper that it was written on, pointing to how one was breached with his older children.  She said that although he had not disrupted the older children’s placements he nevertheless had a history of following the contact supervisor.  In her opinion such change as the parents, particularly the father, sought to demonstrate was in fact attributable to an underlying agenda to care for Z despite publicly supporting MC.  Central to that was the meeting held by the guardian with the father in prison just before he was released to which I will come.
51.	I have said she was unimpressed by a document called the admission that the father had filed at the outset of this final hearing last week and I should mention it now.  Handed in that morning he said:  
“I accept that for most of my life I have abused drink and drugs.  I have engaged in significant criminal activity and my behaviour when under the influence has been frightening to those who have been exposed to it.  I have had a problem with controlling my temper.  In the past I have been aggressive.  I have brandished weapons and on a few occasions I have actually hit people.”
52.	He went on to accept that his aggressive behaviour was “totally unacceptable”.  He said that other than witness intimidation he had not been convicted of anything for two years.  He described his relationship with FP as being appalling, behaving badly towards each other and he abusing cocaine and cannabis.  He said that the local authority was “entirely justified in having concerns” about him based on his behaviour and he understood why they were worried that he would not be able to put Z’s needs first:  “All I can say to the court is that since Z was born I have really tried to turn my life around.”  
53.	He went on to say that he last took drugs before the mother became pregnant, he had reduced his drink consumption to no more than half a pint.  It was not true that he felt no remorse:  
“I regret everything now.  I have a clear head.  I can now see that I can enjoy my life.  I am very sorry for my past behaviour.  I want to have a nice life with M.  I do not want a life dominated by drink, drugs and the police.  I feel very motivated to change and I am looking forward to the rest of my life being normal and like everyone else’s.  I’ve never felt the way I feel today regarding my motivation to change.”
As I say, the social worker struggled to reconcile that document with what the guardian recorded, to which I will come in a little while.
54.	I heard from both parents at length.  It was, I know, an ordeal for the mother who became appropriately upset and needed one break in addition to a natural break that fell overnight before she was cross-examined by Miss Woolrich on behalf of Z.  She confirmed her wish that Z be placed with her cousin:  “I could not wish for a better carer”.  
55.	She emphasised that it was from October last year that, listening to what she had learned on the courses she had undertaken, the decision was made not to put herself forward as a carer.  She told me about those courses in detail and her intention to stay free of alcohol on release.  She nevertheless insisted that she would not seek a return of Z whatever else happened and would accept whatever contact was on offer.  I will come to some specific areas of her evidence in a little while, but she insisted that she was not a risk, was confident that she would not disrupt the placement and that the father would not either:  “I don’t think he’ll risk losing the child again”.  She also told me how horrible the impact on Z would be if trouble was caused for MC.  In many ways she was a very sympathetic witness indeed, obviously giving evidence from a very difficult position.
56.	The father gave evidence at far greater length.  I will again comment on aspects in detail.  He was, in the main, calm, reasonable, good humoured even and anxious to convey the fact that he was contrite.  What he said repeatedly was that he did not think that M should be punished for his mistakes.  Indeed, he said it so often that Z at times seemed almost a secondary consideration.  But his devotion to M thereby shone through.  Indeed, I witnessed it in court at the beginning of the court day when M would be produced at the back of the court.  But in a way I can best sum up what he was saying in his own words:  “I have never felt so fresh, motivated and committed to a girl as in M”, before adding “and obviously Z.”  
57.	He was insistent he would abide by all rules, would deny himself any right to contact and denied that there was any lip service involved.  He was emotional at times, understandably so.  He recognised that he had said many of these things before but pointed out that he had come out of prison, leaving his partner there and said that all of this would have turned him to drink if it was going to happen, and drugs, and he had not.  He said he had been in denial before.  Almost his last words to me were his protest that M was being punished for his past.
58.	MC obviously came with none of the past that the parents have.  She is an appealing, warm and caring individual who in many ways matched the assessment I had heard or read from each of the social workers, Mr Greenhalgh and the guardian.  She said, and I accept, that she is motivated to look after and care for Z as if her own child and was 100 percent committed.  She said that the local authority had given her no encouragement that she could look after Z and when she eventually saw all the papers she realised how horrific the past had been.  But she insisted that she would protect Z and told me that with a range of orders in place even if trouble came to the door with police help she could deal with it:  “Z is family.  She needs to be in her family”.  I will come to her approach to risk in due course.
59.	Unfortunately I was unable to hear from her partner, CP, because of the final illness, and the death last Friday, of his grandmother.
60.	I am going to address the guardian’s evidence in discussing risk, which was in summary that the evidence she had heard during the course of the hearing persuaded her that the risk to Z was greater than ever and thus her recommendation that the court accept the local authority plan was not simply maintained, it was reinforced.
61.	The issue of risk central to this case has to be determined following findings of fact and the assessment of the parents so I propose to make findings and then assess the risk that is relied on.
62.	I want to begin by acknowledging that at first blush the local authority is open to the legitimate criticism that the assessment of the father has been less than ideal.  Seen in August 2014 in prison he has not meaningfully been seen since.  I discount the social worker’s visit in March when she delivered the written agreement around contact which was a doorstep visit not involving any assessment.  It is also the case that her team manager, who in fact put her name to the first statement which contained work that she, Ms Storey, had carried out had been the previous victim of a threat to kill by F which was an event likely to have resulted in him at least challenging her objectivity.  Furthermore, looking at the report presented to the pre-birth conference, it is clear that the local authority view was already formed that MC could not be considered as a long term carer because of the risk it felt that F posed.  It seems that the social worker was again open to criticism on the basis that the outcome of the subsequent, more detailed assessment, albeit that it is called a screening assessment, had an inevitability about it which was self-fulfilling.  Both of these criticisms have varying degrees of validity and are unfortunate.  They have the capacity at least to undermine the evidence of the local authority as well as heighten the perception of unfairness where openness, fairness and rigour are undoubtedly required.  
63.	Whilst she too recognised that the local authority should have seen the father again, the guardian is criticised as well largely because it is said that her previous involvement with the older children has coloured her approach.  She approved the plan for foster care on Z’s birth without having seen the father.  I recognise that prior knowledge can cut both ways.  Whilst it undoubtedly has value, as Mr Greenhalgh stressed, it has to be tempered with a willingness to keep an open mind and assess the evidence as it currently is.  Thus F complains that the guardian has been unfair and it was suggested to her that she too had pre-determined that, whatever merits she may have, MC would not be able to provide the necessary safety that Z needs.
64.	I have borne all of these criticisms in mind and I approach the evidence of these two professionals with what I consider to be the appropriate degree of caution.  The evidence of each has to be put in its proper context.  Other checks and balances have to be considered along with other evidence before the court. Furthermore, ultimately the court’s assessment of the parents and MC, as well as the various disputed factual bases around which assessment falls to be made, although informed by professional evidence, is critical as I reminded Miss Lugg more than once when she emphasised that numerous matters were in issue, particularly during cross-examination of Mr Greenhalgh.
