Jacinta Hofstetter

-v-

The General Social Care Council

Application No.  [2009] 1598.SW

Before:
Deputy Chamber President Aitken
Tribunal Judge Reddish
Specialist Member Howell

Hearing dates:  15, 16, 17 and 18 March 2010

Appeal
On 11 August 2009 the Appellant appealed, under section 68 of the Care Standards Act 2000, against the decision of the General Social Care Council, made on 13 July 2009, to order her removal from the register of social workers maintained by the Council under section 56 of the 2000 Act.

Representation
At the hearing the Appellant was represented by Mr Mark Sahu of counsel.  The Respondent was represented by Ms Lisa Giovannetti of counsel.

Evidence
The parties did not adduce any oral evidence but relied upon the documents comprised in the agreed bundles, save that, during the submissions made by her counsel, the Appellant made a personal statement orally to the Tribunal.
The Tribunal read the contents of the agreed bundles which included the appeal application form and the response thereto; copies of the authorities relied upon; all of the documents and witness statements placed before the Conduct Committee of the Respondent Council; the written submissions of the parties presented to the Conduct Committee; the notice of the decision of the Conduct Committee and a full transcript of the hearings before the Conduct Committee on 19 to 23 May 2008; 6 to 10 October 2008; 10 and 11 November 2008; 29 and 30 January 2009; 26 February 2009; 12 May 2009; 22 June 2009; 25 June 2009 and 13 July 2009 (a total of 19 days).  The agreed bundles consisted of 9 lever arch files comprising a total of 3,856 pages.

Preliminary matters

On 4 November 2009 the Deputy Chamber President gave directions on the basis that the parties had agreed that the evidence that the Tribunal needed to consider was set out in the bundles and that the appeal would be based upon legal submissions rather than rehearing the evidence heard by the Conduct Committee.

Also on 4 November 2009 the Chamber President made an order, pursuant to paragraph 6 of the Senior President’s Practice Statement (Composition of Tribunals) dated 15 December 2008, directing that the appeal be heard by a panel of two judges and one other member with substantial experience of educational, child care, health or social care matters.

Facts
The material facts, presented chronologically, are as follows:

1.	The Appellant was born in November 1960 and is therefore 49 years old.  She was educated at a school in north London; at Tottenham College of Technology and at the University of North London, where she obtained a BSc in Business Studies.  The Appellant was then employed as a civil servant in the Ministry of Defence for several years.
 
2.	From 1992 until 1994 Appellant attended the University of Kent where she obtained an MA in Social Work and a Certificate of Qualification in Social Work.

3.	After obtaining these qualifications, the Applicant worked, from 1994 until 1998, as a social worker for Buckinghamshire County Council and then for Hertfordshire County Council.

4.	From March 1998 until August 2002 the Appellant undertook social work in the London Borough of Brent, first via an agency and latterly (from 26 July 1999) as a full-time employee of the authority.

5.	In 1999 the Appellant became the allocated social worker for Child 1B, a boy from a disturbed background.  Child 1B was accommodated by Brent shortly after his birth in 1994 and was made the subject of a care order in January 2000.  He had been placed with a succession of foster carers and, for some time, with his paternal grandmother, Mrs G.  His foster placements broke down because of his disruptive, uncontrolled and threatening behaviour.  Mrs G was rejected as a long term carer for Child 1B because her own children, including Child 1B’s father, had a history of serious violence.

6.	On 26 June 2000 Ms Shirley O’Malley joined Brent Council’s Social Services became the Appellant’s Team Leader.  Ms O’Malley soon became concerned about the Appellant’s performance of her duties and about the difficulty that she and others frequently encountered in making contact with the Appellant during working hours.  During 2001 Ms O’Malley received several complaints about the Appellant’s work from a variety of sources.

7.	In January 2001 the Appellant became the allocated social worker for the three children (Children 2A, 2B and 2C) of a couple with a history of serious alcohol abuse and violence.

8.	In February 2001 the Appellant became the allocated social worker for Child 1A, who was born on in March 2000 and was the younger brother of Child 1B.  The London Borough of Brent instituted care proceedings in respect of this child, with a plan for him to be placed for adoption.  In those proceedings, Ms Rose Dagoo was appointed as the child’s guardian ad litem on 6 March 2001.

9.	Also in February 2001, the Appellant became the allocated social worker for Child 3, an 11-year old boy who had been received into the care of the London Borough of Brent following the death of his mother in 1997.  He had been accommodated in a children’s home in north London run by an independent charity.  The return of Child 3 to his birth family was not anticipated and there was a plan for long term placement with foster carers.

10.	In February 2001 the Brent Family Placement Team received reports that Child 1B’s current placement was in danger of breaking down.  The foster carer had complained that she had been unable to contact the Appellant.  On 1 March 2001, Mr Richard Hunte of the Family Placement Team suggested to the Appellant that the potential for breakdown of the placement might be due to lack social work support for the foster carer.  The Appellant reacted furiously to this suggestion.  On 6 March 2001, she asserted that Mr Hunte had been “unprofessional”; threatened that she would take matters up with his managers if he made any similar suggestion and demanded an apology.  On 8 March 2001 Mr Hunte responded by inviting Ms O’Malley and others to intervene, expressing the view that the placement of Child 1B was about to break down because of the Appellant’s default. 

11.	On several occasions during March, April and May 2001, Child 3’s key worker in the children’s home encountered difficulties in making contact with the Appellant when he wished to discuss with her the difficulties he was having with the child.  The Appellant was usually unavailable when he called and frequently failed to call him back.

12.	On 12 March 2001 a duty worker in the Family Placement Team prepared a profile of Child 1B in which she recorded: “It is believed that [Child 1B] may have witnessed a stabbing.  [Child 1B] has moved several times in his short life.  The last placement broke down because of [his] uncontrollable behaviour”.

13.	On 13 March 2001 the Appellant transported Child 1B to a new foster home in her car, his current placement having finally broken down following a “nightmare weekend” and a threat by Child 1B to arrange for his father to kill his foster carer’s husband.  During the journey, Child 1B told the Appellant that, while he had been living at his grandmother’s home, there had been a fight between his father and another man during which his father had used a knife and there had been “blood everywhere”.  Child 1B laughed and commented upon his father’s bravery.  He also said that his father and his uncle, who was also present, had told him not to tell anyone what he had seen.

14.	Following this disclosure by Child 1B, the Appellant made no written record of the matter on the relevant file and did not inform her supervisor and/or her colleagues of what had happened.  Furthermore, the Appellant did not inform Ms Dagoo, the recently appointed guardian for Child 1A, of what she had been told.

15.	On 29 March 2001 the Brent Family Proceedings Court made the first of a series of interim care orders in respect of Child 1A and listed Brent’s application for a care order for final hearing on 3 July 2001.

16.	On 4 April 2001 the Appellant wrote a letter to Child 3.  She confirmed that she had taken over as his new social worker; apologised for the fact that her predecessor had not taken the opportunity to say goodbye to him and said that she would visit him on 10 April 2001.

17.	On 10 April 2001 the Appellant visited Child 3 in the children’s home and told him that the Family Placement Team was still looking for a family for him.  The Appellant assured Child 3 that she was aware that he was now ready to be moved to a long term foster home.

18.	On 12 April 2001 the Appellant sent an email to the Family Placement Team to inform them that she had met Child 3 and that he had clearly stated that he wanted to be involved and consulted in relation to future plans and advertisements for potential foster carers for him.

19.	On 20 April 2001 the Secretary of State appointed Lord Laming to conduct three statutory inquiries, which collectively were known as “The Victoria Climbié Inquiry”.  Several employees or former employees of Brent Social Services were required to give evidence to the Inquiry and the Department generally was placed under the pressure that the public scrutiny of their past failings, during their “brief involvement” with Marie-Therese Kouao and her great-niece, Victoria in 1999, inevitably created.

20.	In June 2001 Child 1A’s paternal grandmother formally requested that she should be considered as a carer for her grandson.  Mrs G later applied to be joined as a party to the care proceedings and her application was granted.

21.	On 11 June 2001 the Appellant made her second statement in the care proceedings in respect of Child 1A.  She described the current situation and confirmed that Brent’s plan for the child was to place him for adoption.  The Appellant did not say anything in her statement about the disclosure made to her by Child 1B on 13 March 2001.

22.	On 29 June 2001 the Appellant notified the Family Placement Team that she had seen the profile of a family that they had identified as potential carers for Child 3 and said that she was “keen to proceed with this family”.

23.	On 2 July 2001 Ms Dagoo reported in writing to the Brent Family Proceedings Court as Child 1A’s guardian ad litem.  She said that Mrs G’s earlier application for a residence order in respect of Child 1B had been rejected because of the family’s history of violence but that Mrs G had been a good parent to her three younger children and had not recently been threatened or otherwise adversely affected by her four older children.  Ms Dagoo recommended that Mrs G “should be allowed the opportunity to be independently assessed as a permanent carer” because her parenting capacity merited consideration and because Child 1A had the right “to be raised in his birth family” if that were possible.  Ms Dagoo further recommended to the Court that the hearing of Brent’s application for a care order should be adjourned to allow an assessment to be made.  On the following day, the Court ordered an adjournment and gave leave for an assessment of Mrs G to be undertaken by Mrs Susan Bindman, an independent Child Care Consultant.

24.	On 3 July 2001 the Appellant visited Child 3 in the children’s home and told him that a family placement had been, or may have been, found for him.  Child 3 was overjoyed that his “long wait for a family was over”.  He asked if the prospective carers were Irish.  When the Appellant said that she did not know, Child 3 said that he did not mind if they were not.  However, he was concerned about the prospect of moving from his present school.  The Appellant did not inform Child 3’s key worker, Mr T or any other member of the staff of the children’s home, that she had conveyed significant information to Child 3 during her meeting with him.  Mr T formed the view that the Appellant’s practice in dealing with Child 3 was “extremely sub-standard” and that she lacked competence.

25.	On 9 July 2001 the Appellant informed others by email that she had “shared in principle the idea of a move” with Child 3 and suggested that any move should avoid disruption of his education if possible.

26.	On 11 July 2001 the Assistant Principal of the children’s home wrote to the Appellant.  She complained that the Appellant had chosen to inform Child 3 “that a family may have been found for him” and had then “left the building, failing to inform staff” of what she had discussed with the child.  This had “stirred up anxiety” in Child 3 and there had been “a marked deterioration” in his emotional state.  There was “a connection between this “emotional decline” and the “reckless manner” in which the Appellant had informed Child 3 of the progress in relation to identification of a family.  The Assistant Principal suggested that the Appellant and her manager should consider coming to the children’s home to apologise to Child 3.  She expressed the hope that, in future, the Appellant would inform Child 3’s key worker whenever she intended to talk to Child 3 about “difficult or emotive issues”.

27.	In July 2001 Children 2A, 2B and 2C left England with their mother and went to live in Ireland.  On 11 July 2001 the Appellant completed a Form CPR3 to notify all concerned of the change in circumstances of children who were on the Child Protection Register.  Ms O’Malley countersigned the Form on 18 July 2001 and submitted it to the Head of Systems and Performance Management, Ms Anna Janes.  Ms Janes then notified the appropriate authorities in Ireland.

28.	On 18 July 2001 the Appellant took a “car park buzzer” belonging to the London Borough of Brent from the handbag of Ms Christine Allen, who was then working as a locum senior social worker for the Borough and was about to leave her employment.  Ms Allen subsequently complained to Ms O’Malley in writing about the Appellant’s actions, which she characterised as “very shameful”.

29.	On 11 August 2001 Mrs Bindman presented her preliminary report to the Brent Family Proceedings Court in the care proceedings relating to Child 1A.  Mrs Bindman described the Appellant’s attitude towards her investigation as “both unhelpful and hostile”.

30.	On 11 August 2001 Children 2A and 2C returned to England from Ireland with their mother.  Child 2B remained in Ireland with her maternal aunt.  On 14 August 2001 the children’s mother asked Brent to receive Children 2A and 2C into their care until she could “get herself together”.  The Appellant urgently made arrangements for the children to be accommodated with foster parents in Harrow.

31.	On 24 August 2001 the Appellant received a “photo album to share with” Child 3 from the prospective long term foster carers.  On 5 September 2001 the Appellant asked the Family Placement Team whether they had any objection to her showing the album to Child 3 on her next visit.  However, the Appellant did not immediately arrange to visit Child 3. She did arrange to visit him in the children’s home on 24 September 2001 but she cancelled that visit at the last minute.

