FOURTH SECTION

CASE OF BUĽKOVÁ v. SLOVAKIA

(Application no. 35017/03)

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG

12 May 2009

This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of Buľková v. Slovakia,
The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
	Nicolas Bratza, President,
	Lech Garlicki,
	Ljiljana Mijović,
	David Thór Björgvinsson,
	Ján Šikuta,
	Päivi Hirvelä,
	Mihai Poalelungi, judges,
and LawrenceEarlySection Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 16 April 2009,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1.  The case originated in  against  lodged with the  of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by .
2.  The Slovak Government (“the Government”) were represented by Mrs A. Poláčková and M. Pirošíková, their successive Agents.
3.  On  the President of the Fourth Section decided to give notice of the application to the Government. It was also decided to rule on the admissibility and merits of the application at the same time (Article 29 § 3).
THE FACTS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
4.  The applicant was born in 1979 and lives in Košice.
A. Proceedings concerning the purchase of a flat
5.  On 30 March 1999 the applicant filed a civil action with the Košice II District Court. She claimed that the defendant should be ordered, in accordance with his earlier written undertaking, to sell a flat to her.
6.  The applicant replied to the defendant on 23 July 1999 and 8 February 2000.
7.  In the course of the proceedings the applicant discovered that the defendant had transferred the ownership of the flat in issue to a different person in 1999. The transfer of ownership had been formally registered on 3 March 1999. On 24 February 2000 the applicant therefore requested that the new owner of the flat should join the proceedings as a defendant. She also expressed her wish to extend the action, claiming that the purchase contract of 1999 was void.
8.  Three hearings were adjourned because of the defendant's absence.
9.  On 13 March 2001 the District Court dismissed the applicant's request of 24 February 2000. The decision stated that the purchase contract had been concluded prior to the introduction of the applicant's action of 30 March 1999, and that nothing had prevented the applicant from bringing separate proceedings on the question of its validity. The hearing was held in the defendant's absence. The defendant submitted a medical opinion certifying that he had serious health problems and could not leave his flat.
10.  Three hearings were again adjourned due to the defendant's failure to appear. Because of the defendant's medical condition, a District Court official heard the defendant at his home on 15 August 2002.
11.  The judge dealing with the case was on sick leave between 4 September and 31 October 2002.
12.  On 17 December 2002 the case was adjourned at the request of the applicant's lawyer.
13.  On 4 February 2003 the District Court delivered a judgment by which it dismissed the applicant's action. The court noted that the defendant had transferred the ownership of the flat in question to a third party on 9 March 1999, that is prior to the introduction of the proceedings by the applicant. As he was not the owner of the flat, he could not be obliged to conclude a purchase contract as requested by the applicant. On 21 February 2003 the judgment was served on the applicant's lawyer.
14.  The applicant appealed. She subsequently withdrew the appeal and, as a result, the Košice Regional Court discontinued the proceedings on 12 September 2003.
B.  Constitutional proceedings
15.  On 19 March 2003 the Constitutional Court concluded that the applicant's right to a hearing within a reasonable time had not been violated in the proceedings before the Košice II District Court. It held that the case was not complex and that the applicant's conduct had not contributed to the length of the proceedings. It further held that the proceedings had been substantially protracted as a result of the defendant's repeated failure to appear before the District Court. It established that the District Court had, in principle, taken appropriate action to ensure the defendant's attendance. The Constitutional Court found a period of inactivity of approximately six months in 2001 imputable to the District Court. That period was not, however, capable of significantly interfering with the applicant's right to a hearing within a reasonable time.
THE LAW
I.  ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION
16.  The applicant complained that the length of the District Court's proceedings had been incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement, laid down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which in its relevant part reads as follows:
 “In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”
A.  Admissibility
17.  The Government contested the applicant's argument that the length of the proceedings had been excessive. They concurred with the Constitutional Court's findings and expressed the view that the alleged delays had been caused by the defendant and that they could not be imputable to the respondent State.
18.  The applicant argued that it had taken the District Court more than one year, without any justification, to decide on her request that a second defendant join the proceedings. She further stated that the court had dismissed her action after almost four years on the basis of a fact which had already been at its disposal in 1999, namely that the defendant did not own the flat in issue.
19.  Before the Court the applicant complained about the length of the proceedings before the District Court. The period to be taken into consideration began on 30 March 1999 and ended on 21 February 2003 when the judgment was served on the applicant's lawyer. It thus lasted three years and almost eleven months at one level of jurisdiction.
20.  The Court notes that the application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B.  Merits
21.  The Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII).
22.  The Court has frequently found violations of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in cases raising issues similar to the one in the present case (see Frydlender, cited above).
23.  Having examined all the material submitted to it, the Court considers that the Government have not put forward any fact or argument capable of persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the present case. Having regard to its case-law on the subject, the Court considers that in the instant case the length of the proceedings was excessive and failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement.
There has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1.
II.  APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
24.  Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A.  Damage
25.  The applicant claimed 4,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
26.  The Government contested the claim.
27.  The Court considers that the applicant must have sustained non-pecuniary damage. Ruling on an equitable basis, it awards her EUR 2,000 under that head.
B.  Costs and expenses
28.  The applicant also claimed EUR 494 for costs and expenses incurred before the Constitutional Court and EUR 1,185 for those incurred before the Court.
29.   The Government contested these claims.
30.  According to the Court's case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. The Court observes that the applicant was represented by a lawyer before the Constitutional Court as well as before the Court. Having regard to the materials submitted, the Court considers it reasonable to award the applicant the sum of EUR 1,000 under this head.
C.  Default interest
31.  The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
1.  Declares the application admissible;

2.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention;

3.  Holds
(a)  that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following amounts:
(i) EUR 2,000 (two thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;
(ii) EUR 1,000 (one thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;
(b)  that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

4.  Dismisses the remainder of the applicant's claim for just satisfaction.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 12 May 2009, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
	Lawrence Early	Nicolas Bratza
	Registrar	President