65.	The criticism of the local authority made by MC was in fact acknowledged by the children’s guardian when the application for an independent social work assessment was heard on 17 October.  As I have indicated, the guardian at that hearing said how impressed she had been with MC, by her parenting of Y and she indicated her disappointment that the local authority had not revisited its assessment, particularly in circumstances where MC had only just seen the papers now available to all of us.  The local authority’s response was at that stage a somewhat grudging one indicating that, whilst the only issue so far as MC was concerned was the ability to protect, that could be done by the court.  I thought there was force then in MC’s application supported by the guardian and reinforced by the local authority stance.  Hence I was persuaded that that assessment was not just reasonably required but necessary to ensure that degree of fairness and objectivity.  It seems to the court that whatever else may be said Mr Greenhalgh provided that and so along with my hearing her evidence I am satisfied that there has been a proper, fair and objective and independent assessment of MC.
66.	The position so far as F is concerned is less clear cut but the context is:
(i)	 a long and very comprehensively recorded history; 
(ii)	a recent assessment of F by the local authority and the guardian in the context of his application for contact to A and B;
(iii)	his dishonesty on the pregnancy being discovered in two respects, actively misleading the midwife and the dishonesty of omission in failing to tell the guardian when he was full of his new relationship that he was about to become a father for the sixth time;
(iv)	the robbery aside, the father had just been convicted of what I regard as the most serious form of threat to a witness in criminal proceedings.  His victim was a vulnerable young mother with, as Miss Woolrich suggested in closing, a really quite sadistic twist in implicating her baby just as his own partner was herself about to give birth to his baby.  As the guardian pointed out with some feeling, in many respects the father’s position when Z was born was the worst it had ever been, certainly in her dealings with him, because he was now in prison for a reasonably significant sentence and the mother and his baby likewise for even longer.
67.	In the circumstances, whilst the guardian acknowledged that it was not through want of trying that she did not get to see him before preparing her initial analysis, she said that she had good reason then and in retrospect to form the preliminary view that she did.  Likewise, whilst the guardian also recognised that no further local authority involvement was less than ideal, and I agree, on all the evidence I am not persuaded that F was thereby disadvantaged.
68.	Whatever one’s past, all parents are entitled to further chances.  It would be a depressing position if it were otherwise and it is certainly not the law as the Court of Appeal has emphasised in other analogous contexts.  But it seems to the court that it has been in a very good position to consider the issue on all the evidence before it, including that of the parents.
69.	So the position I find myself in is that, these criticisms aside, it seems to me that the social worker identified very clearly what this case is about, what the risk is that is posed and how ultimately the court is charged with making its own assessment of whether the risk is manageable.
70.	The really key witnesses therefore were the parents and MC.  They bring two sides of the same coin, risk on the one hand and the ability to protect on the other.  I saw them over a period of five days in and out of the witness box and it seemed that it gave the court a very good opportunity to judge them.  From all their points of view the evidence of the independent social worker must have been a disappointment.  A very experienced social worker, the initial optimism he revealed for MC in an email saying he was going to recommend contact forthwith was tempered when his report came and he did not recommend it.  That was an early warning that his undoubted and justified enthusiasm for MC was hedged with reservation and that became fully apparent in his oral evidence, such that emphasising his own personal non-pro adoption stance he nevertheless advocated it here.  Whatever else is said about the social worker and the guardian, the same cannot be said for Mr Greenhalgh, albeit his views were, I accept, significantly coloured by the guardian’s meeting with the father on 6 March.  Thus the court’s assessment of that is critical to the acceptance or otherwise of his analysis.
71.	So it is necessary to make some findings and it is right to begin with the robbery because in several ways it is directly relevant to risk.  The only direct evidence I heard was from M and F, albeit there were some pieces of evidence, such as comments allegedly made by M to the prison officer, repeated to the social worker, together with the interpretation of what F said to W when threatening her, that feeds into it.  There was also access to police disclosure.  I previously described as much of the robbery as I need to.  I note that neither parent chose to answer questions in interview.  M told me she had only glanced at the CCTV footage.  She did not look any further because she was “very disappointed and ashamed”, but she went on to say she did not know why she did it, that she was drunk and that she could not remember anyone encouraging her and she did not know who that person might have been “but it wasn’t F.”  She denied that whilst awaiting trial ten months later she or F had talked about who that person was.  She denied protecting F.  She denied that he had ever asked her who the man was:  “It was, like, my crime.  I take responsibility.  It was not our joint crime.”
72.	Whilst, as I have said, F readily admitted his acquittal without the case going to a jury, he had nothing more to say other than to acknowledge that it was an unprovoked, vicious assault.  He agreed someone was encouraging M, but it was not him.  He said he could not remember where he was at the time.  Asked what his defence was he said it was not guilty.  Eventually, on being pressed, he went on to say that he thought that he was in the flat nearby, albeit at another time he said he was outside, but it looked as though his defence, had it got to that point, was going to be in the nature of alibi, certainly not being involved.
73.	But having been warned that he did not have to incriminate himself, that if he chose not to answer questions that decision not to answer was something the court could take into account in determining this allegation, he said this:  
“I’m not going to incriminate myself in any way.  I’m not going to give any information about anyone there, or the criminal investigation that will probably proceed after this case.  I think if I say I saw it, it would incriminate myself.  I am choosing not to assist.”
74.	He went on to say that his relationship with the police was such that he would not help them with their enquiries.  He said he did not comment in the interview because it was not his policy to do so.  Asked if it was clear from the CCTV that the male who can be seen was largely responsible he said:  
“I don’t wish to assist you in that.  Anything around this matter I don’t wish to assist.  I don’t wish to answer if M was largely responsible.”
He went on later to say that in fact he knew who was encouraging M:  
“But I am denying it was me and I won’t tell you who it was.  It is a matter for M if she knows who it was.  I don’t know.  I haven’t asked M who it was.  She hasn’t told me.  I don’t wish to answer.”
Claiming he realised it was important to tell the truth and be open and honest he insisted he did not want to incriminate anyone.
75.	This is at the end of the day a straightforward fact finding exercise and I have already explained the law that applies.  There are several reasons why I am quite satisfied that the male encouraging M was the F:  
(i)	First, the person who was undoubtedly encouraging her to more and more violence knew who she was by name.  It was being shouted out:  “M, left and right her.” 
(ii)	Secondly, it happened right outside F’s home.  The evidence suggests that this couple are, colloquially, joined at the hip.  Everything that has been said and observed in this hearing, including the exchanges that I have noticed at the back of court, confirm that still to be the case.  
(iii)	Thirdly, the mother’s evidence that she was so drunk that she did not know who it was is incredible.  I do not believe her.  I think it is so improbable as to be incredible that someone could conduct such a sustained assault pursuant to theft on a person in such a state of intoxication that they could not identify a person known to them who was encouraging them.  
(iv)	Fourthly, the improbability of that is reinforced by the attempted denial on the part of both that, despite being jointly charged with a serious offence of robbery, they did not discuss who that person was, M saying:  “They had lots of other things to talk about apart from my crime.”  Indeed, M’s insistence right through to closing that it was “her crime” is a revelatory statement in itself that is contrary to the evidence that caused the Crown Court judge to describe the male as the half-wit who was obviously encouraging the attack, as well as showing a worrying willingness to protect the protagonist regardless of cost elsewhere, including to Z.
