APPEAL COURT, HIGH COURT OF JUSTICIARY
Lord Justice Clerk
Lord Nimmo Smith
 HCJAC 56
Appeal Nos: XC920/05 and XC19/06
OPINION OF THE COURT
delivered by THE LORD JUSTICE CLERK
ANTONIO LA TORRE
HER MAJESTY'S ADVOCATE
the appellant: Bovey QC; Mrs Hughes; Nolf & Co.,
 All members of the court have contributed to this Opinion. These are appeals against (i) the decision of Sheriff K M Maciver, a sheriff of Lothian and Borders at Edinburgh, dated 27 September 2005 by which he remitted the appellant's case to the Scottish Ministers for them to decide whether or not to extradite the appellant to Italy to stand trial on certain charges relating to organised crime, and the decision of the Scottish Ministers dated 26 November 2005 by which they ordered extradition; and (ii) the decision of Sheriff Maciver dated 21 December 2005 by which he ordered the extradition of the appellant. The first appeal (the Part 2 appeal) relates to an extradition request made by the Government of Italy in January 2005. The second (the Part 1 appeal) relates to a European Arrest Warrant submitted to the Crown Agent in September 2005. The appellant has also lodged devolution minutes in both appeals.
II THE EXTRADITION ACT 2003
 The 2003 Act made fundamental changes to the law of extradition. It provides for two separate regimes of extradition based on the distinction between category 1 and category 2 territories. Throughout this Opinion all references to statutory provisions are references to the 2003 Act unless we state otherwise. The following summary covers only those features of the 2003 Act that are relevant to the issues in this case.
1 of the Act implements the Council Framework Decision of
 This procedure is initiated by the issue
of a European Arrest Warrant ("the Warrant") by a judicial authority in a
category 1 territory. When a
Warrant is received by the Crown Agent, the "designated authority" in
 At the extradition hearing, the Sheriff must decide whether the offence specified in the Warrant is an extradition offence (s 10(2)). The answer to that question depends on whether the person has yet to be convicted, or sentenced, in respect of the offence in the issuing state or is said to be unlawfully at large after being sentenced (ss 64-66, Sched 2). The sheriff must then consider whether extradition is barred for any of the reasons listed in section 11(1). These reasons include the rule against double jeopardy (s 11(1)(a)) and the passage of time (s 11(1)(c)). If none of these reasons applies, the sheriff must decide whether the person is accused of the extradition offence or is unlawfully at large after conviction of it (s 11(4), (5)). If the person has been convicted, the sheriff is required to determine whether he was convicted in his presence and, if not, whether he deliberately absented himself from his trial (s 20(1), (3)). If the sheriff decides that he did not, he must decide whether the person would be entitled to a retrial or, on appeal, to a review amounting to a retrial (s 20(5)). If he would be, the sheriff must then consider the human rights aspects of the proposed extradition under section 21 (s 20(6)). It provides inter alia as follows:
"21 Human rights
(1) If the judge is required to proceed under this section (by virtue of section 11 or 20) he must decide whether the person's extradition would be compatible with the Convention rights within the meaning of the Human Rights Act 1998 (c 42).
(2) If the judge decides the question in subsection (1) in the negative he must order the person's discharge.
(3) If the judge decides that question in the affirmative he must order the person to be extradited to the category 1 territory in which the warrant was issued ..."
Where the sheriff decides to order extradition, which in Part 1 is an exclusively judicial decision, an appeal lies to the High Court of Justiciary (s 26(1), s 216(9)), on a question of fact or law, unless the person has consented to extradition. It must be brought within seven days of the granting of the order (s 26(3), (4)).
2 governs the procedure for extradition between the
 The Scottish Ministers may begin proceedings under Part 2 by sending to the sheriff of Lothian and Borders a certificate in respect of a valid request from a category 2 territory under section 70(1), stating that it has been made in the approved way and enclosing with it the extradition request itself and a copy of any relevant Order in Council (s 70(8), (9)). The sheriff may issue a warrant for the arrest of the person if he has reasonable grounds for believing that the offence in respect of which extradition is requested is an extradition offence and that there is evidence that would justify the issue of a warrant for the arrest of a person accused of the offence within the sheriff's jurisdiction, if the person whose extradition is requested is accused of the commission of the offence; or evidence that would justify the issue of a warrant for the arrest of a person who was unlawfully at large after conviction of the offence within the sheriff's jurisdiction if the person whose extradition is requested is alleged to be unlawfully at large after conviction of the offence (s 71(2), (3)).
