UKSC 64
On appeal from:  EWCA Civ 1106
HRH Prince Abdulaziz Bin Mishal Bin Abdulaziz Al Saud (Appellant) v Apex Global Management Ltd and another (Respondents)
Justin Fenwick QC
(Instructed by Mishcon de Reya)
(Instructed by Teacher Stern)
LORD NEUBERGER: (with whom Lord Sumption, Lord Hughes and Lord Hodge agree)
A brief summary of the background
The attack on the decisions below: general
The strength of the Prince's defence
The fact that there will be a trial
"Moreover, it should not be forgotten that one of the great virtues of the CPR is that, by providing more flexible remedies for breaches of rules as well as a stricter regulatory environment, the courts are given the powers and the opportunities to make the sanction fit the breach. That is the teaching of one of the most important early decisions on the CPR to be found in Biguzzi v Rank Leisure plc."  1 WLR 1926, 1933
As I see it, the same principles apply to the striking out of a defence.
"It is very likely that they [ie Global Torch and Mr Abu-Ayshih] will want to put in evidence anyway about this issue. If the summary judgment application fails of course they will have to do it anyway. If it succeeded, clearly they would want to do a proxy defence for the Princes, as they have in the past. Mr Saoul represents the Prince in other hearings. Also they will want to say, 'We issue a summary judgment application in respect of something, we succeeded, this allegation should never have been made, so this is unfair prejudice.' It is fanciful to say that this is a side issue which, if it was disposed of now, would not nevertheless be live at trial."
"would have been received by the Company … as agent for Apex and … as agent for Global Torch, although it was envisaged that the Company might subsequently be permitted to retain some or all of the money by way of loans from Apex and Global Torch."
"4. …. If the respondents are right in the matter now, they will be right then. It is not suggested that the trial will be seriously disrupted if the issue is held over until then: it is of short compass.
5 Accordingly I have approached the matter by reference to what is loosely described as the approach in … Williams & Humbert Ltd v W&H Trade Marks (Jersey) Ltd  AC 368 and I have sought simply to weigh the advantages and disadvantages of dealing with the matter now, safe in the knowledge that the ultimate merits will not spoil. As I have said, my initial instinct - and my abiding instinct - is that the balance is in favour of allowing the matter to proceed. I say that with particular regard to an argument which may or may not be proved correct, which was raised by Mr Lightman, that it is inevitable that the issues regarding the $6m, even if decided on a point of liability, will be ventilated on the broader questions which arise in the petition. These include issues as to the honesty of Mr Almhairat generally and in procuring this claim to be brought forward, it being my assumption that if at any stage he had accepted and told his solicitors that he accepted payment, that should of course have been reflected in the claim being withdrawn.
6. I do this in some senses with a heavy heart because, notwithstanding the general rule that the court at this stage should not poison the water, I should say by way of warning that as matters presently appear to me at this stage, the arguments on behalf of the petitioners seem, if I can put it lightly, frail. I quite understand that they may be entitled to contend that it is the third respondent who agreed to accept the monies in effect as a fiduciary and who bears the responsibility of explaining each and every twist and turn and has not done so. But I consider there to be at least a powerful argument that if receipt is demonstrated and not allocated to any other reason, that will conclude the matter against the petitioners. I do not dare in a sense say more than that, since to say more would falsify my approach of leaving the matter over for determination at trial. But I do caution the petitioners in persisting with this and call upon them to exercise restraint and utmost care. If at trial it were to emerge that there was never any proper defence, though I cannot tie the hands of the trial judge - which may very well be myself - I would expect the trial judge to separate out these costs and make the strongest possible order in respect of them."