



**Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber)**

Appeal Number: OA/17262/2013

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

**Heard at Field House
On 19th June 2015**

**Decision & Reasons Promulgated
On 6th July 2015**

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE M A HALL

Between

**MOAA
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)**

Appellant

and

ENTRY CLEARANCE OFFICER - ACCRA

Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Ms P Yong of Counsel, instructed by Davies, Blunden and Evans Solicitors

For the Respondent: Ms A Everett, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction and Background

1. The Appellant appeals against a decision of Judge of the First-tier Tribunal Walker promulgated following a hearing on 10th September 2014.
2. The Appellant is a male Ghanaian citizen born 8th November 1996 who applied for entry clearance to the United Kingdom as the adopted child of

a parent present and settled in this country. I shall refer to the parent as the Sponsor, who is a male British citizen.

3. The application was refused on 2nd August 2013, the Respondent not being satisfied that the application met the requirements of paragraph 310 of the Immigration Rules, and in particular sub-paragraphs (i)(e)(vi), (vii), (x), and (xi).
4. In giving reasons for refusal the Respondent accepted that the Sponsor is a British national settled in the United Kingdom. It was noted that an adoption order dated 9th August 2012 had been made in Ghana and submitted with the application for entry clearance. It was noted that the Appellant appeared to be 16 years of age at the time of adoption.
5. The Respondent contended that in order for an adoption to be valid there must be a consent form signed by the adopter and the child but no such form had been submitted, neither was there any consent from the Appellant's biological mother.
6. It was noted that the Appellant had changed his name without a duly authorised court order and it was not accepted that the correct legal procedures had been carried out.
7. It was noted that it appeared that the Sponsor was a friend of the Appellant's late father and therefore there should have been an application made for adoption to the Social Welfare Department. There should have been a home study report requested through the international social services in order to assess the eligibility and suitability of the prospective adopter. It was contended that there should be a director's report tendered to the court and no such report had been submitted, and the home study report submitted with the application did not evidence the source of information provided. In addition there was no consent letter from the Social Welfare Department giving permission for the Appellant to be taken out of the country.
8. The documents submitted did not demonstrate that the Sponsor had followed the required procedures in Ghana nor did they demonstrate that he had undertaken any of the required steps in the UK prior to the adoption.
9. The Appellant appealed to the First-tier Tribunal. The Grounds of Appeal prepared by his solicitors are critical of the Respondent's decision describing it as shoddy and incompetent and accusing the Respondent of "desperately clutching on to straws in his attempt to refuse the application." It was also contended that the Respondent had wasted the Sponsor's time and money "in the haphazard manner in which he considered the application." In summary it was pointed out that the adoption order had been made by a duly authorised court in Ghana. The consent form signed by the Appellant's biological mother had been

submitted with the application as had the statutory declaration in relation to the change of name.

10. There had been an application to the Social Welfare Department as if there had been no such application an adoption order could not have been made. There had been no consent from the Social Welfare Department to the Appellant leaving Ghana but such an application would have been made once entry clearance had been granted.
11. The application was reviewed by the Entry Clearance Manager on 12th February 2014, following receipt of the appeal grounds. It was noted that adoptions in Ghana had been recognised by the United Kingdom, but were no longer recognised from 3rd January 2014.
12. The Respondent noted that the Appellant remained in contact with his biological mother and was not satisfied that the requirements of paragraph 310(x) had been met.
13. It was noted that the Appellant was almost 16 years of age when the adoption order was made, and that the application explained that he was adopted following the death of his father, as his mother was struggling to manage with six children, and he was at risk of dropping out of school. It was not clear why the Sponsor adopted the Appellant who was almost at school leaving age and in a position to support his mother, rather than adopt one of his younger siblings. The Respondent believed that the adoption was one of convenience rather than necessity, and noted that the Appellant looked considerably older than his stated 16 years on his application photograph. The Respondent was not satisfied that the requirements of paragraph 310(XI) were satisfied. The concerns in the Respondent's refusal had not been fully addressed, and therefore the decision to refuse entry clearance was maintained.
14. The Appellant's appeal was heard by Judge Walker (the judge) on 10th September 2014. The judge heard evidence from the Sponsor and found that the application had not complied with Ghanaian law and adoption procedures and found that the adoption was not valid. The judge was not satisfied that the proposed adoption was in the best interests of the Appellant.
15. The judge noted that Article 8 of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights (the 1950 Convention) was not raised as a Ground of Appeal, although it had been raised in a skeleton argument produced at the hearing. The judge found that the Appellant's best interests had not been properly considered, and the evidence did not show any established family or private life with the Sponsor, and concluded that Article 8 was not engaged.
16. The Appellant was granted permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal. The appeal came before me on 1st May 2015. Ms Yong appeared for the Appellant and relied upon the principles in Buama [2012] UKUT 00146

