Neutral Citation Number: [2017] EWCOP 34 
CASE NO.: 11327881
IN THE COURT OF PROTECTION
IN THE MATTER OF THE MENTAL CAPACITY ACT 2005
Date: 25th October 2017
Before:
HER HONOUR JUDGE HILDER

BETWEEN
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LONDON BOROUGH OF BRENT
Applicant
and

(1)	NB
(2)	SA
(3)	AD
(4)	MB
(by his Litigation Friend, the Official Solicitor)
(5)	SB
Respondents
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APPROVED JUDGMENT

Miss Zoe Gannon (instructed by Brent Council) for the Applicant Local Authority
First, Second and Third Respondents in person
Mr. Andrew Bagchi QC (instructed by Mackintosh Law) for the Fourth Respondent by his Litigation Friend the Official Solicitor
Mr. Edward Lamb (instructed by Duncan Lewis Solicitors) for the Fifth Respondent

HEARING DATES: 8th, 12th, 13th 14th and 15th June and 12th July 2017
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Judgment

The proceedings were heard in public subject to orders made on 8th November 2016, 6th February 2017 and 8th June 2017 pursuant to the Practice Direction – Transparency Pilot.
This judgment is being handed down and delivered to the parties by e-mail on 26th October 2017. It consists of 49 pages and has been signed and dated by the judge. The numbers in bold typeface and square brackets refer to pages in the hearing bundle.

INDEX
A.	ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION
Paragraphs 1 – 3
B.	MATTERS CONSIDERED
On paper: paragraph 4 (a) – (k)
Oral evidence: paragraphs 5 and 7
MB’s participation: paragraph 6
Attendance of the parties:
NB: paragraphs 8 -10
SA and AD: paragraphs 11- 13
Applicant, MB’s representatives and SB: paragraph 14  
C.	FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Family circumstances: paragraphs 15 – 21
Proceedings to date: paragraphs 22 – 48
D.	CAPACITY
The parties’ positions:
Applicant and OS: paragraph 49
SB: paragraphs 50 - 51
NB: paragraph 52
SA and AD: paragraph 53
The law: paragraphs 54 – 63
The evidence: 
Dr Poz: paragraphs 64 -73
Professor Murphy: paragraphs 74 - 75
Independent Advocate: paragraphs 76 – 77
Other professionals: paragraph 78
SA and AD: paragraph 79
NB: paragraph 80
SB: paragraphs 81 – 82
Submissions: paragraphs 84 – 88
Discussion: paragraphs 89 – 98
Conclusion: paragraph 99
E.	BEST INTERESTS
The concerns : paragraphs 100 – 107
The proposal : paragraphs 108 – 109
The law: paragraphs 110 – 115
The evidence:
Amanda Bairstow: paragraphs 116 – 123
Dr. Poz: paragraphs 124 – 129
Karen Carter: paragraphs 130 – 131
Fiona Firman: paragraphs 132 – 133
JW: paragraphs 134 – 136
Professor Murphy: paragraphs 137 – 138
DY: paragraphs 139 – 142
College staff: paragraph 143
NB: paragraphs 144 – 146
SB: paragraph 147
SA and AD: paragraphs 148 – 152
The adjournment period: paragraphs 153 – 157
The resumed hearing: paragraphs 158 – 159
Submissions: paragraphs 160 - 167
Discussion:
Findings: paragraphs 168 – 169
Balance sheet: paragraph 170
Conclusions: paragraphs 171 – 176
F.	CONCLUSIONS

A.	THE ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION
1.	These proceedings concern MB, a 22 year old young man with dyskinetic tetraplegic cerebral palsy. The substantive question for determination is whether or not it is in his best interests to undertake a 12 week period of intensive support and assessment at a rehabilitation centre. His capacity to make that decision for himself is in issue. His expressed wish is not to attend a residential rehabilitation placement.
2.	On 15th June 2017, rather than formally concluding, the final hearing was adjourned to enable further enquiries to be made as to the availability and suitability of the two proposed rehabilitative placements and, crucially, to provide an opportunity for MB and his family to visit each of them. 
3.	When the Court reconvened on 12th July 2017, ultimately no party opposed the ending of proceedings, with no orders being made in respect of removal of MB to rehabilitative placement. Nonetheless both the Applicant and MB’s representatives sought a reasoned judgment, not least to provide a clear baseline for managing MB’s care in the future.

B.	MATTERS CONSIDERED
4.	I have considered the following documents, most of which are collated into a hearing bundle in 3 lever arch files:
a.	Filed on behalf of the Applicant: 
Position statements dated 26th June 2015 [A35], 22nd September 2015 [A56], 13th November 2015 [A77], 4th November 2016 [A97], for hearing on 6th February 2016 [A126] and 1st June 2017 [A224]
Statement by Fiona Firman dated 5th June 2017 [C42]
Statement by Karen Carter dated 5th June 2017 [C45]

b.	Filed on behalf of the First, Second and Third Respondents jointly:
Position statement for hearing on 19th May 2014 [A7] 

c.	Filed on behalf of the Second and Third Respondents jointly:
Statement of issues dated 26th June 2015 [A33]
Position statements dated 4th November 2016 [A124], 2nd February 2017 [A146]

d.	Filed on behalf of the First Respondent: 
Position statement dated 10th November 2015 [A76]
Two handwritten statements, undated but handed in to the Court in person on 13th and 14th June 2017 respectively 

e.	Filed on behalf of the Second Respondent:
Position statement dated 22nd September 2015 [A63], 10th November 2015 [A74]

f.	Filed on behalf of the Third Respondent:
Position statements dated 22nd September 2015 [A53], 9th November 2015 [A65]

g.	Filed on behalf of the Fourth Respondent:
Position statements for hearings on 11th September 2014 [A31], 29th June 2015 [A37] , 23rd September 2015 [A48], 18th November 2015 [A89], 8th November 2016 [A104], 6th February 2017 [A139] and 8th June 2017 {A237]
Statement by Nicola Mackintosh dated 24th May 2017 [C7]
Statement by JW dated 2nd June 2017 [C48]
Statement of MB dated 5th June 2017 [C93]
Statement of LS (Advocate) dated 7th June 2017 
Statement of HD (College) dated 12th June 2017 [C95]
Statement of ZS (College) dated 12th June 2017 [C99]

h.	Filed on behalf of the Fifth Respondent:
Position statements dated 30th January 2017 [A137], 6th June 2017 [A275] and 11th July 2017.
E-mail setting out views dated 29th March 2017 [A156]
Statement of SB dated 11th May 2017 [A207]

i.	Expert and Other Reports:
JW Initial Assessment dated 8th September 2013 [E1] 
Gail Russell (Occupational Therapist), report dated 27th May 2014 [E9]
Zina Bunnie (Occupational Therapist), report dated 14th November 2016 [E274]
Fiona Prior (Occupational therapist), report dated 23rd January 2017 [E288]
Dr. Poz, reports dated 10th October 2014 [E14], 29th September 2016 [E224],30th January 2017 [E326], 4th February 2017 [E344], 29th April 2017 [E380]
Interim Safeguarding Report dated 30th September 2015 [E40] and Final Safeguarding Report dated 1st December 2015 [E91]
Risk assessment and management plans [E51, E309 and E391]
Mr. A Gibson and Mr H Nordeen, joint report dated 13th October 2015 [E55]
Letters from Mr Gibson dated 3rd April 2017 [E367] and 4th May 2017 [E390]
Amanda Bairstow (Independent Social Worker), reports dated 29th October 2015 [E57], 4th January 2016 [E111], 28th September 2016 [E190], 29th October 2016 [E258], 31st January 2017 [E316], 3rd February 2017 [E335], 30th April 2017 [E384]
Don Young (Case manager), reports dated 13th January 2017 [E275], 20th March 2017 [E354], 17th April 2017 [E368] and 6th June 2017 [E403]
Professor Glynis Murphy, report dated 5th June 2017 [E396] 
Assessment Findings by AB, Registered Manager of G Placement, dated 12th June 2017 

j.	Miscellaneous: 
Position statement of former property and affairs deputy, dated 12th May 2014 [A1]
Position statements of current property and affairs deputy, dated 22nd September 2015 [A50], 13th November 2015 [A85] 
Statement by DH (current property and affairs deputy) dated 4th November 2015 [C1]
Schedule of issues following meeting on 21st March 2017 [A164], with responses {A197, A209
Schedules of facts [A169 and A208]] with responses [A175, A184, A190, A215, A217
Correspondence [G1 – G137]
Cash Flow Analysis Report dated 9th June 2017
E-mail from the CCG dated 2nd June 2017 at 19.53
E-mail from DY to NB dated 7th June 2017 at 21.25.

k. Documents filed in the adjournment period
	      Position statement by Andrew Bagchi QC on behalf of MB (undated) [A279]
	      Position statement by Miss Gannon on behalf of Applicant, dated 10th July 2017	
	      Joint submission by SA and AD, dated “End 11 July 2017”	
	      Letter from MB’s solicitor dated 30th June 2017
	      “THE G. – Recommendations and management of MB moving forward” (undated)	      
     Assessment report by Wendy Shuttle in respect of J Centre, dated 28th June 2017
     Letter from Dr Nyein of J Centre, dated 26th June 2017 
     Report of Professor Murphy dated 10th July 2017	
5.	I heard oral evidence from Amanda Bairstow, Dr. Poz, Karen Carter, Fiona Firman, JW (former case manager), DY (current case manager), AD, SB, HD and ZS.
6.	On the fourth morning of the hearing (a time chosen by his representatives) I met MB in a private room in the court building, in the presence of a support worker, his solicitor and a notetaker. MB’s representatives took the view [A284] that it was not appropriate for MB to attend the hearing on 12th July.
7.	On 12th July, I heard oral evidence from DY and closing submissions on behalf of the Applicant, MB and SB.  
Attendance of the parties:
8.	On the first morning of the hearing NB attended, as she has throughout these proceedings, in person. She declined the offer of assistance from the Personal Support Unit. She asked for the hearing to be adjourned so that she could find legal representation. That application was supported by SB but opposed by all other parties. The application was refused for reasons given at the time but in summary because the Court 
a.	was satisfied that NB has had due notice of this hearing, has been implored to seek legal representation before, and has chosen not to; 
b.	was satisfied that the application was motivated by an intention to delay proceedings, with no indication of any serious intention in fact to seek representation;
c.	has the benefit of legal representation of SB, who takes the same position in these proceedings as NB;
d.	considered that the cost implications would be disproportionately adverse.
9.	NB attended the whole of the first day of the hearing. On the second day, NB found it difficult to listen to the evidence being given and was offered the opportunity to give her evidence first instead. She declined. She left Court at 12.25pm to deal with a telephone call and did not return to the hearing for the afternoon. 
10.	NB attended on the third day, and submitted a handwritten statement. On the fourth day, the hearing was scheduled to start later. NB attended and handed in a second handwritten statement, which lead to discussions in open court to clarify her position. So that NB had chance to consider those discussions, the lunch adjournment was taken early without having heard any evidence. NB did not return to the hearing after lunch. She did not attend on the fifth day, when she was scheduled to give her evidence according to the hearing plan; or on 12th July. 
11.	SA and AD attended for the morning on the first day of the hearing but did not return after the lunch adjournment. They did not attend on the second day but sent a message confirming that they had no questions to put to Dr Poz and accepted her conclusions. On the third and fourth days AD attended but SA did not.  After lunch on the fourth day AD informed the Court that SA was on his way but he did not arrive.
12.	Neither SA nor AD attended the fifth day of the hearing. Telephone calls were made to check their intentions. The Court was told that SA would take about 40 minutes to arrive and wanted to have a fixed time for giving his evidence. The Court agreed that SA could give his evidence at 11.30 am, and the matter was adjourned until then. By 11.40am SA had not arrived and there was no further response to calls. The hearing proceeded in his absence.
13.	Neither SA nor AD attended on 12th July. MB’s solicitor received a call from SA saying that he was not prepared to come to court but wanted to give some information. Mr. Lamb objected to that information being relayed to the Court. On being assured by Mr. Bagchi that SA’s information would not alter the decisions to be made (except that it may inflame proceedings and prevent progress); and that it did not suggest any immediate risk such as to require any particular action to be taken by the Court or others, I declined to hear an account of SA’s information unless he attended Court to give it himself.  
14.	SB, and the representatives of the Applicant and MB, attended each day of the hearing. 

