European Court of Human Rights
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URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2010/1465.html
Cite as: [2010] ECHR 1465
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FOURTH SECTION
DECISION
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application no.
19408/03
by Pavol LÓŠKA
against Slovakia
The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting on 14 September 2010 as a Chamber composed of:
Nicolas
Bratza,
President,
Giovanni
Bonello,
David
Thór Björgvinsson,
Ján
Šikuta,
Päivi
Hirvelä,
Ledi
Bianku,
Nebojša
Vučinić,
judges,
and Lawrence Early, Section
Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 5 June 2003,
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant, Mr Pavol Lóška, is a Slovakian national who was born in 1937 and lives in Michalovce. The respondent Government were represented by their Agent, Ms A. Poláčková, who was succeeded in that function by Ms M. Pirošíková.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
The applicant receives an old-age pension. At the same time, he is still economically active as a self-employed entrepreneur. He has an ongoing dispute with the Social Security Administration (SSA) concerning the contributions he is required to make to the social security funds in his capacity as a pensioner who is self-employed.
On 10 February 1999 the SSA quashed two decisions of 26 November 1998 and took four separate new decisions ordering the applicant to pay contributions for 1998 and 1999 and financial penalties for late payment of contributions for those years. The applicant's appeal was unsuccessful and the decisions were upheld by the SSA appellate body on 8 April 1999.
Although the applicant could have challenged the decisions of 10 February 1999 by way of an administrative-law appeal to the courts, he did not do so. He nevertheless lodged an unsuccessful request, which had no suspensive effect, for a review by the public prosecution service, which was at the latter's discretion. The decisions of 10 February 1999 thus became final and binding.
The SSA subsequently commissioned a judicial enforcement officer (súdny exekútor) to enforce the amounts due. The enforcement was authorised by the Michalovce District Court (Okresný súd) on 14 March 2000. The enforcement was to be carried out in the form of deductions from the applicant's old-age pension.
On 18 April 2000 the applicant challenged the enforcement by way of an appeal (námietka). He contended mainly that the decisions of 10 February 1999 had been flawed by numerous mistakes in calculation and formal irregularities.
On 2 January 2001 the SSA quashed the decisions of 10 February 1999 upon an extraordinary review outside the framework of the appellate procedure in so far as they concerned the contributions and penalty for the year 1998. The SSA informed the judicial enforcement officer accordingly and advised him that all that remained to be enforced were the decisions concerning the contributions and penalty for 1999.
On 26 November 2002 the District Court dismissed the applicant's enforcement appeal, observing that it was aimed at substantive elements of the enforced decisions while the review of such elements fell within the framework of the appellate procedure and outside the scope of the enforcement procedure. No mention was made of the decision of 2 January 2001 to quash the decisions of 10 February 1999 concerning the year 1998.
The written version of the decision of 26 November 2002, which was not subject to appeal, was mislaid and only came to the attention of the judicial enforcement officer on 27 August 2004.
Meanwhile, on 7 May 2003, the Constitutional Court (Ústavný súd) had declared the applicant's complaint under Article 127 of the Constitution that the decision of 26 November 2002 was arbitrary, unfair and wrong and that the procedure leading to it was unfair, inadmissible on account of the lack of legal representation, which was mandatory. The Constitutional Court took that decision having previously dismissed the applicant's request for legal aid on the ground that his complaint had no prospect of success.
By 3 August 2004 the applicant had paid the entire amount due under all the decisions of 10 February 1999. The amount corresponding to the decisions concerning the year 1998 was later returned to him. Consequently, the enforcement proceedings were discontinued on 7 September 2004.
COMPLAINTS
THE LAW
“1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing ...”
The Government objected that the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies by raising his complaint before the Constitutional Court in accordance with the applicable procedural requirements, including legal representation, and by making a formal request for discontinuation of the enforcement of the decisions concerning the year 1998. The applicant's objections in his enforcement appeal had clearly been outside the scope of the enforcement proceedings and belonged rather to the proceedings on the merits. Without legal representation, the applicant's constitutional complaint had had no legal basis and the proceedings in its respect could not benefit ratione materiae from the guarantees of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. In any event, the denial of legal aid to the applicant before the Constitutional Court had been in compliance with domestic law and in keeping with the object and purpose of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
The applicant considered that he had exhausted all remedies available, including a complaint to the public prosecution service, and reiterated his complaint.
The Court observes that what lies at the heart of the present complaint is the enforcement proceedings concerning the SSA decisions of 10 February 1999 in relation to the year 1998. It considers that all elements of the applicant's procedural complaint are to be examined with reference to these proceedings.
In addition, the Court observes that the enforcement of all the decisions of 10 February 1999 was discontinued on 7 September 2004 and that, in so far as the decisions concerning the year 1998 were concerned, the amounts adjudicated thereby have been returned to the applicant.
The Court finds that, in these circumstances, irrespective of whether the applicant satisfied the requirements of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention, he can no longer claim to be a victim within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention of a violation of his rights under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
The complaint is thus manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.”
The parties raised similar arguments. In addition, the Government submitted that the applicant had paid the adjudicated amounts voluntarily, which the applicant denied, and that in so far as the applicant had paid any amount to any person under a legal title that had proved invalid, it was open to him to reclaim that amount on the grounds of unjustified enrichment.
The Court observes that the present complaint has the same factual background as that under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which it has found above to be inadmissible. The Court has established no reasons for reaching a different conclusion under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. In connection with this conclusion the Court observes that, as long as the disputed amount was returned to the applicant, it does not appear to be relevant whether he paid that amount of his free will or not.
It follows that the relevant part of the application is manifestly ill founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
In the light of all the material in its possession, and in so far as the matters complained of have been substantiated and fall within its competence, the Court finds that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the applicant's rights under the provisions invoked.
It follows that the remainder of the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court unanimously
Declares the application inadmissible.
Lawrence
Early Nicolas Bratza
Registrar President