(IAC) contending that the judge had materially erred in law and had failed to adequately consider paragraph 310 of the Immigration Rules, and had also erred in not adequately considering Article 8.

17. Mr Avery appeared for the Respondent and confirmed that Ghanaian adoptions were no longer recognised by the United Kingdom, following The Adoption (Recognition of Overseas Adoptions) Order 2013 which came into force on 3rd January 2014. However it was acknowledged that this was not a retrospective order, and therefore Ghanaian adoptions were recognised by the United Kingdom when entry clearance was refused to the Appellant on 2nd August 2013. Mr Avery contended that the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not contain a material error of law and should stand.
18. I set aside the decision of the First-tier Tribunal. In brief summary I found that the judge had not taken into account the principles set out in Buama. There was evidence that an adoption order had been made by a Ghanaian court on 9th August 2012 which prima facie satisfied paragraph 310(vi)(a) as being a decision taken by a competent court, in a country whose adoption orders were recognised by the United Kingdom.
19. The judge made no adequate findings in relation to the adoption order, but sought to challenge the adoption procedures that were undertaken, although there did not appear to have been any evidence submitted by the Respondent on this issue. This approach conflicted with the principles in Buama which indicated that a challenge to the validity of the court order had to be by way of expert evidence. There was no expert evidence before the First-tier Tribunal.
20. I set aside the decision of the First-tier Tribunal with no findings preserved. The hearing was adjourned so that the decision could be re-made by the Upper Tribunal after further evidence was given. Full details of the application for permission to appeal, the grant of permission by Judge Brunnen, and my reasons for finding an error of law are contained in my decision dated 6th May 2015.

Re-Making the Decision

Preliminary Issues

21. I ascertained that I had all documentation upon which the parties intended to rely. I had the Respondent's bundle, and the Appellant's bundle that had been before the First-tier Tribunal comprising 179 pages, the Appellant's skeleton argument that was before the First-tier Tribunal, and a skeleton argument prepared by Ms Yong which had been submitted at the error of law hearing.
22. Ms Everett advised that she did not have a file. The hearing was therefore put back to allow Ms Everett to consider the relevant documentation. Ms Yong indicated that she had received some further documentation from her instructing solicitors. I advised that the Tribunal had not received any

further documentation. I asked Ms Everett to confirm which requirements of paragraph 310 it was contended that the Appellant did not satisfy.

23. When the hearing resumed both representatives indicated that they were ready to proceed and there was no application for an adjournment. I was not provided with any further documentation.
24. Ms Everett confirmed that it was contended that the Appellant did not satisfy the paragraph 310 requirements specifically referred to in the Entry Clearance Manager review which I set out below;
 '310.
 (x) has lost or broken his ties with his family of origin;
 (xi) was adopted, but the adoption is not one of convenience arranged to facilitate his admission to or remaining in the United Kingdom.'
25. Ms Everett acknowledged that as it had been conceded at the error of law hearing that Ghanaian adoptions were recognised by the United Kingdom when entry clearance was refused, the Respondent would not be seeking to contend that the requirements of paragraph 310(vi)(a) were not satisfied, which relate to an adoption having taken place by a court in a country whose adoption orders are recognised by the United Kingdom.