C.	FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Family Circumstances
15.	MB was born on 28th September 1994. His family is of Lebanese origin and Druze faith. NB is his mother and SB is his father. SA is his uncle (the brother of NB). AD is the partner of SA.   MB also has three younger brothers, none of whom are party to the proceedings.
16.	As a result of injury at birth MB suffers from dyskinetic tetraplegic cerebral palsy. His physical disability is extensive. He needs constant supervision and help with all aspects of daily living. He is wheelchair-bound and needs to wear a spinal jacket combined with various straps and harnesses to provide him with support and maintain an upright seated position. He has an intolerance of pain and needs regular physiotherapy to ensure that his flexibility, muscle tone and function are maintained. He requires PEG feeding. Any food that he does eat orally must be pureed and drinks must be thickened. Many people have described him as “very sensitive.” 
17.	However MB’s mental functioning is “relatively spared.” Assessments variously refer to “Moderate Learning Disability,” “Mild Learning Disability” [E18] and “Significant Impairment of Intellectual Functioning” [E233]. School records indicate that he has been able to acquire skills in maths, science and ICT assessed at National Curriculum Level 3 [E18]. His receptive communication is predominantly verbal and he understands both English and Arabic. However he is unable to use verbal communication to express himself. He uses instead a range of methods to communicate “including nodding and shaking his head, directional eye gaze, emphatic eye contact, a symbolic and photographic communication book, postural changes and some pre-verbal vocalisations.”  [E17] He is also able to use an iPad with a head switch when this is made available to him.
18.	Sometime around 2002, when he was 8 years old, MB’s parents divorced. His younger brothers were subsequently taken into care as his mother “found it difficult to balance the needs of all the children.” They remained as Looked-After Children throughout their childhood. [E17]  
19.	In June 2007 MB was awarded some £4 420 000 in damages from the relevant NHS Trust.  The funds have been used in part to purchase and adapt the house were MB now lives with his mother and his grandmother. The balance is managed by a professional property and affairs deputy, PTC.
20.	MB has a long-established relationship with SA and AD. He has more recently re-established contact with his father and two of his brothers.
21.	Until the end of the 2016/17 academic year MB was attending a local college on a part-time basis. He was enrolled on a course called “Branching Out” which is aimed at “students who are transitioning out of college.” His place came to an end at the end of the school year, with all indications so far made known to the Court being that this will be the end of his access to formal education. MB would like to continue with his college placement if he could and is worried about what will happen when it ends. [C94]
The proceedings to date
22.	MB’s involvement with the Court was initially focused on his property and affairs. RC was appointed first as Receiver and then, after the coming into effect of the Mental Capacity Act 2005, as deputy for property and affairs.
23.	Unfortunately, the relationship between RC and MB’s family did not run smoothly. In 2013 RC applied to the Court to resolve a dispute about gratuitous care payments to NB and for appointment of a health and welfare deputy for MB. In response, seemingly acting on the united instructions of NB, SA and AD, PTC applied for RC to be discharged and for its own appointment in his place.  
24.	The property and affairs issues were subsequently resolved by agreement. NB, SA and AD had together instructed solicitors who conducted detailed negotiations on their behalf in correspondence with RC [A20]. On 19th May 2014, orders were made which recorded that “the relationship between [RC] and [MB] and his family has broken down;” discharged RC ‘s appointment as deputy; and appointed PTC in his place [B36]. By separate order [B29] the new deputy was authorised to make to NB in accordance with a memorandum of agreement [B31] gratuitous care payments and expenses payments at the rate of £2 500 per month and £400 per week respectively.
25.	The welfare issues were not so resolved. The Court initially identified concerns that
 “there may be:
a.	an issue of urgent serious medical treatment (namely spinal surgery)…and
b.	further issues of securing an appropriate wheelchair and educational opportunities for MB
which require determination...” 
The Official Solicitor was invited to act on behalf of MB, who was formally joined as a party to the proceedings by an order made on the papers on 31st March 2014 [B19].
26.	The Official Solicitor articulated concerns about MB’s access to treatment and services. At a hearing on 19th May 2014 the Court [B25] : 
a.	noted that “no party is currently seeking the removal of MB from the care of his family at the family home but…it is vital to his welfare and the security of his placement at home that MB is able to receive treatment, care and services without interruption, interference or obstruction by any family member”;
b.	declared (on an interim basis) that it is in MB’s best interests:
i.	for his meetings with therapists and other professionals to be undertaken in the absence of family members if any such professional requests this for any particular appointment;
ii.	that any adaptations to equipment or arrangements for MB’s care or on-going therapies recommended by MB’s clinicians, professional carers or therapists should be implemented by them without interference in accordance with their advice;
iii.	to receive wheelchair adaptations and aids to communication as recommended by Brent Wheelchair service and Gail Russell and by Steve Wiseman respectively;
c.	recorded the parties’ agreement to enter a process of mediation to resolve outstanding issues;
d.	made provision pursuant to s49 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 for a report to be filed by Dr. Fairhurst setting out the treatment “in place or planned to address the pain and discomfort MB is experiencing and the extent to which this is caused by the wheelchair;”
e.	gave permission for joint instruction of an appropriate expert to assess MB’s capacity “to make decisions in relation to contact, activities outside the family home, and the arrangements for his care including, as far as possible, decisions as to medical care.” 
27.	There was a delay in identifying an appropriate expert to prepare the capacity report. Mediation did not take place. Dr Fairhurst filed a report but an addendum was required, and in any event MB now had an appointment to see Mr. Gibson, Consultant Orthopaedic Surgeon. At a telephone hearing on 11th September 2014, specific directions were given to progress the matter. [B48]
28.	There was then a further delay in the light of a request by Mr. Nordeen and Mr Gibson to file a joint report as to MB’s posture and need, if any for surgical intervention. On 5th November 2014 the Court approved a draft consent order which provided for such report, a round table meeting between the parties, and the filing of statements of issues. No party complied with the directions for filing the schedule of issues.  
29.	On 29th June 2015 [B56] the Court recorded:
a.	Agreement [between the parties] that “it is in MB’s best interests that he is able to make use of his wheelchair and other aids and adaptations provided for him in accordance with the advice given by the specialist wheelchair service and other professional advisers commissioned on his behalf;”
b.	Dr. Poz’s view that “an improvement in MB’s ability to communicate may lead him to acquire capacity to make decisions on a wider range of issues;”
c.	That London Borough of Brent was convening a meeting of professionals, following which it would consider whether it needed to conduct further safeguarding enquiries and/or an assessment of MB’s needs for social care services.
The issues were identified as:
(1)	Whether a declaration should be made that it is in MB’s best interests that he receives such services, support and therapies as are recommended for him by his professional advisers;
(2)	Whether orders in the nature of injunctions should be made so as to prevent any person from obstructing the provision of any services, support and therapies to be provided for him by his professional advisers;
(3)	Whether orders should be made to facilitate MB’s wishes and feelings in terms of his contact with others;
(4)	Whether declarations are to be made concerning whether or not spinal surgery for MB is in his best interests following the review of Mr. Gibson.
30.	Directions were given for joint instruction of an independent social work expert, Amanda Bairstow; for the joint report by Mr Gibson and Mr Nordeen as to MB’s posture management and possible need for treatment; for the local authority to file a statement setting out the conclusions of its safeguarding enquiries; and for the filing of responses by the family respondents. 
31.	The Court was subsequently informed by the Official Solicitor that “appointments necessary for the preparation of the required independent social worker’s report have not been kept by MB, apparently because NB has failed to co-operate.” On 11th September 2015 the Court made an order [B60] listing the matter for attended hearing to consider whether injunctive orders requiring NB to make MB available for any appointments should be made. The order recites explicitly that “NB may wish to consider obtaining separate legal representation for the hearing.”
32.	On 23rd September NB, SA and AD all attended Court but without representation and declining the assistance of the Personal Support Unit. NB gave formal undertakings [B71] to permit Amanda Bairstow to have access to MB, not to obstruct her assessment of him, and to maintain all other appointments arranged for MB.
33.	Ms. Bairstow’s assessment was then duly completed. The London Borough of Brent sought permission to disclose it to the family respondents in person at a meeting arranged on 3rd November, and an order facilitating that approach was made [B76].
34.	At the hearing on 18th November 2015 the family respondents sought “early resolution of court proceedings” [A65]. The Local Authority considered that proceedings did not need to continue but the Official Solicitor sought an order to give effect to Ms. Bairstow’s recommendations over a 6 month period, with a further review by the Court. The order [B77] records all parties’ agreement that a care plan formulated in accordance with Ms Bairstow’s report was in MB’s best interests, and NB’s agreement “not to obstruct or impede the implementation of the care plan” but the Court declined to terminate proceedings. The matter was listed for hearing after 7 months.
35.	Perhaps unsurprisingly, the implementation of the care plan in accordance with Ms. Bairstow’s recommendations did not proceed smoothly. On 17th June 2016 the Official Solicitor filed a COP9 application updating the Court and seeking further directions. A dispute had arisen as to MB’s capacity to make relevant decisions for himself. The Court [B80] granted permission to the parties jointly to obtain from Dr. Poz, and also from Ms. Bairstow, an updating report. The hearing scheduled for June 24th was vacated and the matter relisted on 8th November 2016.
36.	On 8th November, the Official Solicitor’s position statement noted that “one year on from the November 2015 acceptance of the care plan for professional care, little progress has been made…” [A107]. The family respondents were, for the first time, joined by SB who was joined as Fifth Respondent. The Court recorded [B83] that the level of “paid external support for MB is currently 1 hour of personal care in the morning and 1 hour of personal care in the evening.” The Court gave structured directions intended to bring about progress by co-operation:
a.	Aims were identified:
(1)	Developing MB’s independence and autonomy;
(2)	Maintaining a positive relationship between MB and NB;
(3)	Exploring the development of a positive relationship between MB and SB;
b.	A three month plan to meet MB’s health and social care needs would be drawn up by the parties and would provide for:
(1)	The appointment by 22nd November 2016  of a case manager who would;
(i)	identify personal assistants/ support workers for MB by 6th December 2016; and
(ii)	implement a programme of activities for MB in the community, and  formulate the provision of aids/adaptations and therapeutic services by 12th January 2017.
(2)	The appointment of a psychologist for MB, with the Local Authority to inform the Court and the parties of a proposed start-date by 22nd November 2016;
(3)	The appointment of a family therapist for MB and his family, with start-date also to be notified by the Local Authority by 22nd November 2016.
37.	MB’s legal representatives were required to provide the parties with a plan in table form setting out each stage. Provision was made for any party to indicate disagreement to any part of the plan, with a requirement on the Applicant to inform the Court of any disagreements by 29th November 2016 so that any such disagreement could be determined either by further hearing or on the papers, as the Court determined. The matter was listed for attended hearing at the end of the three month period, with costs warnings given about any slippage in the timetable.
38.	The formulation of the tabulated plan was achieved within required time limits. There was no disagreement raised by any party and so, on 25th November 2017, the Court gave directions for it to be treated as an agreed plan. [B92]
39.	Unfortunately, and despite previous assurances that the timescales were realistic, the London Borough of Brent was not able to identify either a psychologist or a family therapist as required. The Court made orders on 22nd November 2016 [B89], 7th December 2016 [B95], 14th December 2016 [B96] and 13th January 2017 [B99] extending time for compliance but requiring full explanation of continuing delay, submissions as to why the Local Authority should not pay the costs occasioned by its two applications to extend time, and written submissions from all parties as to what further steps (including the joinder of additional bodies as party) should be taken at the next hearing to progress the engagement of the required services. 
40.	When the matter returned to court on 6th February 2017 the new case manager, DY, had reached the conclusion that “because of the resistance of NB to the involvement of additional carers, a better solution for MB would be for him to move to a specialist brain injury facility for a temporary period of intensive residential rehabilitation”[A140]. The parties agreed to convene a meeting of all family members and professionals involved in MB’s care to discuss DY’s proposal and to settle the main elements of a plan to achieve its realisation.
41.	At the hearing the Court made several orders:
a.	In respect of psychological and family therapy services, the relevant CCG was required to identify a suitable person to attend a multi-disciplinary meeting to take place no later than 3rd April [B107]; and the Central and North West London NHS Foundation Trust was required to inform MB’s representatives as to whether LBB’s referral for psychological and family therapy services had been accepted, and if it would fund independently identified clinicians. [B110] 
b.	In respect of potential rehabilitation placement, directions were made requiring all relevant bodies to agree how such placement would be funded or in default of agreement, identify the disagreement with reasons and proposals for resolution; requiring the Local Authority to file minutes of the meeting and a schedule of areas of agreement and disagreement, with a list of disputes which the Court may be required to resolve; providing for the family Respondents to file statements setting out their positions; and listing the matter for a hearing in June 2017.
c.	In the meantime, the case manager’s view of what should happen in the best interest of MB was set out in a schedule [B106], which included working towards implementation of 2 support workers for MB when not at college (ie 7am – 10pm), to do a regular programme of exercises under guidance of a physiotherapist and to expand opportunities for socialisation and activities, to extend the use of communication aids, and to secure the provision of wheelchair adjustments.
42.	The meeting took place on 21st March 2017 but it was limited in what it could achieve [G57] because of the nature of the engagement in the process by several family members. SB arrived for the meeting with his younger sons, who had not been invited. SB advised that he would not attend the meeting without them; and NB indicated that she would not take part without SB being present. A decision was taken not to include the brothers in the meeting. Both SB and NB did return to the meeting but NB subsequently left again, and was heard “wailing and screaming”. An ambulance was called, and NB was taken to hospital (from where she was discharged later the same day.) Other family members were asked to leave “due to security concerns.” The minutes of the meeting record a unanimous professional agreement that a move to a rehabilitation centre would be in MB’s best interests.
43.	Further case management directions were required. Orders were made ‘on the papers’ on 6th April 2017 [B111], to cater for hearing Ms. Bairstow’s evidence and to address the unresolved question of funding for the proposed rehabilitation placement; and again on 12th April 2017 [B113], to address outstanding issues of funding decisions and identification of factual disputes.
44.	On 24th May 2017 the Official Solicitor made a COP9 application without notice to the family respondents seeking orders in respect of MB’s passport and to prevent any person from removing him from the jurisdiction. A hearing was held the following day. The Applicant local authority attended and did not support the application. The Court was not satisfied that the application should be granted without notice to the family respondents and made directions for them to be served and the application considered again the next day. 
45.	At the ‘on notice’ hearing on 26th May 2017, SB was represented; SA and AD indicated by e-mail that they neither supported nor opposed the application; and NB took no part. Mid-way through the hearing a message was received that, as SB had indicated she would, NB had handed over MB’s passport to a person nominated by MB’s solicitors. The court made an order providing for it to be held by the property and affairs deputy pending further order.    
46.	The substantive hearing then took place on 8th, 12th, 13th, 14th and 15th June. (The listing on 16th was vacated in the light of the non-attendance of the family respondents.) It was the commonly preferred approach of all the parties present on 15th June that, rather than have closing submission immediately, there should be a period of adjournment with a view to MB and NB and any other family member who wished to visiting the two placements under consideration. I adjourned the matter to 12th July, giving directions for further steps to be taken in respect of the proposed rehabilitation placement, and leaving open the possibility of NB and SA giving evidence then. It was expressly recorded that the Court would be likely to notify the parties of the decision on 12th July, with a fully reasoned judgment to follow. 
47.	In the adjourned period, the directions were not met. MB had not been willing to visit either of the proposed placements. 
48.	On 12th July, the only family member to attend was SB. DY gave updating oral evidence. Those parties who were present made closing submissions. The Court made clear its conclusion both that MB presently lacks capacity to make the decisions in issue, and that there should be no order in respect of the proposed move to residential rehabilitation, with reasoned judgment to follow.    

