European Court of Human Rights

 

 

THIRD SECTION

CASE OF DOVGIY AND SAGURA v. RUSSIA

(Application no. 41103/10)

 

 

 

 

 

 

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG

9 June 2022

 

This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of Dovgiy and Sagura v. Russia,

The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:

          Darian Pavli, President,
          Andreas Zünd,
          Mikhail Lobov, judges,
and Viktoriya Maradudina, Acting Deputy Section Registrar,

Having deliberated in private on 19 May 2022,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

PROCEDURE

1.  The case originated in an application against Russia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 15 July 2010.

2.  The applicants were represented by Ms Y. Liptser, a lawyer practising in Moscow.

3.  The Russian Government (“the Government”) were given notice of the application.

THE FACTS

4.  The list of applicants and the relevant details of the application are set out in the appended table.

5.  The applicants, both former governmental officials convicted for bribery and corruption, complained of the secret surveillance in the context of criminal proceedings. They also raised other complaints under the provisions of the Convention.

THE LAW

I.        ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 of the Convention

6.  The applicants complained of the secret surveillance in the context of criminal proceedings. They relied on Article 8 of the Convention, which reads as follows:

Article 8

“1.  Everyone has the right to respect for his private ... life ...

2.  There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”

7.  The Court reiterates that the measures aimed at interception of telephone communications amounted to an interference with the exercise of the rights set out in Article 8 of the Convention and that such interference will give rise to a breach of Article 8 of the Convention unless it can be shown that it was “in accordance with law”, pursued one or more legitimate aim or aims as defined in the second paragraph and was “necessary in a democratic society” to achieve those aims (see, among other authorities, Goranova-Karaeneva v. Bulgaria, no. 12739/05, § 45, 8 March 2011). It further reiterates that it is the obligation of the domestic courts to carry out an effective judicial review of the lawfulness and “necessity in a democratic society” of the contested surveillance measures and to furnish sufficient safeguards against arbitrariness within the meaning of Article 8 § 2 of the Convention (see Zubkov and Others v. Russia, nos. 29431/05 and 2 others, § 131, 7 November 2017). The failure to comply with this requirement has led the Court to conclude to a violation of the Article 8 of the Convention (see, for example, Dudchenko v. Russia, no. 37717/05, §§ 93-100, 7 November 2017, in which it was established that the domestic courts failed to verify, when authorising covert surveillance in respect of the applicant, whether there was a “reasonable suspicion” against him and to apply the “necessity in a democratic society” and “proportionality” tests).

8.  The Court does not lose sight that in earlier cases against Russia it has not established an availability of effective remedies for the applicants to exhaust prior to introducing a complaint before the Court (see, for example, Zubkov and Others, cited above, §§ 85-99). In this connection, it reiterates that the applicants cannot be reproached for their attempt to bring their grievances to the attention of the domestic courts through the remedies which they mistakenly considered effective in the absence of evidence that they were aware or should have become aware of the futility of their course of action (ibid., §107 in fine).

9.  The Court is satisfied that the applicants’ complaints comply with the admissibility criteria set out in Article 35 of the Convention.

10.  Having examined all the material submitted to it, the Court has not found any fact or argument capable of persuading it to reach a different conclusion on the admissibility and merits of these complaints. Having regard to its case-law on the subject, the Court considers that in the instant cases (as set out in the appended table) the courts did not verify the existence of a “reasonable suspicion” and did not apply the “necessity in a democratic society test” when examining the applicants’ complaints.

11.  These complaints are therefore admissible and disclose a breach of Article 8 of the Convention.

II.     REMAINING COMPLAINTS

12.  The applicants also raised other complaints under various Articles of the Convention.

13.  The Court has examined the application and considers that, in the light of all the material in its possession and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, these complaints either do not meet the admissibility criteria set out in Articles 34 and 35 of the Convention or do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms enshrined in the Convention or the Protocols thereto.

It follows that this part of the application must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.

III.  APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

14.  Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”

15.  Regard being had to the documents in its possession and to its case‑law (see, in particular, Akhlyustin v. Russia, no. 21200/05, 7 November 2017, Zubkov and Others, cited above, Dudchenko, cited above, Moskalev v. Russia, no. 44045/05, 7 November 2017 and Konstantin Moskalev v. Russia, no. 59589/10, 7 November 2017), the Court considers it reasonable to award each of the applicants the sum indicated in the appended table and dismisses the remainder of the applicants’ claims for just satisfaction.

16.  The Court further considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,

1.      Declares the complaint concerning the secret surveillance in the context of criminal proceedings admissible, and the remainder of the application inadmissible;

2.      Holds that this complaint discloses a breach of Article 8 of the Convention concerning the secret surveillance in the context of criminal proceedings;

3.      Holds

(a)  that the respondent State is to pay each of the applicants, within three months, the amount indicated in the appended table, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement;

(b)  that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points.

4.      Dismisses the remainder of the applicants’ claims for just satisfaction.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 9 June 2022, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

      Viktoriya Maradudina                                                Darian Pavli
    Acting Deputy Registrar                                                President

 

APPENDIX

Application raising complaints under Article 8 of the Convention

(secret surveillance in the context of criminal proceedings)