Oral Evidence

26. Oral evidence was given by the Sponsor who adopted his witness statement dated 29th August 2014 which may be summarised as follows.
27. The Sponsor is married and has two children, and his family are settled in the United Kingdom. The Appellant is the son of his friend KO who is now deceased. When the Appellant's father became ill the Sponsor volunteered to take care of the Appellant to ease the burden on his family as the Appellant's parents had six children.
28. The Appellant's father passed away on 30th March 2010. The Sponsor was solely responsible for the upkeep of the Appellant prior to his father's death and was supporting the family financially in order to fund the Appellant's education.
29. The Appellant's mother gave her consent to the adoption because she had five additional children and was finding it hard to provide for their needs. The Sponsor gave a power of attorney to a lawyer, KO, who had the same name as the Appellant's deceased father, and instructed him to process the adoption application. The adoption order was made on 9th August 2012.
30. On 1st November 2012 a statutory declaration was sworn and the Appellant's name changed. Since the grant of the adoption order the

Appellant has ceased all communication with his extended family, and lives with the Sponsor's aunt in Ghana.

31. The Sponsor is in constant communication with the Appellant by telephone and email and they have a father and son relationship. The Sponsor continually sends funds to the Appellant in Ghana while he resides with the Sponsor's aunt. The Sponsor and his family regard the Appellant as a member of their family.
32. In answering questions from Ms Yong the Sponsor said he adopted the Appellant because the Appellant's father had been a good friend of his and he was asked to look after the Appellant. He said that the Appellant was the eldest child, and he did not wish to adopt a young child as the Sponsor and his wife are both working and they wanted an older child who would be able to fend for himself.
33. The Sponsor was cross-examined. He said the Appellant was not in contact with his biological mother. When asked why the Sponsor said that the Appellant's father had passed away and the Appellant lived with his aunt. When asked again why the Appellant had no contact with his mother the Sponsor said that both his parents had decided that they needed help and it was their wish that he adopt the Appellant. The Sponsor confirmed that the Appellant had five siblings and he believed that they were with various friends and family but he was unsure as he had no contact with the Appellant's mother.
34. The Sponsor said that the Appellant did not want to have any contact with his mother. The Sponsor is in daily contact with him and the Appellant did not want to have any contact with his mother. The Sponsor said that the Appellant's father had not asked him to help his wife or other children, but only asked him to help the Appellant. When asked again about the Appellant's contact with his mother, the Sponsor said that he and the Appellant had not spoken about it and that the Appellant's mother is never discussed.
35. The Sponsor was re-examined by Ms Yong who pointed out that the Respondent did not accept that the Appellant had broken his ties with his birth family and asked the Sponsor what he wished to say. The Sponsor replied that the Appellant had found happiness with him.
36. I asked some questions by way of clarification and asked the Sponsor if he knew when the Appellant had last spoken to his mother and the Sponsor said December 2011. The Appellant's mother lives approximately 30 miles away from where the Appellant lives with the Sponsor's aunt. The Sponsor said that the Appellant had had no contact with his mother since December 2011. At that time the Appellant's mother had wanted him to leave the house because he was being stubborn, and the death of his father had shocked him. He described the Appellant and his mother as "having issues."

37. The Sponsor said that the last time he had a conversation with the Appellant in which the Appellant's mother was mentioned was December 2011.

The Respondent's Submissions

38. Ms Everett relied upon the refusal decision dated 2nd August 2013, and the review dated 12th February 2014 insofar as they related to paragraph 310(x) and (xi).
39. I was asked to find the Sponsor's evidence not credible. Ms Everett submitted that no plausible explanation had been given as to why the Appellant had ceased to have all contact with his mother, and there was no supporting evidence to confirm this. There was no reasonable explanation for a loss of contact between the Appellant and his family. It was submitted that this adoption had been created for the purpose of the Appellant gaining entry to the United Kingdom.
40. In relation to Article 8, Ms Everett submitted that no family life had been established that would engage Article 8, and if I found to the contrary, then family life could be carried on in Ghana, and there would be no breach of Article 8 by reason of the Respondent's decision to refuse entry clearance.