32.	On 31 August 2001 the Appellant convened a family group meeting of members of Child 1A’s and Child 1B’s wider, paternal family but failed to ensure that there would be an appropriate person available to chair the meeting.  The family members who attended were kept waiting and became incensed.  The meeting had to be postponed until 5 September 2001.  On that date, family members clearly and vigorously expressed the view that the Appellant had failed to act properly in the past and that Mrs G should be allowed to care for Child 1A.  According to the minutes, “much of the meeting was taken up by [the family] stating their grievances”.

33.	On 14 September 2001 Ms Janes became concerned that she had not received any further Child Protection Register forms relating to Children 2A and 2C from the Appellant.  She wrote a memorandum to Ms O’Malley in which she said that the “last paperwork” she had received was dated 18 July 2001 and that she had found out by chance that the two boys had returned to the country and were “currently in foster care in another London Borough”.  Ms Janes pointed out that the Child Protection Register was therefore not accurate and that “a very dangerous situation” had been created by the Appellant and Ms O’Malley.  The Appellant completed the relevant forms on 17 September 2001.

34.	On 14 September 2001 Ms O’Malley had a meeting with the Appellant during which she showed her the list of the complaints about her work that she had compiled.  The Appellant suggested that the complaints were “very old” and that all of them were completely unfounded.

35.	On 15 September 2001 the Appellant circulated an email in which she complained to senior managers in Brent about the behaviour of Ms O’Malley and of Ms Wendy Bosher, the senior social worker who was her own immediate supervisor.

36.	On 26 September 2001 the Appellant made her third statement in the care proceedings relating to Child 1A.  She said, amongst other things, that the family members felt very strongly that Child 1A should be placed with his grandmother but were unable clearly to identify the type of support that they might be able to provide if she were caring for him.  Again, the Appellant did not mention Child 1B’s disclosure to her.

37.	On 30 September 2001 Mrs Bindman presented her final report to the Brent Family Proceedings Court in the care proceedings relating to Child 1A.  She mentioned the “unusual and, indeed, irregular prominence” of the Appellant in the process of assessment of members of the child’s wider family as potential carers for him.  Mrs Bindman disapproved of the Appellant’s unhelpful involvement; of her failure properly to implement the Court’s direction for a family group conference and of her failure to involve Ms Dagoo in the process.  She expressed the view that the family had been marginalised and that placement alternatives with them should have been explored earlier.  She considered that “a change of social work personnel” might inspire greater confidence in the family and allow them to work in partnership.

38.	On 1 October 2001 the Appellant attended a Permanent Fostering Planning Meeting in relation to Child 3 and, on 3 October 2001, she attended a case discussion meeting at the children’s home.  The Appellant was given several tasks by the meeting, including writing fortnightly to Child 3 “to update him on Family Finding progress”.

39.	On 23 October 2001 the Appellant wrote to Child 3.  She said that she was “still progressing with identifying placement”.  This was, she said, “going well”.  Child 3’s key worker thought that this letter was highly unsatisfactory in that it told Child 3 nothing of any substance.

40.	On 24 October 2001 the Appellant spoke to Child 3’s Psychotherapist, Dr David Trevatt and sought his advice as to the risks that might be involved in placing Child 3 in a family that included younger children.  Dr Trevatt replied on 26 October 2001.

41.	On 31 October 2001 Ms Dagoo presented her final report as Child 1A’s guardian in the care proceedings in the Brent Family Proceedings Court.  She noted that members of Child 1A’s paternal family took the view that they had been “unfairly treated and discriminated against by Brent Social Services” because “the professionals involved in the removal” of Child 1B had not approached any of them to “explore the possibility of a placement in the wider family”.  Ms Dagoo concluded that the family had not received “an even handed service from the Social Services” and were “rightly aggrieved”.  She added that Mrs G would “find it very difficult to engage with the present social worker” [the Appellant] by whom she felt she had been “criticised and harshly judged”.  Finally, Ms Dagoo recommended to the Court that Mrs G should be “allowed the opportunity to raise her grandson” under a care order and with a different allocated social worker.

42.	On 8 November 2001 the London Borough of Brent held a statutory review of Child 3’s care plan, chaired by Mr Gerry Casserly, an Independent Reviewing Officer.  Staff of the children’s home expressed concern about the Appellant’s visit to Child 3 on 3 July 2001.  Mr Casserly noted that staff at the home “were not informed that [Child 3] had been given information [that a family had been identified for him] and were left to deal with the anxiety that this information caused”.  Mr Casserly also noted that there was an “apparent discrepancy” between the dates recorded by the Appellant as the dates when she had visited Child 3 and the dates of such visits recorded by the children’s home.  He concluded that the statutory requirements in relation to visits had not been met; that there was “undue delay in carrying out review decisions” and that “there was inadequate planning and poor preparation for the review”.

43.	At a hearing before the Brent Family Proceedings Court on 12 November 2001 the Appellant gave oral evidence.  In the course of that evidence she related that, when she was taking Child 1B to his new foster parents on 13 March 2001, he had told her that he had witnessed a fight at his paternal grandmother’s house during which his father had used a knife “and there was blood everywhere”.  The Appellant also told the Court that Child 1B’s father and his paternal uncle had told him not to tell anyone about the incident.  The hearing was then adjourned until the following day to enable the Appellant to “reduce the details of the child’s disclosure to writing”.
 
44.	On 13 November 2001 the Appellant made a further written statement in the care proceedings.  She said that Child 1B’s disclosure occurred in her car on 13 March 2001 when she was driving him from his “disrupted placement to a new placement”.  She then gave details of Child 1B’s account of the fight between his father and another man.

45.	Ms Dagoo regarded the Appellant’s new evidence as “a very relevant factor” which “should have been considered”.  Her advocate applied for and was granted an adjournment of the hearing to enable Ms Dagoo to carry out further enquiries and to consider the implications of Child 1B’s disclosure for Child 1A’s placement.

46.	On 23 November 2001 the Appellant sent an email to Mr Casserly in which she expressed her concern about the accuracy of his record of the review of Child 3’s care plan held on 8 November 2001.  The Appellant asserted that Mr Casserly appeared to have recorded “whatever he liked”.  On 28 November 2001, Mr Casserly replied to the Appellant.  He objected “in the strongest possible terms” to the suggestion that his report was inaccurate and pointed out, amongst other things, that “six dates were entered in the review document” but the children’s home had confirmed that Child 3 was actually seen on only two of them.

47.	Ms Dagoo met Child 1B on 4 December 2001.  He told her that there had been a past incident at his grandmother’s home, when she was out shopping, and that “there was blood”.  Child 1B declined to give any further details because “his dad had told him not to say”.  He did say that he had not told the Appellant about the incident.

48.	During December 2001 Ms Dagoo continued her investigations in relation to Child 1A.  She was “unable to find any entry on the files recording the disclosure made by Child 1B” to the Appellant and was “unable to find any evidence” that the Appellant “had informed any professionals involved in Child 1B’s care … or that she had consulted with any professional about this disclosure”.  Ms Dagoo invited the Appellant to show her any recordings she had made at the time but the Appellant was unable to do so because “there was none on record”.

49.	By a letter dated 4 December 2001 Ms O’Malley informed the Appellant that she had been charged with gross misconduct and was to be suspended under Brent Council’s disciplinary procedures.  Ms O’Malley said that it was alleged that the Appellant had “attempted to steal an item from a colleague’s handbag” and that there were “a number of serious practice concerns”.

50.	On 5 December 2001, Ms O’Malley summoned the Appellant to a meeting in her office.  Ms Bosher also attended.  Ms O’Malley advised the Appellant that she would be suspended pending an investigation because of “various complaints about her”.  The Appellant shouted abuse at Ms O’Malley and Ms Bosher and “only just stopped short of physically attacking” Ms O’Malley.

51.	On 6 December 2001 the Appellant wrote an angry letter to the London Borough of Camden in which she complained about the conduct of Ms Allen (who was, by this time, working for them) in reporting her for the alleged theft of the car park buzzer.  She described Ms Allen as “a liar, totally dishonest and not to be trusted” and said that Ms Allen was known in Brent as “a crooked, dishonest and compulsive liar”.

52.	Ms Dagoo presented another report as Child 1A’s guardian in the care proceedings in the Brent Family Proceedings Court on 10 December 2001.  She recited the evidence given by the Appellant on 12 November 2001 and said that this was the first time that “this disclosure was brought to the attention of the court”.  Ms Dagoo also reported that one of Child 1B’s former foster carers had been very critical of the lack of social work support during the three months that Child 1B had stayed with her.  She had not heard Child 1B say anything about witnessing a stabbing. Child B’s subsequent foster carer’s only recollection of any reference to a stabbing was when Child 1B threatened to get his father to stab her husband.  After speaking to Child 1B, Ms Dagoo had formed the view that he had witnessed an actual event involving a stabbing and spilt blood and that his remarks to her were consistent with the account given to the Appellant in March 2001 but not recorded by her at the time.

53.	Mrs Bindman presented a further, supplementary report to the Brent Family Proceedings Court on 16 December 2001.  She noted that Ms Dagoo had been unable to find any contemporaneous reference to the disclosure alleged by the Appellant in any of the seven files held by Brent on the family and expressed her “serious concern, particularly in view of the late arrival of this very crucial piece of information in oral evidence”.  Mrs Bindman added that she was troubled by the lack of file recording and doubted the Appellant’s veracity.

54.	At the adjourned hearing of Brent’s application for a care order in respect of Child 1A on 18 December 2001, Ms Bosher gave evidence on behalf of Brent.  Ms Dagoo withdrew her recommendation that the child should be placed with Mrs G and recommended that a care order should be granted and that arrangements should be made for the child to be placed for adoption.  The Court made an order accordingly.

55.	In December 2001 Brent’s Assistant Director of Social Services asked Ms Jan Fishwick, an experienced social worker and team manager who had recently been appointed to the post of Head of Service for Placements in Brent, to carry out an investigation into “alleged incidents of employment misconduct” by the Appellant.  Ms Fishwick agreed to do so and appointed Ms Claire Bowes, an independent Human Resources Consultant, to assist her.  Ms Fishwick and Ms Bowes examined the Appellant’s case files and identified several possible examples of misconduct.

56.	On 25 January 2002 Ms Fishwick and Ms Emma O’Brien, a Brent Human Resources Adviser, interviewed Ms A, the Principal of the children’s home in which Child 3 was accommodated.  Ms A criticised the Appellant for having told Child 3 that the identified family loved him, undermining everything they had been trying to teach Child 3 about relationships; for having failed to do anything for Child 3 between 3 July 2001 and November 2001 and for leaving herself insufficient time to prepare for and attend review meetings.

57.	Also on 25 January 2002, Ms Fishwick and Ms O’Brien interviewed Ms Christine Allen, who was still working in Camden.  Ms Allen explained the circumstances in which the car park buzzer that she was about to hand over to Ms O’Malley had been removed from her handbag by the Appellant on 18 July 2001.

58.	On 1 February 2002 Ms Fishwick and Ms Bowes interviewed Ms Bosher.  She told them that some members of the team regarded the Appellant as difficult, rude and offensive and that there had been complaints from service users.  The Appellant had acted as though she knew everything and always maintained that she was right and others were wrong.  Her attitude and lack of communication skills had made her very unpopular with some of her colleagues.

59.	On 7 February 2002 Ms Fishwick and Ms Bowes interviewed Ms O’Malley.  Ms O’Malley said that the Appellant “wasn’t a team player” and frequently failed to attend team meetings.  She recalled an angry exchange between the Appellant and another member of the team and complaints made by a family and a school about the Appellant’s work.  Ms O’Malley also suggested that the Appellant had made false excuses for failures to attend meetings and had avoided supervision.  Several people had, she said, complained about the Appellant’s attitude.

60.	On 19 February 2002 Ms Dagoo wrote to the Service Manager at the London Borough of Brent and complained that the Appellant had belatedly given evidence that had had “a direct bearing on the care proceedings” in respect of Child 1A; that she had failed to record the child’s disclosure; that she had failed to inform the child’s foster mother of the disclosure and that she had failed to help the child to talk about the incident so as to “reduce the burden of secrecy, fear and confusion”.