(v)	Fifthly, F’s evidence was equally incredible.  Claiming he was desperate for M not to go to prison, in my judgment, this was a calculated plan that would avoid his conviction and an inevitable lengthy sentence, a decision not to cooperate with the police in the hope that M’s youth and pregnancy, a planned pregnancy that followed a conception in about October 2013, would avoid her going to prison.
76.	Reminding myself of Macur LJ’s warning in Re: M about the assessment of parents during such proceedings, F’s body language and demeanour was really quite striking during this part of his evidence.  Having been so calm and controlled, he began rocking to and fro in the witness box, stretched, twisted and contorted his neck revealing deep discomfort at answering these questions from Miss Moulder in contrast to the otherwise controlled and calm delivery.  The more he was pressed the more apparent it became.  As the logic, or illogic, of his answers became more obvious, long pauses were introduced.  For example, when asked if M had not told him who it was, the pause was eventually to be replaced with “I don’t wish to answer” and an unmistakeable smirk.
(vi)	Sixthly, that was characteristic of him.  It was, I am satisfied, evident when the guardian saw him on 6 March when described something very similar when she confronted him and told him that she had seen him on the television and thought it was him.  It was a rare drop of guard by him.  Having read it described by the guardian I did not expect to witness it myself.  I did and it left me with the very clear impression that I was not being told the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth.
(vii)	Seventhly, despite his convoluted explanation about punctuation, I consider that telling W “you are going to get what U got off me” is a direct reference to his involvement.
77.	Miss Lugg points to the fact that one witness talks of a man of 22, of someone who is six feet tall, with mousey hair and wearing a hoody.  There are undoubtedly discrepancies that I am sure influenced the Crown Prosecution Service decision not to proceed.  But on the evidence I have seen and heard and on each parent being given the chance to explain, I find that I am persuaded that it is more likely than not that the male in the CCTV footage is indeed F who has, in conjunction with M, drawn on his considerable experience to bring about the most favourable outcome possible in the circumstances.  I am satisfied that I have not been told the truth by either parent and accordingly finding 6 in the local authority document is proved.
78.	This finding has these consequences:  
(i)	First, neither parent emerges from this with credit.  They have been disbelieved and found to be collusive.  
(ii)	Secondly, it falls into a long pattern of denial, particularly on F’s part.
(iii)	Thirdly, it is the opposite of openness and honesty that is necessary to have confidence in the future of the intentions of these parents.  
(iv)	Fourthly, it is a denial of responsibility, but more importantly a failure to recognise where the priorities for Z lie.  
(v)	Fifthly, it is a very worrying contraindication of support, cooperation and honesty for a family placement going forwards.
79.	I accept, as I am asked, that merely because a person has lied on one matter it does not follow that they are to be disbelieved on others, the criminal case of R v Lucas.  There is, I can see, a powerful motive not to incriminate oneself and it does not follow that the parents are to be regarded as dishonest on every other issue. But having found that the parents have been, and have done so not just on a matter of such importance but in a way that calls into question their ability to work openly and honestly, this finding does inevitably mean that assessing their good faith in contending that each has turned a corner in all other respects has to be conducted with very particular care because this lie, as I have found, has direct implications for that contention.
80.	Since the focus is acutely on F, it is necessary to consider his argument that the sentence he received on 16 December 2012 for a street robbery marked the turning point.  It falls to be considered in two ways.  First of all, objectively in the light of subsequent events, does it?  Contextually, does the history give confidence that this really is a new dawn?
81.	In F’s favour is his cooperation with one to one work following the discovery of the pregnancy, his willingness to attend the perpetrator programme, thwarted for reasons beyond his control, his participation in Incredible Years, a parenting course, all conceded by the social worker.  His probation officer, Amy Hanson, recognised that he had taken steps to address drug and alcohol misuse and she contrasted favourably his presentation in prison with an earlier telephone conversation she had had with him.  He had expressed enthusiasm for more courses, including the perpetrator programme, and it is unfortunate that his offending behaviour programme cannot start until the autumn, but that is not his fault although Ms Hanson warned that it would be the real test for him, it would be onerous, particularly the group work which F was not keen on doing.
82.	Without labouring his criminal record, he was plainly given a chance in December 2012 following the commission of a street robbery.  It did not prevent him from being arrested in June 2013 but gaps of that sort are not unknown.  There was a gap of seven months between arrests in 2012, a gap of eleven months between convictions in 2011 to 2012 and longer gaps can be found in 2007/8 where there is 15 months, 2008/9 15 months and 2009/10 13 months.
83.	As I have found, despite his acquittal, the robbery in August 2013 was a serious offence.  It was in breach of a court order and it is one for which, as matters stand, no explanation has been offered.  What is also clear is that its seriousness he recognised and from an early stage it seems that a clear strategy was developed from the time of him being arrested in August 2013 to ensure that the fallout was as small as possible, namely, his acquittal and M gaining a community service because by now she was pregnant, something he had made very clear to the social worker in his meeting with her last year.
84.	He was only partly successful in that regard as we know, but his response to the failure of M to avoid custody was about as unrestrained as could be imagined.  I have described his threats already.  His contention that they were drink fuelled simply does not add up.  Claiming that he had drunk three cans, what most would describe as a really modest amount of drink, the offences were committed over a period of eleven hours.  It is difficult to determine the truth of what he says about it.  The drink he says he took cannot sensibly explain such a complete loss of control and therefore he has either minimised that or he is seeking to attribute a cause to his behaviour which is not the true cause and he knows it.  Having given a no reply interview on that occasion again he ended it by speaking to the police “I don’t want to give you anything and no comment.  You stitch us up all the time.  I am giving you fuck all.”
85.	The drink explanation now offered is as concerning as his behaviour subsequently.  He attempted not once but twice to deny that the offending involved phone calls.  The first time was to his probation officer who noted as much in the pre-sentence report.  His bluff was called and he was threatened with a Newton hearing to determine the truth.  What was more, that hearing was believed to be going to be put before the judge who had sentenced M and whose sentencing remarks towards her make it very clear what he believed to be F’s role in the robbery. Faced with the chance of being sentenced by a different judge he accepted the phone calls only to go on and deny them again, I am satisfied, as recently as to the guardian on 6 March, something he admitted was a lie to her.  Faced with the evidence, namely, his sentencing remarks made to him in July, he has again had to admit the telephone calls, but it is characteristic of him that he does so only when the room for manoeuvre is nil and he is boxed in.  
86.	This is not the conduct of a remorseful past offender who has fallen off the wagon and experienced what he called in evidence in chief “a little blip” before belatedly correcting himself to say, “well, a massive blip”, thereby revealing what he really thought of what he had done.  This is minimisation and denial of significant responsibility, all of which makes his moment of revelation so difficult to accept at face value.  On every level this offence is as concerning as it could possibly be and very difficult to reconcile with someone who has turned over a new leaf.  It is a prime and recent example of what F is capable when something does not go his way.  Whilst I do not ignore the work that I have acknowledged he has done since December 2012, as his probation officer said, it all has to be seen in the context of these proceedings as well as to, as the court finds, serious subsequent offences. 