 Where a person is arrested under a section 71 warrant, an extradition hearing must take place within two months of his appearance before the sheriff (s 75(1)) unless a later date is fixed in the interests of justice (s 75(4)).
 At the extradition hearing, the sheriff must decide whether the documents sent to him by the Scottish Ministers consist of or include the formal documents necessary for the section 71 warrant to be issued (s 70(9)); the particulars of the person whose extradition is requested; particulars of the offence specified in the request and, in the case of a person accused of an offence, a warrant for his arrest issued in the category 2 territory or, in the case of a person alleged to be unlawfully at large after conviction of an offence, a certificate issued in the category 2 territory of the conviction, and of the sentence if he has been sentenced (s 78(2)). If the sheriff is not so satisfied, the person must be discharged (s 78(3)). If the sheriff is content that the necessary documents have been provided, he must then be satisfied (s 78(5)) that the person before him is the person whose extradition is requested, that the offence is an extradition offence (cf ss 137-138) and that copies of the documents sent by the Scottish Ministers to the sheriff have been served on the person (s 78(4)).
 The sheriff is then required to be satisfied that extradition is not barred for any of the reasons set out in section 79(1). These reasons include, as in Part 1, the rule against double jeopardy (s 79(1)(a); s 80) and the passage of time (s 79(1)(c); s 82).
 Where a person has already been convicted of the offence, the same considerations as apply to category 1 territories must then be applied; for example, in the case of a person convicted in absentia, whether he was wilfully absent. If a person has been convicted in absentia without knowledge of the proceedings, a prima facie case must be established against him as in the case of an accused person.
 If the sheriff is satisfied as to these matters, he must then consider whether an order for extradition would be compatible with the person's Convention rights (s 87). If not, he must order the person's discharge.
 When he is satisfied on all of these matters, the sheriff must send the case to the Scottish Ministers to decide whether or not to extradite (s 92(1)). He must at that stage inform the person that he has a right of appeal to the High Court of Justiciary, but that any appeal will not be heard until the Scottish Ministers have made their decision (s 92(2)). If the Scottish Ministers decide to make an extradition order (s 93) they must inform the person of that decision and inform him in ordinary language of his right of appeal against their decision to the High Court of Justiciary (s 100(1)).
 The person to be extradited may appeal against the decision of the sheriff on a question of law or fact within fourteen days of his being informed of an order by the Scottish Ministers for his extradition (cf s 103). He may appeal against the extradition order on a question of fact or law within the same time limit (s 108).
III HISTORY OF EVENTS LEADING TO THE EXTRADITION REQUESTS
"...for having participated together with MORRA Carmine (deceased), each one aware of his contribution, covering specific roles, in a camorra-type criminal association known as the "LA TORRE CLAN", having a summit type structure, organized, promoted and led by Augusto LA TORRE, first, and then by Antonio LA TORRE, which, using the force of intimidation deriving from the bond of association, operates in the Mondragone area and in other zones, to obtain profits or unjust advantages for themselves or for others, and for achieving the following illegal purposes:
threatening witnesses in criminal proceedings against the LA TORRE clan of in others (sic)
control and acquisition of public and private contracts and works
extortion to the detriment of economic operators
trafficking in counterfeit coins
recycling money coming from illegal activities of purchasing real estate and companies, also abroad
With the aggravating circumstances of having arms and explosives available and of obtaining or controlling economic activities financed in whole or in part with the price, the product or the profit of the crimes.
With the following further specific aggravating circumstances:
for Antonio LA TORRE, Mariano LA TORRE, Giovanni BOCCOLATO, Salvatore ORABONA, of having had directive and organizational roles ...
In Mondragone, adjoining municipalities
The other charges involve inter alia extortion, fraud, robbery and counterfeiting.
 The Statement of Facts dated
"[The appellant] has been charged with the crime of participation in a camorra-type association centred on the commission of acts of extortion and other crimes against property. From the investigations carried out - above all thanks to telephone wire-tapping - it has emerged that in the period covered by the investigations (1998-99) [the appellant] was the undisputed head of the criminal organization and directed all the group's activities, programming numerous acts of extortion and carrying them out personally and/or by telephone and/or by sending affiliated members. In fact, alongside the crime charged of camorra association, numerous end-crimes emerge, especially acts of extortion to the detriment of entrepreneurs in Mondragone, as well as participation in trafficking in counterfeit coins and the forging of documents aimed at helping other members to remain at large, and, lastly, the threat made to those who had 'dared' to report the illegal activities of the criminal group to the Authorities" (Official Translation, supra, p 1).
