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TEODORSKI v. POLAND - 7033/06 [2008] ECHR 57 (22 January 2008)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2008/57.html
Cite as:
[2008] ECHR 57
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FOURTH
SECTION
CASE OF TEODORSKI v. POLAND
(Application
no. 7033/06)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
22
January 2008
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Teodorski v. Poland,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Nicolas Bratza,
President,
Josep
Casadevall,
Giovanni
Bonello,
Kristaq
Traja,
Stanislav
Pavlovschi,
Lech
Garlicki,
Ján
Šikuta,
judges,
and Lawrence Early, Section
Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 4
January 2008,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
The
case originated in an application (no. 39840/05) against the Republic
of Poland lodged with the Court on 6 February 2006 under Article 34
of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (“the Convention”) by L. Teodorski (“the
applicant”), represented by Ms M. Gąsiorowska, a lawyer
practising in Warsaw.
The
Polish Government (“the Government”) were represented by
their Agent, Mr J. Wołąsiewicz of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs.
On
6 June 2006 the President of the Fourth Section of the Court decided
to give notice of the application to the Government. Under the
provisions of Article 29 § 3 of the Convention, it was decided
to examine the merits of the application at the same time as its
admissibility.
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
a. First set of proceedings
The
applicant was born in 1974 and lives in Warsaw.
In
2001 the police conducted an operation to
disband several organised criminal
gangs that were acting in and around Warsaw, stealing luxury cars
with a view to selling them
in the countries of the former Soviet Union. There were about five
such groups, cooperating closely with each other and closely
connected with Poland's most dangerous armed criminal groups: the
Pruszków Mafia and the Wołomin Mafia.
The
applicant was arrested on
20 March 2002 on
suspicion of thefts,
robberies, drunk driving and membership of an organised
criminal group. He was remanded in custody by the decision of
the Warsaw District
Court of 21 March 2002.
At
that time the Warsaw Regional Prosecutor was conducting an
investigation in respect of more than
fifty other members of the criminal gangs mentioned above. Forty-two
of them were held in custody. The investigation was complex and
time-consuming, given that the criminal gangs collaborated closely
with many persons who were to be questioned by the prosecutors, for
example, receivers of stolen goods, persons hiding stolen cars or
persons tracking cars which were to be stolen, among others.
In
addition, the prosecutor opened an investigation in respect of
several police officers from Warsaw and surrounding towns on charges
of corruption and
helping the criminal groups' members to evade the law.
On
5 December 2002 a bill of indictment
against the applicant and fifty-nine other co-accused (members of
five cooperating criminal gangs) was lodged with the Warsaw District
Court. The evidentiary material was presented in 99 case files. The
applicant was charged with membership of a criminal gang,
carrying out multiple robberies and thefts,
committed with extreme brutality. The criminal gang, of which the
applicant was a member, was known for its
violence and ruthlessness and for illegal trafficking in firearms.
On
6 January
2003 the Warsaw District Court held the first hearing. The following
hearings were held by the District Court on: 23, 30 May, 23, 24 June,
1,4,7,8 July, 13, 18, 22, 25 August, 5, 12, 15, 19 September, 10, 20,
21, 23, 24, 31 October, 17 November, 5, 22 and 23 December 2003; 5,
26 January, 16, 17, 19, 20 February, 8,
9 March,
1, 9 April,
14, 18, 21, 25 May, 3, 7, 14, 23 June, 5 July, 10, 25, 31
August, 3, 6 September, 7, 8, 15
October, 2, 9 November, 7, 8, 10, 13 and 18 December 2004. In total,
sixty hearings were held by the District Court.
During
the trial the District Court examined a wide range of evidentiary
material, ordered medical expert opinions on the accuseds' mental
health and expert opinions in the
field of dactyloscopy, conducted inquiries in the accuseds'
respective neighbourhoods, inspections of the crime scenes and
garages where the stolen cars had been hidden and assessments of the
accuseds' assets.
The proceedings involved taking evidence from a considerable number
of witnesses and victims and from one key witness.
The
applicant's pre-trial detention was prolonged several times by the
District Court.