61.	On 1 March 2002 Ms Fishwick invited the Appellant to attend a meeting with her on 13 March 2002 to discuss the allegations in more detail.  On 11 March 2002 the Appellant’s then solicitor informed Ms Fishwick that the Appellant would not attend any meeting until full details of the allegations against her had been supplied and that he doubted Ms Fishwick’s status “as the supposedly independent investigating person”.

62.	On 12 March 2002 Ms Fishwick spoke to the Appellant at the telephone.  The Appellant was “very disrespectful” and kept interrupting Ms Fishwick.  She declared that she would not attend any meetings with Ms Fishwick and would “see her in court”.

63.	On 19 April 2002 Ms Fishwick informed the Appellant that she had arranged for a disciplinary hearing to take place on 27 May 2002.  She invited the Appellant and her representative to attend.  On 20 April 2002 the Appellant replied.  She said that Ms Fishwick was not “conducting an honest and unbiased investigation” and that she had made “empty promises … about producing details of [the] allegations”.  However, the Appellant said that she would attend the disciplinary hearing with her union representative, if she were provided with details of the allegations and the evidence against her beforehand.

64.	On 3 May 2002 the Appellant wrote to Ms Fishwick again.  She accused Ms Fishwick of being, amongst other things, “furtive and insincere” and referred to her “dishonesty, bias and inability to handle this matter”.

65.	On 14 May 2002 the Appellant presented a 10-page statement in which endeavoured to explain the difficulties she had experienced in working with Ms O’Malley.  She described Ms O’Malley as “corrupt”, “insecure”, “humiliating”; “resentful”, “having no scruples or morals”, “unfit to work in children’s services”, “incapable”, “unreliable”, “infuriating”, “parasitic”, “vindictive”, “abusive”, “manipulative”, “callous” and “cunning”.  Her allegations were, she said, “based on malice” or “conveniently fabricated and planted”.

66.	On 27 May 2002 the Appellant presented a further 10-page statement in which she endeavoured to address the 46 specific allegations made against her.  She attacked Mrs Bindman and Ms Dagoo, accusing the latter of “indecisiveness”.  She rejected the allegations relating to the CPR forms as “fabrication and distortion of the truth”.  She said that the recording of events in relation to Child 3 was a misrepresentation.

67.	Ms Fishwick formed the view that, even making allowances for the “poor legal advice” that the Appellant had received, she was “rude, unprofessional and obstructive to the investigation”.

68.	Between 27 May 2002 and 9 August 2002 a panel, chaired by Brent’s Assistant Director of Social Services, conducted a series of hearings of the disciplinary charges against the Appellant.  The Appellant faced three allegations: first that she had removed a car park buzzer from a colleague’s handbag without permission; secondly, that she had shown repeated lack of care for the children for whom she had responsibility and thirdly, that she had behaved in a rude and abusive manner towards colleagues and service users.  During the hearings the Appellant, who was represented by an officer of her trade union, frequently became agitated.  She lost her temper and “ranted”, particularly against Ms O’Malley.  She said that Ms Dagoo’s complaint in relation to Child 1B was false and malicious and that the “information regarding the stabbing was on the child’s file”.  She had, she said, recorded it “the day after disclosure”.  Ms Dagoo had known about the disclosure throughout the proceedings.

69.	The Appellant also said that she had informed “CP Admin” of the return of Child 2A and Child 2C to England from Ireland, though possibly not until after Ms Janes had complained to Ms O’Malley.

70.	In relation to Child 3, the Appellant said that the allegations made against her in relation to the statutory visits were “rubbish” and that she had “grave concerns” about the accuracy of Mr Casserly’s record of the review meeting.

71.	Ms Fishwick formed the view that the Appellant’s attitude and behaviour during the hearings betrayed a “lack of professionalism”.

72.	The panel found that the Appellant should have been given prior warning that there was to be a suspension meeting on 5 December 2001 so that she could have been represented at that meeting.  However, the Appellant had been invited to attend formal suspension meetings on four other occasions before her suspension was confirmed on 14 February 2002.  The panel further found that the Appellant was guilty of misconduct in that she had removed the car park buzzer from her colleague’s bag; she had been grossly negligent in the performance of her duties towards Children 1A and 1B; she had failed to follow the recognised procedure in relation to Children 2A and 2C and she had failed to recognise the implications of her actions in relation to Child 3.  There were a number of incidents of unprofessional and unacceptable behaviour towards colleagues.  The Appellant had sought to question the conduct of the investigation notwithstanding that it had been professional, unbiased and fair.

73.	On 15 August 2002 Brent’s Assistant Director of Social Services formally dismissed the Appellant for gross misconduct and gave her reasons in writing.  The Appellant lodged a long “letter of appeal” on 27 August 2002 but did not attend the appeal hearing on 6 November 2002, when her appeal was dismissed.

74.	From 2 October 2002 until 6 March 2003 the Appellant worked as an social worker (via the agency, Social Work Solutions) for the London Borough of Barnet.  

75.	On 7 November 2002 the Appellant commenced proceedings in the Watford Employment Tribunal against the London Borough of Brent, alleging unfair dismissal and racial discrimination.  The Borough denied liability.

76.	In January 2003 Lord Laming published the Report of the Victoria Climbié Inquiry.  The Report contained criticisms of senior managers in Brent and noted that the Social Services Inspectorate had, in May 2000, assessed the Brent Duty Team unfavourably.  The Team had “missed opportunities to help Victoria”.  The Appellant transcribed significant parts of Lord Laming’s Report into her subsequent witness statement.

77.	In January 2003 the Appellant completed an application form for registration with Quality Locum Services Limited.  She said that she had worked for Hounslow Social Services from July 1998 until July 1999 and for Brent Social Services from July 1999 to August 2002.  She also said that she had left practice from August 2002 until October 2002 “to get married and move house”.

78.	On 4 March 2003 Ms Jo Pymont, an Acting Divisional Manager with Barnet Social Services, reported that the Appellant had “shared in supervision that, during her period of employment with Brent Social Services, she was involved in a disputed staffing matter” but there had been “no such concerns” whilst she was working in Barnet.

79.	On 11 March 2003 the Appellant obtained a post with the London Borough of Camden through Quality Locum Services.  However, her employment there was terminated on her second day when she was confronted by Ms Allen, the former Brent locum manager who had alleged that she had taken the car park buzzer from her handbag on 18 July 2001.

80.	Thereafter, Ms Emma Clark of Quality Locum Services asked the Appellant to provide “an outline of the problem with Brent”.  On 17 March 2003 the Appellant responded in writing to Ms Clark’s request.  She said that she was suspended as a result of “unsubstantiated allegations” and had recently been made an offer of compensation by Brent, which her solicitor was considering.

81.	On 24 March 2003 Mr John McNally, the Service Unit Manager of Brent Social Services, wrote to Quality Locum Services in response to their request for a reference.  He said that the Appellant had been employed by Brent Council Social Services Department as a qualified social worker from 26 July 1999 until 8 August 2002 and that she had been dismissed on the grounds of gross misconduct.  Mr McNally said that, for this reason, he could not recommend that the Appellant be considered for employment as a social worker.

82.	On 31 March 2003 the Appellant obtained a post with the London Borough of Enfield through Quality Locum Services.  This job came to an end on 18 April 2003 “due to concerns”.  Records of these “concerns” have not survived, save that the Manager of Quality Locum Services made a contemporaneous note to the effect that Enfield had alleged that the Appellant had “broken client confidentiality”.

83.	On 10 April 2003 the Appellant agreed to withdraw her claims for unfair dismissal and racial discrimination upon receipt of compensation from the London Borough of Brent in the sum of £3,500.

84.	On 24 April 2003 Mr Edward, the non-practising barrister who acted for the Appellant in the Employment Tribunal proceedings, informed her that he had “secured the exclusion of the usual ‘gagging’ clause in the settlement terms agreed” so that it was open to the Appellant to inform any future employer that she had been unfairly dismissed; that she had taken proceedings against her employer and that “the case was settled out of court”.

85.	From 30 April 2003 until 1 December 2003 the Appellant worked as an “agency worker” for Hertsmere Council and was “allocated a number of complex care proceedings which she undertook appropriately”.

86.	From December 2003 until February 2004 the Appellant worked for the London Borough of Islington as a locum Deputy Team Manager.  She was “reliable and trustworthy” and there were no disciplinary issues.

87.	On 11 May 2004 the Appellant applied for registration with Social Workline Limited, a specialist recruitment agency for social workers.  She provided a curriculum vitae in which she said that she had been employed by Brent Council from 1997 to 1999.  She made no reference to the fact that she had been employed by Brent until August 2002 and was then dismissed for gross misconduct.  She said that she had been employed by Hounslow Social Services from 1999 until 2001 and by Barnet Social Services from 2001 to 2002.  In answer to a question on the application form as to whether she had ever had any disciplinary action taken against her the Appellant answered in the negative.  When asked, by an employee of Social Workline Limited, to clarify her work record to deal with an apparent, though not real, gap in the history, the Appellant said that between 1999 and 2002 she had been out of work because of “marriage and travel”.

88.	On 10 August 2004 the Appellant and her husband applied to the London Borough of Barnet to become adoptive parents.  Ms Nina Shepherd was appointed to assess them.  During several discussions with Ms Shepherd, the Appellant neglected to reveal that she had worked for the London Borough of Brent as a permanent employee and that she had been dismissed for gross misconduct.

89.	From November 2004 until June 2005 the Appellant worked for the London Borough of Croydon as a locum manager in the Children’s Quality Assurance Unit, receiving a positive reference when she left.

90.	On 14 March 2005 the Appellant applied to the Respondent Council for registration as a social worker.  She provided a curriculum vitae from which she omitted the facts that she had been employed by the London Borough of Brent and that she had been dismissed by them in August 2002. She said that she had undertaken social work via an agency between March 1998 and March 2002.  The Appellant completed the section of the application headed “Disciplinary record”.  She answered “No” to the questions “Is there a current employment disciplinary finding against you?” and “Are you currently the subject of an employer’s disciplinary investigation?” but added that she had had “a dispute with employer years ago whilst working with Agency. Settled amicably”.  The Appellant also revealed a caution for theft in 1999, which she described as a “shop incident which arose out of misunderstanding – much regretted”.  The Appellant’s application for registration was approved and her name was placed on the register of social workers in June 2005.

91.	In July 2005 Ms O’Malley was involved in a violent incident in Southport during which a man was killed.  Ms O’Malley’s 25-year old son was charged with murder and Ms O’Malley was charged with failure to give a specimen of her breath for analysis.  Mr O’Malley was later acquitted of murder, manslaughter and causing death by dangerous driving.  During the trial at Preston Crown Court in December 2005 the jury heard evidence that Ms O’Malley had been “uncontrollably drunk”.

92.	On 21 August 2005 the Appellant and her husband were approved as prospective adopters by the London Borough of Barnet.

93.	In September 2005 the Respondent Council received information from an anonymous reporter to the effect that the Appellant had been untruthful when describing her employment history.  On 6 October 2005 the Council invited the Appellant to clarify the position and notified the London Borough of Barnet and others that allegations had been made against the Appellant.

94.	On 17 October 2005 Ms Shepherd spoke to the Appellant about the information she had received from the Respondent Council.  The Appellant was evasive but admitted that she was concerned that disclosure of her dismissal by Brent “might jeopardise their application to adopt”.  She said that she had wanted to tell Ms Shepherd but her husband had advised her to wait.  Ms Shepherd noted that “there were a number of inconsistencies … as there always are with Jacinta, particularly when she is distressed about what she sees as the unfairness of the situation”.

95.	On 19 October 2005 the Appellant telephoned Ms Shepherd in a very distressed state.  She said that her “life had been ruined by what happened in Brent”, which was “part of a ‘witch hunt’ after the Climbie situation”.  Ms Shepherd said that she was concerned about the information contained in the papers she had received from Brent and about the fact that the Appellant had withheld the information from her.  Later on the same day, when Ms Shepherd telephoned the Appellant and informed her that there would have to be “formal discussions” with the Department, the Appellant again became extremely distressed and said that she took full responsibility for her mistake.  She then said that she had been advised not to tell Barnet about the dismissal, though she would not say by whom.  The Appellant then “oscillated” between blaming Ms Shepherd and expressing understanding that there was a process that had to be followed.

96.	On 24 October 2005 Ms Shepherd and her manager, Ms Jenny Belsham wrote to the Appellant and her husband.  They said that they were very concerned about the non-disclosure and intended to review the position.