On the same date, the Assistant Public Prosecutor declared that these crimes were not of a political nature and did not constitute an infraction of military and fiscal laws.
 "Camorra" is defined in the Oxford English
Dictionary as "a secret society of lawless malcontents in
Conviction in the Court of Naples, No GIP 48797/03
"... and therefore, deeming there to be continuation between all the aforesaid crimes, sentences him to the punishment of thirteen years' imprisonment and to the fine of 1400.00 euro, his earlier conviction by the Court of Santa Maria Capua Vetere being considered absorbed in the aforesaid punishment (Official Translation, p 318) ...
Having read Arts 29 et seq, declares Antonio LA TORRE ... to be permanently debarred from public office, and legally debarred during the period of serving their punishment; ...
Having read Art. 32/quarto of the Penal Code, declares ... Antonio LA TORRE ... incapable of contracting with the Public Administration.
Orders those convicted to pay jointly the trial costs, and each of them to pay his respective costs of preventative custody.
Indicates as 90 days the term for depositing the grounds hereof (ibid, p 320) ... "
Memo from Raffaele Cantone, Assistant Public Prosecutor at the Court of Naples to Giovandomenico Lepore, the Advocate General at the Court of Naples, dated 18 May 2004
"Re: Request for information on the position of Antonio La Torre.
With reference to your request dated 17.05.04, please find herewith an excerpt of the preventative order containing the essential parts of the document regarding Antonio La Torre.
The following points should also be observed:
La Torre has in fact been convicted for the crime of camorra-type association and for various acts of extortion; the decision of the sentence is attached, as the grounds thereof have not yet been deposited (the final term for depositing them is 25 May this year)
It is thus not known whether La Torre will lodge an appeal
La Torre was certainly informed about the proceeding, and indeed he chose and appointed Avv Angelo Raucci of the Santa Maria CV bar as his personal defence counsel
It is not possible to foresee how long it will take before the appeal trial is held; as, however, a number of persons accused in the proceeding are in custody, the appeal judgement should naturally take place within the terms contemplated in Art. 303 of the Code of Criminal Procedure ... (Official Translation, pp 4-5)".
IV THE PART 2 REQUEST AND ENSUING PROCEDURES
 On 7 February 2005 the Scottish Ministers certified the request under section 70(1) and sent to the sheriff of Lothian and Borders the request, the certificate and a copy of The Extradition Act 2003 (Designation of Part 2 Territories) Order 2003 (2003 SI No 3334), which designated Italy as a category 2 territory.
 Among the documents before the sheriff
there was an affidavit of an Italian practitioner, Avv Guglielmo Busatto, which
set out that the sentence imposed on the appellant was passed on
 On 27 September 2005, the sheriff found
that (1) all the charges laid against the appellant constituted extradition
offences; (2) the 2003 Act applied to
offences allegedly committed before its commencement; (3) copies of the
documents sent to the sheriff had been served on the appellant in terms of
section 78(4)(c); (4) the appellant's status was that of a person accused
in a category 2 territory of the commission of the offences in that territory;
and (5) there was no bar to extradition in respect of double jeopardy or the
passage of time. He therefore sent the case to the Scottish Ministers for
a decision as to whether the appellant should be extradited. On
V THE EUROPEAN ARREST WARRANT (PART I) AND ENSUING
"Offence committed in Mondragone between October and December 2001. Antonio LA TORRE carried out various violent and threatening activities committed in complicity with other persons, availing himself of the intimidating power of the associative bond of the LA TORRE clan which controls the area, aimed at obtaining the payment of a bribe from a local entrepreneur in relation to the contracts for catering services he had been awarded, event [sic] which did not occur due to circumstances independent of their will."
Attached to the Warrant was a document dated
"La Torre Antonio answers as
mandatory of an extortion's [sic]
attempt against an entrepreneur dealing with catering; in particular Mr La
VI THE DEVOLUTION ISSUES AND THE GROUNDS OF APPEAL
Part 1 appeal and Part 2 appeal - common issues
 In both appeals the appellant has lodged a devolution minute on the ground that the exclusion of a right of appeal from this court to the House of Lords is a violation of his rights under articles 5, 6 and 8, when read with article 14, of the European Convention on Human Rights. In addition, counsel for the appellant has made the fundamental submission that the 2003 Act does not apply at all to conduct occurring before the date on which it came into force (Part 1 and Part 2 appeals, ground 7). In both appeals he also submits that the extradition is barred by the passage of time (Part 1 appeal, ground 8; Part 2 appeal, ground 11).