The decisions were
issued, inter alia,
on 17 June,
13 December 2002, 25
May, 17 November 2003, 20 February, 22
June, 28 September and 18 December
2004. In its decisions the court
underlined that there was a strong likelihood that the applicant had
committed the crimes, confirmed in particular by the testimonies of a
key witness and a co-accused, and considered that there was a
reasonable risk that the applicant would tamper with the evidence,
given that he had had close connections with the other co-accused.
There was a serious threat that the applicant would go into hiding
after his release from custody, as he had been living in hiding
before the investigation and was arrested following the arrest
warrant issued by the police. The court also made reference to
the activities previously carried out and gave a precise indication
of the evidence that still had to be taken. Consequently, it decided
that it was indispensable to separate the applicant from the other
suspects, the witnesses and the evidence which had not yet been
secured. The court also relied on the serious nature of the charges
against the applicant and the severity of the penalty he faced.
No special circumstances dictated the lifting of the
detention.
The
applicant unsuccessfully appealed against the above-mentioned
decisions.
From
21 March to 29 July 2002 and from 27 January to 18 December 2004
the applicant served a prison sentence imposed on him in separate
proceedings.
On 18 December 2004
the District Court imposed a sentence on
fifty of the co-accused. The applicant was
found guilty of
the charges laid against
him and sentenced
to 7 years' imprisonment and a fine of 20 000 PLN. On the same date
the court prolonged the applicant's detention until 17 March 2005.
On
16 March and 14 November 2005 the Warsaw District Court decided on
the prolongation of the applicant's detention. The court found no
grounds for quashing or changing the preventive measure and stressed
that the further detention of the applicant was “essential”.
On
6 June 2006 the case file, comprising 149 volumes, was transferred to
the second-instance court.
The
applicant was kept in custody by virtue of decisions issued by the
Warsaw District Court on 8 May, 2 August and 7 November 2006.
On
22 November 2006 the appellate court quashed the judgment and
remitted the case for re-examination.
The
proceedings are pending before the Warsaw District Court.
b. Second set of proceedings
On
4 February 2004 the applicant was detained on remand by the Warsaw
District Court on suspicion of robbery and theft. In its decision,
upheld on 22 March 2004 by the Warsaw Regional Court, the court
stated that the suspicion was reasonable and, in view of the fear of
collusion, the applicant's detention was necessary to secure the
proper conduct of the investigation. It also attached importance to
the likelihood of a severe sentence of imprisonment being imposed on
the applicant.
On
3 March 2004 a bill of indictment against the applicant and other
co-accused (members of five co-operating criminal gangs) was lodged
with the Warsaw District Court. The applicant was accused of acting
in an organised criminal gang and committing numerous robberies.
Hearings were held by the District Court on average every 2 weeks
between 18 October 2004 and 23 March 2006.
The
decisions on prolongation of the applicant's detention were given by
the Warsaw District Court on 14 April, 12 July 2004, 24 January and
26 July 2005. The court found that in view of the progress in the
proceedings and the fact that several members of the criminal gang
had been arrested in the course of the proceedings, the applicant's
release from custody would hinder their effectiveness. In view of the
severity of the likely penalty and the fact that the applicant had
been living in hiding before the investigation, there was also a
serious threat that the applicant would abscond after his release.
On
20 January, 9 June and 7 November 2006 the Warsaw Court of Appeal
prolonged the applicant's detention upon the District Court's motion.
The
applicant lodged a considerable number of unsuccessful applications
for release from detention or for commutation of the preventive
measure to a less severe one, on the ground of his poor state of
health or other reasons.
He
also challenged, likewise unsuccessfully, the decisions of
20 January, 9 June and 7 November 2006 prolonging his detention.
On
31 January 2007 the Warsaw District Court found the applicant guilty
of most of the charges and sentenced him to 5 years' imprisonment.
The applicant appealed.
The
proceedings are pending before the second-instance court and the
applicant remains detained.
II. RELEVANT
DOMESTIC LAW
The
relevant domestic law concerning the imposition of pre-trial
detention (aresztowanie tymczasowe), the grounds for its
prolongation, release from detention and rules governing other
“preventive measures” (środki zapobiegawcze)
is set out in the Court's judgments in the cases of Gołek v.
Poland, no. 31330/02, §§ 27-33, 25 April 2006, and
Celejewski v. Poland, no. 17584/04, §§ 22-23, 4 August
2006.
