Title: Appeal No.
Author: Ola Odunlam
Last saved by: vmartzou
Company: BAILLI

Appeal No.	 EAT/1160/97

EMPLOYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL
58 VICTORIA EMBANKMENT, LONDON EC4Y 0DS

	At the Tribunal
	On 13 November 1998

Before
THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE MORISON (PRESIDENT)
IN CHAMBERS
APPEAL FROM REGISTRARS’ ORDER

MR B GRAVES	APPELLANT

MANCHESTER CITY COUNCIL	RESPONDENTS

Transcript of Proceedings

JUDGMENT

Revised

	APPEARANCES

Mr B Graves
(in Person)

	MR JUSTICE MORISON (PRESIDENT):	This is an appeal against the Registrars’ Order by which she refused to extend time to the prospective Appellant, Mr Graves, in relation to a Notice of Appeal which he filed some 48 days out of time.  The Notice of Appeal against a decision of Industrial Tribunal which struck out his Originating Application alleging race and sex discrimination, breach of contract, breach of the Transfer Of Undertakings Regulations and breach of the obligation to provide him with written statement of the particulars of his employment.

	The decision striking out the Originating Applications was dated 4 June 1997 and was based on the fact that according to the Industrial Tribunal Chairman the Appellant had failed to comply with an Order that he provide Further and Better Particulars of his claim which was sufficient properly to identify the issues between the parties.  There is no doubt that Mr Graves had attempted to provide particulars, but it was the judgment of the Industrial Tribunal that such as he had provided were not sufficient.

	The Registrars’ Order was dated 12 November 1997 and there should have been an appeal lodged against that Order, if an appeal was intended, within five days, so that the appeal as it was eventually presented to us was out of time against her Order, by some 163 days.  Despite the delays in this case, I have to say that I have some sympathy with the position of Mr Graves.  He felt under considerable pressure in the Summer of 1997.  He believed that he was being harassed at work by his immediate manager.  

	He was spending five hours a day getting to and from work and at the same time he was undergoing stress at home as a result of the activities of a certain number of local people who had, as he put it, ‘put through’ his windows on four separate occasions, and that the Police were required to be round at his premises once or twice a week.  

	So that in the circumstances, he felt overwhelmed both by the litigation process and by those three matters to which I have referred.  Nonetheless, he honestly accepts, and I was very impressed by the way he conducted his appeal, that he was aware that there was a 42 day period for appealing.  He says that he just did not get on with his paperwork in relation to the appeal and he also says that his trade union, to whom he turned to for assistance, were guilty of substantial delays themselves in responding to enquiries from him.

	Nonetheless, he wishes the appeal to be considered because he is a man who believes that once he has started something he should see it through to the end.  He admitted that he did not really have much excuse for the delay in legal terms, but he asked me to take into account the matters to which I have referred.  He was dissatisfied with the decision of the Tribunal.  He says he has taken advice from ACAS before delivering the particulars and had believed their advice to be that he merely needed to give a very bare brief summary of the discrepancies on which he was relying in support of his case; and that when he received the decision of the Tribunal, he was not sure that he was given any proper reasons for their conclusion that his case should be struck out.

	He had asked for Extended Reasons beyond the 21 day time period and was subsequently refused them.  He regards that as unsatisfactory.

	So here is a case where somebody has not yet had their day in Court because their claim has been struck out and he seeks the Court’s indulgence.  It seems to me applying the principles set out in the decision of United Arab Emirates -v- Abdelghafar [1995], that the first question I must ask is, “what is the explanation for the delay and have I been given a full and honest explanation?”  I am quite satisfied that I have been given a full and honest explanation as I have indicated already.

	The next question is, does that in my judgment excuse the delay in appealing against the decision of the Industrial Tribunal?  The answer to that question I am afraid must be no.  Whilst I fully understand the pressures that Mr Graves was under, so far as this Court is concerned, if he wished to appeal from the decision of the Tribunal he should have complied with the rules with which he was familiar, namely, that the appeal should be lodged with us within 42 days. And I do not regard his union’s lack of support for him as justifying the delay in lodging the Notice of Appeal of when it was lodged.

	Accordingly in the exercise of my discretion, I do not believe that it is appropriate to extend time and the Registrar’s decision was in my judgment correct and should be upheld.  That makes it unnecessary for me to consider whether in any event I should consider this appeal, bearing in mind that it is substantially out of time itself.  I have to say to Mr Graves that if I had had to consider that, then for very similar reasons, I do not think that it would be appropriate to extend the time for him to appeal against the Registrar’s decision.  He indicated to me that he was grateful for the opportunity for putting forward his point of view.  The Court would like to express its gratitude to him for having presented his case fairly and effectively as he did.  The appeal is dismissed.

Copyright 1999

EAT/1160/97

EAT/1160/97
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