D.	CAPACITY
The parties’ positions
49.	The Official Solicitor’s position statement for the final hearing states at paragraph 4:
“It does not appear that any party is challenging the conclusions of Dr. Poz in relation to MB’s mental capacity.”
The Applicant Local Authority did indeed confirm its acceptance of Dr Poz’s views in its position statement but at the outset of the hearing it was less clear that other parties shared this view.
50.	In his statement [A197] SB says:
“I believe that MB is a very intelligent man who knows his own mind and expresses his wishes and feelings very clearly. However I will respect the Court’s decision as to his capacity.”
51.	The position statement filed on his behalf (dated 6th June 2017) confirms SB’s view that MB “has insight and understanding” and can “weigh information concerning his own care” but says at paragraph 9:
“Dr. Poz makes an interesting distinction between MB’s decision making in relation to his therapy which arises ‘not so much because of an impairment of, or a disturbance in the functioning of, MB’s mind or brain (MCA s2(1)) but because of the consequences of the impairments…one of the consequences of which has been the evolution of an enmeshed relationship between MB and his Mother.’ Whether this distinction, albeit illustrative, is capable of withstanding an analysis of capacity under MCA 2005 remains to be seen.”  
(For the purposes of this judgment I shall refer to that part of Dr Poz’s evidence as “the causation quote”.)
When asked directly by me at the outset of the hearing, Mr. Lamb confirmed that SB does not accept Dr. Poz’s conclusions of incapacity.
52.	NB aligned herself with SB’s position at the beginning of the hearing. Subsequently, in her second handwritten statement she said:
“…I would like [MB] to have his wish on what he may want as his own choice, and if he is not happy to stay at residential care then I feel he should be given the right to decide.“
This could be interpreted as a ‘best interests’ argument in favour of giving effect to MB’s wishes and feelings but, taking a cautious approach, I infer that NB considers that MB has capacity to make relevant decisions for himself.  
53.	SA and AD have now confirmed that they accept Dr. Poz’s conclusions.
The Law
54.	When addressing questions of capacity the Court must apply the principles of the Mental Capacity Act 2005. I remind myself in particular that:
a.	pursuant to S1(2) a person must be assumed to have capacity unless it is established that he lacks capacity. The burden of proof is therefore on those who assert that capacity is lacking ;
b.	pursuant to S1(3) a person is not to be treated as unable to make a decision unless all practicable steps to help him to do so have been taken without success. The Code of Practice states at paragraph 4.16 that “It is important not to assess someone’s understanding before they have been given relevant information about a decision. Every effort must be made to provide information in a way that is most appropriate to help the person to understand.”
c.	pursuant to S1(4) a person is not to be treated as unable to make a decision merely because he makes an unwise decision. The outcome of a decision made is not relevant to the question of whether the person making that decision has or lacks capacity to make it. 

55.	I further remind myself that:
a.	pursuant to S2(1) a person lacks capacity in relation to a matter if at the material time he is unable to make a decision for himself in relation to a matter because of an impairment of, or a disturbance in the functioning of, the mind or brain. There must be causative link between the impairment/disturbance and the incapacity;
b.	pursuant to S2(3)(b) a lack of capacity cannot be established merely by reference to a  condition … which might lead others to make unjustified assumptions about his capacity. Lack of capacity cannot simply be inferred from  particular diagnosis; and
c.	pursuant to S2(4) any question whether a person lacks capacity within the meaning of this Act must be decided on the balance of probabilities.
56.	The test for determining whether a person is unable to make a decision is set out in section 3 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005:
a.	S3(1): a person is unable to make a decision for himself if he is unable –
(a)	To understand the information relevant to the decision,
(b)	To retain that information,
(c)	To use or weigh that information as part of the process of making the decision, or
(d)	To communicate his decision (whether by talking, using sign language or any other means).
b.	S3(2): A person is not to be regarded as unable to understand the information relevant to a decision if he is able to understand an explanation of it given to him in a way that is appropriate to his circumstances (using simple language, visual aids or any other means).
c.	S3(4): The information relevant to a decision includes information about the reasonably foreseeable consequences of
(a)	Deciding one way or another, or
(b)	Failing to make the decision.
57.	With respect to the level of understanding which is required for decision-making to be capacitous, I have regard to the well-known observations of Macur J in LBL v. v RYJ [2010] EWHC 2664 (Fam) at paragraph 24 that “it is not necessary for the person to comprehend every detail of the issues…it is not always necessary for a person to comprehend all peripheral detail.” What is required is that the person can “comprehend and weigh the salient details relevant to the decision to be made” (paragraph 58).
58.	With respect to how sections 2 and 3 of the Act inter-relate, I have regard to the judgment of McFarlane LJ in PC & NC v. City of York Council [2013] EWCA Civ 478 at paragraphs 52 and 56 to 58: 
“…for the Court to have jurisdiction to make a best interests determination, the statute requires there to be a clear causative nexus between mental impairment and any lack of capacity that may be found to exist (ss2(1)).”
“The core determinative provision within the statutory scheme is MCA 2005, s2(1)…. The remaining provisions of s2 and s3, including the specific elements within the decision making process set out in s3(1), are statutory descriptions and explanations which support the core provision in s2(1)…. Section 2(1) is the single test, albeit that it falls to be interpreted by applying the more detailed description given around it in ss 2 and 3.”
59.	Mr Lamb says, at paragraph 13 of his final position statement,:
“The key question is not whether the person’s ability to take the decision is impaired by the impairment or, or disturbance in the functioning of, the mind or brain but rather whether the person is rendered unable to make the decision by reason thereof (see Re SB (A Patient: Capacity to Consent to Termination) [2013] EWHC 1417 9COP) at [38].”
60.	I understand Mr. Lamb to be distinguishing between an impairment/disturbance of the mind/brain which has some adverse impact on decision-making ability, and one which negates such ability completely; and further to be contending that only the latter is sufficient to render someone incapacitous within the meaning of the Mental Capacity Act 2005.  Having read very carefully the decision of Holman J in Re SB, I am not satisfied that it amounts to authority for the full sophistication of Mr. Lamb’s contention (at paragraph 38 or otherwise).  I do however accept his contention, on the basis of the ordinary wording of S2(1) itself (“because of”) and in the light of the decision of the Court of Appeal in PC & NC and City of York.  In the complicated nature of being human, there may be a number of factors operating in a person’s life circumstances at any particular time but unless the Court is satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the impairment/disturbance itself causes an inability to perform those thinking processes set out in section 3, the statutory test for incapacity is not made out. 
61.	Capacity is both issue- and time-specific: a person may have capacity in respect of some matters but not others, at one time but not another. The question to be determined is whether, at the date on which the court is considering the matter, the person has or lacks capacity to make the decision in issue.
62.	The court must consider all the relevant evidence, including but not limited to evidence from an independent expert:
“Clearly the opinion of an independently-instructed expert will be likely to be of very considerable importance, but in many cases the evidence of other clinicians and professionals who have experience of treating and working with P will be just as important and in some cases more important. In assessing that evidence, the court must be aware of the difficulties which may arise as a result of the close professional relationship between the clinicians treating, and the key professionals working with, P……in cases of vulnerable adults, there is a risk that all professionals involved with treating and helping that person – including, of course, a judge in the Court of Protection – may feel drawn towards an outcome that is more protective of the adult and thus, in certain circumstances, fail to carry out an assessment of capacity that is detached and objective.”  
63.	It goes without saying of course that the relevant evidence includes also that of non-professionals involved in P’s life, and in particular his family members; and they too may be influenced by a protective urge.
The Evidence 
64.	The independent expert: Dr. Poz is an Associate Fellow of the British Psychological Society, holds chartered status with the British Psychological society and has 19 years of experience of Clinical Psychology. She currently holds an NHS role as a Clinical Psychologist and Clinical Neuropsychologist. She was instructed as a joint expert. Over the lengthy course of these proceedings she prepared 5 written reports and she gave oral evidence.
65.	The first report (13th October 2014): Dr. Poz met MB on 3 occasions in two different settings (home and college), spending 7 hours with him directly, at all times in the presence of a person experienced in his methods of communications. She records that
“[MB] showed skills in turn-taking with his communication methods, he also demonstrated patience in managing the listeners’ incorrect assumptions, and persistence in communicating his point. On some occasions he declined for the assessment to be moved forwards until he had achieved the correct understanding from the listener of the thought he wished to communicate.” [E17]
66.	Dr. Poz records that, notwithstanding two previous assessments of capacity to manage his property and affairs which recommended specific technological aids, MB did not have available to him full use of technological assistance:
“[MB] has available to him an iPad with a head switch. This was provided at the first assessment but the iPad had not been charged and the head switch was broken. [MB] appeared keen to use the switch and the iPad, for example communicating to his mother where the plug should be attached. Unfortunately by the end of my final visit the iPad and switch still did not function.”
67.	Dr Poz noted that communication “optimally require(s) the involvement of someone who is familiar with [MB’s] methods of communication” but “it was not always possible even for the person who has known [MB] the longest ie his mother, to interpret exactly what MB wishes to communicate.” [E23 para 8.3] She clearly described the limitations of MB’s ability to communicate:
“..he is dependent on being presented options by the listener which he can then endorse or refute. It is therefore very difficult for [MB] to communicate concepts and ideas of which the listener has no knowledge, and therefore very difficult for him to demonstrate independence of thought.” [E24 para 8.3]
68.	Dr. Poz identified [E24] two distinct ways in which MB’s communication may be enhanced: 
a.	Practically: by “presenting concepts in a visual format which are widely separated in space to facilitate accurate interpretation of his eye gaze” and “through consistent access to his full range of communication aids.” She identified that he has no way of communicating the concept “I don’t know;” and that in his communication book, his family members were not represented at all and the photographs of his peers, support staff and therapists were 3 years out of date. 
b.	Interpersonally:  “there are occasions when [MB] feels he should not express his opinion if it differs from the opinion of those he cares about, in particular his mother.” She suggests that “it may be possible to provide support to MB to develop an understanding that it is emotionally safe to hold and express differences of thought to the people one cares about” through Family Therapy and/or individual psychological therapy. 
69.	Dr Poz concluded on the basis of neuropsychological testing, that 
•	MB has “Significant Impairment of Intellectual Functioning” [E22 para 8.1] and that this learning disability “has been assessed to reduce his skills in the cognitive domains of attention, working memory and visual reasoning.” 
•	Where it was possible to quantify skills, MB’s scores “fall at the 0.1st percentile in comparison to age-matched peers.” 
•	MB retained “some skills in being able to manipulate hypothetical verbal information” but less so when the information presented was “more personally emotive.” Overall, he retained “sufficient skills to be able to make decisions about simple choices which are not emotionally arousing for him.” [E23 para 8.2]
70.	Answering a question about psychological care needs (as distinct from capacity) [E24 para 8.4], Dr Poz referred to descriptions of MB’s key family relationships as “enmeshed …and over-protected.” She noted “high levels of anxiety” and advised that the process of reducing anxiety and developing emotional independence 
a.	should be facilitated by means of family therapy “before [MB] is forced into a position of ruptured relationship, for example as a result of bereavement” [E24 para 8.4 
b.	could ”enhance MB’s functioning and ability to demonstrate his capacity.”   [E25 para 8.5]
71.	Specifically addressing questions of capacity:
a.	capacity to make decisions on the care he requires, including medical treatment and surgery [E25 para 8.6]:, Dr Poz noted MB’s immediate refusal of treatment, even before options had been presented and that MB:
i.	was not able to communicate that he had retained key elements of the relevant information provided;
ii.	was not able to weigh information because he could not retain it accurately, and his insight into his care needed was inconsistent;
iii.	was not able to demonstrate an awareness of the reasonably foreseeable consequences of making a decision one way or another, or of failing to make a decision, such as an increase in pain.
She considered it likely that “the information which will need to be shared regarding his care and medical treatment will exceed the complexity which his current communication method can manage;”
She concluded expressly that “MB lacks the mental capacity to decide on the care he requires including decisions regarding medical treatment and surgery; [and that]… the inability arises because of an impairment of or a disturbance in the functioning of his mind or brain.”
She also stated her belief that “…an improvement in MB’s communication…may enable him to express his thoughts more effectively and ask the questions he needs in order to engage in simple healthcare choices. However I do not believe that this will be sufficient for [MB] to regain capacity to make complex healthcare choices; I believe his capacity will continue to be limited, by his cognitive impairments, at the level of an inability to understand complex information and to weigh choices.” [E26]

b.	capacity to decide whether meetings with therapists and professionals should be undertaken in the absence of family members [E27 para 8.7]: Dr Poz noted that MB:
i.	understood information about engaging with therapists and indicated that he thought it was important.( He communicated that, if they are present, NB and SA will “tell him to stop engaging if they think he is in pain”); and  
ii.	was able to communicate retention of relevant information; but
iii.	was unable to weigh relevant information because he “appeared emotionally conflicted.” He communicated that he would “always do what his mother told him.”