The Appellant's Submissions

41. Ms Yong submitted that the Sponsor had given clear and consistent evidence and that it should be accepted that the Appellant had broken all ties with his mother and his family.
42. I was asked to accept the Sponsor's evidence that there had been issues between the Appellant and his mother, and that it was the Appellant's father's wishes that the Sponsor take on responsibility for the Appellant. I was referred to the home study report prepared by the Department of Social Welfare, dated 6th August 2012, which had been prepared for the purposes of the adoption proceedings in Ghana. I was asked to note that the Appellant's mother had expressed her readiness to give the Appellant up for adoption, because she had five other children and was finding it hard to provide for their needs. I was also referred to an affidavit at pages 32 and 33 of the Appellant's bundle, prepared by the Sponsor's attorney in Ghana, who has the same name as the Appellant's father. It is confirmed that the Appellant's father died on 30th March 2010, and that he wished the Sponsor to adopt the Appellant as his mother had five other children to care for.
43. Ms Yong indicated that she wished to rely upon the Grounds of Appeal submitted to the First-tier Tribunal, and VB v ECO Ghana [2002] UKIAT 1323, in particular paragraphs 8, 13 and 15 which considered paragraph 310(x) and what is meant by the expression "ties with his family of origin." Ms Yong also relied upon the skeleton arguments.

44. I was asked to allow the appeal with reference to paragraph 310, but if I found that the requirements of paragraph 310 were not satisfied, I was asked to allow the appeal with reference to Article 8 outside the Immigration Rules. It would be in the best interests of the Appellant for entry clearance to be granted to enable him to live with the Sponsor in the United Kingdom.
45. At the conclusion of oral submissions I reserved my decision.

My Conclusions and Reasons

46. I have taken into account all the evidence, both oral and documentary that has been placed before me, and taken into account the submissions made by both representatives. I have considered the evidence in the round, and because this is an appeal against refusal of entry clearance, I have considered the circumstances appertaining at the date of refusal, that being 2nd August 2013.
47. I bear in mind that in considering the Immigration Rules, the burden of proof is on the Appellant, and the standard of proof is a balance of probability.
48. I find as a fact that the Sponsor is settled in the United Kingdom, and that an adoption order was made in Ghana on 9th August 2012, naming the Sponsor as the Appellant's adoptive father. I find that the Appellant's biological mother signed a form consenting to the adoption. That form has been produced in evidence.
49. I find that the Respondent's refusal, and the First-tier Tribunal did not have regard to the principles set out in Buama, and for ease of reference I set out below paragraph 17 of that decision;
- "In relation to the order of the Ghanaian court it is on the face of the order valid. The Immigration Rules do not appear to contemplate a refusal to accept the validity of the order of a competent court. Further, any challenge to the validity of the order had to be by expert evidence in my view."
50. This is not a case where the Respondent has relied upon any expert evidence to challenge the order of the Ghanaian court. As accepted at the error of law hearing, Ghanaian adoptions were recognised by the United Kingdom at the date entry clearance was refused. That situation has now changed, but as accepted by the Respondent at the previous hearing, the change is not retrospective. It was therefore not, at the hearing before me, suggested that the requirements of paragraph 310(vi)(a) were not satisfied.
51. I make a finding that the Appellant was adopted in accordance with a decision taken by a competent court in Ghana, at a time when Ghanaian adoption orders were recognised by the United Kingdom.

52. The issues in dispute before me related to whether the Appellant had lost or broken his ties with his family of origin, and whether the Appellant had been adopted, but the adoption was one of convenience arranged to facilitate his admission to the United Kingdom.
53. In relation to whether the Appellant has lost or broken ties with his family of origin, I have considered the evidence, having taken into account the principles outlined in VB v ECO Ghana and I set out below paragraph 15 of that decision;
- “15. We are satisfied that ‘ties with his family of origin’ does not have the wide meaning the Adjudicator has applied. It is intended to ensure that the adoption is not as it were temporary and that, once the child has obtained the entry to the United Kingdom which the adoption will achieve, the family of origin takes back responsibility. There must be a loss or break of the ties of responsibility. Those of affection may remain. Were it otherwise, a child of a single parent who was smitten with a terminal illness and was wholly unable to care for him or her could not join adoptive parents merely because he or she retained affection for and visited the dying parent.”
54. I find that there is a lack of evidence to prove that the Appellant has lost or broken his ties with his family of origin and therefore the burden of proof has not been discharged. I find that there is no evidence from the Appellant’s biological mother to prove he has lost or broken his ties with his family of origin, although I accept that she consented to the adoption. That however, without more, does not prove that he has lost or broken his ties with his family. I find there is no satisfactory evidence from the Appellant to confirm what contact if any he has with his biological family. The Sponsor has said that the Appellant has been living with his aunt. There is no evidence from the aunt. It is not clear when it is contended that the Appellant started to live with the Sponsor’s aunt, and one would have thought that she would be well placed, if the Appellant was living with her, to confirm this, and to provide evidence as to the relationship between the Appellant and his family.
55. I accept that there is an adoptive home study report dated 6th August 2012, which was prepared for the adoption proceedings in Ghana. This report states the Sponsor has been taking care of the Appellant since the Appellant’s father died on 30th March 2010, and the Appellant’s mother is quoted as stating that the Sponsor has been solely responsible for the upkeep of the Appellant. Although this report was accepted by the court in Ghana I do not attach substantial weight to it. It is not accurate to say that the Sponsor has been taking care of the Appellant since 30th March 2010, as the Sponsor has in fact been in the United Kingdom for the majority of time. It is contended that the Appellant has been living with the Sponsor’s aunt and there is no mention of the aunt in this report.
56. There is an error in the report under the heading ‘Parenting’, as this indicates that the Sponsor has two children living on their own in the United Kingdom. According to the Visa Application Form the ages of the