Issues in the Part 1 appeal only
 In this appeal the appellant has presented a further devolution argument alleging that his Convention rights will be infringed if he should be extradited.
 In addition to the devolution issue, counsel for the appellant argued the following further grounds, namely that the Warrant failed adequately to specify where the conduct alleged took place and accordingly could not be said to set out an extradition offence (Part 1 appeal, ground 6); that the Act failed to reflect the discretion reserved to the judicial authority by the Framework Decision to refuse to execute the Warrant where it relates to offences committed wholly or in part in the territory of the Member State, and accordingly infringed the appellant's rights under article 8 of the Convention (part 1 appeal, ground 10); that the Act failed to reflect the provision of the Framework Decision that allows the law of the executing state to make it a condition of the execution of the Warrant that the person extradited should be returned to the executing state to serve his sentence there, and in this respect too infringed his rights under article 8 (Part 1 appeal, ground 9); that the Warrant failed to comply with the requirements of the Framework Decision (Part 1 appeal, ground 4); and that it failed to contain the statement required by section 2(2)(a) and (3) of the Act (Part 1 appeal, ground 5).
Issues in the Part 2 appeal only
 Counsel for the appellant restricted this appeal to the following further grounds; namely that the sheriff erred in holding that the requirements of service in section 78(4) of the Act had been satisfied (Part 2 appeal, ground 6); that the sheriff erred in holding that the first charge was an extradition offence, since membership of a Mafia-type criminal association was not an offence known to the law of Scotland (Part 2 appeal, ground 8); that the sheriff erred in holding that the appellant fell to be regarded as a person "accused" of a criminal offence, he having been already convicted and sentenced (Part 2 appeal, ground 9); and that the sheriff erred in failing to hold that the rule on double jeopardy barred extradition (Part 2 appeal, ground 10). Grounds 4 and 12 in this appeal were not argued.
VII SUBMISSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
(A) The devolution issues
(i) The competency of the appellant's devolution minutes
 A devolution minute is a minute which seeks to raise a devolution issue within the meaning of paragraph 1 of Schedule 6 to the Scotland Act 1998. The questions which may constitute devolution issues include, by virtue of subparagraph (d), a question whether a purported or proposed exercise of a function by a member of the Scottish Executive is, or would be, incompatible with any of the Convention rights, ie the rights and fundamental freedoms set out in those provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights and the Protocols thereto specified in section 1 of the Human Rights Act 1998.
 The appellant has lodged three devolution minutes, one in the Part 1 appeal before the sheriff and one in each of the Part 1 and Part 2 appeals before this court. It is not necessary at this stage to do more than to explain that in each of these minutes it is alleged that the present proceedings infringe the appellant's Convention rights in one way or another. We shall discuss the substance of these allegations in due course.
 The question which arises at this stage is whether these devolution minutes are competent. So far as we are aware, it has consistently been conceded on behalf of the Lord Advocate and, where the Advocate General has been represented, on behalf of the Advocate General, that devolution minutes in extradition proceedings are competent. Such a concession was made in respect of the devolution minute before the sheriff in the present proceedings, and again before us in respect of all three devolution minutes. In the present case, the sheriff accepted the concession. In the case of HM Adv v Headrick 2005 SCCR 787, however, Sheriff Stoddart did not accept the concession, and instead went on to hold that a devolution minute was not competent in extradition proceedings. Sheriff Stoddart's decision has been followed in a number of subsequent cases in the sheriff court, so it is appropriate that we examine the issue of competency for ourselves. We can do so comparatively briefly.
Submissions for the appellant
for the appellant took as his starting point the fact that
 It was submitted on behalf of the appellant that in issuing a certificate and in ordering the appellant to be extradited the Scottish Ministers acted in a manner inconsistent with the appellant's Convention rights and therefore contrary to section 57(2) of the Scotland Act. Further, by conducting the extradition proceedings the Lord Advocate acted and continued to act in a manner inconsistent with the appellant's Convention rights and therefore contrary to section 57(2) of the Scotland Act. This sub-section provides inter alia that a member of the Scottish Executive, ie any of the Scottish Ministers, including the Lord Advocate, has no power to do any act so far as it is incompatible with any of the Convention rights. Accordingly the acts of either the Scottish Ministers or the Lord Advocate could be made the subject of a devolution issue within the meaning of paragraph 1 of Schedule 6 to the Act. The analysis of the statutory provisions which Sheriff Stoddart made in HM Adv v Headrick overlooked the fact that that when conducting extradition proceedings in Scotland in terms of section 191(1)(a) of the 2003 Act the Lord Advocate remained a member of the Scottish Executive and did not therefore cease to be subject to the provisions of section 57(2) of the Scotland Act.