97.	On 31 October 2005 Mr Edward, having been approached by the Appellant and or her husband, wrote to Barnet and suggested that, when the Appellant’s claim against Brent was settled, “both parties agreed not to disclose the facts forming the basis of the case and the terms of settlement” and that he had advised the Appellant and her husband of “their obligations not to disclose Mrs Hofstetter’s dismissal or the facts forming the basis of that dismissal”.  Mr Edward thus contradicted his letter to the Appellant dated 24 April 2003.

98.	On 23 November 2005 the Appellant and her husband had a “long and emotional meeting” with Ms Shepherd and Ms Belsham.  The Appellant and her husband “maintained that there was no intention to be dishonest”.  Ms Shepherd pointed out that the non-disclosure had led her to believe that the Appellant and her husband might not be open and honest if, for example, there were problems with an adoptive placement.  Ms Shepherd concluded that the Appellant was “again not consistent in her answers”.  At the end of the meeting Ms Shepherd and Ms Belsham informed the Appellant and her husband that they intended to apply to the Adoption and Permanency Panel for the rescission of their approval as prospective adopters.  

99.	In December 2005 Mr Andrew Potts, a Senior Employment Lawyer with Brent’s Legal and Democratic Services, informed the London Borough of Barnet that the Employment Tribunal proceedings “were settled … on an economic basis and without prejudice” and confirmed in writing to the Appellant that there were no allegations against her “that were considered to be child protection issues” and that the Borough had not “made any reference to any statutory agency in respect of her professional practice or conduct”.

100.	The Barnet Adoption and Permanency Panel rescinded the approval of the Appellant and her husband as prospective adopters on 18 January 2006.

101.	On 19 January 2006 the Preliminary Proceedings Committee of the Respondent Council decided to refer the allegations made against the Appellant for consideration by a second or further meeting of the Committee.  The Committee also decided that it would not be necessary to impose an interim suspension order on the Appellant because no concerns had been expressed about her work practice since her dismissal from Brent in 2002, other than in a vague letter from the London Borough of Enfield.  It was there suggested that the Appellant had been required to leave Enfield “for conduct related issues” but no details were given.

102.	On 28 August 2006 the Appellant submitted a 22-page statement to the Preliminary Proceedings Committee.  In this statement the Appellant alleged that she had been “unsupported, overloaded with complex cases and unguided” when working in Brent; that her colleagues had been told not to support her in the disciplinary proceedings and that she had successfully made a claim against Brent in the Employment Tribunal for unfair dismissal, receiving £3,500 compensation.

103.	In her statement, the Appellant denied each of the allegations of misconduct made against her.  She said that the disclosure made by Child 1B had been made not to her but to his foster carer and that she had “shared information about this family” with Child 1A’s guardian ad litem.

104.	In response to the allegation that she had failed to complete a Form CPR3 in relation to Child 2A and Child 2C, the Appellant said that she had worked late to ensure that she kept records up to date.

105.	In response to the allegation that she told Child 3 that a family had been found for him, the Appellant said that she “would never have said this” and that she had “just reassured him that a family was still being searched for”.

106.	The Appellant also denied that she had been rude and abusive to colleagues and managers in Brent and said that she had not breached the “GSCC code of conduct”.

107.	In response to the allegation of failure to disclose relevant information to the London Borough of Barnet, the Appellant alleged that Ms Shepherd was “biased in her approach”, “inflexible” and “selective of the truth”.  She accepted that she had not given Barnet the information that she had been “involved in a disciplinary in Brent” but said that she had not had any intention to deceive because she “thought the matter was over”.  However, she had “learnt a big lesson” and would “ensure that this never happens again”.  Barnet had, she said, “acted unreasonably in rescinding the approval to adopt” because she had “acted in good faith” and “was not deliberately or maliciously trying to withhold information”.

108.	The Appellant concluded her statement by saying that she recognised that she “should have been more accurate” in recording the local authorities for which she had worked but she had worked for many authorities and “sometimes it was not easy to remember all the dates”.

109.	In September 2006 a Conduct Investigations Caseworker prepared and submitted a 27-page report to the Preliminary Proceedings Committee suggesting that there was a real prospect of a finding of misconduct in relation to the revised allegations against the Appellant.

110.	On 6 November 2006 the Preliminary Proceedings Committee decided that there was a real prospect of a finding of misconduct on some but not all of the revised allegations and transferred the case to the Conduct Committee.

111.	At a pre-hearing review on 22 November 2006 the Clerk to the Conduct Committee gave directions with a view to holding a hearing between April and August 2007 with a time estimate of 7 to 10 days.  In January 2007 the timetable was revised because of the difficulties experienced by the Respondent Council in obtaining required information.  In February 2007 the Clerk granted a further extension of time for the service of a draft schedule of allegations.

112.	In March 2008 the Appellant’s solicitors submitted that the revised formal allegations should be dismissed without a hearing on the bases (a) that the Conduct Committee could not consider “complaints about general employment issues”; (b) that the anonymity of the referrer had not been considered properly or at all; (c) that there had been a failure to specify which parts of the Code of Conduct were alleged to have been breached; (d) that the Rules of Procedure had been breached and (e) that there was insufficient evidence that the offences occurred or, if they did occur, that they amounted to misconduct.  The Conduct Committee rejected that submission.

113.	On several dates between 19 May 2008 and 13 July 2009 the Conduct Committee held a hearing in accordance with the provisions of the General Social Care Council (Conduct) Rules 2008.  The hearing, including the time taken for consideration, lasted for 23 working days.

114.	The Appellant submitted a 96-page witness statement to the Conduct Committee in which she denied all allegations of misconduct.  She acknowledged that some of the dates in her curricula vitae were incorrect but said that it was obvious that there was no malicious intent or dishonesty.  She criticised the “poor standard of the GSCC investigation” and said that it was “totally one-sided and biased”.  She referred extensively to the criticisms of Brent managers made in Lord Laming’s Report.  She noted that Lord Laming had observed that “the duty system was in administrative chaos in 1999”; that the administrative team were “relentlessly overworked” and that there was a “staffing crisis” in 1999 (when the two referrals relating to Victoria were left unconnected).  The Appellant also emphasised Lord Laming’s conclusions that “front-line staff in Brent Social Services, whose actions and decisions affected Victoria in mid 1999, were working in an under-resourced, understaffed, under-managed and dysfunctional environment” and that “senior managers and elected members were either unaware of, or unable to tackle, these deep-rooted deficiencies within the organisation”.

115.	In her witness statement the Appellant also suggested that the Respondent Council had “carefully removed crucial evidences” and had “contributed to smear” her name.  They had “no evidence to support their allegation that child 1B made a disclosure” to her.  Ms Dagoo’s allegation was “untrue” and “unsupported” and she was “trying to cover for error … on her own part”.  There was no mention of a disclosure made by child 1B in any case files because he never made such a disclosure.  The only incident she had referred to was the child’s threat to his carer’s husband and the information she shared with the court was not new information.

116.	In response to the allegation concerning Children 2A and 2C, the Appellant said that she took all necessary action to ensure that the children were protected and she had “signed the forms and passed them on to administration (in this case, Trish King)”.  Ms Janes had never spoken to her about any omission.  It was “the responsibility of the team Admin to submit this form to Anna Janes and/or to update the CP register”.  It was not true that information held by police and emergency services was not accurate as a result of her inaction.  It was “utterly preposterous” to suggest that she forgot to fill in and hand in “these extremely important documents”.  There was “not a shred of evidence … that any of the children … had suffered the slightest bit of harm”.

117.	In response to the allegation concerning Child 3, the Appellant said that it was untrue that she had advised the child that a foster home had been found for him. Her email to Ms Joan Simpson [of the Family Placement Team] on 9 July 2001 demonstrated this.  Child 3’s key worker only alleged that she had informed Child 3 that “a permanent foster placement may have been found”.  Her own record did not contain any evidence to support the allegation that she told Child 3 that a family had been found.  Evidence that she had undertaken five visits to Child 3 had “gone missing”.

118.	In response to the allegation that she had been rude and abusive to Ms Fishwick, the Appellant said that she was “understandably frustrated and upset by the allegations” made against her.  The allegation was “entirely misconceived” because it was “about an employment matter” not about her fitness to practise as a social worker.  It was clear that she was being targeted and made a scapegoat and that she was being “victimised for speaking up”.

119.	In her statement, the Appellant further disputed that her application for registration gave the impression that she was hiding the fact that she had worked for Brent.  It could not be said that she had been dishonest because there was no intent to deceive.  She had simply “bunched together” her employment between 1998 and 2002.  If she had been intent upon deception she would not have declared her caution for shoplifting.  She had nothing to gain by misrepresenting her employment within Brent Council.  In any event, the whole allegation was “to do with an employment matter … outside the jurisdiction of the Conduct Committee”.

120.	The Appellant further asserted that the errors in her curricula vitae given to employment agencies were “innocent mistakes”.  She “always specifically drew to the attention of employers” the fact that she had worked for Brent Council, as her reference from Ms Pymont showed.  The Appellant added that there were “serious questions about the probity of Mr Richard Pomerenke” [the Managing Director of Social Workline Limited].

121.	In relation to the allegation of non-disclosure to Barnet Adoption Agency, the Appellant accepted that her “CV dates were confused” and she was “mistaken” in what she provided.  The fact that she had been “wrongfully dismissed 4 years earlier was not the least bit important” in her life at the time.  She did not consider “that there was the slightest connection … between that period of employment four years previously” and her application to become an adoptive parent.

122.	The Conduct Committee heard oral evidence on behalf of the Respondent Council from Ms Dagoo; Mr Casserly; Child 3’s key worker, Mr T; Child 3 himself; the Business Manager of the Registration Team at the Respondent Council, Ms Sarah Redgrave; Ms Fishwick; Ms Janes; Ms Shepherd and Mr Pomerenke.  Each of the witnesses was cross-examined extensively by Mr Sahu.  Ms O’Malley did not give any oral evidence to the Committee, presumably as a consequence of the widely reported fatal incident in July 2005 and its aftermath.

123.	The Appellant gave oral evidence to the Conduct Committee on 9 October 2008; 10 and 11 November 2008 and 29 January 2009.  The Appellant’s husband gave oral evidence on 29 and 30 January 2009.

124.	On 25 February 2009 Mr Sahu presented his closing written submissions in relation to the findings of fact to the Conduct Committee, consisting of 133 paragraphs set out on 57 pages.  Ms Giovannetti presented her written submissions in response, consisting of 88 paragraphs set out on 27 pages.

125.	On 15 June 2009 Mr Sahu presented his further written submissions in support of his application for a review of the findings of fact, consisting of 34 paragraphs set out on 19 pages.  On 17 June 2009 Ms Giovannetti presented her supplementary written submissions in relation to misconduct, consisting of 19 paragraphs set out on 6 pages.  On 30 June 2009 Mr Sahu presented his further written submissions in relation to mitigation and sanction, consisting of 52 paragraphs set out on 13 pages. 

126.	The Conduct Committee set out its decisions and reasons in a document consisting of 62 pages and dated 14 July 2009.  The Committee (a) rejected the Appellant’s application to dismiss all or some of the allegations of misconduct without hearing any evidence; (b) rejected the Appellant’s submission that she had no case to answer; (c) found that the several charges laid against the Appellant were proved; (d) declined to undertake a review of its findings of fact before proceeding to the next stage of its inquiry; (e) found that the proved charges against the Appellant amounted to misconduct and (f) decided to make an order for the removal of the Appellant’s registration from the register.

127.	The Conduct Committee concluded that removal from the register was the only appropriate sanction because (i) the Appellant’s behaviour had been very serious and had involved dishonesty and blatant disregard of the values underpinning the social care standards set out in the Code of Practice for Social Care Workers; (ii) removal should be presumed to be the appropriate outcome in cases involving dishonesty, particularly when associated with professional practice, since it is so damaging to a registrant’s suitability and to public confidence in social care services; (iii) there was no other way to ensure the protection of the public from the Appellant, given her lack of insight, regret and remorse and (iv) a failure to remove the Appellant from the register would undermine confidence in social care services.

The law

128.	Section 59 of the Care Standards Act 2000 provides that the Respondent Council shall by rules determine the circumstances in which, and the means by which, a person may be removed from a part of the register, whether or not for a specified period.

129.	The relevant rules are the General Social Care Council (Conduct) Rules 2008, which replaced the General Social Care Council (Conduct) Rules 2003 in 2008.