Dr. Poz’s conclusion in respect of this particular question includes the causation quote which Mr Lamb repeats in his position statement but it is important to set that extract into the full conclusion:
“..I am of the opinion that [MB] lacks the ability to decide whether meetings with therapists and other professionals should be undertaken in the absence of family members, if any such professional requests this for any particular appointment. I am of the opinion that the inability identified above arises not so much because of an impairment of, or a disturbance in the functioning of, MB’s mind or brain…but because of the consequence of the impairments. His impairments, from birth, have required a different level of care from his mother than he would have required had he been born without impairments. One of the consequences of which has been the evolution of an enmeshed relationship between [MB] and his mother, this is best summarised by his mother’s comment “we are one opinion.” I believe that this impairs his ability to conceive of separateness as viable and therefore impairs his ability to weigh the decision in the balance. I believe that the provision of Family Therapy may help to reduce the enmeshment and anxiety within the relationship which may in turn enable [MB] to regain his capacity in this area of decision-making.” [E28]
Dr Poz went on to give her opinion that at present, expecting MB to make a decision about excluding a family member would “be experienced as a distressing burden” to him so the burden should be borne by the therapist; and that observing his mother to be content with arrangements appeared to be beneficial. She noted that MB did not decline to see her in the absence of his mother, or become distressed when seen independently. He did ask about MB’s whereabouts but ”appeared to be reassured” when told of her whereabouts and then continued to engaged. She concluded that “on balance there would not be a significant negative impact on [MB’s] health and well-being if he were treated in the absence of his family member, against his wishes, if he was reassured about the arrangements by his family, and if he was reassured of their whereabouts during the therapy session.”[E29]

c.	     capacity to make decisions regarding adaptations to equipment or arrangements for care and ongoing therapies: Dr Poz concluded that :
i.	MB appeared to understand relevant information;
ii.	MB was able to communicate retention of some, but not all, relevant information;
iii.	MB struggled to weigh the information in part because he mis-remembered it and in part because he was “heavily guided by the attributes of the therapist rather than the content of the therapeutic intervention” ;
iv.	Possibly, some of the relevant information which would need to be shared would exceed in complexity what can be managed with his current communication methods.
Dr Poz’s conclusion was that MB lacked relevant capacity and because of an impairment or disturbance in his mind or brain. 
However she further considered that MB’s capacity in this domain should be re-assessed in due course because “it is possible that with maturation [MB’s] skills in weighing long-term benefit against immediate rewards may develop…This process cannot be externally facilitated.”[E30] Meanwhile, she noted that “Given the amount of interventions that MB has received in his lifetime it is probable that some would have gone against his preferences; however he remains euthymic. I am therefore of the opinion that on balance there would be no significantly negative impact… if his ongoing care were not entirely in consistent (sic) with his wishes, particularly if he was reassured about the arrangement by his family.” [E30]

d.	     capacity to decide what activities outside the family home he should participate in: Dr Poz concluded that MB retains capacity. [E31]

e.	    Capacity to decide with whom he should have contact, Dr Poz noted that:

i.	MB appeared to understand relevant information but “it is possible that if the decision in question were more complex, for example involving complex risk issues, [MB] may not be able to understand such information”;
ii.	MB was able to communicate retention of sufficient relevant information;
iii.	MB appeared able to weigh the relevant information except in respect of his mother. He communicated that he “would not tell anybody if his mother made him feel ‘not safe’.”
On balance, she concluded that MB retains capacity to make decisions regarding with whom he should have contact up to the point where complex risk issues arose [E32]. 
72.	For her second report (almost two years later) Dr Poz spent a further 7 hours with MB. She was asked to address broadly similar questions, with the addition of a question about capacity to decide whether to have a case manager and who that person should be. Again MB was unable to use the switch and iPad to aid communication [E227 para 3.4] but he did have an eye-gaze card showing a question mark to indicate “I don’t know/I’m not sure/Tell me more information.” [E227 para 3.5].
•	On this occasion Dr Poz noted “evidence of MB being cognitively rigid and fixed on a particular point, at which point he has shown difficulty with verbal reasoning. This was particularly evident when the information presented was more personally emotive, he was then less able to manipulate the information and more likely to reject any suggestions…” [E234]
•	Dr Poz noted that “on every occasion that I have met with MB he has endeavoured to communicate points that even people who know him well, including his mother, have been unable to interpret; which was observed to result in apparent frustration.” [E235] She noted the limitations of the communication aids available to MB and how the assessment of his ability to weigh information “is significantly compromised by his reliance on closed questions, and the limitations of the concepts provided within his communication book.” She still considered that an improvement in MB’s ability to communicate may lead to him being able to demonstrate that he retains capacity to make decisions an wider range of issues but found “no noticeable improvement” [E236] in his ability to communicate since her first assessment. In respect of the interpersonal factors of communication Dr Poz noted that MB “continues to indicate that his opinion should not differ from his Mother’s and endorses a belief that his Mother can never be wrong.”
•	Dr Pos restated with renewed vigour her recommendation for Family Therapy and Anxiety Management treatment for MB:
“I am of the opinion that the emotional acceptance of the treatments, and the ability for the family and the professionals to work in harmony ie the psychology of the case, is what underpins the success of all of the other specialisms, and not the other way round…. I remain of the opinion that MB’s functioning and ability to demonstrate his capacity could be enhanced if the anxiety that maintains enmeshment and over-protectiveness can be reduced.”[E238]
a.	Capacity to make decisions about care and health services: Dr Poz’s conclusions were exactly the same as in her first report [E240]. Additionally she asserted that MB “should be supported in healthcare appointments by someone who is able to moderate his level of emotional arousal and model calmness in the face of uncertainty.”
b.	Capacity to decide about meetings with professionals in the absence of family members: MB was this time noted to understand only “some information”, and he was considered unable to communicate retention of relevant information. The overall conclusion remained the same, that MB lacks the relevant capacity, but Dr Poz went further and opined that “this is underpinned by both inherent and situational factors; a combination of MB’s impaired cognitive skills and his enmeshed maternal relationship.” [E241] She went on to repeat that opinion which Mr Lamb quotes.
c.	Capacity to make decisions about adaptations and care arrangements, this time Dr. Poz concluded that MB appeared to understand only some of the relevant information but otherwise her conclusions were exactly as before. In respect of her previous suggestion of scope for maturation, she found no noticeable improvement over the preceding two years. She suggested that the wheelchair may be an example of an issue where “MB has become globally negative… and is therefore answering ‘no’ to any question put to him about it.” [E243].
d.	Capacity to  make decisions about activities, Dr Poz maintained her view that MB retains capacity but expressed concerns that he “is not being provided with sufficient, if any, information regarding social activities in his area that are appropriate and accessible to a young man of his age and skills….His capacity to make decisions about what activities he could participate in is therefore reliant on the provision of information by others.” [E244]
e.	Capacity to make decisions about contact with others, Dr. Poz’s opinion was unchanged. [E246]
f.	Capacity to make decisions concerning a case manager:  Dr Poz concluded that MB was not able to demonstrate an awareness of the reasonably foreseeable consequences of making a decision one way or another or of failing to make a decision. She noted that his opinion changed rapidly and considered that he was vulnerable to the influence of others in making his decisions. [E247]
73.	In her oral evidence Dr Poz explained that “it’s incredibly difficult to assess this young man” but she felt she had done “the best job possible” and was as confident of her conclusions  “as I can be, given the limitations of communication.” When questioned by Mr. Lamb about the causation quote, Dr. Poz told him quite firmly not to “take that out of context.” She went on to explain that 
•	MB’s cognitive function is not likely to improve, but the emotional enmeshment could;
•	if there was such improvement, MB “may weigh up slightly better” but it’s “not going to affect his underlying cognitive difficulties.” 
•	She was not impressed by the anecdotal evidence put to her which others suggest may indicate no lack of capacity, and she distinguished “expressing a preference” from making a capacitous decision. 
•	She did not accept that MB’s advocates may be better placed than her to draw conclusions about his capacity – “not unless they’ve done a capacity assessment, no.” 
•	She confirmed that, in reaching her conclusions, she had “looked at all the information available at the time, including family and staff…it has to be taken together and looked at in totality.”