87.	At this point the longer history is important.  This was explored comprehensively with the father by Miss Woolrich and I have, of course, read it all.  It is not so much the circumstances leading to the 2006/7 litigation that are relevant as F’s response.  There is a vast amount of evidence even within the heavily restricted volume of material that by agreement I was given.  But the then social worker identified dishonesty as being a significant risk going forwards, as well as the difficulty that F and FP had responding to authority and taking personal responsibility.  He identified work that was essential, a perpetrator programme, to cooperate with the probation officer, to cooperate with psychological assessment and attend a parenting course.  He said the pattern of regular police involvement had to be broken.  It was necessary for those parents to demonstrate that they were working openly and honestly.  The final suggestion that he made was that consideration be given to random drug testing.  Save for possibly the latter, if I give F that credit, these are all still issues today.
88.	The most comprehensive psychological assessment followed by a very experienced and robust family psychologist, Mrs Estelle Louw, and from that report I take the fact that F cooperated, or appeared to, fully.  He made clear admissions about his past drinking.  He insisted to her he was not drinking.  His admissions about drugs she noted were more qualified.  Interestingly, despite what is described as “considerable pressure” he remained calm and balanced throughout.  He had identified changes that needed to be made and talked of the recognition of the benefit of spending quality time with FP.  He described the removal of A and B as devastating, a shock, a threat he had not taken seriously.  He and FP were responsible, especially him, he said.  The children did not deserve this and he would make it up to them.  He had already started working with professionals and hoped that it had been noticed.  He would do anything asked of him.  Noting that he had not been a reliable individual or historian, he readily accepted how bad his behaviour had been, how he could not continue to live his life like that, stating his views, Mrs Louw said, “firmly and with evident emotion.”  
89.	As she concluded that the possibility for change existed should he follow through, she described: 
“A tentative first step only recently developed and F would need to prove that this attitude is long lasting and consistent before the children’s safety could be ensured.”
90.	Describing him as:  
“Very committed to work and to demonstrate his good will, making apparently free and fulsome admissions of guilt about his approach to the local authority as well as the fact of his children being removed, it was noted that the perpetrator programme had assessed him as an excellent candidate but the signs of change were very fragile still.”
91.	That was not all because the children’s guardian was then Mrs Debbie Gaskin, a very experienced guardian who is now a well known independent practitioner.  Her final analysis reveals that he had participated fully in an anger management course in which he was described as “highly motivated and engaged” demonstrating good insight, good understanding, the ability to develop alternative strategies and a significant shift in his management of anger.  Indeed, such progress had been made that no further treatment or intervention was recommended.  She identified the scepticism that the local authority nevertheless held, but despite that F’s good engagement resulted in the successful return of the children and both parents were noted following their return, before proceedings were concluded, to “continue to work openly with all professionals and have an excellent relationship with the social worker.”  Mrs Gaskin’s conclusion was that FP and F had “without exception” cooperated well with professionals despite the background, made significant progress despite their difficult starts to life and identified clear potential going forwards.  Her final recommendation of no order was ultimately, as I say, accepted.
92.	In 2010, again it is not necessary to detail just how badly it went wrong, but understandably Mrs Louw was asked to report again.  She found a man in a very different place.  She noted minimisation to the point of absurdity.  For example, he claimed that cocaine seen on his nose by the police had been a consequence of being forced to sniff a line.  She noted minimisation of the consequences of what the children had experienced.  She noted his very strong anti-professional approach and his complaint that his family had been victimised.  She noted his denial of violence, praying in aid his success on the anger management course, seeking to distinguish, as he put it, between being assertive rather than aggressive.  She noted how sincere she felt that he had been in 2007, insistent that being a father was what gave him the motivation to change, but pointed out that there were some warning signs even then, such as minimisation, albeit as we know she ultimately concluded there were enough promising signs.  Her own assessment identified no positives about his capacity and willingness to change: “He is likely to avoid and minimise in order to maintain his own choice of lifestyle.”
93.	Her previous recommendation for therapy had not been accepted. She found his view more entrenched and said:  
“At the age of 28 capacity for change is getting less, especially in a situation where he presented as now acknowledging less concern about his own behaviours and has not acted to provide his children with a different environment as he was so insistent previously that he would.”
It should be noted that even in this second, less favourable, assessment by Mrs Louw the emotion on display in 2007 and again before me in 2015 was present.  She described how he spoke “tearfully about how much he cared for his children.”  
94.	Despite that very negative view, there was an independent social work report as well, this time from Lynn Appleby, who was able to report the parents as being very cooperative, very open to learning, willing to be flexible and responsive and showing signs of establishing stability in their lives and commitments and maintaining it.  All that said, however, her assessment ultimately was negative because the risk was too great.
95.	I make no apology for setting this out at some length because it seems to the court that it is directly relevant to its assessment of the F’s presentation and expressions of good intent going forwards.  I have been reminded of the 2007 evidence.  F said there was much detail that he could not remember.  That was not unreasonable.  But I was surprised by his inability to remember that he had indicated his fulsome commitment to work and the need to prove that he could maintain it.  Rather grudgingly, it seemed to me, he conceded that he “must have been doing the right things then.”  In the context of his “total shock” at his then two children being removed and his desperation to get them back, something he is so anxious to avoid here, that was a surprising lapse of memory.  He agreed it had all gone wrong again.  He agreed that he and FP had impressed on the independent social worker their willingness to work, ultimately unsuccessfully, but he characterised what he had said to Mrs Louw as “being in denial”.  He said that when he in denial he tells lies.
96.	Put in the context of his threats to W, for example, he sought to deny that he was then angry, praying in aid what he had learned on the anger management course I have mentioned.  He only reluctantly accepted that he probably was angry when he rang her up, but I think as some form of mitigation he went on to say that he had not taken it out on her physically, implying that somehow it was less serious.  It is the court’s judgment that this again minimises the effect of what he did and that has to be pointed out to him and he be pressed on it before he acknowledges it.
97.	The parallels with how he now presents and what he says to the court compared in varying degrees with 2007 and 2010 are stark and compelling.  Mrs Louw’s warning of the limited capacity to change at the age of 28, five years ago, is therefore particularly concerning.  This is in the context of assessing the claimed change brought about in December 2012, the key date that F identifies.  He says that from a life that was chaotic up until then with drink and drugs and past behaviour that was “totally unacceptable” and being ashamed, the very words he used with Mrs Louw in 2007, he began the process of change and he had never felt, as he said, so fresh, motivated and committed.  It seems to the court that these are all words of intent that he has used before.
98.	He pointed to his work with NECA, with probation on victim awareness, all of which preceded the threats to W.  Recognising as the court does that Rome was not built in a day it is still the case that following the suspended sentence for a robbery itself committed on bail, the alcohol treatment requirement that was imposed was extended for a breach for failure to comply with its requirements in August 2013, in July 2013 he was arrested and subsequently pleaded guilty to being drunk and disorderly at a time when he said he had stopped drinking, another offence when he was on bail.  By then he had been arrested for theft to which ten months later he pleaded guilty.  Meanwhile, on my finding, he participated in another street robbery in breach of a suspended sentence for a like offence.  What can be said is that there is no evidence of any other offending from 9 July 2013 until he threatened W on 8 June 2014.  That is a period of eleven months.  However, that has to be put in the context of past gaps of an even greater length in offending as I have already noted and it is therefore not impressive, particularly when the seriousness of the offences I have had to consider is taken into account.
