British
and Irish Legal Information Institute
Freely Available British and Irish Public Legal Information
[
Home]
[
Databases]
[
World Law]
[
Multidatabase Search]
[
Help]
[
Feedback]
European Court of Human Rights
You are here:
BAILII >>
Databases >>
European Court of Human Rights >>
GORKIEWICZ v. POLAND - 41663/04 [2009] ECHR 51 (13 January 2009)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2009/51.html
Cite as:
[2009] ECHR 51
[
New search]
[
Contents list]
[
Printable RTF version]
[
Help]
FOURTH
SECTION
CASE OF GÓRKIEWICZ v. POLAND
(Application
no. 41663/04)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
13 January
2009
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Górkiewicz v. Poland,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Nicolas Bratza, President,
Lech
Garlicki,
Giovanni Bonello,
Ljiljana
Mijović,
Päivi Hirvelä,
Ledi
Bianku,
Nebojša Vučinić, judges,
and
Lawrence Early, Section
Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 9 December 2008,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
The
case originated in an application
(no. 41663/04) against the
Republic of Poland lodged with the Court
under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”)
by two Polish nationals, Mr Jan Górkiewicz (“the first
applicant”) and Mrs Bogdana Górkiewicz (“the
applicants”), on 9 July 2004.
The
Polish Government (“the Government”) were represented by
their Agent, Mr J. Wołąsiewicz of the Ministry of foreign
Affairs.
On
6 December 2007 the
President of the Fourth Section of the Court decided to give notice
of the application to the Government. It was also decided to rule on
the admissibility and merits of the application at the same time
(Article 29 § 3).
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The
applicants were born in 1948 and 1955 respectively and live in
Glinica.
A. Civil proceedings for compensation for seizure of
property
On
27 November 1995 the first applicant lodged a claim for payment of
compensation for the seizure of his property. On 13 May 1998 the
Katowice Regional Court gave judgment. On 24 June 1999 the Katowice
Court of Appeal partly remitted the case. On 6 November 2003 the
Katowice Regional Court gave judgment. The first applicant appealed.
On 9 June 2004 the Katowice Court of Appeal upheld that
judgment. According to an assessment made by two lawyers, a cassation
appeal lacked any prospects of success.
In
a letter of 5 December 2004 the first applicant informed the Court
that he did not intend to make use of the remedies provided by the
Law of 17 June 2004 (Ustawa
o skardze na naruszenie prawa strony do rozpoznania sprawy w
postępowaniu sądowym bez nieuzasadnionej zwłoki) (“the
2004 Act”).
B. Proceedings for compensation for the unlawful
annulment of a contract
1. The applicants' claim for compensation
On 25 November 2002 the
applicants filed an action against the State Treasury with the
Gliwice Regional Court (Sąd
Okręgowy).
They claimed compensation for the unlawful annulment of a contract by
a public official.
On 27 December 2002 the Gliwice
Regional Court ordered that the applicants rectify certain formal
shortcomings in their statement of claim.
On 18 November 2003 the Court
dismissed the applicants' request to be exempted from court fees. The
applicants appealed. On 19 February 2004
the Katowice Court of Appeal (Sąd
Apelacyjny) quashed the Regional
Court's decision and exempted the applicants from court fees.
On 24 March 2004 the Gliwice
Regional Court found that it did not have the competence to deal with
the subject-matter and referred the case to the Katowice Regional
Court.
The first hearing in the case
was held on 26 January 2005.
On 16 May 2007 the Katowice Regional Court gave
judgment and granted the applicants' claim in part.
Both parties lodged appeals against the first-instance
judgment.
On 8 November 2007 the Katowice Court of Appeal
dismissed both appeals.
It appears that both parties lodged cassation appeals
and the case is pending before the Supreme Court (Sąd
Najwyższy).
2. Proceedings under the 2004 Act
On
21 December 2004 the applicants lodged a complaint under section 5 of
the 2004 Act. They particularly referred to the Gliwice and Katowice
Regional Courts' inactivity between the date the claim had been filed
with the Gliwice Court and the date the first hearing had been
scheduled. They sought just satisfaction in the amount of 20,000
Polish zlotys (PLN), that is, PLN 10,000 each.
On
10 March 2005 the Katowice Court of Appeal dismissed the applicants'
complaint. The court held that the 2004 Act had legal effect as from
its entry into force on 17 September 2004. It found that during the
relevant part of the proceedings, there had been no inactivity or
undue delay on the part of the authorities. In that connection, the
court held that there had been no breach of the right to a fair trial
within a reasonable time in the period after 17 September 2004.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE
The
relevant domestic law and practice concerning remedies for the
excessive length of judicial proceedings, in particular the
applicable provisions of the 2004 Act, are stated in the Court's
decisions in the cases of Charzyński v. Poland, no.
15212/03 (dec.), §§ 12-23, ECHR 2005-V and Ratajczyk v.
Poland, no. 11215/02 (dec.), ECHR 2005-VIII, and the
judgment in the case of Krasuski v. Poland, no. 61444/00, §§
34-46, ECHR 2005-V.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION ON ACCOUNT OF THE UNREASONABLE LENGTH OF THE PROCEEDINGS
The
applicants complained that the length of the proceedings had been
incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement, laid
down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a
reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”
The
Government refrained from expressing their opinion on that matter.