The
judgment in Bąk v. Poland, no. 7870/04, §§
38-40, 16 January 2007, addresses the issue of domestic practice in
the area of pre-trial detention and organised crime in particular.
For
the relevant domestic law and practice concerning the available
remedies against excessive length of proceedings, see Ratajczyk v.
Poland (dec.), no. 11215/02, ECHR 2005-VIII; Rybczyńscy
v. Poland, no. 3501/02, 3 October 2006; and Białas
v. Poland, no. 69129/01, 10 October 2006.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 3 OF THE CONVENTION
The applicant complained that the length of his pre-trial detention
was in breach of Article 5 § 3, which, in so far as relevant,
provides:
“Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with
the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be
... entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending
trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.”
A. Admissibility
1. As to the first set of proceedings
The
Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within
the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further
notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must
therefore be declared admissible.
2. As to the second set of proceedings
The
Court notes that the applicant's detention lasted from 4 February
2004 to 31 January 2007, the date on which the first-instance court
issued its judgment (see paragraph 28 above). During that time the
applicant's detention coincided with his prison sentence imposed in
separate criminal proceedings against him and lasted from 27 January
to 18 December 2004 (see paragraph 14 above).
The
Court further notes that on 18 December 2004 the applicant was
sentenced by the first-instance judgment in the criminal proceedings
against him described as the first set of proceedings above. The
judgment was quashed on 22 November 2006 by the second-instance court
(see paragraphs 15 - 22 above).
The
Court reiterates that, in view of the essential link between
Article 5 § 3 of the Convention and
paragraph 1 (c) of that Article, a person convicted at first instance
cannot be regarded as being detained “for the purpose of
bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable
suspicion of having committed an offence”, as specified in the
latter provision, but is in the position provided for by Article 5 §
1 (a), which authorises deprivation of liberty “after
conviction by a competent court” (see, for example, B. v.
Austria, judgment of 28 March 1990, Series A no. 175, pp.
14-16, §§ 36-39).
Consequently,
the Court cannot take into account the period between 27 January and
18 December 2004 and the period between 19 December 2004 and 22
November 2006 for the purpose of assessing the reasonableness of the
length of the detention under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention,
as during those periods the applicant's detention on remand coincided
with his detention after conviction in separate criminal proceedings.
Such detention cannot be considered on the same footing as a
detention under Article 5 § 1 (c), with which Article 5 § 3
is solely concerned, as it applies only to persons in custody
awaiting their trial (see Wemhoff v. Germany, judgment of 27
June 1968, Series A no. 7, pp. 23-24, § 9 and Bąk v.
Poland, no. 7870/04, judgment of 16 January
2007, § 54).
The
Court consequently finds that the period to be taken into
consideration lasted from 22 November 2006 to 31 January 2007 and
amounted to approximately 2 months.
In these circumstances, the Court considers that the
length of the applicant's detention in this set of proceedings did
not amount to an excessive time about which the applicant can validly
complain of a violation of Article 5 § 3. Accordingly, this part
of the application must be declared inadmissible as being manifestly
ill-founded pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of
the Convention.
B. Merits
1. Submissions of the parties
The
Government pointed out that the evidence obtained in the proceedings
indicated that there was a strong likelihood that the applicant had
committed the crimes in question. The charges brought against him
concerned serious offences such as robbery and theft while acting as
a member of a criminal gang. Thus, bearing in mind the severity of
the charges and the scale of the criminal activity in question, the
applicant's detention was justified, in the Government's opinion, by
a genuine public-interest requirement which, notwithstanding the
presumption of innocence, outweighed the rule of respect for
individual liberty.
The
Government further argued that the detention had been aimed at
ensuring the proper conduct of the proceedings and had been justified
by the risk of the applicant's obstructing the proceedings and
tampering with the evidence. This risk stemmed from the fact that the
proceedings concerned an organised criminal gang of which the
applicant was a member. On the date of applying the preventive
measure the investigation had still been in progress, many
investigatory measures had yet to be taken and additional evidence
yet to be found and secured. The Government concluded that only the
isolation of the members of the group from each other could prevent
their colluding and coordinating their testimonies or exerting
unlawful pressure on the witnesses or the suspects who were
cooperating with the prosecution authorities.