130.	Rule 5(4) of the General Social Care Council (Conduct) Rules 2008 provides that it shall be the duty of the Conduct Committee of the Council to consider any formal allegation against a registrant served on it and to decide (a) whether the facts are proven; (b) whether the registrant has committed misconduct, and (c) where it has decided that the registrant has committed misconduct, what sanction, if any, should be imposed on the registrant.

131.	Rule 13 of the 2008 Conduct Rules provides that a registrant may be removed or suspended from the register if the Conduct Committee has made a finding of misconduct against the registrant.

132.	Paragraph 12 of Schedule 2 to the 2008 Conduct Rules provides that the burden of proving the facts alleged in a formal allegation against a registrant shall rest upon the Council and that the standard of proof shall be the balance of probabilities.

133.	Paragraph 25(1) of Schedule 2 to the 2008 Conduct Rules provides that, upon a finding of misconduct, the Conduct Committee may (a) admonish the registrant and direct that a record of the admonishment be placed on the registrant’s entry in the register, for a period of up to five years; or (b) make an order suspending the registrant’s registration for a period not exceeding two years (‘a Suspension Order’); or (c) make an order for removal of the registrant’s registration from the register (‘a Removal Order’).

134.	Paragraph 25(2) of Schedule 2 to the 2008 Conduct Rules provides that in deciding what sanction is to be imposed the Conduct Committee shall take into account (a) the seriousness of the registrant’s misconduct; (b) the protection of the public; (c) the public interest in maintaining confidence in social care services; and (d) the issue of proportionality.

135.	Section 68 of the Care Standards Act 2000 provides that an appeal against a decision of the Council in respect of registration shall lie to the Tribunal and that, on an appeal against a decision, the Tribunal may confirm the decision or direct that it shall not have effect.

136.	The terms of section 68 of the 2000 Act are wide enough to enable the Tribunal to accept an invitation to conduct a review of a decision of the Conduct Committee and the reasons given for that decision (such as the specific invitation made by and on behalf of the Appellant in this case) rather than to read and/or hear the evidence and reach its own conclusions.

137.	When reviewing findings of fact made by the Conduct Committee in response to an invitation to proceed in that way, the Tribunal can overturn the decision: (i) if the findings were perverse or irrational; (ii) if the Committee committed or permitted a procedural or other irregularity capable of making a material difference to the outcome or to the fairness of the proceedings; (iii) if the Committee failed to take into account material matters or gave weight to immaterial matters; or (iv) if the Committee failed to give reasons or any adequate reasons for its findings (see Brooke LJ in R (Iran) and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 982 at paragraph 9).  The reasons given by the Conduct Committee need not be elaborate and they do not have to deal with every argument presented (see Griffiths LJ in Eagil Trust Co Ltd v Pigott-Brown [1985] 3 All ER 119 and Mackay J in R (W) v National Care Standards  Commission [2003] EWHC 621 (Admin).  The reasons given must enable the Tribunal on an appeal to understand why the Committee reached its decisions but this does not mean that every factor which weighed with the Committee has to be identified and explained. The Committee must identify and record those matters which were critical to its decisions but this does not mean that every piece of evidence considered has to be identified and referred to (see Lord Phillips MR in English v Emery Reimbold & Strick Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 605; [2002] 1 WLR 2409).  In common with the decisions of the former Special Educational Needs and Disability Tribunal, the decisions of the Conduct Committee do not have to be “the product of refined legal draftsmanship”.  They simply have to contain an outline of the story that gave rise to the charge of misconduct, a summary of the Committee’s basic factual conclusions and a succinct statement of reasons explaining why the Committee reached the conclusion that it did (see Wall LJ in W v Leeds City Council and SENDIST [2005] EWCA Civ 988).

138.	When reviewing a decision of the Conduct Committee as to the appropriate sanction, in response to an invitation to proceed in that way, the Tribunal can direct that the decision shall have no effect if it is satisfied that the decision was plainly wrong.

139.	It was further submitted on behalf of the Respondent Council, by further reference to the decision of the Court of Appeal in R (Iran) and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 982, that “perversity” represents a very high hurdle and is a “demanding concept”.  Miss Giovannetti drew attention to the observation of Brooke LJ at paragraph 12, where he said:
	“[F]ar too often practitioners use the word ‘irrational’ or ‘perverse’ when these epithets are completely inappropriate.  If there is no chance that an appellate tribunal will categorise the matter of which they make complaint as irrational or perverse, they are simply wasting time … by suggesting that it was.”
	The Tribunal accepted the validity of this submission and noted the particular relevance of the quoted observation in this case.

Issues

140.	Mr Sahu presented his written submissions to the Tribunal on behalf of the Appellant consisting of 66 paragraphs set out on 64 pages.  At the hearing Mr Sahu accepted, under pressure from the Tribunal, that his submission to the effect that the Conduct Committee was not entitled to consider any misconduct not connected to the Appellant’s duties as a social worker was untenable.  However, he argued on behalf of the Applicant that:

(a)	the Conduct Committee failed to take into account, properly or at all, the evidence adduced and submissions made on behalf of the Appellant so that the rejection of the submission of no case to answer and the three formal “stages” of the hearing were all fatally flawed;

(b)	the Committee’s failure to accede to the Appellant’s submission of no case to answer was perverse, since there was plainly no case for the Appellant to answer, at least in relation to parts 3, 4, 5, 8 and 9 of the formal allegation as drafted;

(c)	in rejecting the submission of no case to answer the Committee failed to take into account, either sufficiently or at all, the overwhelmingly inconsistent evidence of several of the key witnesses for the Respondent Council;

(d)	once the allegation that the Appellant was guilty of misconduct in informing Child 3 that a foster placement had been found for him had been withdrawn (part 3(a)), the allegation that the Appellant was guilty of misconduct by failing to advise those who were caring for Child 3 in the children’s home that she had done so (part 3(b)) became untenable;

(e)	since there was evidence that the Appellant had kept Child 3 informed by a letter written on 23 October 2001, the Committee had no basis for its finding that the Appellant had failed to update Child 3 on the progress of the identified foster placement between 3 July 2001 and November 2001 (part 3(c));

(f)	the Committee acted perversely in failing to reject the allegation that the Appellant was guilty of misconduct in falsely recording the dates upon which she had seen Child 3 (part 4) because there were admissions that important documents, which might have shown that the Appellant did make the visits as recorded, had gone missing;

(g)	the allegation that the Appellant had been rude and abusive during the disciplinary investigation (part 5) should not have been allowed to proceed since the investigation had ended by 3 April 2002 and the allegations related to the period after that date;

(h)	in relation to the allegation that the Appellant had failed to disclose her true work history to employment agencies (part 8), the Committee acted perversely in failing to make reference to the only evidence they heard (that of Mr Pomerenke);

(i)	the Committee should have rejected the allegation of non- disclosure to Barnet Adoption Agency (part 9) because Ms Shepherd admitted that the reference from Ms Pymont disclosed that there had been “a staffing dispute” in Brent;

(j)	the Appellant could not have been found guilty of failure to disclose “during the assessment process” because, when asked about the matter in October 2005 (when the assessment process was continuing), the Appellant made full disclosure;

(k)	the Appellant could not be found guilty of misconduct in relation part 9 because there was no evidence that she had ever signed the relevant form;

(l)	the Committee’s findings of fact in relation to all of the parts of the formal allegation pursued were erroneous and/or perverse and the reasoning that was adopted had no, or very little, relationship to vast tranches of the actual evidence;

(m)	the Committee was extremely selective and failed to incorporate many crucial pieces of evidence into its reasons;

(n)	when the Committee did mention the crucial evidence relied upon by the Appellant it did so only to knock it down and dismiss it;

(o)	when making its findings of fact, the Committee made no reference to the findings of Lord Laming’s Inquiry, in spite of the frequent references made to those findings by the Appellant in her written and oral evidence;

(p)	the Committee made no reference to the relevant and important evidence of the Appellant’s husband;

(q)	the Committee relied upon the evidence of Ms O’Malley and explicitly named and defended her, notwithstanding her failure to give oral evidence;

(r)	the Committee made no reference to the wealth of detailed evidence supplied by the Appellant to show that she had been “scapegoated” by Brent;

(s)	the Committee failed to explain why it regarded the hundreds of pages of additional documents provided by the Appellant as irrelevant;

(t)	in relation to the allegations concerning Children 1A and 1B (part 1), the Committee perversely failed to accept that the alleged disclosure by Child 1B was not new information and failed to deal with key documents (in particular, the email dated 12 March 2001 and counsel’s note of the hearing on 12 November 2001);

(u)	the Committee failed to take into account the fact that the Brent Family Proceedings Court congratulated the Appellant on her work and her dedication in the case of Child1A;

(v)	the Committee should have rejected the evidence in relation to the alleged failure to complete Forms CPR3 (part 2) because it was not consistent and other documents showed that the information was supplied by other means;

(w)	the Committee should not have relied upon the memorandum from Ms Janes dated 14 September which was clearly manufactured and the Committee should not have found Ms Janes’ evidence to be compelling and credible when it was not;

(x)	the Committee failed to acknowledge Lord Laming’s specific conclusions about the administrative “black hole” that existed in Brent;

(y)	in relation to part 3, the Committee perversely failed to consider the notes made by the Appellant following her meeting with Child 3 on 3 July 2001 and/or the minutes of the discussion meeting held on 3 October 2001;

(z)	the Committee perversely failed, in relation to part 4, to deal with the point that important documents, which might have shown that the Appellant did make the visits as recorded, had gone missing;

(aa)	the Committee was perverse in finding that the Appellant was rude and abusive to Ms Fishwick (part 5) because it failed to take into account the context, including the Kafkaesque situation in which the Appellant found herself (having made complaints against her manager); Ms Fishwick’s demonstrable bias and the obvious flaws in her investigation;

(bb)	the Committee perversely failed to accept that the Appellant was not dishonest when making her application for registration (part 7);

(cc)	the Committee perversely failed to take into account, in relation to part 8 of the formal allegation, the fact, admitted by Mr Pomerenke under cross examination, that a member of his staff had annotated the Appellant’s registration form in manuscript;

(dd)	the Committee failed to take into account several important points made by and on behalf of the Appellant in relation to part 9, including the fact that there was evidence to suggest that Ms Shepherd might well have recorded something that was not true because she and Ms Belsham had pre-judged the matter;

(ee)	the Conduct Committee’s decision as to sanction was too severe, manifestly excessive and disproportionate;

(ff)	the Conduct Committee ought not to have reached the conclusion that the Appellant’s conduct was serious;

(gg)	when considering the seriousness of the Appellant’s misconduct, there were a number of mitigating features to which the Conduct Committee should have given weight but did not, in particular that:
there was no evidence of any harm to service users;
there were no child protection issues;
the Brent Social Services were in disarray at the material time as was shown in the Report of the Victoria Climbié Inquiry by Lord Laming;
the Appellant’s manager was open to severe criticism;
the Appellant had shown genuine regret and insight into her failings; and
the Appellant had been in employment since her alleged misconduct without there being any question as to her competence or professional conduct;
(hh)	the Conduct Committee’s explanation as to why there were no complaints from service users was without foundation and tantamount to the introduction of its own evidence;

(ii)	the Committee’s conclusion that there was potential harm to Child 3 and to Child 1B as a result of the Appellant’s defaults was utterly without foundation;

(jj)	the Committee failed to note that the Appellant did not present any risk to the public;

(kk)	the Committee failed to take into account the Appellant’s long, unblemished and distinguished record of service in social work; and

(ll)	the Committee was wholly unrealistic in its expectation that the Appellant should have shown contrition.