then turned to the provisions of Part 1 of the 2003 Act. Under the provisions of this part, a
Part 1 warrant received from a category 1 territory must be certified by
the designated authority before it can be executed in the
"The Lord Advocate has a permanent staff known as the Crown Office situated in Edinburgh which is headed by the Crown Agent ... The Crown Agent is the departmental head of the procurator fiscal service, the Civil Service head of department as opposed to the ministerial head who is the Lord Advocate."
The person who issued the certificate on behalf of the Crown Agent was employed as a procurator fiscal depute and also appeared on behalf of the Lord Advocate in extradition hearings under the 2003 Act. In terms of section 191 of the 2003 Act, the Lord Advocate was conducting the extradition proceedings. In terms of section 44(1)(c) of the Scotland Act the Lord Advocate is a member of the Scottish Executive.
 Counsel submitted, on the same basis as in relation to Part 2, that by conducting the extradition proceedings the Lord Advocate had acted and continued to act in a manner inconsistent with the appellant's Convention rights and therefore contrary to section 57(2) of the Scotland Act. Further, by commencing the extradition process in the foregoing circumstances as he had done, the Crown Agent acted in a manner inconsistent with the appellant's Convention rights. As a civil servant answerable to the Lord Advocate, the acts of the Crown Agent were acts of the Lord Advocate. The Lord Advocate was responsible for the Crown Agent's said actings which were accordingly contrary to section 57(2) of the Scotland Act. Moreover, under section 2(7) of the 2003 Act the Crown Agent, as the designated authority, had a discretion in respect of the issuing of a certificate under that section. In HM Adv v Headrick Sheriff Stoddart had attached importance to the mandatory nature of the role of the Scottish Ministers under Part 2. This might be contrasted with the discretion conferred on the Crown Agent in Part 1 cases.
Submissions for the Lord Advocate
for the Lord Advocate conceded the competency of the devolution minutes in both
appeals. He said that this concession
was made notwithstanding the decision of Sheriff Stoddart in HM Adv v Headrick. Counsel said that
he accepted that a different argument could be advanced, but this was the
considered position of the Lord Advocate and the Solicitor General for
 So far as Part 2 was concerned, it was ultimately a decision for the Scottish Ministers, in terms of section 93(4) of the 2003 Act, to order a person to be extradited to a territory to which his extradition was requested. By section 87(1), the sheriff had to decide whether the person's extradition would be compatible with the Convention rights. If the person claimed that extradition would contravene his Convention rights, he was saying in effect that for the Scottish Ministers to authorise his extradition would be incompatible with his Convention rights. He could present a similar argument on appeal to this court under section 103 of the 2003 Act. Nonetheless, when such an argument was presented, it amounted at the same time to a contention that the Scottish Ministers would not have the power to act by making the decision that he should be extradited. This was a devolution issue within the meaning of Schedule 6 to the Scotland Act.
said that this concession was no more than practical. The purpose of the specific statutory
arrangements in respect of devolution issues was to ensure consistent
application of Convention rights throughout the
 Counsel said that the analysis in respect of Part 1 was different. By section 2(9) the designated authority was the authority designated for the purposes of Part 1 by Order made by the Secretary of State. By section 141(1), references in Part 2 to the Secretary of State were to be taken to be references to the Scottish Ministers. There was no comparable provision in Part 1, so the Secretary of State was the Home Secretary. By the 2003 Order the Crown Agent was designated for the purposes of Part 1 ex officio by a member of the Government of the United Kingdom in relation to a matter which was not devolved under the Scotland Act, but was reserved under Schedule 5, Part II, head B, section B11. The Crown Agent was one of the members of staff of the Scottish Administration within the meaning of section 51(1) of the Scotland Act. He was not one of the members of the Scottish Executive, as defined in section 44(1). Accordingly, where the Crown Agent was acting as a designated authority, section 57(2) of the Scotland Act did not apply to him, and a devolution issue, within the meaning of Schedule 6, could not be raised in respect of his performance of his functions under the 2003 Act. When acting on behalf of the Lord Advocate, as a member of staff of the Scottish Administration within the meaning of section 51(1) of the Scotland Act, the Crown Agent would be performing a different function from that conferred on him ex officio as a designated authority under the 2003 Act. The Crown Agent was not in respect of this matter answerable to the Lord Advocate. Part 1 of the Act was intended to operate free of ministerial input.
