England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Decisions

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION

		Royal Courts of Justice The Strand London WC2
		24th March 2000

1. MR JUSTICE HOOPER: Karamjit Singh Dhillon appeals his conviction on 10th June 1999 in the Crown Court at Isleworth before His Honour Judge Baker on one offence of offering to supply a controlled drug contrary to section 4(1)(b) of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971. The particulars of the offence were that he and his brother, Jasbir Singh Dhillon, on 17th December 1998 offered to supply a controlled drug of class A, namely heroin, to "Shaz". Shaz was an undercover officer who gave evidence at the appellant's trial. The particulars show, as Mr Bryan accepts, that this was an allegation of a joint enterprise.
2. Pursuant to an agreement between Jasbir and Shaz on 14th December Jasbir was to supply one kilo of heroin for £18,000, delivery to take place on 17th December. The evidence of what happened on that day can be found in the transcript of the tape from the tape recorder being carried by Shaz. Shaz drove to a lorry park at the rear of a service station. Jasbir arrived, got into the car being driven by Shaz and directed him to a block of flats. He made a phone call and the appellant appeared. Jasbir returned with a sample. The appellant denied in evidence that he had provided that sample. Subsequently the appellant went to the car and placed in the back of it a bag which on subsequent analysis was shown to contain only flour.
3. According to the appellant, when he gave evidence, he decided to do a favour for his brother. He agreed to go to the car with the bag. He thought the man in the car was a drug dealer and he thought that his brother was ripping him off for his money. Having thrown the bag into the car the appellant was arrested.
4. There was other evidence upon which the prosecution relied to show that the appellant was involved in the transaction on 14th December and earlier on 17th December. We shall assume for the purposes of this appeal that the jury may have decided that the appellant's involvement in the matter started at about the time that the appellant threw the bag of flour into the car. Indeed that was how the matter was left to the jury by the learned judge (see page 8G of the transcript of the summing-up).
5. The thrust of the appellant's case as presented to the jury and as presented to this court today is that the offence had not been committed because the offer had been accepted by Shaz on 14th December and was no longer therefore an offer on 17th December. Mr Bryan who appears for the appellant today and who appeared for him at the trial made a submission to that effect at the close of the prosecution's case. The learned judge rejected the submission being satisfied that there was an offer to supply the drug on the 17th. He held that the offer made on 14th December was a continuing offer and one that remained so until it had "either been resiled from or had been completed." As he said to the jury the case turned on "whether there was an offer made by this defendant" on 17th December. There was therefore for the jury a simple and single issue, namely whether there was an offer on that day. The learned judge told the jury that the prosecution's case was that it was a continuing offer and that nothing had been finalised. He left it to the jury to decide whether on 17th December there was an offer made by this appellant to supply the bag. He drew the jury's attention to the passages in the transcript for 17th December which recorded conversations between the appellant and the police officer Shaz in which the appellant expressed concern about the circumstances of the transaction.
6. In our judgment there was ample evidence from which the jury could decide that there was an offer on 17th December. Mr Bryan seeks to persuade us in effect that the matter should be approached by reference to the law of contract. He submits that once an offer has been accepted then it can no longer be treated as an offer. He referred us to casess including Goodard [1992] Crim.L.R 588 and Haggard v Mason [1976] 1 WLR 187. Those cases are authority for the obvious proposition that the offence is completed when the offer is made. Thus there was an offence committed here on 14th December by Jasbir. Those authorities do not help this court in resolving the issue as to whether or not there was also an offer on 17th December.
7. We take the view that it would be quite wrong to introduce into the trial of a person charged with this offence the principles of the law of contract. It is clear to us that this appellant was either offering heroin or taking part in such an offer, as the jury so found. We reject therefore that ground of appeal.
8. Mr Bryan renews a further ground upon which he was refused leave by the single judge. In her opening to the jury Mrs Jessel said about undercover police officers:

"They receive information and on the basis of the information they receive they have a duty to catch and arrest criminals."

9. Following her opening Mr Bryan made a submission that the jury might reach the conclusion that Mr Dhillon was a criminal and that they had a duty to arrest him. His Honour Judge Baker rejected that submission and we agree with the reasons that he gave for so rejecting it.
10. Mr Bryan also complains about a question asked by Mrs Jessel when cross-examining his client. According to the transcript at page 3 Mrs Jessel said this:

"I am going to suggest that just a little time, a few days, this was the 14th, and the deal was going to be the Wednesday and it did not come quite off then, and you were in on it, behind it, as you always are. What do you say to that?

Answer: No."

11. Mr Bryan makes complaint to this court of the addition of those words "as you always are." We take the view that it was perhaps unfortunate for Mrs Jessel to have used those words, albeit that we have not asked her to address us on the topic. However, we are certainly of the view that there was no material irregularity and that this conviction is safe.