IMPORTANT NOTICE
This judgment was delivered in private.  The judge has given leave for this version of the judgment to be published on condition that (irrespective of what is contained in the judgment) in any published version of the judgment the anonymity of the child[ren] and members of their [or his/her] family must be strictly preserved.  All persons, including representatives of the media, must ensure that this condition is strictly complied with.  Failure to do so will be a contempt of court.

Case No: MA14C00004   
IN THE MANCHESTER COUNTY COURT
Civil Justice Centre
1 Bridge Street West
Manchester
M60 9DJ

Friday, 4th April 2014

Before:

HER HONOUR JUDGE NEWTON

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IN THE MATTER OF THE CHILDREN ACT 1989
AND IN THE MATTER OF: R-G (A CHILD)

Re: R-G (A Child)

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Transcribed from the Official Tape Recording by
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Counsel for the Local Authority: MISS N
Counsel for the Mother: NOT KNOWN
Counsel for the Father: NOT KNOWN
Solicitor for the Child: MISS M

Hearing dates: 
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JUDGMENT
1.	THE JUDGE:  I am concerned with a little boy called A, who was born on 10th January 2009, so he is now 5.  His mother is B and his father C.  
2.	The other individuals concerned in these proceedings are his maternal grandmother, D; the Local Authority’s key social worker, E; and A’s guardian, who is F.
3.	On 23rd February 2011, His Honour Judge Knopf, sitting in this court, made a care order in relation to A and his half-sibling H.  He approved the Local Authority’s care plan, which provided for direct contact on two occasions per year between A and his father for identity purposes.  The plan was for A and H to live with the maternal grandmother, although their mother remained closely involved in their lives.
4.	The mother has the misfortune to suffer from bipolar disorder.  As a result of C’s behaviour towards her, she now also suffers from post traumatic stress disorder.  The culmination of a deeply abusive relationship was an assault by C committed upon B on 8th January 2010 followed by a further battery on 12th January 2010 (recorded as item 9 in his extensive criminal record).  C was sentenced to three and a half years’ imprisonment, a sentence which reflects the gravity of the assault.
5.	The first application in time is the Local Authority’s application to discharge the care order issued on 2nd September 2013.  That was an application which encompassed both A and H.  Both children have now returned to the day-to-day care of their mother, although their grandmother is still very closely involved.  On 3rd January 2014, in relation to H, I agreed to discharge the care order and made a joint residence order in favour of the mother and the maternal grandmother.  K, the mother’s older son has now also returned to live at home. It is very pleasing indeed to record the very real progress which the mother has made. There is no opposition to the discharge of the care order in relation to A and I intend to make a joint residence order.  
6.	However, the issue of the Local Authority’s application for discharge of the care order prompted an application by C for contact to A, issued in January 2014. The father does not seek direct contact immediately.  He suggests there should be a period of indirect contact so that he can be reintroduced into his son’s life.  That suggestion is stoutly opposed by the other parties to these proceedings.
7.	Following his discharge from prison, C exercised contact with A on three occasions in accordance with the Local Authority’s care plan.  The last contact visit took place in October 2012. Since then, A has become very unhappy about the prospect of any contact with his father and the Local Authority ceased to facilitate it. 
8.	The matter came back before His Honour Judge Knopf.  During the course of the hearing, the father absented himself from the courtroom and His Honour Judge Knopf declined to make any further order in relation to direct or indirect contact.
9.	Given the mother’s acute vulnerability, I have excused her presence during these hearings, though she has been represented.  The father has attended on two occasions.  On the last occasion and again today, he has absented himself during the course of the proceedings.  Today, he put forward an excuse which I have some difficulty in accepting but which, even put at its highest, did not justify him leaving a crucial final hearing in relation to his son.  
10.	Accordingly, I have dealt with the matter on the basis of the two statements the father has filed in support of his application; the core assessment, which was prepared by J, social worker, as long ago as December 2012 and her initial statement on 23rd August 2013; and, more importantly, the evidence of E filed as recently as 25th March 2014.  I also have the advantage of a detailed Cafcass report from F, dated 2nd April 2014. 