99.	What other signs are there?  Offending aside, information from South Tyneside Community Treatment Team in early 2014 points to longstanding problems with anxiety and depression as well as psychotic symptoms enhanced by drink and drug use, the latter enhancing the risk of impulsive and aggressive outbursts.  There were hospital admissions in September 2013.  Later that month there was an accident and emergency admission when he was under the influence of drink, expressing suicidal ideation.  There were issues around sustaining tenancies, being evicted for antisocial behaviour in 2013.
100.	That said, in November of that year there was an assertion that he had changed his attitude to social services and the system generally, albeit that did not translate into openness around the mother’s pregnancy.  He told me that his past experience back to childhood with the local authority had not been pleasant and in reports, as he put it, “they twist and turn”, are good at pointing out the negatives and he added, perhaps not without reason, “a little ‘well done’ would have helped.”
101.	Indicating that he wanted to prove that he could change, he was asked about a complaint made by the social worker that he was just paying lip service to all of this, derived from her note of their meeting in August, that he was “covering all angles and ticking all boxes”.  He denied that this was his phrase.  He suggested it was that of the social worker.  This has to be considered in the context of the guardian’s meeting with him in March.  The report of that interview only came to light in her final report on 13 May and it was made clear at the outset of this hearing that it was very contentious.  The cross-examination of Mr Greenhalgh, who was so obviously alarmed by it that it firmed up his opinion, was actually interrupted at one point by Miss Lugg who stressed that the contents were not agreed as being accurate.  It is, of course, for the court to decide, but by the time the evidence was finished it seems to me that the evidence was not in fact nearly as contentious as had been implied.  I felt that there was a shift, and almost certainly one brought about by the production of the guardian’s very detailed, hand written notes kept by her because she told me of her experience of F not accepting the truth of accounts subsequently relayed.
102.	The report and notes were much scrutinised and from it he agreed that he had said that the placement with MC would be for “the foreseeable future”, which he said would be until she was 13 or 16, or an age when she could decide herself, giving a very curious explanation for mentioning 13 by reference to the age that some airlines charge children as adults.  He agreed that he had said that he thought he could parent Z, that is to say now, but in evidence he qualified by saying that what he had meant was that that was in an “ideal world”.  He agreed that he had been negative about the local authority, although he said it was more saying things that he did not agree with rather than asserting that it had lied, as he and M undoubtedly did in accusing the social worker of misleading them into thinking that if they worked with the local authority they would be able to keep the baby.
103.	He agreed he had said, on being asked what contact he would like, that he would start with once a week, increasing as they proved themselves.  When the guardian pointed out that this was an unusually high level, she recorded that this was how his lawyers “sold it to me”.  He took grave exception to the use of the word “sold” saying he would not have used it but then went on to say that what he had actually said was that they had “told” him different.  He agreed that he had told the guardian that he was very unhappy with his solicitor and counsel and would sack them if they did not ask the “right” questions or let him speak.  He continued to deny, however, that he had only agreed to placement with MC on legal advice or that his mother would apply for contact, saying that the guardian must have misheard or twisted things.  He also denied, in the context of his criticism of the local authority, that he had said he was a victim.
104.	In standing by her contemporaneous notes, which I have read and accept as such, the guardian said that from what he told her she takes first of all a lack of genuine acceptance of a permanent placement, a view supported by the local authority, the social worker telling me that whatever the parents may have said they see this placement as a holding position as well as having a wholly unrealistic view of the role that they would have in such an arrangement in terms of contact.  The guardian also took a complete lack of confidence that there would be cooperation with the local authority, the important thing that Mr Greenhalgh emphasized.
105.	It all feeds into the social work assessment of F saying and meaning that he was “ticking the boxes”, but then in March the guard was dropped, as it has been before.  So, to take that particular phrase it is synonymous with him saying to Mrs Louw in 2007 that he and FP had to “jump through the hoops”, another phrase that he claimed he would not have used.  
106.	Likewise, casting himself as the victim, as I am satisfied he did to the guardian who wrote it down in quotation marks and told him that she was doing so, he was simply repeating what he had said to Mrs Louw in 2010.  Whilst I accept that F is not happy that Ms Firth is the guardian, a very experienced and professional guardian at that, I simply cannot accept that, as F characterized it, she has deliberately twisted what he said.  Even he acknowledged that to say as much “makes me sound daft”.  But, despite sitting watching the guardian write it all down, I am satisfied that he did not attempt to restrain himself on that occasion, only expressing the wish now that the interview had been tape recorded.  I am afraid it all fits with his smirking on being challenged that he was a party to the robbery.
107.	Whilst Mr Greenhalgh obviously did not know the outcome of what I regard as an ultimately limited factual dispute from that document his alarm at what was reported at the meeting was considerable.  It called into question, he said, the admission F made at the beginning of the hearing, the contradiction, the inconsistency and what he said was the very worrying tone.  Of the robbery, to which I found F was a party, Mr Greenhalgh had said that it would be a huge concern that F was encouraging M.  It fitted a pattern of denial.  The attack was awful and honesty was required from both parents and thus there was a failure of responsibility as well as priorities.
108.	Whilst it is acknowledged that F has had limited time to prove himself whilst he has been at large, I cannot accept Miss Callaghan’s contention that two months of no offending or other concerning behaviour is evidence of change put in the context I have sought to explain at length.  I cannot accept either that staying off drink and drugs itself is the answer.  It is, of course, part of it, but the history shows that drink and drugs are the symptoms, not the cause.  As Mrs Gaskin pointed out in 2007, it is the father’s early and adolescent experiences that contribute to his anger and aggression.  Despite what he did in 2007 with regard to anger, it remains a real and serious issue as the threats to W prove and which he has, as I say, continued at times to try and avoid.
109.	Whilst, as Miss Lugg said, he accepted that he intended to scare W and recognised the effect on her, which is a level of honesty and insight it is only, in the court’s judgment, when faced with evidence from which there is no wriggling or minimising, such as he had attempted over the phone calls, that his obvious basic intelligence forces him to say the necessary thing.  He has a long history of that, as 2007 and to an extent 2010 show, and his assertion that it went wrong there because of being in denial does not begin to meet the deep seated endemic problem.
110.	I accept, as Miss Lugg said, that these are very difficult attitudes to change.  My concern is that there is really no evidence of durable or sustainable change and, just because he is devoted to M, as I am sure he is, that is no guarantee.  One only has to look at what he said about FP and his older children that persuaded the experts in 2007 with such disastrous consequences for those children. 
111.	So although this is a different mother and a different child, the situation is indistinguishable from them and the confidence, if anything, is significantly less for the reasons that Mrs Louw gave in 2010.  He is now 33.  It is therefore my reluctant but unhesitating conclusion that the risk that F poses is of a very considerable order indeed.  He has unaddressed issues that are deep rooted and life long and have played themselves out in a disastrous way right up to his imprisonment in July 2014.  They go beyond drink and drugs.  They encompass a complete lack of confidence in his ability to be open and honest and therefore a reliable partner in any long term plan with the authorities.  It is my assessment that he has consistently shown that he has the intelligence to behave, to engage and to say broadly the right things when he deems it necessary to do so, but equally the inability to apply that in a consistent, reliable or safe way.  The danger he poses is nowhere more clearly exemplified than by the last crime of which he was convicted.