74.	      Professor Murphy: It proved extremely difficult to implement Dr. Poz’s recommendation of psychological therapy for MB and his family. There was very considerable delay first in identifying an appropriate expert, and then in securing the funding but eventually, on 25th May 2017 Glynis Murphy, Professor of Clinical Psychology and Disability, was able to begin working with MB. She did so with the benefit of having read much of the documentation available to me, including the reports of Dr Poz and DY.
75.	      In her second report (10th July 2017 page 4), by which she time she had had 4 meetings with MB and meetings with other family members as well, Professor Murphy advised that “intervening to reduce enmeshed relationships is an extremely long-term process, requiring gradual building up of trust with other people outside the two partners who are considered to be enmeshed. It is not achievable in a few short weeks.”        
76.	     The independent advocate: MB has had an independent advocate, LS, since November 2015. In her statement, LS acknowledges that “it is not my role to assess a client’s capacity around a particular decision, but to support them to voice their views and facilitate their involvement” but she nonetheless sets out some vigorous observations of MB’s capacity and “raise[s] questions for consideration, in line with 7.52 of the Care and Support Statuary (sic) Guidance, issued under the Care Act 2014.” 
77.	      LS expressly questions whether the time Dr. Poz spent with MB is sufficient to determine his capacity. She points out that capacity “is seldom black and white;” that due to workloads, people working with MB have limited availability; and that there is a tendency whenever MB says he is unhappy about anything, to try to persuade him to a particular treatment option. She is “concerned whether the issues are fully explored with MB and whether he is given the opportunity to partake in supported decision making.” LS gives examples of when she feels that MB was enabled to voice reasons for his reluctance to take part in hydrotherapy at college and his dislike of his new wheelchair. She refers to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disability; and she reminds us of the right of capacitous persons to make unwise decisions. She questions the ‘best interests’ conclusions of others. 
78.	     Other professionals: none of the other professionals involved with MB has questioned Dr. Poz’s conclusions as to capacity, save that very late in the proceedings SB’s solicitors produced a letter (dated 6th June 2017) apparently from MB’s GP [G143]. The letter is unsigned but states that the author has been MB’s GP since June 2013. The letter states a clear opinion that MB has capacity to make a decision not to go for rehabilitation placement whilst also acknowledging that “I have not made a formal mental capacity assessment here.”
79.	     SA and AD have confirmed that they accept the conclusions of Dr Poz. 
80.	     NB strongly asserts that she knows MB best, and that he should be allowed to decide for himself     whether he goes to a rehabilitation placement or not:
“I would like [MB] to have his wish on what he may want as his own choice.” [C103]
81.	    SB said in oral evidence that MB is 
“an adult, he’s 22, he’s not willing [to go to a rehabilitation placement], it is his decision; of course he can make his own decision. He’s my son – I’m sure about that.”
82.	    On the other hand, SB also vehemently asserted that he is ready and willing “to sign consents for surgery if that would help [MB] walk,” which is on the face of it inconsistent with a stance that MB has capacity to make such decisions for himself.  
The submissions
83.	Mr. Lamb made substantive submissions as to capacity. His explanation of SB’s case rested on two key arguments, namely that:
a.	the basis of Dr Poz’s assessment was fundamentally flawed on causation. (He made “no specific challenge to her functional test conclusions” but invited the Court to consider them through the evidence relied on in support of his causation argument); and
b.	without having completed the psychological therapy recommended by Dr. Poz, it could not be said that all reasonably practicable steps have been taken to help MB make the specific decision.
84.	The first argument rests on the causation quote. The submission that “enmeshment is the significant cause of the difficulty MB has in making decisions” is said to be supported by “evidence that MB exhibits more complete decision making capacity/insight when away from NB,” with examples referred to at E158 – 160, E355, G27 and E399:
•	The first of these is a Care Plan Updating Report from the Local Authority. It reports the views of LS and another advocate that MB “has capacity to make decisions for himself” but it does not seem to me to provide the evidence which Mr. Lamb suggests.
•	The second is a Case Management Update by DY dated 20th March 2017. It reports the views of the college physiotherapist that MB “is an adult and he has good decision-making abilities” but again I do not consider that it provides the evidence which Mr. Lamb suggests.
•	The third is a letter from the independent advocate LS to the social worker KC dated 12th May 2016. It describes discussions with MB but on each occasion MB called upon assistance from his mother and SA. I do not consider that it provides the evidence which Mr. Lamb suggests.
•	The last is the report by Professor Murphy dated 5th June 2017. On this occasion MB was seen without his mother because she did not attend. By the end of the session Professor Murphy “anticipated that [MB] would be ready to plan a visit [to a rehabilitation placement] at the next session.” MB was brought to the next session by NB, and was vehemently opposed to rehabilitation placement at all. It seems to me that this report is evidence of MB’s wishes and feelings in respect of rehabilitation placement being more amenable to suggestion when away from NB, but not of his decision-making capacity/insight being any more complete.    
85.	When asked about Dr. Poz’s assertion in oral evidence that the causation quote had to be seen in context, Mr Lamb said that he could not disagree that the written context was limited to consideration of capacity to decide whether to see therapists and professionals in the absence of family members but he did not accept that the overall tenor of her evidence was so limited. He submitted that, on the question of residential rehabilitative placement, it was in fact difficult to distinguish between the first two domains of capacity which Dr Poz was specifically asked to address. He regarded this a “a conceptual difficulty for the report”, leaving the way open for a broader understanding of Dr. Poz’s concerns about enmeshment: “ I have to accept that her conclusions are more detailed [but] when reading them together, and taking the evidence as a whole, the enmeshment theory is the more persuasive.”
86.	Miss Gannon on behalf of the Local Authority refuted the suggestion that the causation quote made in the context of decisions to see therapists and professionals in the absence of family members could somehow be merged into the clear conclusion of incapacity to make decisions as to care. She pointed out that rehabilitation is “all about physiotherapy, hydrotherapy” and the kinds of treatments which fall squarely into what is meant by “care.” The first area of capacity addressed by Dr Poz “deals head on with what the Court has to make a decision about”; and her conclusion in that respect has “nothing to do with enmeshment.” Enmeshment, she says, emerges in Dr Poz’s considerations “only when [MB] has to decide whether his family is involved.” She submitted that this reading of Dr. Poz’s report “wasn’t undermined in cross-examination – Dr Poz is clear – [MB] doesn’t have capacity to make this sort of decision, at this time, because of impairment” to his brain.
87.	Miss Gannon further asserted that the second limb of Mr, Lamb’s assertions was wrong because of impracticability: resolving any enmeshment is not practicable, certainly in the short-term. 
88.	Mr. Bagchi adopted all of Miss Gannon’s submissions. Reviewing the oral evidence of Dr Poz, he said she had “identified two things: a cognitive impairment from acquired brain injury giving a learning disability, overlaid by emotional enmeshment in certain areas.” Considering all of Dr. Poz’s evidence he said that “no where…does she seem in any doubt as to whether, in respect of complex decisions, MB was even near to the point of capacity.”           
Discussion
89. On the occasions when I have met MB, I have been left in no doubt about the enormous difficulties of achieving communication. I was impressed by the way in which both JW and MB’s solicitor were able to assist MB to communicate with me directly but the limitations which Dr Poz described were always apparent
90. MB himself gave every impression of wanting to communicate with me, at least for the length of time which he chose. He demonstrated a degree of humour when he might have felt frustration at the slow speed of identifying the picture he wanted.  Given his apparent will to communicate, it is difficult to understand why technology has not been employed much more extensively to assist him; and where technological assistance has been obtained, why it is not actually made available to him in working order. My impression is that there must be a significant possibility that MB could be enabled to communicate better if those closest to MB have the will to support assistive technology and those in a position to effect it are not impeded.  
91.  Regrettable though the current situation as to communication aids may be, I am satisfied that Dr. Poz has taken all practicable steps to do as thorough as possible an assessment of MB’s capacity to decide the issues in question. Her assessments have been conducted over time and across different settings. In so far as it may be theoretically possible to improve MB’s communication by the employment of assistive technology, I am satisfied – sadly – that it has not been practicable for her to employ such aids to date. This very impracticability sits at the heart of the substantive application – one of the goals of the proposed rehabilitation placement is to provide consistent opportunity to use the tablet and chin switch (point 8 in the G Recommendations document.)  
92.  The questions posed by LS as advocate provide a useful cross-check on the adequacy of the assessment process.   LS is right, and within the remit of her advocacy role, to insist on the need to provide MB with adequate information in an appropriate format; and to insist on adequacy of communication with him. Her assistance with the difficulties particularly in respect of hydroptherapy and the new wheelchair is to be welcomed but I consider that LS fails to distinguish between expressions of wishes and feelings, and a decision-making process. Her statement does not amount to an assessment of MB’s capacity within the terms of the Mental Capacity Act 2005. In contrast, asking the very questions which LS poses leads me to conclude that Dr. Poz has appropriately addressed each element of the statutory test.  I am satisfied that Dr. Poz is fully aware of the complexity of capacity considerations and, if LS intended to imply otherwise with her ‘black and white’ comment, she undermines her own credibility.
93.  Dr. Poz’s assessments show nuanced appreciation of MB’s situation and the issue-specific nature of capacity. I consider that her explicit consideration of MB’s capacity “to make decisions on the care he requires, including medical treatment and surgery” fully encompasses the question in issue, namely residential placement at a rehabilitation unit. I accept her conclusion as to functionality – that MB is presently unable to make such decisions for himself within the meaning of section 3 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005.
94.  As to causation, although I accept the correctness of Mr. Lamb’s submissions in law, I do not consider that they are made out in the evidence. Dr. Poz was clear about the limited context of the causation quote, and clearly irritated by Mr. Lamb’s attempts to stretch it further.  I do not accept that in oral evidence Dr Poz in any way widened her written concerns about enmeshment so as to alter her written conclusions in respect of MB’s incapacity to make decisions as to his care. On the contrary, I consider that she firmly refuted Mr. Lamb’s attempts to get her to do so. The submissions of Miss Gannon and Mr Bagchi more accurately reflect the totality of her evidence. I accept the conclusions of Dr. Poz (as set out in paragraph 70 above) that MB’s inability to make decisions on the care he requires arises because of the identified mental impairment, and not ‘because of’ his enmeshed relationships.    
95.  The only “evidence” from a medical professional which contradicts Dr Poz’s conclusions is the lately-produced letter from MB’s GP. In so far as the author states that “it appeared clear to me that [MB] had capacity to make this decision,” I note the express concession just a few lines later that the author had made no formal capacity assessment. Moreover, such conclusion is not supported by any of the parties – Mr. Lamb does not challenge Dr. Poz’s functional conclusions of incapacity. In any event the letter is unsigned, and lacks even a typed named of authorship. I place no weight at all on it.
96.  MB’s parents assert that MB can make decisions for himself. As a litigant in person, and one for whom English is not her first language, it is of course understandable that NB has not addressed Dr Poz’s report directly but in failing to attend key parts of the hearing, and in particular not giving oral evidence, NB has given up the opportunity to explain to the court her position as to MB’s cognitive abilities. I acknowledge the emotional intensity of her feelings for MB but I am left with the impression that NB does not distinguish on any level between an expression of wishes and feelings, and capacity to make a decision. In his  keenness to give consent to certain medical procedures on his son’s behalf, I conclude that SB too fails to make that distinction. I prefer the evidence of Dr. Poz.  I note that other family members (SA and AD) do too.
97.  Mr. Lamb submits that insufficient has been done to help MB make the decision in issue because the psychological therapy has not been completed. I remind myself that s1(3) of the Mental Capacity Act refers to “all practicable steps” (emphasis added). It is truly a source of frustration that MB’s access to technological communication aids has been so limited but I am satisfied that this is in significant part due to the complicated dynamic between MB and NB; and that it has not been practicable for any of MB’s professional carers, for Dr. Poz or for Professor Murphy to take further steps in this regard until that dynamic is addressed. It is further frustrating that the psychological therapy took such a long time to source. However, now it has started I accept Professor Murphy’s evidence that it will take a long time, if it is possible at all.    It is clear that serious attempts have been made to give MB an opportunity to visit proposed placements, so as to inform his decision-making process. They have failed but not for want of trying on the part of those parties who bear the burden of establishing incapacity. 
98. I am satisfied that, in the current circumstances, all practicable steps to help MB make a decision as to residential rehabilitative placement have been taken; and it is appropriate for the Court to determine the question of MB’s capacity to make the decision in issue at this point. (A determination now will of course not preclude the Court from considering the question afresh if and when there is reason to consider that circumstances have changed.)      
99.  Conclusion: Considering all the evidence, I am satisfied that MB is presently unable, because of mental impairment from acquired brain injury and learning disability, to make a decision about whether he should attend a 12 week rehabilitation placement. The Court’s jurisdiction to determine that question is therefore engaged.

E.	BEST INTERESTS   
The Concerns: 
100. There has been no suggestion in these proceedings that NB’s care of MB as a child was anything other than appropriate. SA has said that his sister “gave up a lot” to care for MB, and it seems that she did it well. The family’s account is that NB was largely left alone to manage as she saw fit but AD points out [A68] that NB was able to accept (and give consent to) medical advice and intervention for MB when appropriate, as demonstrated in 2010 or 2011, when he was seriously ill for some 3 months and was surgically fitted with a PEG feed.
101. However, concerns have arisen as MB reached adulthood. In December 2013, MB’s headmaster raised concerns [A4], and shortly afterwards in early 2014 the then property and affairs deputy RC felt it necessary to make an application for appointment of a welfare deputy [A2].  At that stage, the immediate problems appeared to be:
•	MB’s ability to express his own views
•	That MB needed spinal surgery but NB “walked out of the room when the issue of surgery was mentioned” [A3]  
•	That MB needed to use a wheelchair with particular adaptations but his mother prevented it.
 102. Through court proceedings, financial arguments were settled and a ‘fresh start’ put in place, with a new property and affairs deputy, PTC, and a new case manager, JW. Unfortunately by April 2015, both of these independent persons were raising concerns, “all related in some way to NB’s wish to control MB’s access to support and services and seemingly reflecting her own anxieties” [A41]. JW referred to the Local Authority worries that NB was preventing MB from spending time with his uncle SA, was preventing MB’s use of the appropriate wheelchair, and was otherwise inhibiting his independence. 
 103. Once NB’s failure to co-operate with necessary arrangements for assessment by the Independent Social Worker had been overcome,  Ms. Bairstow concluded that 
•	“NB’s wish to protect MB results in her being over protective …[which] restricts his independence…having a negative impact on the quality of his life.” [A91]  
•	NB was effectively preventing MB from receiving the health interventions he required. 
•	It was in MB’s best interest to remain living with NB in the short term but “essential for MB’s future planning that he is supported to reduce his dependency on NB….facilitated through the introduction of paid carers.”[A93] In the longer term, she considered that MB’s best interest required a move to a shared, supported living placement.
104. In broadly the same timescale as the ISW report, the Local Authority conducted a full safeguarding investigation concluding in November 2015 that 
•	NB had been “neglecting MB by not engaging with professionals involved in the care of MB” [A81] 
105. In November 2015, a plan was made, apparently with the agreement of all parties, to address these concerns by introducing paid carers, and extending MB’s independence gradually. One year later, that plan had got no further than 1 hour of personal care in the morning and 1 hour in the evening. In the process, such had been the resistance of the family that .JW had to leave her post as case manager. When the matter came back for hearing, the Official Solicitor  identified a pattern of 
“apparent acceptance of the need for change; formal agreement to plans and proposals in the context of proceedings followed soon after by resistance, and disputes with professionals…MB being left without services recommended by professionals and stalemate until the Court intervenes with expert advice, when the cycle begins again.”
106. Nonetheless, at the hearing on 8th November 2016, there was substantial agreement between the parties. The order made was effectively a carefully constructed routemap for progress on the basis of co-operation. That approach was not entirely unsuccessful. A new case manager was appointed (DY), and he was able to begin the involvement of support workers. However the psychological and family therapy services were not secured, and as early as 13th January 2017 DY concluded that he did not feel confident that the overall plan was attainable [E276]. He reported concerns that:
•	“… whilst [NB] has confirmed her support of the move to paid carers, I do not believe she is fully understanding or accepting of this position” [E276] Her reaction to his proposed move to two carers (rather than one plus NB herself) had led him to make a safeguarding alert to the Local Authority. 
•	the NHS-provided wheelchair is “in very poor repair…and offers little bodily or foot support” but when he tried to make progress with the privately purchased chair, the provider reported “there is a lot more to this case than just seating adjustment,” referring to “constant unapproved and incorrect alterations made by the family” and his view that any adjustments now “will not last.” Relations with the family were such that, although the provider was willing to attend MB at college, he was not willing to attend at the family home. 
•	he had not yet seen MB’s igaze communication aid in use at all and on enquiry the supplier informed him that it “has not been possible for us to introduce a two switch system, which potentially could speed up access, because his mother has resisted this.”     
•	whilst support workers had been introduced, their ability to engage with MB had been limited: “most activities suggested that are beyond the top of the street are rejected for one reason or another”. When a plan to take MB to the cinema was mooted, NB instead took him herself.
107. In broadly In broadly the same timespan (by 24th January 2017), the Local Authority provided a risk assessment and risk management plan which highlighted elevated (amber) risks to MB in three areas: physical abuse, emotional abuse and neglect. 
The Proposal 
108. DY concluded that the many ‘loose ends’ in having a robust consistent and therapeutic regime at home made it unworkable. He sought instead the period of intensive residential rehabilitation which has been the issue of this hearing. DY’s proposal was always, in many ways, a very limited one:
•	He suggested a 12 week placement only.
•	He explicitly confirmed that his proposal was “not made as a long-term option, but as a means of ‘breaking the mold’ (sic) ….in no way am I implying a permanent removal of NB from MB’s life, she should rightly maintain her relationship, but primarily as ‘mother’ not ‘carer.’” [E282]
109. At the outset of the hearing, an assessment of MB by the R Centre was available [E463]. It concluded that “a period of time receiving rehabilitation …. [was] absolutely essential…. MB’s mother should be involved in this process but from the start there will be a clear expectation that each week she takes time away from MB.” NB’s involvement was envisaged to last for 6 days. The report confirmed a vacancy for admission in approximately 4 weeks’ time, and offered accommodation for NB to use.
The Law:
110. Fundamental to the Court’s consideration of DY’s proposal is the principle set out at section 1(5) of the Mental Capacity Act 2005: an act done, or decision made, under this Act for or on behalf of a person who lacks capacity must be done or made, in his best interests.
111. Section 4 of the Act provides that
(1) In determining for the purposes of this Act what is in a person’s best interests,  the person making the determination must not make it merely on the basis of –
(a)	The person’s age of appearance, or
(b)	A condition of his, or an aspect of his behaviour, which might lead others to make unjustified assumptions about what might be in his best interests.
(2) The person making the determination must consider all the relevant circumstances and, in particular, take the following steps.
(3) He must consider – 
(a) whether it is likely that the person will at some time have capacity in relation to the matter in question, and
(b) if it appears likely that he will, when that is likely to be.
(4) He must, so far as is reasonably practicable, permit and encourage the person to participate, or improved his ability to participate, as fully as possible in any act done for him and any decision affecting him.
(5) Where the determination relates to life-sustaining treatment he must not, in considering whether the treatment is in the best interests of the person concerned, be motivated by a desire to bring about his death.  
(6) He must consider, as far as is reasonably ascertainable – 
(a) the person’s past and present wishes and feelings (and, in particular, any relevant written statement made by him when he had capacity),
(b) the beliefs and values that would be likely to influence hid decision if he had capacity, and
(c) the other factors that he would be likely to consider if he were able to do so.
(7) He must take into account, if it is practicable and appropriate to consult them, the views of –
(a) anyone named by the person as someone to be consulted on the matter in question or on matters of that kind,
(b) Anyone engaged in caring for tha person or interested in his welfare,
(c )Any done of a lasting power of attorney granted by the person, and
(d )Any deputy appointed for the person by the court,
as to what would be in the person’s best interests and, in particular, as to the matters mentioned in subsection (6).

