ON APPEAL FROM NOTTINGHAM CROWN COURT
The Hon. Mr Justice Crane
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
MRS JUSTICE CHEEMA-GRUBB OBE
and
HIS HONOUR JUDGE WAIT
(Sitting as a Judge of the CACD)
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Regina |
Appellant |
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Gary Lucien Robinson |
Respondent |
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Duncan Atkinson QC for the Crown
Hearing date : 22 June 2017
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Crown Copyright ©
Lord Justice Hamblen :
Introduction
The outline facts
The evidence at trial
The applications
"In deciding whether to grant an extension, the court will consider all the material circumstances, including the explanation for the delay and the cogency of the reasons in seeking an extension when determining whether it is in the interests of justice to grant an extension: see, for example, Hamilton v R [2012] UKPC 21, [2013] 1 Cr App R 13 , at paragraph 17 and R v Thorsby [2015] 1 Cr App R (S) 63 at paragraphs 12-18. There is no limit on the court's discretion."
"In this court's experience the principled approach to extensions of time is that the court will grant an extension if it is in the interests of justice to do so. There are, however, several components that contribute to the interests of justice. The court will have in mind the public interest in the proceedings of the Court generally, in particular in the finality of Crown Court judgments, the interests of other litigants, the efficient use of resources and good administration. However, the public interest embraces also, and in our view critically, the justice of the case and the liberty of the individual."
"The Court of Appeal is never subject to a mandatory duty to receive the evidence, but is bound in considering whether to receive the evidence or not to have regard in particular to the specific matters listed in subsection (2). The Court of Appeal is not precluded from receiving fresh evidence if the conditions in subsection (2)(a), (b), (c) and (d) or any of them are not satisfied, but the Court would for obvious reasons be unlikely to receive evidence which did not appear to it to be capable of belief, or which did not appear to it to afford any ground for allowing the appeal, or which would not have been admissible in the trial court. The Court of Appeal would ordinarily be less ready, and in some cases much less ready, to receive evidence which the appellant had failed without reasonable explanation to adduce at the trial, since receipt of such evidence on appeal tends to subvert our system of jury trial by depriving the decision-making tribunal of the opportunity to review and assess the strength of that fresh evidence in the context of the case as a whole, and retrials, although sometimes necessary, are never desirable. On any application to the Court of Appeal to receive fresh evidence under section 23 in an appeal against conviction, the question which the Court of Appeal must always ask itself is this: having regard in particular to the matters listed in subsection (2), does the Court of Appeal think it necessary or expedient in the interests of justice to receive the new evidence? In exercising its statutory discretion to receive or not to receive fresh evidence, the Court of Appeal will be mindful that its discretion is to be exercised in accordance with the statutory provision and so as to achieve, in the infinitely varying circumstances of different cases, the objective for which the discretion has been conferred. The exercise of this discretion cannot be circumscribed in a manner which fails to give effect to the statute or undermines the statutory objective, which is to promote the interests of justice; the Court will bear in mind that the power in section 23 exists to safeguard defendants against the risk and consequences of wrongful conviction."
"…it is well understood that, save exceptionally, if the defendant is allowed to advance on appeal a defence and/or evidence which could and should have been but were not put before the jury, our trial process would be subverted. Therefore if they were not deployed when they were available to be deployed, or the issues could have been but were not raised at trial, it is clear from the statutory structure, as explained in the authorities, that unless a reasonable and persuasive explanation for one or other of these omissions is offered, it is highly unlikely that the "interests of justice" test will be satisfied."
(1) The fresh evidence renders the conviction unsafe.
(2) The judge misdirected the jury in relation to self-defence.
Ground 1
(1) The boxes incident and the initial confrontation
(2) The atmosphere before the confrontation
(3) The applicant left the bar area: second confrontation and altercation.
(4) The context of M2 leaning over the bar
(a) At 02:32:33: the applicant (still behind the bar) goes out of view whilst heading towards the left hand side.
(b) At 02:32:34: M2 moves into view heading towards the bar hatch, moving from the left hand side.
(c) At 2:32:37: an object is seen that Mr. Kennedy states is consistent with a bottle being thrown. In addition what appears to be fighting is taking place on the left side of the screen.
(d) At 02:32:38: M2 is at the bar near the hatch, facing the bar and appears to lean forward over the bar. Mr. Kennedy stated that this means that the applicant has had to pass M2 as he made his way towards the exit.
(e) At 02:32:40: M2 moves away from the bar, towards the left hand side. At the same time an object is seen that Mr. Kennedy states is consistent with a bottle being thrown.
(5) Violence continuing after the applicant moves away
(a) At 02:32:58: a fight appears to continue in the red annotated area, despite the applicant Robinson having moved to the right hand side.
(b) At 02:33:11: a woman with a dark toned shoulder strap appears to have fallen down to the left hand side.
(1) Mr. Kennedy's analysis contradicts the evidence of Damian Gage when he stated that he could not recall bottles being thrown before the lights went on, after the attack.
(2) It also contradicts the evidence of Wayne Philpott that it was the applicant who leant over the bar. Moreover, it provides a basis upon which the jury could have concluded that M2 was, or may have been, the deceased who may have armed himself with something taken from the bar, and then moved towards the area of an existing fight.
(3) Following on from this, the applicant's actions would then need to be considered in the context that rather than setting out from the bar with a knife intent on seeking revenge against the deceased he may have actually passed by him on his way to the exit: a scenario far more consistent with attempting to escape attack and thus self defence than a revenge attack.
(4) The new analysis also demonstrates that whilst M2 was leaning over the bar and possibly arming himself, the applicant had moved to the left where fighting was taking place, and bottles were being thrown from the right and the left before the deceased was stabbed. The point at which the bottles are thrown are crucial. It was within this context that the applicant was forced to react in order to defend himself.
(5) This would have presented a wholly different picture to the jury, and one that supported the defence case that the deceased may have armed himself before attacking the applicant who was in different area under attack from others.
(6) In the context of self defence this new evidence may well have made a crucial difference to the jury's decision to convict the applicant of murder in that it was a significant factor for the jury to take into account when considering whether the prosecution had made them sure that the applicant had not acted in self defence.
(7) Alternatively, even if the jury rejected the assertion that M2 was or may have been Mr. Tyrell, the new evidence would still support the defence of self defence in that it shows that M2 was not the applicant, that the applicant had moved out of that area and was moving towards the door, and that M2 (whoever he was) could have been arming himself with a weapon, and moved towards the area of an existing fight, whilst bottles were being thrown.
Ground 2
(1) "Many people would say that the law in relation to self-defence is common sense. It seeks to allow people to defend themselves, but not to go over the top";
(2) "A person who is attacked or is about to be attacked in entitled to use force to defend himself if it's necessary to do so; and if a person does use force to defend himself the nature and degree of the force used must be no more than is reasonable";
(3) "Note of course that even if a person is attacked it may in some circumstances not be necessary to use force at all and you must distinguish between self-defence and retaliation". The Judge sought to assist the jury as to this by way of examples away from the facts of the case;
(4) "The nature and degree of the force used must be no more than is reasonable in the circumstances and ultimately you as the jury must judge what was reasonable in the circumstances if the need to defend himself did arise here, but you should bear in mind that a person who has to use force to defend himself may well have little time to think...";
(5) The judge also sought to address this direction to the issues and facts in the case, for example he said "in judging self-defence here you need to concentrate on the second time that he went out of the bar taking a knife with him.."
Conclusion