112.	The consequences for M are considerable because, despite her difficulties and vulnerability and what she herself has had to admit, my view of her is altogether more favourable.  As I discussed with Miss Miller, whatever problems she presents with, and she does, the management of them would be a task of a wholly different order were F not to be implicated.  M’s efforts to put herself in a position to care for Z have been considerable.  The work she did before her sentence and that done in prison do represent progress.  It is all untested, of course, as she acknowledged, but by itself it may be a good foundation for moving forwards and I hope that she is correct when she identifies her prison sentence as giving her the wake up call she needed.  She and her daughter have already undoubtedly paid a very heavy personal price and she does not seek to avoid responsibility for that.
113.	However, within that personal responsibility is her continued contention that, for example, the robbery was her crime.  I simply do not accept that analysis.  I did not believe what she told me about it and the worrying thing is her denial of responsibility on F’s part in the face of what must have been clear evidence to her.  That denial is significant because, in the court’s judgment, it does go to underline her emotional complete dependence on F, apparent to all professionals and indeed to the court.  Rightly or wrongly she has aligned herself to him and has thereby paid a very high price in terms of offending of an order of a magnitude several times anything she had done before and now in relation to her separation from her first child born in the most difficult circumstances.  Listening to her I cannot tell whether she simply cannot see the risk that F poses or recognises it and chooses to deny it, but either way it is very concerning. 
114.	I fully accept that M is not the author of her own vulnerability.  She is a victim of her own childhood in exactly the same way as F.  Although she has worked hard, particularly with regard to parenting and drink work, as the impressive folder of certificates she gave me to look at shows, she too has significant unresolved issues.  Even before the robbery she had an unenviable police record, punctuated with violence at the ages of 14 and 17.  Her capacity for violence is all too apparent from the CCTV footage.  Nor do I accept that, however much of a problem she had with drink, it is the cause.  The drink is, in her case, a symptom of her underlying issues and they have not been addressed, albeit keeping off the drink, as with F’s case, if sustained on release is a good start.
115.	Whatever progress she has made has to be seen in the context of a return to F on her day of release.  She is ten years younger than him and, although she says she is stronger and more confident, even her counsel can see that she cannot control him but would hope to have some influence over him.  Only time will tell.
116.	So having assessed this risk the court has to consider the parents’ real intentions.  For her part I think that M, by herself, is probably genuine in her expressed position that she accepts Z living with MC for her minority, despite her efforts to try and put herself in a position where she could be a carer.  Albeit I do not think that she reached that view as early as October as she asserts the court.  The professionals were not told, I am satisfied, until January and it is not without significance that this followed Mr Greenhalgh’s report.
117.	By contrast, I have absolutely no confidence in F’s similarly stated position, even seeking to accept no contact in contrast to the weekly contact that he wanted to start with in March.  He has demonstrated himself over a long period of time to be untrustworthy and saying what he thinks people need to hear.  Despite his admission, which he has offered previously as far back as 2007, he remains, in the court’s view, in denial.  His assertion that he can care, his ambitions for contact only recently toned down, are all inconsistent with a settled intention to support placement elsewhere long term.  The underlying issues remain ever present and are highly likely to re-erupt when, for whatever reason, he does not get his own way.  He may believe that he will not seek to care for Z but there is no confidence that he will believe the same in six, twelve or 24 months time. 
118.	Furthermore, as Miss Woolrich said in closing, these are parents who together do not bring out the best in each other.  Just as M continues to protect F to this day, if F changes his mind about Z living with MC or any other matter around such an arrangement, despite his assertion that he is “lucky” that she would be placed there, there is presently very little that will prevent him from reverting to type.  The probation officer, it seemed to me, sounded a very cautious note about the offending behaviour programme that is yet to begin.
119.	Therefore the risk, in the court’s judgment, is a very real one.  It will be present for as long as the underlying issues remain unaddressed.  Whether it is demanding more contact, more involvement, fewer restrictions or a return to the parents’ care, it is a risk of the disruption of the most serious kind given what is known each is capable of, F particularly alone, but also M under F’s influence.  F asked in the witness box, rhetorically, if this meant he could never have children.  It does not, but he needs over a prolonged period of time to demonstrate that he has addressed his issues and thereafter by his conduct over a sustained period of time show that he really has demonstrated change.
120.	Care proceedings, of course, involve two principal questions, the threshold criteria for making a care order and, if so, what the order should make.  It is not disputed in this case that the threshold criteria are satisfied and the one issue that remained outstanding I have resolved.  So I need now to concentrate on the second issue as to what order the court has to make.  I apply well established principles in doing so, bearing in mind the rights of the parents and Z, under Article 8 of the European Convention, to respect for family and private life.  Under s.1 of the Children Act 1989, Z’s welfare is my paramount consideration in the care proceedings.  Delay in making decisions concerning her future is likely to prejudice her welfare.  The checklist of factors to be taken into account in determining where her welfare lies has to be considered and above all, particularly here, her exposure to the risk of harm.
121.	There is an application for a placement order so s.1 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 Act applies.  My paramount consideration is the child’s welfare throughout her life.  Delay is also a relevant factor and there is another checklist of factors to be taken into account, particularly the likely effect on her throughout her life of ceasing to be a member of her birth family and becoming an adopted person.  The court must also, of course, have regard to her relationship with her birth relatives, particularly her parents and, in this case, her aunt and the value of that relationship continuing.  Of acute focus, which I will come to shortly, is the aunt’s ability and willingness to provide her with the secure environment that she needs.
122.	Finally, just dealing with the statutory provisions, of course I cannot make a placement order unless satisfied that both parents consent.  No such consent is forthcoming and so the court ultimately would have to consider its power under section 52 to dispense with their consent if satisfied that the welfare of Z required consent to be dispensed with.  
123.	These provisions have been subjected to analysis in a number of important decisions by the higher courts, particularly the Supreme Court in Re: B (A Child) [2013] UKSC 33 and the Court of Appeal in Re: B-S (Children) [2013] EWCA Civ 1146 and the cases that follow.  I have had these very much in mind throughout this hearing.  The Supreme Court reminded us that the test for severing a relationship is a very strict one such that it should only occur in exceptional circumstances where motivated by overriding requirements pertaining to the child’s welfare.  In short, where nothing else will do.  It is pointed out in that case that, in many cases, the feared harm has not yet materialised and may never do so.  Hence the importance of exploring and attempting alternative solutions.  As Lord Neuberger said, such a plan is a last resort where no other course is possible.  
124.	The stringency of the test was emphasised by the Court of Appeal in Re: B-S where the President identified the need for proper evidence both from the local authority and the guardian addressing all the options realistically possible, with an analysis of the arguments for and against, together with the second thing identified by the President, namely an adequately reasoned judgment, thereby approving what was said in Re: G  about the judicial task being to undertake a global and holistic evaluation of the options.
125.	In this case all acknowledge that there are only two real options, placement with MC or adoption.  Whilst long term foster care under a care order with a stranger would be an option, no party has argued for it and it is not suggested it should be regarded as realistic.  Indeed, the local authority, having considered it as part of placement with MC, rejects it because of the disruption and intrusion it would bring into Z’s life preventing her from having a normal childhood.  Mr Greenhalgh argued that she should have the same opportunity as her siblings to be placed in an adoptive family for that very reason, if the placement with MC could not be adequately safeguarded.  No one has contended in the event that the analysis or evidence was deficient in this regard.  The options are therefore stark.