112. In seeking to apply the provisions of section 1 and section 4 of the Act, I derive some assistance from the judgment of Munby J (as he then was) in the matter of ITW v. Z, M & Ors [2009] EWHC 2525 at paragraphs 32 – 36:

“[32] i)….the statute lays down no hierarchy as between the various factors which have to be borne in mind, beyond the overarching principle that what is determinative is the judicial evaluation of what is in P’s “best interests”.
ii)…the weight to be attached to the various factors will, inevitably, differ depending upon the individual circumstances of the particular case. A feature of factor which in one case may carry great, possibly even preponderant, weight may in another, superficially similar, case carry much less, or even very little, weight.
iii)….there may, in the particular case, be one or more features of factors which….are of “magnetic importance” in influencing or even determining the outcome…. 
[35] i).. P’s wishes and feelings will always be a significant factor to which the court must pay close regard:
ii) …the weight to be attached to P’s wishes and feelings will always be case-specific and fact-specific… One cannot, as it were, attribute any particular a piori weight or importance to P’s wishes and feelings: it all depends, it must depend, upon the individual circumstances of the particular case. And even if one is dealing with a particular individual, the weight to be attached to their wishes and feelings must depend upon the particular context; in relation to one topic P’s wishes and feelings may carry great weight whilst at the same time carrying much less weight in relation to another topic.
iii)…in considering the weight and importance to be attached to P’s wishes and feelings the court must of course, and as required by section 4(2) of the 2005 Act, have regard to all the relevant circumstances. In this context the relevant circumstances will include, though I emphasis that they are by no means limited to, such matters as:
a)	The degree of P’s incapacity, for the nearer to the borderline the more weight must in principle be attached to P’s wishes and feelings…
b)	The strength and consistency of the views being expressed by P;
c)	The possible impact on P of knowledge that her wishes and feelings are not being given effect to…
d)	The extent to which P’s wishes and feelings are, or are not, rational, sensible, responsible and pragmatically capable of sensible implementation in the particular circumstances; and
e)	Crucially, the extent to which P’s wishes and feelings, if given effect to, can properly be accommodated within the court’s overall assessment of what is in her best interests.

113. I also have regard to the decision of the Supreme Court in Aintree University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v. James [2013] UKSC 67. Baroness Hale noted that the Act gives limited guidance about best interests. At [39] she said:
“The most that can be said, therefore, is that in considering the best interests of this particular patient at this particular time, decision-makers must look at his welfare in the widest sense, not just medical but social and psychological; they must consider the nature of the medical treatment in question, what it involves and its prospects of success; they must consider what the outcome of that treatment for the patient is likely to be; they must try and put themselves in the place of the individual patient and ask what his attitude to the treatment is or would be likely to be; and they must consult others who are looking after him or interested in his welfare, in particular for their view of what his attitude would be.” 
As she went on [44 – 45], the purpose then of the best interests test is “to consider matters from the patient’s point of view.”
114. Where the protected person is able to express wishes and feelings about the decision in issue, the Court must decide what weight to give them. I have regard to the decision of Jackson J in X NHS Trust v. B (by his Litigation Friend, the Official Solicitor [2015] EWCOP 60. He concluded that Mr. B lacked capacity to make a decision concerning surgery, and went on to consider the weight to be given to his expressed wishes, in particular at paragraph 10: 
“…there is no theoretical limit to the weight or lack of weight that should be given to the person’s wishes and feelings, beliefs and values. In some cases, the conclusion will be that little weight or no weight can be given; in others, very significant weight will be due.
This is not an academic issue, but a necessary protection for the rights of people with disabilities. As the Act and the European Convention make clear, a conclusion that a person lacks decision-making capacity is not an ‘off-switch’ for his rights and freedoms. To state the obvious, the wishes and feelings, beliefs and values of people with a mental disability are as important to them as they are to anyone else, and may even be more important…. For people with disabilities, the removal of such freedom of action as they have to control their own lives may be experienced as an even greater affront than it would be to others who are more fortunate.”
115. I have considered also the decision of the Court of Appeal in K v. A Local Authority [2012] EWCA Civ 79. The circumstances of that case included a concern that P was in an environment in which he could not articulate his own wishes, as opposed to what he believed to be the wishes of his father; and the proposal in issue was a move to supported living on a trial basis. The first instance judge had cited with approval the following passage from another case:
…it is very much the approach when dealing with incapacitated adults that the medical, educational and social authorities do their very best to nurture and facilitate any skills which the incapacitated adult may have to help them in moving, where possible, towards a greater degree of independence in the way they live their lives. Thus whilst in many cases the family may be the providers of care and nurture for such adults, there seems to me to be a philosophical and practical shift towards ensuring as great a degree of independence in living arrangements as is possible.” 
In the Court of Appeal, Thorpe LJ said at paragraphs 30 and 35:
“In my judgment it is unnecessary to enter any investigation of social care policy or whether have  been philosophical and practical shifts.  ….  The safe approach of the trial judge in Mental Capacity Act cases is to ascertain the best interests of the incapacitated adult on the application of the s 4 checklist. The judge should then ask whether the resulting conclusion amounts to a violation of art 8 rights and whether that violation is nevertheless necessary and proportionate.”