11.	The father has participated, albeit superficially, in an assessment by E, not seeing fit to attend all of the agreed appointments.  I am satisfied that the father underwent some courses while in prison and, since his discharge from custody, he has completed an IDAP course.  He tells me through his counsel that he has changed and he is not the same man he once was.  
12.	On the other hand, there are four separate recent FWIN reports from Police Force O, setting out incidents to which the police have been called occurring between C and a lady called L, who is described as his “former partner” and the mother of his child.  C has also explained to the guardian’s solicitor that there was further involvement from the police in August 2013, an occasion upon which his then partner appears to have suffered significant injury, although C denies having inflicted violence upon her.
13.	In reaching my conclusions, I have borne firmly in mind both section 34 of the Children Act 1989 and the Local Authority’s obligation to facilitate reasonable contact between a child and his parents but, more pertinently for the future, section 1(3) of the Children Act.  A’s welfare must be my paramount concern and I have referred myself to the welfare checklist. It is a drastic step to deprive any child of a meaningful relationship with his father.  I also bear in mind A and his father’s Article 8 right to respect for their family life.  Any interference with those rights must be lawful, necessary and justified by pressing concern for A’s welfare.  I attach very limited weight to A’s wishes and feelings given his age, although he has expressed himself very clearly to the guardian as not wanting to see his father.  More important is the likely impact upon the mother of any resumption of direct contact.  C may contend that he has changed.  I think B would take a great deal of persuading of that proposition and it is quite clear from her CPN that the continuance of direct contact after C’s discharge from custody has had a very serious impact upon her and I quote from C11:
“It has been significantly evident during the course of the assessment that the continued prevalence of her ex-partner’s contact with [A] has been a precipitating factor in [B’s] being unwell.  When [B] has had periods where her mental health has deteriorated, it has been linked with the timing of contact arrangements between [A] and his father and [B] has expressed how the continued prevalence of him in her life has made it very difficult to put the trauma that she has suffered behind her as this has been a constant trigger.”
A has picked up, no doubt, on his mother’s anxiety and that of his siblings and his reason for not wanting to see his father is because, “He used to hit mummy.”  
14.	It would be utterly disastrous for this little boy and, indeed, his siblings, if his mother’s fragile mental health were to be affected by contact arrangements.  This is a family that is now reunited and making good progress.  The children are flourishing.  The mother is in a stable condition.  I would not wish to do anything to jeopardise that.  I remain sceptical, given the existence of the FWINs, that C has indeed made the progress that he contends but even taking his case at its highest, in my judgment, B remains absolutely terrified of him.
15.	In all of those circumstances and applying the welfare checklist, I am satisfied that it could not conceivably accord with the welfare of this little boy for me to begin the process of reintroducing him to his father.  Their relationship is tenuous in the extreme.  He went to prison when A was, I think, 13 months and has had three contact visits since then.  I do think it would potentially be helpful for A to have information about his father and for his father to have some indirect contact with him.  That is a possibility that has been open to the father now for a very long period of time and he has not availed himself of it but, even so, I think it would be in A’s interests for there to be some very limited indirect contact, perhaps on two occasions each year, neutral occasions, not birthdays and Christmas, for him to be able to communicate with his son in some way.  It seems that the most sensible way of trying to achieve that would be via some form of email to an email address set up specifically for this purpose.  I am not sure how that can be negotiated in the absence of the involvement of the Local Authority, so whilst I am content to discharge the care order and I do so, that is on the basis that, over the coming weeks, Ms N, the current key social worker will do her best to facilitate those indirect contact arrangements before the case is closed.
16.	I will make a residence order to the mother and the maternal grandmother.  I make no order for direct contact.  I reserve any further applications in relation to A to myself.  I direct a transcript of this short and imperfect judgment and I direct the usual assessment of the legally assisted parties’ costs.
[Judgment ends]