126.	The parents and MC urge me to place Z with her under whatever order would secure Z’s future and with whatever other restrictions, orders or agreements would reinforce that plan.  F agrees to forego contact.  M agrees to accept whatever contact she is offered.  She told me of the life changing effect of prison and her determination to support Z with the best mother figure she could imagine.  As I have said, they deny an ulterior motive.  Miss Miller urged on me the increasing insight M has developed, her engagement and responsibility and acceptance of the situation in which she finds herself and she reminded me that M’s own experiences in care reinforce her wish for Z to enjoy something different.
127.	F’s counsel asked me to accept the frustration he feels with professionals and the sense he has not been given a fair chance.  His considerable efforts to turn his life around were urged on me, along with his love for M, sustained now over many months, as the constant spur to continue to improve himself.  She said that the probation officer, whilst cautious, nevertheless had a note of some optimism as well.  She reminded me that he had never attempted to undermine the placements with his older children.
128.	Miss Callaghan says that a combination of emerging signs of change and MC’s robustness should give the court confidence that she can provide the necessary degree of protection.  Not wholly risk free protection, which is unattainable, but to be weighed against the risks associated with adoption, thereby ensuring that Z has the best possible type of placement, namely, a family one.  
129.	By contrast, the local authority with the guardian, recognising MC’s merits, say the risk is too great and really turns on taking F at his word.  In the absence of sufficient evidence that he is changing, what is proposed is too risky and may result in what should be a final placement breaking down at quite the worst time for Z.
130.	Between them the following positives and negatives were identified.  The former includes placement in the family, giving the opportunity to be placed with a family member.  It enables direct links with the birth mother and maybe the father to be maintained.  Z’s sense of identity as part of the birth family is maintained.  The undoubted quality of care that Z would receive would include much love and affection that MC will offer and the bona fides of MC are self-evident.
131.	Set against that there is the risk that is posed by F is of high order.  Whilst of a much lesser order on her own M, in conjunction with the malevolent influence of F, is a further risk.  Neither parent can be trusted in their support for this placement throughout Z’s minority.  The parents do not recognise that risk or dismiss it and MC underestimates it.  The risk could only be managed in what would be a highly intrusive way for Z as well as for MC and Y.  Disruption in one form or another is highly likely and the risk of breakdown and the consequences that follow would be disastrous.
132.	So far as adoption is concerned, the alternative, the advantages are that in all probability Z’s emotional and physical needs would be fully met in a placement where she would be claimed.  She would be placed with carers who had been comprehensively assessed as having a capacity to look after a child and specifically matched to be suitable to meet her needs.  There is no likelihood that Z would suffer significant harm in the care of adopters where she would be safe and secure and not exposed to the degree of risk of harm arising from attempts to undermine her placement.  As a consequence she would have an opportunity to lead a normal life, free from statutory interference, in a secure environment where she would have a good chance of developing into a balanced, emotionally stable person.  She is 11 months old.  At this age she will be able to manage the transition from foster care to adoption without suffering undue harm.
133.	Set against that, she would lose the chance of being brought up by a family member who would, I know, love and cherish her.  She would lose the potential of relationships with her mother and father and extended family members.  Such relationships are, of course, extremely valuable to a child even where relatives cannot care for that child.  She would lose her sense of identity as a member of her birth family and a person’s identity is an important aspect of their development.
134.	Finally, although most adoptions are successful, a not insignificant number breakdown resulting in further emotional harm to the child.  The professionals all reminded me that adoption should only be considered when absolutely necessary and in the child’s best interests.  A firm recommendation is therefore made by each of them that this plan is required.
135.	So that brings me to MC, whose merits are plain.  Her good intentions are obvious.  Her ability to meet Z’s needs on a day to day basis is unquestioned.  Uninterrupted Z would have the prospect of a secure and nurturing childhood where no one doubts that she would be loved every bit as much as Y is.  
136.	As I have previously said, central to the success of such a plan is the permission of the parents, freely given and for the duration of Z’s minority, as Mr Greenhalgh repeatedly emphasised.  The professionals all doubt that and, ultimately, so have I.  That is not by itself an end of the matter because MC is very determined to prove that she can manage the risk.  The issue it seems now to the court is, what is the risk that she thinks she can manage or, put another way, does she recognise the same degree of risk that the professionals and the court have identified?
137.	I have to say that I found her evidence in this regard to be disappointing despite her otherwise being a very attractive, appealing, warm, maternal young woman.  It was these answers that really caused me the greatest concern. Having under cross examination by Miss Moulder, with a degree of reluctance, accepted that her written evidence pointed to an increasing realisation that she could not manage F’s behaviour, (her statement in September says so very plainly as did that in January), she insisted that she was not able to say that she could or she could not, rather “I can but try”, which itself imported a significant recognition that she may yet fail.  I fully accept, as Miss Callaghan pressed on me, that children cannot be protected from every harm that may exist, but the balancing exercise of course has to weigh the magnitude of the risk alongside the seriousness of the harm if the risk materialises.  I was surprised to hear MC say that she did not accept the degree of influence that F has over M.  Of course MC knows M well.  She cut off her ties with her in the past because of her own view of M’s bad behaviour.  I do not doubt her when she says that M has her own mind, thus suggesting some independence of thought from F.  Of course, MC did not have the court’s assessment of the robbery at the time she said this, but she heard the same evidence that we all heard and it concerned me that she thereby underestimates F’s potential influence over M.
138.	What caused me the greatest concern, however, was her statement of increased confidence in the ability of F to be trusted.  I accept she does not know him.  She has barely clapped eyes on him, save in court.  She has had the advantage of reading the historical papers and I am sure that the task of assessing an individual the way that the professionals and the court must is alien to her normal day to day existence.  Her view of him, therefore, was very different to mine and the professionals from whom I heard.  I think in part that is due to her being a genuinely nice person unwilling to think the worst and keen to see the best.  For much of the time F was trying hard, as he has in the past, to ensure that that was what was seen.  But having said at one point that obviously she could not trust what he said, she could not say one way or another that he would not disrupt the placement. She said more than once that she had been made more confident by what she had heard from him and, despite his history, said that he could still be trusted.  The return of A and B to his care and his then promises broken so soon did not alter her view.  She thought that he would respect orders because of the consequences for Z, despite the consequences for A and B being removed not once but twice.  I found that evidence to be surprising and troubling because, whilst it was not a denial, it was an optimistic view and in the court’s judgment an overoptimistic view that was surprisingly naïve in view of what has gone before.
139.	The focus on disruption in her mind appeared primarily to be of F turning up at the house.  She explained how she would call the police, and I have no doubt she would, and she would get the children upstairs and out of the way.  On being asked, she said it worried her that she might receive messages like those W received, but her response was still that she would trust him.  There was, in the court’s judgment, very little reflection on the impact that this would have on her own sense of integrity and security, let alone the children in her care.  Those were threats of a direct nature that would disrupt.  They could not but undermine her security and in turn that would have an impact on the care of Z and indeed Y.