Sponsor's children at the time of application were 5 years and 18 months, and they were living with their mother in the United Kingdom.

57. There also appears to be an error under the heading 'Background of Child' where the Appellant is described as the third of his parents' six children. The evidence from the Sponsor is that the Appellant is the eldest child and this is a significant discrepancy. For these reasons I do not attach significant weight to the claim in the report that the Sponsor has been solely responsible for the upkeep of the Appellant since the death of his father. In any event the report does not indicate that the Appellant has lost or broken all ties with his biological family.
58. The Sponsor's evidence is that the Appellant has no contact with his family. I do not find the evidence to be reliable or credible. The Sponsor's evidence is internally inconsistent when one compares his oral evidence with the contents of a letter he wrote dated 9th April 2013. In that letter the Sponsor states that the Appellant has cut all links with his extended family since the adoption order and has been living with his aunt. This is not what the Sponsor stated in his oral evidence, when cross-examined. The Sponsor was asked whether the Appellant had any contact with his mother, and when he said he did not, he was asked why. He gave no satisfactory answer to this question, even though the question was repeated. He could give no rational or credible explanation as to why the Appellant would have no contact with his mother whatsoever, and why although he and the Sponsor had daily telephone conversations, they never mentioned the Appellant's mother.
59. The Sponsor said in oral evidence that he did not discuss the Appellant's mother with him, but could give no rational explanation as to why not. He confirmed that the Appellant had had no contact with his mother since December 2011, which was the last time that the Sponsor had a conversation with the Appellant in which his mother was mentioned. That would indicate that the Appellant had left the family home a considerable period before the adoption order was made in August 2012, but in his letter, the Sponsor indicated it was only after the adoption order was made that the Appellant had ceased all contact with his family.
60. In his oral evidence the Sponsor mentioned for the first time that there were difficulties between the Appellant and his mother. This had never been mentioned in the initial application, and the Sponsor's witness statement, and there was no indication that this was mentioned before the First-tier Tribunal. If there were such difficulties, I would have expected this to have been mentioned prior to the hearing on 19th June 2015, and I do not accept this evidence.
61. I find it relevant that there is a lack of evidence from the Appellant, his biological mother, and the Sponsor's aunt. I do not find the Sponsor's evidence reliable for the reasons given above, and I do not place any substantial weight upon the home study report. I therefore conclude that

the burden of proof has not been discharged in relation to paragraph 310(x) and therefore the appeal fails.