141.	Ms Giovannetti presented her written submissions consisting of 104 paragraphs set out on 33 pages.  She argued on behalf of the Respondent Council that:
(a)	there is a right of appeal to the Tribunal against a decision to suspend a registrant (including a decision to impose an interim suspension order) and against a decision of the Committee to remove a person from the register, or to alter his or her entry in the register (section 68 of the Care Standards Act 2000) but an interim decision that a registrant has “a case to answer” does not carry a right of appeal to the Tribunal (sections 59 and 68 of the 2000 Act);

(b)	in any event, the Conduct Committee was plainly entitled, as a matter of law, to decide that the Appellant did have a case to answer and to proceed to hear all the evidence before making findings of fact;

(c)	there is no obligation upon any court or tribunal to give reasons for deciding that there is a case to answer at the end of the prosecution evidence;

(d)	the question of whether the Appellant had “a case to answer” had already been determined on more than one occasion under the general scheme of the General Social Care Council (Conduct) Rules 2003;

(e)	in order to demonstrate that there was no case to answer in relation to various parts of the formal allegation, the Appellant had to surmount a high hurdle and she did not do so;

(f)	the Committee’s reasons were “expressed in a summary way, but one that [wa]s clear and comprehensible to someone with knowledge of the case” and were therefore lawful;

(g)	the Committee was under no obligation to “recite and then reject the points that ha[d] not found favour with them”;

(h)	the mere fact that the points advanced on behalf of the Appellant did not find favour with the Committee does not demonstrate bias;

(i)	the Appellant did not admit the preamble to, nor any of, part 1 of the formal allegation: her position was that Child 1B had not told her that he had witnessed a stabbing at his grandmother’s house and thus there was nothing she needed to record or report and she confirmed that position in cross-examination;

(j)	thus, the entirety of part 1 of the formal allegation essentially turned on a single issue of fact: did Child 1B tell the Appellant, in the course of a car journey on the 13 March 2001, that he had witnessed a stabbing at his grandmother’s house;

(k)	there was overwhelming evidence that Child 1B did tell the Appellant this: in the course of care proceedings in the Brent Family Proceedings Court, the Appellant herself gave extensive oral and written evidence to that effect;

(l)	the Committee was entitled to reject the contention that Ms Dagoo gave false evidence out of malice, in order to damage the Appellant, because Ms Dagoo’s evidence was corroborated by the Appellant’s own witness statement before Brent Family Proceedings Court and/or by the written reasons of Brent Family Proceedings Court;

(m)	the Appellant contended, highly implausibly, that her witness statement in the care proceedings was inaccurate because it had been “tampered with by Brent barristers”;

(n)	although the Committee was under no obligation to “recite and then reject the points that ha[d] not found favour with them”, the Committee did, in fact, summarise and give their reasons for rejecting each of the three main submissions made on the Appellant’s behalf and they addressed the main piece of evidence upon which the Appellant relied – Mr Richard Alomo’s note dated 13 November 2001;

(o)	the Appellant’s case in relation to part 2 of the formal allegation was relatively straight-forward: she “definitely” remembered submitting the CPR3 form, duly signed and counter-signed, to the team administrative officer, Trish King;

(p)	there were two difficulties with this account: first, there should have been two copies of the CPR3 form, one on the case file and one that was forwarded to Ms Janes’ office and, secondly, at the time when it is reasonable to conclude events would have been relatively fresh in the her mind, the Appellant did not say that she had completed the CPR3, obtained the counter-signature and given the form to Trish King but said that the matter had not been raised with her before and she had not seen it as a complaint;

(q)	in determining whether to accept the evidence of the Appellant under this heading, the Committee was entitled to have regard to the fact that, in her witness statement in the proceedings before the Committee, adopted by her in oral evidence, she asserted that this matter formed no part of the disciplinary proceedings against her at Brent and that the first she knew of this allegation was when she was told that the GSCC was investigating it, some 5 years after the event and the fact that this assertion was demonstrably untrue;

(r)	none of the documents relating to these children relied upon by the Appellant demonstrated that the Child Protection Register was updated prior to Ms Janes finding out about the children’s return during the week she wrote the memo of 14 September 2001 (part 2(c)), nor did they demonstrate that the police and emergency services had the correct information at that time (part 2(d)), nor that the London Borough where the children were living had formal notification that the children were on Brent’s Child Protection Register (part 2(e);

(s)	the Committee was entitled to conclude (as it did when considering the Appellant’s submission of “no case to answer”) that part 3(b) stood independently of part 3(a) (which had been withdrawn):  it was implicit in part 3(b) that on 3 July 2001 the Appellant disclosed to Child 3 that a permanent foster placement had been found for him;

(t)	the Appellant’s position with regard to part 3 of the formal allegation mirrored her response to part 1 in that she contended that she did not disclose to Child 3 that a permanent foster placement had been found and that, therefore, there was nothing she needed to tell staff at the children’s home;

(u)	however, it was quite clear from the Appellant’s own contemporaneous recordings that she visited Child 3 on 3 July 2001 and that there was discussion about the possibility of his moving from the children’s home to a foster home;

(v)	the Committee concluded that the Appellant did indicate to Child 3 that a specific family had been identified as potential foster carers for him and it was entitled to do so because that conclusion was properly supported by evidence from Child 3;

(w)	the Appellant had been made aware of the impact of her visit of 3 July 2001 upon Child 3 very soon afterwards: she was informed in a conversation with the Assistant Principal on 9 July 2001 and by her follow-up letter dated 11 July 2001;

(x)	the Committee was plainly entitled to find that the Appellant did not update Child 3: it expressly addressed and rejected the Appellant’s contention that it was not her responsibility to do so and that conclusion cannot be categorised as perverse;

(y)	the Committee was entitled to reject the submission that the Appellant’s letter dated 23 October 2001 demonstrated that the she had updated Child 3 about the identified placement;

(z)	the Appellant’s case in this regard demonstrated a complete lack of empathy and insight and the Committee was entitled to express particular concerns about her failure to take prompt action in relation to Child 3;

(aa)	in relation to part 4 of the formal allegation, it was contended that the file notes recording those visits might subsequently have been lost but the Committee was entitled to conclude that this was unlikely because, when the question of missed visits was raised with the Appellant in 2001, she did not produce any file notes to show that she had visited as she had stated on the forms;

(bb)	moreover, this part of the formal allegation did not depend solely on the absence of file notes in relation to those visits because there was contemporaneous evidence that the visits had not taken place;

(cc)	in relation to part 5 of the formal allegation, the Committee was entitled to accept Ms Fishwick’s evidence as to the tone and content of the telephone conversations she had had with the Appellant;

(dd)	the Committee concluded that Ms Fishwick had embarked upon her investigation with an open mind and had actively sought the Appellant’s comments and contributions, but that even if, for the sake of argument, it was supposed that the investigation had been unfair, the Appellant’s behaviour was not justified: in adopting this approach, the Committee properly addressed the Appellant’s principal submission in respect of this part, namely that she had been justifiably aggrieved by the unfairness of the disciplinary investigation;

(ee)	the Committee was plainly entitled to conclude that the facts alleged in part 8 were made out;

(ff)	the only real issue under parts 7 and 8 was whether the Appellant’s acts and omissions were dishonest;

(gg)	the Committee was entitled to conclude that any reasonable and honest social worker would have been aware of the requirement to disclose her employment with Brent and her dismissal for gross misconduct and would have regarded a failure to do so as dishonest;

(hh)	the Committee was also entitled to conclude that the facts admitted or found proved under parts 7(a) and (b) and parts 8(a), (b), (c) and (d) demonstrated a pattern of behaviour consistent with the Appellant attempting to hide the fact of her dismissal from Brent for gross misconduct, particularly when considered with her non-disclosure to Barnet Adoption Agency;

(ii)	the Committee was entitled to reject as “totally untenable” the Appellant’s assertion that she understood the question: “Have you ever had any disciplinary action taken against you?” to relate only to current disciplinary action;

(jj)	the Committee expressly considered and rejected the Appellant’s contention that she had inadvertently “bunched up” the dates of her employment with Brent with periods of agency work and it was entitled to do so because the Appellant had worked for Brent for over 3 years - a substantial period not capable of being muddled with short periods of agency work;

(kk)	the Committee was entitled to accept Ms Shepherd’s evidence that it would have been clear to the Appellant that any significant traumatic events in the lives of the Appellant or her husband should have been discussed at the face to face meetings with her;

(ll)	the Committee was also entitled to conclude that the Appellant regarded her dismissal from Brent for gross misconduct as a significant traumatic event and to reject her contention that it was not relevant;

(mm)	the Committee addressed and rejected the Appellant’s contention that her dismissal for gross misconduct was effectively disclosed in a reference provided for her by Ms Pyrmont of Barnet Council in 2003 and its conclusion was properly supported by evidence;

(nn)	the Committee also considered and rejected the Appellant’s apparently inconsistent contentions that she had disclosed her dismissal for gross misconduct to Barnet Adoption Agency in an informal conversation with a former colleague from Brent, Mr Owusu, who attended the initial adoption preparation group sessions and that she had not disclosed her dismissal for gross misconduct to Barnet Adoption Agency because she had been advised that she was prohibited from doing so under the terms of a confidentiality agreement;

(oo)	the Committee was entitled to attach weight to the contemporaneous documentation, including the file note made by Ms Shepherd recording the Appellant’s acknowledgement that she was concerned that the information about her dismissal from Brent would prejudice her application to adopt;

(pp)	the Committee was also entitled to reject the Appellant’s contention that Ms Shepherd and Ms Belsham had deliberately told untruths about her, motivated by malice and seeking to do her damage;

(qq)	on the basis of the findings of fact made by the Committee, there was plainly misconduct on the part of the Appellant and any other conclusion would have been amenable to challenge on perversity grounds;

(rr)	there is no principled basis for the Appellant’s suggestion that the conduct of “Shirley O’Malley and Wendy Bosher, as well as others such as Anna Janes, Nina Shepherd, Fiona Woodward and even Richard Pomerenke” could preclude a finding of misconduct against her;

(ss)	the Appellant appears to suggest that because there was no question of her conduct falling within the ambit of child protection legislation, she could not have failed in her duties to safeguard and protect the children for whom she was responsible but this is to elide two distinct concepts;

(tt)	the Committee identified consistent, persistent and serious breaches of specific provisions of the Code of Conduct and found in terms that these breaches called into question the Appellant’s suitability to remain on the register;

(uu)	the Committee’s reasons demonstrated that it had identified the correct test and applied it to the findings of fact and they were thus legally sufficient;

(vv)	on the Committee’s findings of fact, the Appellant was guilty of numerous instances of misconduct, which related to several different aspects of social work practice;

(ww)	the sanction has to be “appropriate, proportionate and sufficient” and the Conduct Committee should only use its powers “where necessary” but a removal order was necessary in this case because of the seriousness of the misconduct;

(xx)	the Appellant’s position can be contrasted with that of the registrant in Cordingley v The Care Council for Wales [2009] UKFTT 213 (HESC) (one of the decisions upon which she relies) because Mrs Cordingley “accepted from the outset that not only did she make a professional misjudgement but that this amounted to misconduct”; she did not seek “to diminish her responsibility or hide behind semantic arguments”; she was “clear throughout that she was culpable” and she did not “just make this concession in order to try to achieve tactical advantage”.

Conclusions with reasons
Having carefully considered all of the arguments presented at the hearing and the witness statements, transcripts, written submissions, written reasons and other papers submitted in advance, the Tribunal came to the following conclusions:

142.	The Appellant was charged with misconduct as follows:

Part 1 of the formal allegation
In relation to Children 1A and 1B, having been told by Child 1B that he had witnessed a stabbing at his grandmother’s house (a) during a car journey on the 13 March 2001, she (b) did not report this information to Child 1B’s foster carers to ensure that they were aware of the incident following the disclosure; (c) she did not report this incident to any therapeutic professionals involved in Child 1B’s care or consult with any such professionals about this disclosure to help Child 1B deal with what he had seen; (d) she did not inform her line manager and/or any other manager at Brent Council in relation to the disclosure by Child 1B; (e) she did not record this information on Child 1B’s file as she would be required to do in the case of any relevant information provided by a service user; (f) she did not discharge her social work duties to protect Child 1B as a result of her actions as detailed in (a)-(e) above; (g) she did not disclose this information in the care proceedings by way of a witness statement and/or other communication to any other parties to the proceedings relating to Child 1A until the hearing on 12 November 2001; (h) she did not consider that this information was relevant for Ms Dagoo to be made aware of when assessing the suitability of Child 1A’s grandmother to become a permanent carer for child 1A; and (i) she did not consider the impact of her actions in (g) above in protecting Child 1A.

Part 2 of the formal allegation

In relation to the Children 2A, 2B, 2C, she did not inform the Principal Officer of Children Protection and Administration at Brent Council that: (a) Children 2A and 2C had returned to England on or around 11 August 2001 as soon as she became aware of this information on 14 August 2001; (b) Children 2A and 2C had been placed in foster care at another London Borough on 14 August 2001; and, as a consequence of 2(a) and 2(b) above, the Child Protection Register was not up to date and was therefore inaccurate; the information held by the police and emergency services was not accurate; and the London Borough in which the children were placed had no formal notification that the boys were on Brent Council’s Child Protection Register.

