IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE HIGH COURT
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
(KENNEDY LJ and NELSON J)
Friday, 6 December 2002
B e f o r e :
(Vice President of the Court of Appeal, Civil Division)
LORD JUSTICE KAY
LORD JUSTICE KEENE
|IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW|
|on the application of|
|THE LONDON BOROUGH OF HACKNEY||Defendant/Respondent|
|THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT||Interested Party|
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MR A UNDERWOOD QC and MR K RUTLEDGE (instructed by Hackney Directorate of Law & Probity, London N11 0ZH) appeared on behalf of the Respondent
MR P HAVERS QC and MR S RAHMAN (instructed by the Treasury Solicitor) appeared for the Interested Party
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"whether the Defendant is entitled to set a rate under Asylum Support Interim Provisions Regulations 1999 for 'essential living needs' which is designedly less than the rate payable under the Asylum Support Regulations 2000 for persons eligible for assistance from NASS."
"Schedule 9 makes temporary provision for support in the period before the coming into force of this section."
Schedule 9 is entitled "Asylum support: interim provisions". Paragraph 1(1) thereof states:
"The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision requiring prescribed local authorities or local authorities falling within a prescribed description of authority to provide support, during the interim period, to eligible persons."
There are then a definition of eligible persons and specific provision for the regulations to deal with a number of matters.
"'The interim period' means the period -
(a) beginning on such day as may be prescribed for the purposes of this paragraph; and
(b) ending on such day as may be so prescribed."
It will be observed that that definition of "the interim period" sets no limit to the duration of the period.
"during the interim period to eligible persons": Reg 3(1).
Reg 2(5) then defined the interim period. It stated as follows:
"The interim period begins on the day on which these Regulations come into force and ends on 1st April 2002."
"If the Act says that the Schedule is to be used for a certain purpose and the heading of the part of the Schedule in question shows that it is prima facie at any rate devoted to that purpose, then you must read the Act and the Schedule as though the Schedule operated for that purpose, and if you can satisfy the language of the section without extending it beyond that purpose you ought to do it."
Here, therefore, schedule 9, it is said, must be read as operating subject to the limit imposed by section 95(13).
"The schedule is as much a part of the statute, and is as much an enactment as any other part".
That, however, does not resolve the difficulty in the present case. It is well established that, in interpreting a statute, it must be read as a whole so as to give effect to Parliament's intention: Lumsden v The Commissioners of Inland Revenue (1914) AC 877. One cannot therefore simply focus one's attention on schedule 9 and ignore the wording of section 95(13).
ORDER: Appeal dismissed. Take order from computer. Permission to appeal to the House of Lords refused.