The Evidence: 
116. The Independent Social Worker: Amanda Bairstow is an independent social worker with 13 years of experience of care management within both the public and private sector. In her first report she advises that MB “needs to receive treatment and therapy from a team of various professionals working together as a cohesive, multi-disciplinary team.” [E64] She noted the relationship between NB and MB to be “close and loving” but that MB “presented as reluctant to give me answers to all my questions and looked to his mother for a response…despite MB being encouraged to reply, NB regularly provided an answer on [his] behalf.” [E65] After wide-ranging consultation with many people involved in MB’s life, she observed that “their relationship has failed to develop from that of parent/child to that which naturally forms when a person reaches adulthood.” [E67] 
117. Ms. Bairstow considers that NB’s “inherent wish to protect MB and her strong beliefs around his care, treatment and therapy needs will more often than not lead her to oppose clinical decisions.“ She was “not clear whether NB’s reactions to recommendations for treatment, equipment and therapy result purely from her overwhelming wish for him to avoid pain, her mistrust of professionals, or a need to have control. Either way, the outcome to date is that MB is prevented from receiving the intervention he requires.” [E68] She gave examples :
•	Splints to be used preparation for a standing frame:  MB was willing to take them home to trial over the weekend, but returned to college on Monday unwilling to use them. [E68]
•	Hydrotherapy: MB had been looking forward to hydrotherapy but, after his mother became angry when the therapist would not do what she asked, he advised that he no longer wanted to receive this or indeed any treatment from the therapist with whom he had previously got on well. [E73] 
118. By the time of her third report, Ms Bairstow confirmed her belief that MB’s relationships with his family were “essential to MB’s continued emotional wellbeing but ... there is far more that could be done to help MB explore the opportunities life can offer him.” [E201] Nonetheless, she made clear that she was “not in any way saying that [MB] should not continue living with [NB] or for her to be excluded from his care. Nor am I advocating any ‘draconian’ type measure which would prevent MB from remaining with his family or destabilising him as suggested in the position statement of LBB…” [E208] She continued to believe “that it would be beneficial for MB if he were to remain living with his family while accepting external, paid support with all activities of daily living” [E209] She identified the risk that “if MB continues to allow only his mother to support him with personal care tasks, when the time comes whereby she is unable to care for him through illness, old age etc, he will have increased difficulty accepting external intervention… it would be in MB’s best interests to begin accepting assistance with personal care now, in a measured and planned way, rather than this having to be introduced in a crisis situation in the future.” [E212]
119. When asked to consider the situation again in the light of DY’s proposal, Ms. Bairstow supported the 12 week placement [E318]. Furthermore, she considered it in MB’s best interests that he move to the placement as soon as possible: “To date, a great deal of time has been spent arranging for therapists, clinicians, and other professionals to work with [MB] at home and I am of the opinion that this course of action has, for now, been exhausted.” [E320]  She agreed the need for “staged and planned transition” but recommended that this “doesn’t take place over too long a period to reduce the risk of NB’s response to the move influencing or distressing MB.” [E338] As to how long, she deferred to the treating psychologist.
120. By the time of her final report, Ms Bairstow acknowledged that the proposed placement “presents as a risk to MB’s emotional wellbeing and he will undoubtedly be distressed, however, I believe this risk should be taken, as to not will certainly leave him in a position where his treatment, care and control of his life are extremely limited.” [E386] She supported the planned transition recommended by Dr Poz, including an opportunity for NB to visit prior to a move but continued to recommend that this be achieved in the shortest timescale possible. 
121. In oral evidence, Ms Bairstow confirmed that recent developments lead her to “put increased emphasis” on the need for rehabilitation placement: “Over almost 2 years, we haven’t moved on. We are still in the same position.” She acknowledged small improvements but felt they “hadn’t resulted in any meaningful improvement to MB’s quality of life or access to services.”
122. When asked about the distress MB may experience, she acknowledged that the transition is “clearly going to be a difficult experience” but she did not think that those difficulties outweighed the benefits. She pointed to evidence that MB has been resilient in the past, has been open to discussion, and presents at college with his peers very differently to how he presents with his family. She considered that NB should have an opportunity to visit the placement but she should not do so with MB. As to speed of transition, she said “if [NB] can find it in herself to be positive when they are together, it can not be rushed. If professionals believe that her involvement will cause [MB] to be distressed, then transition should be swifter.” In practice she considered it “unrealistic” to think that NB would accept a decision of the court in favour of the placement proposal, so it would be better to follow the latter course: “better to go without having been upset by his mother, as difficult as that is.”
123. When asked by Mr Lamb about MB’s cultural heritage she accepted that it “might well be the case” that Lebanese families’ cultural way is care within the family. However she pointed out “someone without disability would have opportunity and be able to make a choice to remain in cultural norms or do something different. It’s about being given the opportunity to understand what’s available.”
124. Dr. Poz: In her second report, Dr. Poz explained that:
“Within the context of being born with multiple disabilities and complex needs whereby one is entirely dependent on others for survival, the development of an enmeshed relationship with the primary caregiver can be understood as a functional survival strategy….Existing within an enmeshed relationship provides those within the relationship with a sense of safety, and therefore any challenge to this will initially be experienced as distressing and even threatening. I am of the opinion that MB will gain long-term benefit from the enmeshment reducing and increasing his autonomy. However I am of the opinion that any change must be conducted in a mindful and planned way, within a psychologically informed therapy, for example that his independence is fostered gently and not forced upon him. The enmeshment will take some time to loosen and could be experienced as traumatic if there was a rapidly forced separation.” [E248] 
125. For her third report [E326] Dr Poz was asked to consider specifically DY’s proposal of rehabilitation placement. She took a clear position that it would be in MB’s best interests to develop his sense of independence but “whether a respite intervention is in MB’s best interests hinges on the manner in which it is facilitated.” [E329 para 3.2.1] She advised that “any transitions from the status quo will need to be conducted in a mindful and planned way” and noted “a risk that a rapidly enforced separation will be experienced as traumatic.” She expressly disagreed with DY’s suggestion that a rehabilitation placement could be implement in a “clean break process” but proposed a graded approach – “taking place on more than one occasion, with an increasing level of independence for MB being achieved on each occasion” and NB accompanying MB during his first residential stay [E328 para 3.1.4] She emphasised that “the next step of the respite plan should not be implemented until a psychological formulation is in place to guide the work.”[E330 para 3.3.2]
126. In her fourth report [E344] Dr. Poz provided a balance sheet of advantages and disadvantages of the proposed rehabilitation placement, and restated her opinion that “preparatory psychological work is essential to the family experiencing this as something positive and not traumatic.” [E349 para 3.1.3] She also made an observation about how NB would perceive the proposal:
“I believe that she does not currently have the emotional ability to allow practices to continue …. when she perceives that MB is suffering in the short term even if it is beneficial to him in the longer term. The hope is that she would achieve this emotional resilience and skill by receiving psychological input.” [E350]
127. In her final written report [E380] Dr Poz stuck to her insistence on the importance of psychological input for MB and his family before any rehabilitation placement but yielded to the “more strongly” held opinion of DY and Ms. Bairstow as to starting such placement with a ‘clean break.’ Even so, she restated her view that it is important for NB and MB to visit the rehabilitation unit before any placement started. [E381 para 6]
128. In oral evidence Dr Poz was asked how reliable an indicator of MB’s interests his presently expressed views could be. She considered that they were “not necessarily a good indicator…he struggles weighing short term and long term…he doesn’t have skill for long term best interests “  She interpreted Mr. Gibson’s final report about spinal surgery as “reassuring… [[the situation is] not life-threatening; so [the move to rehabilitation placement] could be done in a slow way to address mental health at the same time.” She said the duration of transition was “a difficult question…[she preferred] MB and his family to have psychological therapy so their fears can be heard and take reassurance…how long is dependent on how successful therapy is. For that to happen, people have to attend the meetings.”
129. When asked about cultural influences, Dr. Poz distinguished between “high expressed emotion” and “highly passionate cultural ways of expression which are normal” She confirmed that her concerns were “about unhealthy over enmeshment” and that the kind of conduct from NB which had caused the court to rise earlier in the day “falls into the ‘need to protect from’ side” of that distinction. 
130. Karen Carter: Ms. Carter is the Safeguarding Adults Manager of the applicant local authority. In her written statement [C45] she outlined two safeguarding concerns:
•	The first was raised by MB’s college about one of his new support workers in February 2017 An allegation of neglect was found to be substantiated and the care worker removed from his role.
•	The second was raised by DY on 31st May 2017 about emotional abuse and neglect by NB relating to an incident where NB abused one of the new careworkers, TC. That enquiry was ongoing, although the incident had already led to TC not returning to work with MB.
131. In oral evidence, Ms. Carter confirmed that she supported the proposal for rehabilitation placement as in MB’s best interests. She did “not feel very optimistic about [NB] engaging” in therapy or support of such placement.
132. Fiona Firman: Ms. Firman is a social worker, involved with MB since November 2015. Her written evidence [C42] provided an update of MB’s current situation and in respect of the proposed residential placement confirmed that “Whilst we cannot 100% declare that MB’s health conditions will be improved, we can be sure that there will be a chance for MB’s needs to be properly and holistically assessed across health and social care professionals. Once there is a proper assessment in place then a treatment/management plan can be put in place for all to follow.” 
133. In oral evidence, responding to questions from Mr. Lamb Ms. Firman confirmed her view that a period of residential rehabilitation “could significantly change the position at home.” If it was not attempted she considered that “We’re stuck in a situation where MB is not allowed to develop and the enmeshed relationship remains.” Ms. Firman followed Dr. Poz as to preparatory work before moving to placement: “I’d consider it important for NB and MB to have enough preparation about how they’re feeling emotionally – if NB can do that, I would advocate slower. If not, I’d advocate swift move to rehabilitation.”
134. JW: JW worked as a case manager for MB from August 2013 until 31st May 2016. Her appointment ended because she was “informed that MB decided that he no longer wanted to work with me. I was not given an opportunity to directly to MB about this decision.” [C52] In her written evidence she described how MB “was extremely protective of his mother and there were many occasions when I believe he made a decision based on not wanting to upset his mother rather than his own needs and wishes.” [C54] She described spending “a significant amount of time trying to get [NB] to agree with recommendations that were made for [MB] rather than working with [MB] himself.” By the time her own involvement ended, JW noted that NB “had been allowed to end the involvement of one private physiotherapist, one speech and language therapist and an occupational therapist…and had also refused to work with a physiotherapist at college.” JW also reported that “there were many incidents where NB adjusted equipment herself without professional advice.” [C55]
135. In oral evidence JW explained that “at first, I’d hoped we’d get to a position where [MB] would be allowed to achieve independence whilst living with his mother. By the end I was sceptical about the likelihood of that being achieved.” When asked about MB’s resilience and ability to cope with change, she said “If Mum is able to say ‘let’s do this’, then absolutely…you can see him physically relax when he knows his mum supports him – he needs her permission. If mum supported him [to go to a residential rehabilitation placement] he’d still be scared but he’d go.” On the other hand, she was “pessimistic” about the prospects of success with the therapy to resolve enmeshment.
136. When asked by me about MB’s request to meet her at court, JW expressed real pleasure: “it was just like nothing had happened – lovely.”
137. Professor Murphy: Professor Murphy gave a written account of her (then)  two meetings with MB. At the first, MB attended without NB. Initially he was vehement that there were ”no good things, only bad things” about going to a rehabilitation centre but by the end of the session he agreed that it would be a good idea to visit. Professor Murphy “anticipated that he would be ready to plan a visit at the next session.” 
138. On the next occasion, NB again did not attend at the appointed time. She did however “turn up, very late,…with MB in his (old) wheelchair.” This time when asked, MB told Professor Murphy that he had decided not to visit a rehabilitation centre. 
 139. DY: having made the rehabilitation proposal in his first report, DY’s second report provided an update. He “continue[d] to have serious concern in the management of MB’s physical status.” He gave an account of NB’s failure to discuss with MB’s GP the problem of his vomiting, despite DY’s referral for such discussion [E355], and her requests that the carers be stopped from attending and replaced [E356]. Having spoken to AD and SA, he accepted that “some of the concerns of NB had credence” and took steps to change procedures and replace two carers. He considered that these difficulties “reinforce the benefits in having ‘a clean break’ from the family environment in order to establish routines and for MB to gain new insights and experiences to help inform his future choices in life.”[E358] He asked, “what is the alternative?”
140. In his third written report, DY described raising a safeguarding alert in respecto f NB’s conduct towards on of the replacement care workers and “doubt[ed] that any attempt at promoting, regularising and maintaining a home-based rehabilitation regime would succeed.” [E405] He continued to believe that a short term period of rehabilitative placement was “the best means …to establish routines, clearly identify longer term support needs and for NB to gain new insights and experiences.” [E405]
141. In his oral evidence, DY wanted to “be clear that I don’t see any malice from [NB]. She clearly cares and loves [MB] very deeply… [but] as a consequence she can’t emotionally separate herself to see the practical benefits of assisting [MB] improve his general health and wellbeing.”  He doubted whether therapeutic intervention would make a great deal of difference to how NB feels emotionally and felt “on balance, the sooner the move the better.”
142. DY visited one of the potential placements during the course of the hearing. He was recalled to give oral evidence of his views. He proposed to invite both facilities under consideration to produce a care plan and decide his final preference “against what can practically be delivered.” He hoped that college staff would help MB visit and transition but noted that up to this point they had been reluctant to become so involved. He said he would “dearly like to think we can get [NB] to visit and continue to engage her in the plans” but he said that on all the occasion he had tried to explain how he would help her, he had found “a very harsh reluctance to want to engage.”
143. The college staff: ZS and HD confirmed in writing and in oral evidence MB’s enjoyment of and participation in college activities and his potential for further development.
144. NB: NB’s opposition to the proposal of residential rehabilitative placement was always clear, but the basis of it less so. The first written statement she submitted said:
“I ... am more than happy to try and reassure [MB] and try to help settle [MB] into residential…care for the period of 12 weeks only. I would like reassurance before [MB] goes that at the end of his 12 weeks the final decision will be {MB]’s. I would like [MB] to have his wish on what he may want as his own choice, and if he is not happy to stay at residential care then I feel he should be given the right to decide and make future improvement in his home and look for a more appropriate care assistance in and around his…home. So is it possible I could have something in writing to reassure myself and [MB] that what I have stated in this letter will be taken into account and acknowledged before I make my decision.”  
145. In a subsequent written submission, NB stated that “fact of the matter is [MB] and I were happy before all professionals and family members [SA] and [AD] got involved. There seems to be so much people involved. Please take into account before all this involvement and how I was [MB]’s only carer for 22 years without respite or cause for concern…I do believe I can give the best care to [MB]”
146. NB chose not to attend large parts of the hearing and did not give oral evidence.
147. SB: In his written statement, SB opposed the proposal of residential placement but considered that “intensive rehabilitation at home could begin almost immediately” [A201] In his oral evidence he confirmed that his view had changed: “I say MB should stay at home and his mum should take care of him.” He gave his view that, if MB was to be placed anywhere else “within 10 – 15 days he will pass away.” This appeared to be on the basis of a concern that professional carers “won’t be able to feed him.” In contrast, when asked if he had any worries about NB’s care, he said : “he’ll be safe with her. Nothing at all.”
148. SA and AD: For most of the proceedings, SA and AD have spoken jointly. Their written evidence for most of the proceedings has been firmly supportive, and quite defensive, of NB.  SA was clear that MB “needs his mother, and NB would be lost without him. I don’t want my sister to feel her life sacrifices for that boy have not been recognised.” [A64] However AD attended more of the hearing than SA, and only she gave oral evidence. She explained how the deterioration in NB’s relationship with them since early 2017 had left her “so I don’t feel I can strongly defend or support her position.” Having heard most of the evidence, she told the Court that DY’s proposal “seems to me a really great opportunity… [MB] Is not keen on it so it’s difficult to give 100% support but there is so much disharmony, confusion, resistance, too much concentration on NB’s concerns…I now support the move to rehabilitation. This is a big change.”  
149.  A little later she explained her change on the basis of now having a lot more information: “actually this place looks pretty great.” She expressed some frustration with NB’s refusal to visit it. She asked rhetorically “What’s the worst that will happen? I have confidence that professionals would pull him out. The best case is that he has a wonderful kick start.” She likened the short-term placement to “an off-site MOT.” She explained that when she and SA had seen MB on the previous Saturday “he was not vehemently opposed to it. He trusts SA [who says] if the court decides, we’ll help you through it, and we’ll look after your mum too.”
150.  As to timing of a move, AD “originally thought slow…now I think we should get on with it. It’s sink or swim. I don’t agree with the stress of waiting first, or of going one or two days a week.“ She was clear though that contact between NB and MB whilst he was in any placement would be “absolutely important – it would be going in the wrong direction if she was prohibited from seeing MB.” 
151. AD preferred not to comment on SB’s involvement at all but her responses to questions from Mr Bagchi made clear that relations with him and his son are extremely difficult.  
152. Subsequently, SA confirmed that he agreed with AD’s change of position.
153.  The adjournment period: The J Centre assessed MB in the presence of NB and SB. The report by Wendy Stuttle [E470] confirmed that “The assessment was difficult to complete as [MB] became extremely anxious, non-compliant at times and agitated on 2 occasions within the time that we were with him, resulting on one occasion being removed by his mother from the room.” MB was using his ‘old’ wheelchair, with no communication aids attached.  The assessment concluded that admission to the J Centre “would be extremely distressing for [MB] and it would take him more than 12 weeks to settle and adapt … and would not be in his best interests.”                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
154.  Although there had been no direction for it, Professor Murphy prepared a further report which gave a detailed account of the (lack of) progress made in the adjournment period. She had seen MB twice more and reported that MB now “hated” people : “he very specifically chose this word and got quite agitated and vociferous. We asked who he hated and he replied that he hated [DY], .…and the judge ‘a little bit’ and his own solicitor ‘a little bit’, because [DY] and the court were making him do what he did not want to do ie go to the rehabilitation centre.” MB agreed for Professor Murphy to meet his father and brothers but did not want her to see SA. Professor Murphy “could not understand why and he could not explain this.” He later said that his father and uncle argued.
155.  A fourth meeting was scheduled for 4th July but DY rang Professor Murphy to explain that MB was “refusing to leave the house and refusing to get into the taxi.” Professor Murphy therefore went to see MB at his home. She recounted a brief discussion with NB:
“[NB] added ‘I’m not stopping him. Not stopping him doing anything. He is a grown man.’ I said there was a difference between not stopping someone doing something and encouraging them. I asked if she encouraged [MB] to visit the rehabilitation centre. [NB] did not answer for a while and then repeated that she was not stopping him.”
155. Professor Murphy also reported the explanation of MB’s carer, Maria, as to his refusal to attend the meeting with her:
“She explained that [MB] was very stressed earlier on and had flung his arms out to prevent them getting him through the door and to prevent them getting him into the car that had come to collect him.”
MB himself told Professor Murphy that he felt “angry, sad, ill,” because of the rehabilitation centre. He said that  he “did not want to visit, no, no,no.” He said he would refuse to go the following day, like he had refused to visit her that day. He wanted to go back to college. When asked about how he would feel about a different college, he “was enthusiastic, making it clear that his refusal to visit the rehabilitation centre is not about refusing all new activities.” 
156. Professor Murphy concluded:
“… neither [MB] nor any of his family members, think [MB] should go to a rehabilitation centre, even temporarily….It is difficult to be certain whether it was originally MB’s view or whether he is being influenced by his family, and it seems pretty clear that none of his family members are encouraging him to give it a try….he is now so completely and implacably opposed to the idea that he would be totally unco-operative and consequently unable to benefit from the stay.” 
She suggested that:
 “one of the problems, I think, is that culturally non-European families often expect to do all the caring within the family, and it has been repeatedly noted that this means they are often reluctant to access service (see for example Bhardwaj, Murphy & Forrester-Jones, 2016). Their relative isolation from other families and from services often means that they may have very different views about the lives of people with disabilities and they may, for example, not understand the European view that we should strive for self-determination, even with the most disabled individuals….I am not certain yet to what extent this is reflected in [MB]’s family’s views of his care….” 

157. Professor Murphy recommended that 
•	“the plan for a residential stay at a rehabilitation centre should be abandoned for the present.” 
•	The provision of regular paid carers should be continued, and involvement of wider family in his care considered.
•	In the longer run, she advised that it would be good for MB to be cared for overnight, occasionally, by either paid carers or family members: “It is very unwise for MB to be left too dependent on his mother, as she will not be available for ever and may have periods of illness in the future,. Without discovering that others can also provide good overnight care, MB would be left very vulnerable to major anxiety in such circumstances as his mother being suddenly unavailable. Frustrating and difficult as it may be, professionals need to seek a collaborative relationship with family members.”  