Part 3 of the formal allegation (as amended, omitting 3(a))

In relation to Child 3 who was being cared for at X Children’s Home: (b) she failed to advise those who were caring for Child 3 at the children’s home that she had disclosed to Child 3 on 3 July 2001 that a permanent foster placement had been found for him; and (c) she failed to update Child 3 on the progress of the identified fostering placement between 3 July 2001 and November 2001.

Part 4 of the formal allegation

(a) In November 2001, she recorded on a review document that she had seen Child 3 with his carers on 5 occasions on the following dates between June and November 2001 in accordance with statutory requirements: 11 June 2001; 3 July 2001; 24 September 2001; 28 September 2001 and 3 October 2001; but
(b) she did not see Child 3 on the following dates: 11 June 2001; 24 September 2001 and 3 October 2001.

Part 5 of the formal allegation (as amended, omitting 5(a))

In 2001 and 2002 she was rude and/or abusive towards professionals working with her and/or other individuals, in particular: (b) she was rude and/or abusive during the disciplinary investigation led by Jan Fishwick at Brent Council between December 2001 and 9 August 2002.

Part 7 of the formal allegation

In her application to the GSCC dated 14 March 2005: (a) she stated in section 4 that she was an agency worker between March 1998 and March 2002; but (b) in fact she was a permanent employee at Brent Council between July 1999 and August 2002; and (c) the failure to give an accurate account of her employment at Brent Council was dishonest.

Part 8 of the formal allegation
In May 2004 she registered with Social Workline Limited: and (a) in the curriculum vitae submitted to Social Workline it was noted that she worked at Brent Council between 1997 and 1999; (b) in fact she was a permanent employee at Brent Council between July 1999 and August 2002; (c) she did not disclose to Social Workline that she had been the subject of disciplinary proceedings whilst she was employed by the London Borough of Brent; (d) she did not disclose to Social Workline that she had been dismissed from employment for gross misconduct by the London Borough of Brent; and (e) the failure to give accurate and complete details of this period of employment was dishonest.

Part 9 of the formal allegation (as amended, omitting (a))
In her application to Barnet Adoption Agency to become an adoptive parent: (b) during the assessment process between August 2004 and August 2005 she did not inform Barnet Adoption Agency that she had been employed on a permanent basis by Brent Council and that she was subsequently dismissed from Brent Council for gross misconduct.

143.	The Conduct Committee went to extraordinary lengths to ensure that the procedure that they adopted was fair to the Appellant. Amongst other things, it excluded documents from its consideration whenever it was plausibly suggested that they might generate prejudice; it carefully considered whether to proceed in the absence of the Appellant on the several occasions when she failed to attend the hearing; it listened patiently to, and carefully adjudicated upon, a series of preliminary submissions made on behalf of the Appellant and it gave detailed and cogent reasons in writing for all of its findings and decisions.  The contention that the Committee was blind to the cogent evidence adduced on behalf of the Appellant and deaf to the convincing arguments advanced on her behalf was completely unfounded.

144.	The Conduct Committee was extremely thorough when dealing with the case against the Appellant.  It considered voluminous documents and submissions and gave extensive opportunities for the examination and cross-examination of witness and for oral argument.

145.	The contention that the Conduct Committee should have acceded to the submission of no case to answer was misconceived.  The filtering process, properly undertaken by the Respondent Council in accordance with the Rules, resulted in a formal allegation which was fully supported by evidence and plainly called for answers from the Appellant.  Where a part of the formal allegation was not fully supported by evidence from a witness or witnesses who could be tendered for cross-examination, the Respondent Council elected not to proceed with it.  Parts 7, 8 and 9 of the formal allegation were based upon documents that contained errors on their face and had been executed by the Appellant herself.  The evidence in relation to the other charges was not “overwhelmingly inconsistent”.  It was consistent, clear and compelling.

146.	On receipt of information about a registrant the Respondent Council must first consider whether such information amounts to a complaint (Rule 12(1) of the General Social Care Council (Conduct) Rules 2008).  Information can only be considered to be a complaint if it makes “a specific allegation or allegations of misconduct” against the registrant (Rule 12(2)(b)).  The Respondent Council must next decide, in respect of each complaint, whether, in their opinion, there is a real prospect of a finding of misconduct in relation to each allegation which forms the basis of the complaint, taking into consideration any documents and information provided to them by the registrant (Rule 12(8)).  Before making any decision as to the prospect of a finding of misconduct in relation to each allegation, the Respondent Council must send a copy of the complaint and a copy of the Rules to the registrant and invite him or her to submit written representations and any additional documents (Rule 12(9)).  In these circumstances, it is difficult to conceive of any case in which a submission of “no case to answer” could properly be made in a subsequent hearing before the Conduct Committee.  Certainly, this was not such a case.

147.	The submission that, once the Respondent Council had elected not to pursue the allegation in part 3(a) of the formal allegation, the allegation at part 3(b) became untenable, missed the point entirely.  The Respondent Council elected not to pursue part 3(a), not because they accepted that the allegation was untrue but because they accepted that that the Appellant’s action in informing Child B that foster carers had been identified did not amount to misconduct.  The Appellant’s misconduct lay in failing to notify the staff of the children’s home of what she had said and in failing to follow up her visit to Child 3, properly or at all, until November 2001, thus leaving the child in an unresolved state of anxiety.

148.	The submission that, since there was evidence that the Appellant had kept Child 3 informed by a letter written on 23 October 2001, the Conduct Committee had no basis for its finding that the Appellant had failed to update Child 3 on progress between 3 July 2001 and November 2001, was based on an absurd, narrow misconstruction of the relevant allegation.  The Committee could obviously have treated the allegation as proved even if it had been satisfied that the Appellant’s letter dated 23 October 2001 amounted to an “update”, because the specification of the month of November was not, in criminal indictment terms, a “material averment”.  In fact, the Committee, with justification, specifically found that the Appellant’s October letter contained no relevant up-dating information and so it was content to hold that November was the correctly specified month.

149.	The Committee was not obliged to reject part 4 of the formal allegation (that the Appellant had falsely recorded visits to Child 3 that had not, in fact, taken place) because it was admitted that important diaries and other documents, which might have shown that the Appellant did make the visits as recorded, had gone missing.  The Committee was fully entitled to have regard to other evidence relating to the matter.  The chronology compiled by Child 3’s key worker by reference to records held in the children’s home was not the best evidence but it was a sufficient basis for a preliminary finding that the Appellant had a case to answer by a Committee that was not bound by strict rules of evidence.  Furthermore, the allegation against the Appellant was supported by the recollection of a witness who had good reason to recall the events and by the formal record of observations made during a statutory review conducted shortly after the material time.

150.	The submission relating to part 5 of the formal allegation (to the effect that the Appellant could not be guilty as charged because the investigation had ended by 3 April 2002) and the submission relating to part 9 (to the effect that the Appellant could not be found guilty of failure to disclose “during the assessment process” because she had made full disclosure in October 2005 when that process was still continuing) were similarly flawed in that they were based upon absurd misconstructions or distortions of the relevant parts of the formal allegation.

151.	The submission that the Appellant could never be found guilty of misconduct in relation to the application to Barnet Adoption Agency in the absence of evidence that she had actually signed the relevant form was hopelessly misconceived.  Quite apart from the inference to be drawn from the fact that the Appellant and her husband would not have been accepted as prospective adopters in the absence of a signed form, the non-disclosure relied upon occurred not only in the written form but also during the Appellant’s oral representations to the assessor.

152.	Ms Shepherd’s admission that the reference from Ms Pymont disclosed that there had been “a staffing dispute” in Brent was entirely peripheral to the allegation of dishonest non-disclosure to the Barnet Adoption Agency of the dismissal for gross misconduct.  The contemporaneous notes made by Ms Shepherd contained a clear admission by the Appellant of a lack of frankness.  The Committee would have been fully entitled to proceed on the basis of that evidence alone.  However, there was, as the Committee later explained, no evidence that the reference written by Ms Pymont, as an employee of Barnet Social Services, was available to Barnet Adoption Agency at the material time.  That did not follow from the fact that it was the same local authority.

153.	The Conduct Committee was properly selective when approaching the evidence.  It is inherent in any investigative process that attention will be focussed on relevant documents and turned away from those that have little or no bearing on the issue.  The submission that the Committee failed to incorporate many crucial pieces of evidence into its reasons was ill-founded hyperbole.  When the Committee mentioned evidence relied upon by the Appellant only to “knock it down” it acted entirely reasonably.

154.	The absence of repeated references to the findings of Lord Laming’s Inquiry did not in any way invalidate the decisions of the Committee.  The Appellant’s frequent references to those findings in her written and oral evidence were only of marginal relevance.  The fact that those who were managing and administering Brent’s Social Services in mid-1999 were criticised by a public inquiry did not prove, or even say, anything about the actions of individual managers, administrators or social workers in Brent in 2001.  The Committee read and heard direct evidence about those matters and rightly paid greater attention to that.  The fact that the Laming Inquiry was hearing evidence in 2001 might have had some impact upon events in Brent at that time but the Appellant did not rely upon any contemporaneous pressures that might have been exerted upon her or upon her colleagues or managers.  She claimed that her performance as a social worker had been exemplary throughout.  The Appellant did seek to suggest that she was part of the “fall-out” from the Laming Inquiry.  That suggestion was difficult to follow since she was suspended in December 2001 – more than a year before the publication of the Report of the Victoria Climbié Inquiry in January 2003.

155.	The Conduct Committee made extensive reference to the relevant and important evidence of the Appellant’s husband, but only when considering sanction.  It did not mention Dr Hofstetter’s evidence in relation to findings of fact since that evidence had no bearing upon them.  Dr Hofstetter was not directly involved in any of the matters that gave rise to charges of misconduct against the Appellant, save the last (part 9).  He was not present when the Appellant made her first admissions to Ms Shepherd.  The Committee probably extended kindness to Dr Hofstetter in not referring to or commenting upon his subsequent involvement.  Any such comment could only have been adverse in the light of the evidence of his attempts to minimise and deceive in the period between October 2005 and January 2006.

156.	Mr Sahu was able, on behalf of the Appellant, to identify a few pieces of documentary evidence to which the Committee failed to refer specifically in its written reasons.  In several instances, the document relied upon, when read as a whole, did not support the Appellant’s case.  For example, the Form F1 Part1 (Bundle 8 page 386) and the Form F Part 4B (Bundle 8 page 396) confirmed the evidence of Ms Shepherd to the effect that the non-disclosure by the Appellant of her dismissal by Brent was a matter of significance.  Further, the case recording sheets prepared by Ms Shepherd in November 2005 (in particular Bundle 8, Section 6 page 11) showed why it was felt necessary and appropriate to obtain the rescission of the approval of the Appellant and her husband as prospective adopters.  In any event, the Committee gave reasons in relation to all of its findings sufficient to enable the Tribunal to understand why it reached its conclusions.  It identified and recorded all of the matters which were critical to its decisions.  The fact that the Committee did not specifically refer to every piece of evidence placed before it does not render its decision perverse, irrational or unfair.

157.	The Committee, had it chosen to do so, could have relied upon Ms O’Malley’s witness statement but it did not.  The allegation that the Appellant was rude and abusive to Ms O’Malley was specifically not pursued, notwithstanding that there was more than sufficient evidence to support it, in the form of contemporaneous or near-contemporaneous notes, reports and letters made or written by Ms O’Malley and/or Ms Bosher.

158.	The Committee relied upon legal advice which was sound in every particular, save that the Legal Adviser probably failed, when dealing with the standard of proof, correctly to reflect the decision of the House of Lords in Re B (Children) [2008] UKHL 35; [2008] 2 FLR 141.  However, this had no adverse effect upon the Appellant since the Legal Adviser suggested that “the more serious is the factual allegation, the more cogent must be the evidence before the allegation can be found to be proved”. This slightly erroneous statement of the law was more favourable to the Appellant than a strictly true statement of the law would have been.  Baroness Hale pointed out in Re B that neither the seriousness of the allegation nor the seriousness of the consequences should make any difference to the standard of proof to be applied in determining the facts. The inherent probabilities are something to be taken into account, where relevant, in deciding where the truth lies but Lord Nicholls’ celebrated observations in Re H and others (minors) (sexual abuse: standard of proof) [1996] AC 563; [1996] 1 All ER 1; [1996] 1 FLR 80, should not be treated as meaning that an enhanced standard of proof has to be applied whenever the allegation under consideration is serious.