140.	Considering more subtle matters, such as increasing pressure for more or different types of contact, she largely dismissed this saying that she did not think that F would seek to join M’s contact, attributing to him continued reliance on his word, a rational and consistent response to events.  I do not think that she has considered just how much disruption this type of pressure causes and she underestimated significantly just how irrational yet determined he can become.  Although she considered that both parents think that they can care for Z, and in M’s case she volunteered that she would be a very good parent, she appeared to dismiss out of hand the suggestion that this could lead to disruption, still less apply to care for Z in due course.
141.	Although not at the forefront of the court’s considerations, I think I should mention the mother’s partner, CP.  As I have mentioned, very sadly, the final illness of his grandmother coincided with this hearing.  Entirely understandably he wanted to be with her and she in fact died last Friday when he was due to give evidence.  It was, however, disappointing that he felt emotionally unable to come to court on Monday.  Indeed, I was told that he would not be able to come at all this week because of his bereavement.  I do, of course, understand how upsetting a loss it is that he has suffered, although I am having to look forward to plans for a person whose life has just begun.  
142.	His part in that life is, on MC’s plan, to be a significant one.  I do not for present purposes attach any significance to difficulties that he and MC may have had in the past, albeit it does concern me that when MC was assessed, CP appeared very reluctant to participate in the process.  His own first statement really points to him seeing himself as having a role in supporting her wish rather than having a wish of his own, and his very short later statement he expresses shock at what he had now read and learned and concern at the extent of F’s offending.  Insofar as one can form an impression of his view, it is a much more cautious one than I felt MC adopted.
143.	I also note, and again do not seek to emphasise, that Y has a diagnosis of a genetic disorder of Marfan Syndrome, which has as yet an uncertain prognosis.  Like her, I very much hope that Y’s condition follows the apparent course of the other paternal family members who have it, but the possibility that Y will one day be a child with greater care needs than another child of her own age cannot be dismissed as wholly fanciful.  
144.	There is, therefore, drawing all this together in the court’s mind, a degree of mismatch between the extent of the risk posed, particularly by F, and the acceptance and understanding of its magnitude and consequences on the part of MC.  That, therefore, explains the difference in approach to the issue of measures that could be taken with the help of the relevant authorities and agencies to minimise that risk.  MC and the parents suggest a raft of measures, such as no contact, supervised contact to M, injunctions, written agreements and so on.  The ultimate measure in a case like this, relocation, had been considered by MC, but ultimately and understandably was ruled out because of her local ties and the advantage that they bring to Y in particular.
145.	By contrast the local authority, the guardian and Mr Greenhalgh all say that these measures simply do not suffice to reduce the risk to manageable proportions and that is because, fundamentally, it is conditional on continued parental cooperation.  The issue of honesty being central, that cannot be assured.  Injunctions and written agreements are only as good as the willingness of those bound by them to abide by them and there is here, unfortunately, an established history of non-compliance with orders going back years.  The fact that this relates to F’s child is really no indicator that he will treat them differently to any other order once roused into action, as the history with his older children proves.
146.	This, therefore, is the balancing exercise that has to be performed.  I have wrestled with it because of the enormity of the alternative if it is not attempted, but therein lies the problem.  There is enormous credit to MC and determination to make life as good for Z as it has been for Y.  But ultimately it does not depend on her.  It depends on someone who cannot be trusted, cannot be predicted and who is capable of inflicting serious harm.
147.	MC’s robust ability to separate from M when she was behaving badly, to tell the F’s mother that she would take her own legal advice thank you very much, to tell M face to face “how it is” and to sort out competently a parking issue with a neighbour in a way that impressed Mr Greenhalgh, all urged on me by Miss Callaghan, are on a scale of issues quite different from those I consider that F poses.  One phone call or social media message like that received by W would be utterly chilling and devastating to the placement and there is nothing that could stop F from doing that.  But it would not start with such a call and it is not difficult to see how an increasing belief in his or M’s competence to care for Z could start the process of undermining and disruption.  It is really for that reason that in the court’s judgment the only plan with some prospect of success would be relocation to an undisclosed place that would itself be fraught with difficulty, imposing an intolerable burden on not just MC but the children as they grow up and it is one that no one advocates.
148.	What the court is being asked to do is to embark on an experiment that is obviously untested. Whilst, of course, risk sometimes has to be taken with placements it has to be informed risk where the prospects of success look better than the reverse.  I do not accept Miss Callaghan’s characterisation that if F is as unreliable as the professionals say, and the court now finds, it will breakdown very soon.  By contrast I think F is perfectly capable of making it work for six months or longer.  Meanwhile Z is almost a year old.  After introductions and a move she will transfer her attachment to MC and form a relationship with a quasi-sibling.  She is ready to move.  If this were to fail in six, twelve, 18 months time the consequences for her will be disastrous and she simply cannot afford a placement breakdown.
149.	It would have to be managed, it seems to the court, under a public law order with all the intrusions that that would bring, something that Mr Greenhalgh underlined in pointing out Z’s right to be brought up free from such interference.  That aside, however, the complete lack of trust I am afraid makes what is proposed a highly risky experiment that is, in the court’s judgment, more likely to fail than not and fail not in the next few weeks or months in its infancy but at a time when Z will be increasingly secure and attached.
150.	All parties remind me of adoption breakdown but little was said about the effect of family placement breakdown.  For all MC’s good intentions I fear that this father, with M in his slipstream, not only has the capacity to do that by a variety of means but is more likely than not to do so. Whilst it is commendable as MC said more than once, “I can but try”, that is something that should only be put into practice if the prospects are good enough to make success more likely than not.  It is the court’s judgment that they are not.  I regret that because the consequences are plain and not in dispute. But I have taken perhaps longer than I ought to explain as clearly as I can my reasons.
151.	I am therefore satisfied that the evidence fully complies with the requirements of the Court of Appeal in Re: B-S.  The realistic options have been comprehensively analysed.  The advantages and disadvantages of each have been considered.  I accept the analyses of the local authority, guardian and Mr Greenhalgh.  The risk I have identified would, despite MC’s best endeavours, expose Z to the risk of serious harm in the form of disruption or worse and placement breakdown.  Whilst I am not confident that even a care order would provide the security that Z needs were she in MC’s care, it would come at an unacceptably high price in terms of preventing her from having a normal childhood that outweighs the advantage of the right to life with one’s birth family.  The Supreme Court reminds us that adoption is the last resort.  It is not a panacea and although the risk of breakdown exists, the last published figure I can find from the Department of Education was 3.2 percent, with by far the majority occurring where the child is over four years on placement.  
152.	Having conducted the balancing exercise here, I unhesitatingly conclude that there is no realistic possibility of Z being safely placed in MC’s care, not through any risk from her but from risk principally from her F, and that her needs for stability and permanence can only be met in an adoptive placement.  That is a necessary and proportionate order that is required by reference to the welfare checklist as well as Z and her parents’ Article 8 rights.  
153.	Accordingly I make a care order and having concluded that Z’s welfare requires me to dispense with her parents’ consent I make a placement order authorizing the local authority to place Z for adoption.  
154.	This is, I know, a desperately sad outcome for all the adults concerned and Z.  There is little by way of consolation that can be offered in such circumstances other than the hope that this affords Z the opportunity to grow up in a secure way, avoiding suffering the disadvantages that her parents have had.
[Judgment ends]