The
period to be taken into consideration began on 25 November 2002
and has not yet ended. It has thus lasted almost six years for two
levels of jurisdiction.
A. Admissibility
In
the present case the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicants'
complaint against the excessive length of proceedings, holding that
after the entry into force of the 2004 Act no unreasonable delays in
the proceedings could be discerned (see paragraph 17 above). Having
regard to the criteria for determining victim status in respect of
length of proceedings complaints as set out in the judgment Scordino
v. Italy (no.1) [GC], no. 36813/97, §§ 193-215,
the Court concludes that the complaint cannot be rejected as being
incompatible ratione personae with the Convention.
The
Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill founded
within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It
further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It
must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
The
Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings
must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and
with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case,
the conduct of the applicants and the relevant authorities and what
was at stake for the applicants in the dispute (see, among many other
authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, §
43, ECHR 2000-VII).
The
Court has frequently found violations of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention in cases raising issues similar to the one in the present
case (see Frydlender, cited above). Furthermore, the Court
considers that, in dismissing the applicant's complaint that the
proceedings in his case exceeded a reasonable time, the Katowice
Court of Appeal failed to apply standards which were in conformity
with the principles embodied in the Court's case-law (see Majewski
v. Poland, no. 52690/99, § 36, 11 October 2005).
Having
examined all the material submitted to it, the Court considers that
the Government have not put forward any fact or argument capable of
persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the present case. In
particular, the Court notes that the case showed no factual
complexity which would explain the delays in the proceedings and that
no hearing was held during two years and two months from the date of
the lodging of the claim by the applicants. Having regard to its
case-law on the subject, the Court considers that in the instant case
the length of the proceedings was excessive and failed to meet the
“reasonable time” requirement.
There
has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION
The
Court raised of its own motion a complaint about the lack of an
effective remedy under Article 13 of the Convention, which provides
as follows:
“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth
in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy
before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has
been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”
The
Government refrained from making any comments in that connection.
The
Court reiterates that Article 13 guarantees an effective remedy
before a national authority for an alleged breach of the requirement
under Article 6 § 1 to hear a case within a reasonable time.
However, the “effectiveness” of a “remedy”
within the meaning of that provision does not depend on the certainty
of a favourable outcome for the applicant (see Kudła v.
Poland [GC], no. 30210/96, §§ 154 et seq., ECHR
2000-XI, §§ 156-157).
While
the subsidiarity principle underlying the Convention system requires
the Contracting States to introduce a mechanism addressing complaints
about the excessive length of proceedings within the national legal
system, they are afforded – subject to compliance with the
requirements of the Convention – some discretion as to the
manner in which they provide individuals with the relief required by
Article 13 and conform to their Convention obligation under that
provision. In particular, where the State has introduced a
compensatory remedy, the Court must leave to it a wide margin of
appreciation and allow it to organise the remedy – including
the interpretation and application of the notion of “damage”
in a given case – in a manner consistent with its own legal
system, traditions and the standard of living in the country
concerned (Scordino (no. 1), cited above, §§
188-189).
The
fact that in the present case the applicants' claim for just
satisfaction failed and was dismissed does not in itself render the
remedy under the 2004 Act incompatible with Article 13, although it
does have consequences for the Court's assessment of their victim
status in respect of the alleged breach of the reasonable-time
requirement (see paragraph 21 above, with references to the Court's
case-law, and, mutatis mutandis, Zarb v. Malta,
no. 16631/04, §§ 49-52, 4 July 2006).
As
stated above, the expression “effective remedy” used in
Article 13 cannot be interpreted as a remedy bound to succeed,
but simply an accessible remedy before an authority competent to
examine the merits of a complaint (see paragraph 31 above, and, also,
Šidlová v. Slovakia, no. 50224/99,
§ 77, 26 September 2006).
In
the light of the foregoing, the Court considers that in the
circumstances of the present case it cannot be said that the
applicants' right to an effective remedy under Article 13 of the
Convention has not been respected.
It
follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded
and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and
4 of the Convention.
III. OTHER
ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION
Lastly,
the applicants complained about the outcome and length of the
proceedings for compensation for seizure of property.
The
Court notes that those complaints are substantially the same as the
complaints lodged by the first applicant on 14 June 2003 subsequently
declared inadmissible by the Committee's decision of 14 June 2003.
It
follows that these complaints must be rejected in accordance with
Article 35 § 2 (b) of the Convention.
IV. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article
41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
The
applicants claimed 300,000 euros (EUR) and PLN 1,214,985 in respect
of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage.
The
Government considered the applicants' claims unreasonable as to
quantum and requested that they be rejected.
The
Court does not discern any causal link between the violation found
and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects this claim. On
the other hand, it awards the applicants EUR 3,500 jointly in respect
of non pecuniary damage.
B. Costs and expenses
The
applicants did not make any claim for costs and expenses incurred in
the proceedings.
C. Default interest
The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
Declares the complaint concerning the excessive
length of the proceedings admissible and the remainder of the
application inadmissible;
Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention;
Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicants, within three months
from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 3,500
(three thousand five hundred euros) jointly in respect of
non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
Dismisses the remainder of the applicants' claim
for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 13 January 2009, pursuant
to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Lawrence Early Nicolas Bratza
Registrar President