The
Government argued that the circumstances justifying the applicant's
detention had remained valid throughout its duration. Moreover, in
the course of the proceedings the prolongation of his detention had
been justified by the need, which had arisen during the preparatory
proceedings, to extend the personal and material scope of the
investigation. New circumstances had come to light when other
perpetrators had been detained and examined. It was necessary to
examine the files of the relevant inquires, to obtain new pieces of
evidence, expert opinions and documents, and to take further
investigatory measures. A need had arisen to take evidence from
further witnesses and persons involved in the activities of the
criminal gang, and from police officers in the criminals' pay. Since
not all these persons had been located and questioned, it was
necessary to prevent contact between them and other members of the
gang.
The
Government also submitted that the courts had not applied the
pre-trial detention measure automatically but had based their
decisions on a careful consideration of each individual case. The
courts had decided to release four co-defendants as soon as they had
found that the reasons justifying their detention ceased to persist.
The
Government drew attention to the high quality of the prosecutor's
applications for the prolongation of the applicant's detention. In
his applications the prosecutor had indicated in detail and in
respect of each of the detainees what investigatory measures had to
be taken and what evidence had been taken since the previous decision
to prolong the detention.
As
to the complexity of the case, the Government argued that it was
extremely complex. The Government pointed out that both the
prosecutor and the trial court had conducted extensive evidentiary
proceedings, as was typical for proceedings in cases concerning
organised crime. The case
file of the investigation in the applicant's case contained 99
volumes. In the course of the judicial proceedings, a further 49
volumes were added. A huge number of investigatory measures were
taken in respect of numerous suspects and dozens of stolen vehicles.
The witnesses were questioned on at least 100 occasions and many
expert opinions and reports were obtained (in the area of
dactyloscopy, psychiatrists' opinions). Operations with the
participation of key witnesses were carried out. Dozens of searches,
inspections, and procedures for the identification of individuals,
including identity parades, and objects were carried out. The
prosecution obtained voluminous documentary evidence from various
sources. The first-instance court held 60 hearings and examined 59
co-accused. The judgment numbered 190 pages.
According
to the Government, hearings had been held regularly during the
proceedings and had been fixed at regular intervals. In their
submission, the proceedings had been concluded with reasonable speed
and without any undue delays.
The
applicant did not address the issue of the complexity of the case. He
stated, however, that the length of the proceedings had been
excessive. He argued, in particular, that it had taken 6 months for
the first-instance court to forward the files to the second-instance
court. Moreover, 11 months had elapsed before the written grounds of
the judgment were prepared.
The
applicant alleged that the length of his detention had been
unreasonable.
2. Principles established under the Court's case-law
The
Court recalls that the general principles regarding the right “to
trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial, as
guaranteed by Article 5 § 3 of the Convention were stated in a
number of its previous judgements (see, among many other authorities,
Kudła v. Poland [GC], no. 30210/96, § 110
et seq, ECHR 2000 XI; and McKay v. the United Kingdom
[GC], no. 543/03, §§ 41-44, ECHR 2006-..., with further
references).
3. Application of the principles to the circumstances
of the present case
(a) Period to be taken into consideration
The
Court considers that the applicant's detention lasted from 20 March
2002 until
18 December 2004, the date on which the first-instance judgment was
given and from 22 November 2006, the date on which the judgment was
quashed by the appellate court, up to the present. During that time
the applicant's detention coincided with his prison sentence imposed
in separate criminal proceedings against him and lasting from 20
March to 29 July 2002 and from 27 January to 18 December 2004.
As of 31 January 2007 the applicant's detention coincided with his
detention after conviction in the second set of criminal proceedings
described above (see paragraphs 21 -29).
Having
regard to its established case-law, as reiterated in paragraphs 37
and 38 above, the Court cannot take into account the periods between
20 March and 29 July 2002, between 27 January and 18 December
2004 and after 31 January 2007 for the purpose of assessing the
reasonableness of the length of the detention under Article 5 §
3 of the Convention.
The
Court consequently finds that the period to be taken into
consideration lasted from 29 July 2002 to 26 January 2004 and from
22 November 2006 to 31 January 2007 and amounted to
approximately 1 year and 8 months.