159.	The Committee found that part 1 of the formal allegation was proved.  The reasons (set out at pages 19 to 21 of the written decision) cannot be faulted.  There were two separate incidents.  Child 1B did threaten his foster carers with a stabbing on 12 March 2001 and did disclose that he had witnessed a stabbing on 13 March 2001.  The Appellant herself made this clear in her statement dated 13 November 2001.  There was no proper basis for the suggestion that Ms Dagoo was malicious.  The Appellant changed her account during the hearing before the Committee and, under cross-examination, departed from her bizarre denial of the position that she had herself described.  However, her case, as presented to the Committee, was that she did not report the disclosure because it never happened.  The Appellant’s own evidence was hopelessly inconsistent.  At one point she asserted that she had recorded the disclosure but at other times she denied that the disclosure had been made.  In these circumstances, it was difficult for her to say that she did not need to record the disclosure because the information was well known. However, that did not stop her endeavouring to do so.  The single, brief reference to the fact that Child 1B might have witnessed a stabbing in the email dated 12 March 2001 and the reference to another communication in counsel’s note dated 13 November 2001 was scant basis for the submission that the Committee failed to take into account “crucial evidence”. 

160.	The Brent Family Proceedings Court did not congratulate the Appellant on her work and her dedication in the case of Child1A.  In their written reasons, the Justices showed that they shared Mrs Bindman’s doubts about the Appellant’s veracity but were prepared to make the order that they did because there was other evidence upon which they could rely.

161.	The Committee found that part 2 of the formal allegation was proved.  Again, the reasons (set out at pages 21 to 23 of the written decision) cannot be faulted.  The Committee was fully entitled to regard the evidence of Ms Janes as credible and compelling and to reject the Appellant’s account as recent invention.  Throughout the disciplinary proceedings in 2002, the Appellant made no mention of completion of the Form CPR and the delivery of it via Ms Trish King.  She first made that allegation in her witness statement to the Committee prepared in May 2008.  The Committee rejected the allegation as untrue for that and other valid reasons.  The Committee properly noted the marked difference in the Appellant’s evidence to the Preliminary Proceedings Committee.

162.	The points made by and on behalf of the Appellant to the effect that the relevant information about Children 2A and 2C was made available to the proper authorities by other means went to the seriousness of the Appellant’s offence but not to the central allegation that she had failed in her duty, as the allocated social worker, to complete forms which she herself described as very important.   

163.	The Committee found that parts 3(b) and 3(c) of the formal allegation were proved, part 3(a) having been withdrawn from consideration for reason set out above.  As before, the Committee’s reasons (set out at pages 23 to 24 of the written decision) cannot be faulted.  The Committee concluded, as it was entitled to do, that Child 3 was clear and consistent in his recollection that the Appellant had told him that she thought that a permanent placement had been found for him.  This rendered fruitless the Appellant’s attempts to highlight the fine distinctions between the different accounts of the words she used.  In any event, the Appellant denied that she had ever said to Child 3 the things that he clearly recalled and that she had recorded in her own contemporaneous notes.  The Committee also properly treated the Appellant’s email dated 29 June 2001 as corroboration.  The finding that the Appellant failed to contact Child 3 properly or at all between 3 July and November 2001 was fully justified by credible evidence.  Further, the Committee rightly rejected the Appellant’s attempt to suggest that it was not her responsibility to keep Child 3 informed but the responsibility of the Family Placement Team, using the expertise of its own expert member and taking a point that was properly canvassed with the Appellant and her advisers during the oral evidence.  The Committee could also have relied upon the minutes of the meeting held on 3 October 2001 (at Bundle 6, page 1,284) in support of their conclusion.

164.	The Committee rightly concluded that the serious allegation that the Appellant had falsified documents, in that she had recorded in the review notes visits to Child 3 that she had not actually made, was adequately proved. The reasons (set out at pages 24 to 25 of the written decision) are sound.  It was unlikely that, while some of the Appellant’s case records were available, others had gone missing from the case file.  The chronology prepared by Mr T provided clear support for his compelling oral evidence.  The minutes of the meeting on 3 October 2001 (referred to above) clearly indicated that the visit claimed on that date did not happen.

165.	The Committee’s decision in relation to part 5 of the formal allegation (abuse of Ms Fishwick) is plainly unchallengeable.  The words used by the Appellant in her letter dated 3 May 2002 (carefully transcribed by the Committee) were obviously abusive and intemperate.  The Committee was entitled to accept Ms Fishwick’s oral evidence as considered and credible.  Her credibility, if not her equanimity, survived a sustained attack in a cross-examination that extended over several days.  The Appellant’s responses to her suspension by Ms O’Malley and investigation by Ms Fishwick, however unfair they might have been, were worryingly vituperative and intemperate.

166.	The only real issue in relation to parts 7, 8 and 9 of the formal allegation was whether the Appellant could properly be said to have been dishonest.  The Committee found that the Appellant was thoroughly dishonest for the good reasons set out at pages 29 to 32 of the written decision.  The non-disclosure of information was not a single isolated incident but a number of incidents which formed a pattern.  That pattern was consistent with a sophisticated attempt to hide information by the Appellant after she discovered, in March 2003, the adverse consequences of disclosure of the true date of her departure from Brent.  The contents of the Appellant’s application for registration as a social worker did indicate that she had given thought to the matter.  The Appellant was not a credible witness.  There were very considerable inconsistencies in her evidence.  Many of her contentions were wholly unbelievable.  The notion that her November 2001 witness statement to the Brent Family Proceedings Court was in some way falsely constructed or tampered with by “the barristers at Brent” was wildly fanciful.  Several of the Appellant’s contentions were directly contradicted by her own written statements and notes.  The Committee properly recorded that, when giving oral evidence, the Appellant frequently did not answer the question directly but sought to bring in other matters and thus appeared evasive.

167.	The Appellant’s attack on the probity of Mr Pomerenke in relation to Part 8 of the formal allegation was strangely unnecessary.  His only involvement in the case against the Appellant was the production of a copy of the registration form completed by her and submitted to his company.

168.	The Committee’s finding that the handwritten entry on the curriculum vitae supplied to Social Workline Limited was “either made by the Registrant herself or made on the basis of information provided by her” was wrong.  There was clear evidence that the manuscript was added by an employee of the company.  Furthermore, the Committee had voluminous examples of the Appellant’s own handwriting to compare and contrast with that which appeared on the curriculum vitae.  However, the error is obviously immaterial.  The only inference sensibly to be drawn from the evidence was that the Appellant had instigated the annotation by answering questions during an interview.  The information contained in the annotation was plainly false.

169.	The Committee rightly rejected the Appellant’s discreditable attempt to argue that she had withheld disclosure of her dismissal from Ms Shepherd on legal advice.  The careful comparison of the contradictory letters from Mr Edward and the careful analysis of the Employment Tribunal document were appropriate.

170.	The Committee rightly rejected (at page 36 of its written reasons) the “criticisms of bias, prejudice, strangely selective analysis, flaws in procedure and inappropriate and perverse conclusions” made on behalf of the Appellant on the basis that it could not act as an appellate tribunal in respect of its own findings.

171.	The Committee’s reasons for finding that the Appellant’s actions amounted to misconduct (set out at pages 42 to 43 of the written decision) were sound.  The Committee correctly identified the several parts of the Code of Practice for Social Workers that the Appellant had breached.

172.	The Tribunal, having read the written and documentary evidence and the transcripts of the oral evidence given at the hearing before the Conduct Committee, concluded that, had it been asked to hear or read the evidence afresh and to reach its own conclusions, it would have found that the Appellant was guilty of misconduct as charged.

173.	It is a principle of general application that a regulatory body should not remove an otherwise competent and useful member of a profession who presents no danger to the public in order to satisfy public demand for blame and punishment.  However, the Conduct Committee took the view that to remove the Appellant from her profession in the circumstances of this case would not breach that principle.  The Tribunal found that that conclusion was neither perverse nor irrational but was based on compelling evidence.

174.	The Committee rightly directed itself that it was not bound by its previous decisions as to sanction and was obliged to determine the sanction on the facts of the individual case.

175.	The Committee properly had regard to the guidance contained in the Indicative Sanction Guide.

176.	The Committee correctly identified each of the mitigating factors and carefully and extensively analysed each of them.  The Tribunal could find no faults in the reasoning.

177.	The suggestion that the Committee was unaware of and dismissive of Lord Laming’s report was unwarranted.  It is recorded (at pages 49 to 50 of the written decision) that the Committee looked in depth at Chapter 5 of the Report.  It then correctly analysed the marginal relevance of the findings of the Inquiry.

178.	The detailed reasons given by the Committee for making a removal order (set out at pages 49 to 62 of the written decision) are almost all soundly based.  It would be possible to argue that some of the conclusions were unduly harsh to the Appellant.  For example, the observation (which appears on page 54 of the written decision) that Child 3 suffered distress and anxiety and was potentially deterred from pursuing a permanent family placement by the Appellant’s failures was probably an over-simplification of a complex issue.  Further, the conclusion (also set out on page 54 of the written decision) that Child 1A was placed at risk of harm as a result of possible placement in a family which Child 1B’s disclosure indicated was not suitable, ignores the fact that the decision as to placement lay, in effect, with the Court.  The Appellant was endeavouring, by reference to other evidence, to persuade the Court not to follow the potentially harmful course.  Thus it was, to say the least, harsh to say that the Appellant placed Child 1A at risk of harm by delaying her revelation of the crucial evidence until a late stage.  However, if the dubious findings were removed from the balance, it would remain heavily weighted towards the conclusion that removal from the register was the only possible sanction. The Appellant’s extraordinary reactions to her suspension, to the disciplinary process in Brent and to the investigation by the Respondent Council and its two relevant Committees showed that she was catastrophically vulnerable to pressure.

179.	Perhaps the most significant feature of the Appellant’s approach, in the context of the appropriate sanction, was her predisposition to hide the truth and/or to deny flatly any allegation that reflected adversely upon her.   As the Tribunal has observed in another context (see, for example, Mairs v Secretary of State [2004] 269.PC and Davies v the Secretaries of State [2007] 1129 and 1130.PC), self-protective actions taken in times of panic are not necessarily a reliable indicator of a propensity to act in a manner that would be harmful to children.  However, this Appellant’s self-protective actions were not taken precipitously at a time of panic.  She was rightly found to have been guilty of calculated, sustained obfuscation.

180.	In response to the contention that the Appellant was the victim of false allegations made only by malign managers and others in senior positions intent upon self-protection and “scapegoating” and to the contention that respectable professional colleagues did not complain about the Appellant, the Committee correctly identified the Assistant Principal of the children’s home and Ms Fishwick as complainants who could not sensibly be accused of malice.  The Committee could properly have added the names of Mrs Bindman; Mr Casserly; Mrs A (the Principal of the children’s home); Mr T (Child 3’s key worker); Mr Hunte; Ms Allen; Ms Bowes; Ms Shepherd and Ms Belsham to the list of those who were wholly undeserving of the challenges made to them by the Appellant and/or upon her instructions.  Furthermore, the suggestions made to the effect that Ms Dagoo; Ms O’Malley; Ms Bosher and Ms Janes all acted maliciously and in bad faith had no proper foundation.

181.	It would, of course, have been difficult for the Appellant to make the substantive expressions of regret or remorse, the absence of which the Committee noted and took into account, while at the same time contesting the allegations made against her.  However, the Appellant’s decision to resort to vituperation; to deny the undeniable; to “lash out” verbally at her accusers and to attack the probity and good faith of anyone who expressed criticisms of her, in response to both the Brent and the GSCC disciplinary procedures, betrayed flaws in her character which make her unsuitable to work in the field of social care.

182.	The Tribunal also concluded that, had it been invited to determine the appropriate sanction rather than to review the sanction imposed by the Conduct Committee, it would have been driven to the conclusion, by the considerable weight of the evidence, that the sanction of a removal order was necessary and proportionate in the particular circumstances of this case.

183.	The Tribunal therefore decided to dismiss the appeal.

184.	The decision of the Tribunal was unanimous.

Order

The Respondent Council’s decision to order the removal of the Appellant from the register of social workers is hereby confirmed.

Signed

Tribunal Judge Reddish
29 March 2010