158.  The resumed hearing: when the hearing resumed on 12th July DY’s position had changed and he was recalled. He confirmed that he had been “surprised” by the view of Dr. Nyein of the J Centre that any clinical input from his team would not bring about changes in MB’s posture, and that residential placement would secure no benefit. He confirmed that he had ‘put on hold’ MB’s proposed visit in the light of information from Professor Murphy. Taking all together, he no longer believed that residential rehabilitation placement was in MB’s best interests.     He acknowledged that moving MB would involve severe physical resistance “and that would be untenable.” 
159. In order to move forwards, DY explained that he has submitted a number of options to MB’s property and affairs deputy to consider funding, and he had embarked on discussions with the social worker. He proposed to “recruit a team” and not use agency staff. He considered that his new approach “the lesser of the options, but it’s got to be the realistic one.” He expected that there will be periods of crisis, and that he would then need to raise safeguarding alerts. He agreed that it would be a particular cause for concern if NB agitated for the removal of key workers in MB’s care arrangements. He confirmed his intention to “remain as case manager in the long term.”
Submissions
160. The Applicant Local Authority: At the beginning of the hearing the Applicant’s position was that the proposed rehabilitation placement was in the best interests of MB [A231]. In the light of events during the adjourned period, on 12th July it then “doubt[ed]” that proposition [A287]. It sought “further detailed reports” from Dr Nyein and Professor Murphy, whilst at the same time urging that proceedings “reach a timely conclusion”. Ultimately, the Local Authority accepted that there should be no order on the issue of residential respite placement and Miss Gannon’s oral submissions were limited to capacity. She agreed the need for a reasoned judgment, and confirmed that the Local Authority accepted and was very conscious of its safeguarding obligations to MB in the future.
161. SA and AD submitted a joint written submission for the resumed hearing.  They described being “extremely disappointed” that MB had refused to visit a placement; and “convinced that a new approach to MB’s care such as [DY]’s proposal is desperately needed.” Neither of them attended on 12th July to make oral submissions.
162. On behalf of SB, Mr. Lamb’s written submissions on 12th July urged that “the substantive proceedings need to end now.” He referred to the decision of Re ITW and submitted that “MB meets each consideration head on.” Ultimately, he limited his oral submissions to the remaining issue of capacity.
163. The Official Solicitor began the hearing seeking orders to achieve MB’s placement for 12 of residential rehabilitation as soon as Professor Murphy assessed him as ready to attend. [A239] Mr. Bagchi pointed out “the lengths to which the court, the other parties and public authorities have been prepared to go to avoid the prospect of MB’s removal from the care of his mother…. Generally all such measures have failed” [A258] He sketched the consequences of not putting into effect DY’s proposal in the following terms:
“.. in very simple terms, nothing will change and MB would be consigned to a life of enmeshed dependency upon his mother without any prospect of him developing his potential to make his own decisions and live with much more independence than his current circumstances presently allow…..he is likely to be in increased pain and his quality of life will be significantly reduced.” [A259]  
164. After the adjourned period, Mr. Bagchi’s written position statement for the 12th July noted that “it seems sensible for the court to take stock as to the way forward for the litigation.” He identified three potential options: proceedings with DY’s proposal, creating a care package for MB in his home, or giving active consideration to a long term educational residential placement. He accepted that the second “may be the least worst “ option but urged that “no party should be under any illusion that this remains a risky option for MB and may well result in further safeguarding referrals, high turnover of staff and, ultimately, more litigation” [A283] He considered it necessary for the key clinicians and experts to prepare further reports, exchange them and discuss options at a professionals meeting, with a further hearing thereafter.
167. Ultimately, at the hearing Mr Bagchi did not oppose the notion that proceedings should end immediately. He accepted that, for the steps necessary to put into effect residential placement to be in the best interests of MB, “a different balance of risk” would need to exist. He urged instead the imperative of vigilance on the part of the Local Authority to ensure that  MB’s needs are met in the future. In this “extraordinary case”, he considered that this should include the Local Authority taking “a broad view of funding now”, in case a need for emergency placement arose.  
 Discussion
168. Findings: In the course of proceedings, the Local Authority drew up s “sample schedule of facts” [A169] which made clear the basis of its position in respect of DY’s proposal; and the Official Solicitor subsequently added an additional list making clear the basis of his position [A208]. SA, AD and SB gave their response but NB never did.  Those documents are of some assistance now in setting out my conclusions at the end of the hearing..
169. Considering all the evidence, I am satisfied that: 
a.	MB refuses to receive physiotherapy while at college and does not receive it at home.
I accept the professional evidence, which is not disputed by any family members, to that effect. There seems to be no argument but that physiotherapy would be beneficial for MB’s long-term health. His reluctance appears to be linked to fear of short-term pain. I accept the evidence of Dr. Poz that NB is unable to support him through the short term difficulty.

b.	MB has been provided with a customised wheelchair. Family members made adjustments to the new chair without consulting the provider and over a long period of time did not ensure that MB used it consistently.
I accept the professional evidence on this, having particular regard to DY’s account of conversations with the wheelchair providers and the evidence of JW. In so far as SA and AD say that they have not made alterations, I accept that account but I am nonetheless satisfied that unadvised alterations have been made at home. 
I note that progress is now being made with professional adaptations of the wheelchair and that all family members other than NB have positively indicated their intention to ensure consistent use in the future.

c.	MB has been provided with igaze equipment but over a long period of time has not been consistently supported by family members to use it.
I accept the evidence of JW, the ISW and DY as to their experience of the igaze equipment being unused at home. I accept that AD in particular has been keen to enhance MB’s communication abilities in the past but her attempts have been limited by lack of technical knowhow. For the future, SB expresses an intention to encourage MB to communicate in the best way possible.

d.	NB has allowed very limited progress towards paid care assistance and has at times actively limited his ability to engage with non-family members without her presence. She has at times prevented MB from seeing his uncle SA.
The history of these proceedings taken as a whole demonstrates the lack of progress in the introduction of carers other than NB. Such progress as NB has allowed is to be welcomed, and it is acknowledged that on occasions she has raised legitimate concerns (which have then been acted upon appropriately). However, where the accounts of family members and case managers diverge, I prefer the evidence of the case managers as to the reasons for the limited progress being founded in NB’s unwillingness to engage.
NB seems not to dispute that she has at times prevented SA from seeing MB. To the extent that their accounts differ, I accept the account of SA and AD. I do not find any credible evidence that SA and AD have been anything other than supportive of MB and constructive in their approach to these proceedings, whilst trying to be supportive of NB. The renewed contact between SA and MB which was achieved around the time of the hearing is positive development.     

e.	NB has been unable to work constructively with many professionals, leading to their services being withdrawn from MB. She has not followed professional advice in relation to therapies and treatments proposed. She did not attend appointments with a court-appointed expert, necessitating further court proceedings. 
The evidence of NB’s inability or unwillingness to work with a range of professionals is overwhelming. Her own written statement makes clear her wish to be left to care for MB alone. The ending of the services of JW and the carer TC are particularly clear examples of loss to MB.

f.	MB is unable or unwilling to express views that differ from his mother’s, and adopts her attitude to professionals.
I do not accept the accounts of NB and SB that MB is routinely able to express wishes independently of his mother’s views. Those accounts are contradicted by the assessments of Dr. Poz, Professor Murphy and Amanda Bairstow, and the reports of the case managers, all of which I accept. In their response to the Local Authority’s schedule of facts, SA and AD concede that “sometimes this is true.” To the extent that SB suggests otherwise, I do not accept that his view is accurate, limited as his perspective is by the relatively short time in which he has returned to being an active presence in MB’s life. I note that the statements and letters from MB’s advocate LS do not address this point.     

g.	There are significant tensions and hostilities amongst MB’s family members. MB is usable to understand these tensions and finds them distressing. 
It would appear that the parties were able to keep family discord out of the courtroom chiefly by SA and AD choosing not to attend or to comment. Nonetheless, it is apparent from the statement of Nicola Mackintosh QC, and the attachments to that statement, that there are very significant tensions and difficulties between family members. DY has recently made a safeguarding referral on this very issue. 
MB’s own presentation, including the vomiting, and his changing responses to people who previously mattered to him (like JW and SA) once they are the focus of disagreement, demonstrate his limited tolerance of such difficulties.  

h.	NB has not taken all reasonable steps to maximise MB’s opportunity to learn about the rehabilitation placements on offer so as to enable him to form his own views.
NB refused to visit the proposed placements herself, despite extensive efforts to encourage and facilitate it. She was unable to answer Professor Murphy’s question of what she had done to encourage MB (as distinct from ‘not stopping him’) to consider the proposal. There is not reported in any of the reports and statements filed a single incidence of NB positively giving MB encouragement to explore what was being proposed.

170. Balance sheet: The Local Authority also drew up a balance sheet of “positives” and “possible risks” of DY’s proposal [A181]. Considering all the evidence, it seems to me that the balance sheet is as follows:

		DISADVANTAGES				ADVANTAGES

Contrary to MB’s wishes, consistently expressed. 	Evidence suggests that MB’s wishes are influenced by NB and her reactions/wishes. His initial response to suggestion of visiting was relatively open.	
Contrary to the wishes of his parents	Other members of his family, SA and AD, support the proposal	
Significant change from MB’s experience to date.  He has not so far had overnight care from anyone other than by NB. 	Would begin to expand MB’s independence and confidence other than in the company of NB. He has demonstrated adaptability in the past eg starting college.	
The proposed placements are not local to the family, making it difficult for them to visit	There is a possibility of NB being given accommodation on site to help MB settle into placement. SA and AD are willing to support MB as well. He would live alongside his peer group, with similar levels of need to his own and would be able to develop social relationships with other residents.
	
He will need to share core staffing with other residents when he is used to receiving one to one support from NB at home	MB would not be living in a volatile environment, exposed to family arguments. The shared living arrangements would address MB’s lack of social interaction with anyone other than family members, particularly when college comes to an end. Would aid development of independence and autonomy. Enmeshment of relationship with NB would reduce.	
Little prospect of clinical gain, and lack of co-operation would prohibit therapeutic gains	Full access to health services, including consistent postural management programme and communication aids. Would enable proper assessment of his needs and co-ordinated approach to support planning. Previous attempts to provide structured care at home have failed.	
	MB will more easily adapt to receiving support from paid carers when he returns home. His understanding of options available to him will be enhanced.	

171. Conclusions: MB’s wish not to engage in residential rehabilitation has been consistently held and expressed with increasing distress. He is undoubtedly at present vehemently opposed to such a move. A great deal of time and resources have been expended by the many professionals involved in MB’s care, and indeed the court, in trying to afford him a better understanding of what is proposed, including latterly by a short, daytime only visit, in the company of trusted college staff.  He has consistently refused, using what little control he has over his body physically to block what he views as steps towards even discussing a visit. He has made it clear that he would physically resist as far as he is able being taken to visit a proposed placement.
172. What has been lacking for MB, is encouragement from the person who matters most to him, his mother. There is reason to conclude that, had she given such encouragement, MB’s views may not have crystallised against DY’s proposal. In his first interactions with Professor Murphy, and in the college staff account of his interest in discussions of alternative living arrangements, there are grounds to conclude that MB may have been open to considering the proposal positively. The enmeshed relationship between NB and MB identified by Dr. Poz, recognised by Amanda Bairstow, and acknowledged by SA and AD, means that NB’s refusal to visit the proposed placements herself is a powerful signal to MB to do the same. I agree with Professor Murphy that there is difference between ‘not stopping’ someone, and encouraging them. Given MB’s dependence on her, NB’s failure to support and encourage MB to take up the opportunity on offer IS the same as preventing him from taking it up. To the extent that MB’s views are a reflection of his mother’s, they are a manifestation of the very disability which DY’s proposal sought to address. 
173. Nonetheless, however frustrating and difficult it may be for professional carers and representatives to accept, I am satisfied that MB does indeed hold those strong wishes and feelings against DY’s proposal; and further that those wishes must be the magnetic factor in weighing the advantages and disadvantages of  residential rehabilitation placement. As long as he holds those views, the prospects of achieving his engagement in the proposed rehabilitation are minimal, meaning that any benefits achieved would be too. To act against them would require measures which those who previously advanced the proposal now accept are realistically untenable, and would cause undoubted trauma to MB. To give effect to DY’s proposal now would be less fighting on MB’s behalf, more simply fighting MB. Even accepting the Official Solicitor’s analysis of the risks of not going ahead with DY’s proposal, weighing all the factors I am in no doubt that the balance settles against MB moving to residential placement at the moment. 
174. So where does that leave MB’s care arrangements for the future? DY will continue efforts to secure for MB as many of the necessary therapeutic interventions as possible within MB’s home environment. NB however must bear the heavy responsibility of knowing that an opportunity to explore enhancement of her son’s life experience has been passed by. Unless she markedly changes her approach to non-family carers and professionals, the likelihood is that his life will continue to be more limited than it could be. And the risk remains that MB will be forced to cope with unplanned rupture in his narrow care arrangements because of ordinary life events, such as illness befalling NB herself.
175. It is to be hoped that the conclusion of these proceedings will alleviate some stress on MB’s household. However, it is clear that there has only been progress in moving to develop MB’s life opportunities within the prism of court involvement. Without it, the need for proactivity on the part of the Local Authority in fulfilling its statutory obligations is acute. I am reassured that the Local Authority is very much alive to this. If NB tries to roll back from the progress made to date with independent carers and activities beyond her involvement, and in particular if she tries to exclude key professionals concerned in the delivery of services to MB (such as the case manager, or the property and affairs deputy), then warning bells should ring. The necessity of future litigation cannot be ruled out. 
176. More positively, NB should take from the conclusion of these proceedings reassurance that her continued role in MB’s life is recognised. With less fear, she could choose to trust the positive aspects of her relationship with her son, and genuinely encourage him to explore the world around him as far as his disabilities allow.  A good start would be to build bridges with those family members who have long been a support to MB, in particular his uncle SA; and to work with DY and the Local Authority to establish a regular structure of care and support for all of MB’s needs.

F.	CONCLUSION     
 177. I am satisfied that MB presently lacks capacity to make decisions on the care he requires and particularly whether to move to a 12 week residential rehabilitation placement. 
178. I am further satisfied that it is not presently in MB’s best interests to move to such placement as long as that is contrary to his own wishes.  To be clear, this decision is not intended to prohibit MB ever from attending such placement. There are many positive aspects to DY’s proposal. If over time MB changes his mind, and becomes willing to explore again the possibility of similar placement, the balance of risks and benefits will be different.
179. The parties are requested to submit for approval a draft order giving effect to these conclusions.  

Her Honour Judge Hilder
25th October 2017