62. In relation to paragraph 310(xi) on the issue of an adoption of convenience, I take into account my findings that it has not been proved that the Appellant has lost or broken his ties with his family of origin. I have considered this issue taking into account the guidance given in Papajorgji Greece [2012] UKUT 00038 (IAC). Although I accept that the guidelines in Papajorgji relate to a marriage of convenience, I find that the principles when considering a marriage of convenience and an adoption of convenience are similar and I set out below the first two paragraphs of the head note to that decision;
- “(i) There is no burden at the outset of an application on a claimant to demonstrate that a marriage to an EEA national is not one of convenience.
 - (ii) IS (Marriages of Convenience) Serbia [2008] UKAIT 31 establishes only that there is an evidential burden on the claimant to address evidence justifying reasonable suspicion that the marriage is entered into for the predominant purpose of securing residence rights.”
63. In this case, the Respondent made reference to paragraph 310(xi) in the initial refusal, and the subsequent review of the decision. The Respondent made the point that it was not clear why the Sponsor had adopted the Appellant, who was almost at school leaving age, and would have been in a position to help his mother, rather than offer help to the Appellant’s mother or one of the younger siblings. I find that the Sponsor has not adequately explained this. He had said that he was friends with the Appellant’s late father and he was asked to look after the Appellant only. I find no rational explanation has been given as to why the Sponsor was not asked to help the family financially, rather than offer no help at all to the Appellant’s mother or five siblings, and adopt the Appellant.
64. I find it relevant in answering the questions put by Ms Yong, that the Sponsor specifically said that he did not want to adopt a young child, and the Appellant was the eldest, and that he and he and his wife were both working, and they wanted an older child who would be able to fend for himself.
65. My assessment of the evidence is that the Tribunal has not been provided with a comprehensive or accurate description of the Appellant’s circumstances in Ghana. I do not find that any satisfactory explanation has been given as to why he would cut off all contact with his biological family, nor do I find any satisfactory explanation has been given by the Sponsor as to why he would only seek to assist one member of the Appellant’s family, that being the Appellant by adopting the oldest child in the family.
66. I find that the Respondent’s refusal justified reasonable suspicion that this was an adoption entered into for the purpose of the Appellant securing entry clearance to the United Kingdom. I accept that there is evidence

that there has been some email contact between the Sponsor and Appellant, and that there has been some evidence of telephone contact and money being sent to Ghana. I have taken that into account. Nevertheless I conclude that the burden of proof has not been discharged by the Appellant, and I do not find that he has broken or lost ties with his family of origin, and I conclude this is an adoption of convenience and therefore the appeal under the Immigration Rules fails.

67. At the error of law hearing I found that the judge had erred in finding that Article 8 was not engaged. That was on the basis that adequate reasons had not been provided for making that decision. In considering Article 8 I note that it is not contended that the Appellant can satisfy Article 8 within the Immigration Rules, that being Appendix FM in relation to family life, and paragraph 276ADE in relation to private life. I find that to be the case.
68. I have decided to consider Article 8 outside the Immigration Rules, on the basis that the Immigration Rules in this case are not a complete code.
69. In considering Article 8 outside the rules, it is appropriate to adopt the step-by-step approach referred to in Razgar [2004] UKHL 27, which although relates to a removal case, can also be applied in an entry clearance case, in my view.
70. However the first issue to be decided is whether the Appellant has established a private or family life would engage Article 8.
71. In my view it is clear that the Appellant's private life is in Ghana. He does not have a private life in the United Kingdom. Refusal of entry clearance does not interfere with his private life. Article 8 is therefore not engaged on that basis.
72. I do not find that the Appellant has established a family life with the Sponsor that would engage Article 8. The Sponsor has a wife and two children, and has made reference to them engaging with the Appellant, but the evidence does not indicate that they have ever met.
73. The Sponsor's wife has not adopted the Appellant. The adoption order relates only to the Sponsor. In view of my findings that the Appellant has not lost or broken ties with his biological family, and that the adoption is one of convenience, I conclude, notwithstanding that an adoption order has been made in Ghana, that the Appellant has not proved that he has family life with the Sponsor that would engage Article 8. For that reason I conclude that Article 8 is not engaged, and the decision to refuse entry clearance does not breach Article 8 of the 1950 Convention.

Notice of Decision

The decision of the First-tier Tribunal contained an error of law and was set aside. I substitute a fresh decision.

The appeal is dismissed under the Immigration Rules.

The appeal is dismissed on human rights grounds.

Direction Regarding Anonymity - Rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008

At the error of law hearing I made an anonymity order pursuant to rule 14 of The Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 because the Appellant is a minor. That order is continued. The Appellant is granted anonymity and no report of these proceedings shall directly or indirectly identify him or any member of his family. This direction applies both to the Appellant and to the Respondent. Failure to comply with this direction could lead to contempt of court proceedings.

Signed

Date 24th June 2015

Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge M A Hall

**TO THE RESPONDENT
FEE AWARD**

The appeal is dismissed. There is no fee award.

Signed

Date 24th June 2015

Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge M A Hall