(b) Reasonableness of the length of
detention
The Court notes that detention pending trial was imposed on the
applicant in view of the severity of the charges against him, the
fact that he had been a member of a criminal gang and the resulting
risk that he would obstruct the proceedings. Thus, it was a classic
example of a case relating to organised crime, by definition
presenting more difficulties for the investigating authorities and,
later, for the courts in determining the facts and the degree of
responsibility of each member of the gang. It is obvious that in
cases of this kind, continuous control and limitation of the
defendants' contact with each other and with other persons may be
essential to avoid their absconding, tampering with evidence and,
most importantly of all, influencing, or even threatening, witnesses.
Accordingly, longer periods of detention than in other cases may be
reasonable (see Bąk, cited above, § 56).
The
Court observes that in their decisions to remand the applicant in
custody the judicial authorities relied on the following principal
grounds: the reasonable suspicion against the applicant, the serious
nature of the offences with which he had been charged, the risk of
his influencing the testimonies of the witnesses and of the
co-accused and the need to obtain extensive evidence (see paragraph
12 above). Furthermore, the Government stated that the particular
complexity of the case, since it concerned organised crime, was an
additional justification for the applicant's detention.
The
suspicion that the applicant may have committed the offences was
confirmed in particular by the testimonies of a key witness and a
co-accused. The Court recalls that the domestic courts, in particular
the trial courts, are better placed to examine all the circumstances
of the case and take all the necessary decisions, including those in
respect of pre-trial detention. The Court may intervene only in
situations where the rights and liberties guaranteed under the
Convention have been infringed.
Therefore,
the only question which remains is whether and when the continuation
of his detention ceased to be warranted by “relevant” and
“sufficient” reasons.
The
Court considers that the authorities were faced with the difficult
task of determining the facts and the degree of alleged
responsibility of each of the defendants. In these circumstances, the
Court also accepts that the difficulties in obtaining evidence
deriving from the fact that, at the same time, the
prosecutor was conducting an investigation
in respect of more than fifty other members
of several closely cooperating criminal gangs and police officers in
their pay, constituted relevant and sufficient grounds for
prolonging the applicant's detention for the time necessary to
complete the investigation, draw up the bill of indictment and hear
evidence from the witnesses and the accused.
It
must be noted that the domestic courts, in ordering the prolongation
of the applicant's pre-trial detention, referred to the continuing
need for that measure and did not merely rely on the grounds
previously given (see paragraphs 12 and 37 above).
The
foregoing considerations are sufficient for the Court to conclude
that the grounds given for the applicant's pre-trial detention were
“relevant” and “sufficient” to justify
holding him in custody for the entire period in issue.
It
remains for the Court to ascertain whether the authorities, in
dealing with the applicant's case, displayed diligence required under
Article 5 § 3 (see, McKay, cited above, §
44). In this regard, it would observe that that the proceedings were
of a considerable complexity, regard being had to the number of
defendants, the need to separate them during the extensive
evidentiary proceedings and to implement special measures on account
of the connections between the criminal gangs. Nevertheless, the
hearings in the applicant's case were held regularly and at short
intervals. The
first-instance court held 60 hearings and examined 59 co-accused.
The witnesses gave evidence on at least 100 occasions and a
considerable number of other investigatory measures were taken.
The
Court therefore concludes that the national authorities displayed
special diligence in the conduct of the proceedings. The length of
the investigation and of the trial was justified by the exceptional
complexity of the case. It should not be overlooked that, while an
accused person in detention is entitled to have his case given
priority and conducted with particular expedition, this must not
stand in the way of the efforts of the judges to clarify fully the
facts in issue, to provide both the defence and the prosecution with
all necessary facilities for putting forward their evidence and
stating their case and to give judgment only after careful reflection
on whether the offences were in fact committed and on the sentence to
be imposed.
For
these reasons, it considers that the domestic authorities cannot be
criticised for a failure to observe “special diligence”
in the handling of the applicant's case.
There
has, accordingly, been no violation of Article 5 § 3 of the
Convention.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
Declares the applicant's complaints under
Article 5 § 3 of the Convention with respect to the
first set of proceedings admissible, and the remainder of the
application inadmissible;
Holds that there has been no violation of
Article 5 § 3 of the Convention with respect to the first
set of proceedings.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 22 January 2008, pursuant
to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Lawrence Early Nicolas Bratza
Registrar President