Lord Advocate, however, conducted proceedings under Part 1 by virtue of
section 191 of the Extradition Act.
In doing so he was not acting in his capacity as head of the system of
criminal prosecution in
 In our opinion, the Lord Advocate is correct to concede the competency of the devolution minutes so far as directed against his own acts and those of the Scottish Ministers. Since no contrary argument was advanced, it is not necessary to say much more than that we accept the submissions of counsel, and in particular counsel for the Lord Advocate. The role of the Lord Advocate in extradition proceedings is as provided by section 191(1) of the 2003 Act, wherein he is described as "the Lord Advocate". It is therefore as Lord Advocate that he conducts extradition proceedings. No doubt he does so because, under Part 1, an arrest warrant has been issued by a judicial authority of a category 1 territory in terms of section 2, and under Part 2 because a valid request for extradition to a category 2 territory has been received in terms of section 70; so he is not acting in his capacity as head of the system of criminal prosecution in Scotland, but is performing a specific statutory function under the 2003 Act. But he remains the Lord Advocate, and as such continues to be a member of the Scottish Executive and one of the Scottish Ministers within the meaning of section 44 of the Scotland Act.
 In HM Adv v Headrick Sheriff Stoddart, in declining to accept the concession on behalf of the Lord Advocate in that case, said at p 797, paras 20 and 21, that the Lord Advocate was acting merely as someone upon whom a statutory function had been conferred by section 191(1) of the 2003 Act, and that his function in conducting the proceedings had nothing to do with his membership of the Scottish Executive. We cannot accept this analysis. The Lord Advocate performs many functions, but whatever the capacity in which he performs them he remains Lord Advocate. His holding of the office of Lord Advocate is inseparable from his membership of the Scottish Executive, that is to say the Lord Advocate is one of the Scottish Ministers, and cannot, in accordance with section 44 of the Scotland Act, be Lord Advocate without also being a member of the Scottish Executive. Whatever function he is performing, it therefore constitutes an act within the meaning of section 57(2) of the Scotland Act and it can therefore be brought into question as a devolution issue within the meaning of paragraph 1 of Schedule 6 to the Act. The same considerations apply with at least as much force to the performance by the Scottish Ministers of their functions under Part 2 of the 2003 Act. In our opinion therefore the devolution minutes, so far as directed against acts of the Lord Advocate and of the Scottish Ministers, are competent.
 There remains for consideration the position of the Crown Agent. As has been seen, he is the designated authority for the purposes of section 2 in respect of a Part 1 warrant, and performs the necessary but limited function of issuing a certificate under section 2 if he believes that the authority which issued the Part 1 warrant has the function of issuing arrest warrants in the category 1 territory. The 2003 Order making him the designated authority designates him as the Crown Agent of the Crown Office, and thus as the holder of that office. In performing his function as designated authority the Crown Agent does not act on behalf of the Lord Advocate, and the Lord Advocate is not responsible for his performance of that function. The Crown Agent is acting as the holder of that office in his capacity as such, and not as a member of staff of the Scottish Administration within the meaning of section 51(1) of the Scotland Act. He is not a member of the Scottish Executive, and is not therefore affected by the provisions of section 57(2). The devolution minutes, so far as directed against the acts of the Crown Agent, are therefore incompetent. This is of no great significance, since the devolution minutes so far as directed against the acts of the Scottish Ministers and the Lord Advocate at all subsequent stages are entirely adequate for the purpose of protecting the appellant's Convention rights.
(ii) Part 1
and Part 2 devolution minutes: no appeal
to House of Lords
 The appellant has lodged a devolution minute in this court in each of the two appeals. The essence of the complaint in each minute is that there is no appeal from this court to the House of Lords. Section 32 provides for an appeal to the House of Lords, but by sub-section (13) the provisions of that section do not apply to
 It is alleged in each of the minutes that the exclusion of a right of appeal to the House of Lords is a violation of articles 5 et separatim 6 et separatim 8 taken with article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights; there is no such exclusion in relation to proceedings taken in any other part of the United Kingdom; nor was there such an exclusion under the previous law on extradition. In relation to the Part 1 appeal, it is alleged that by conducting the extradition proceedings the Lord Advocate has acted and continues to act in a manner inconsistent with the appellant's said Convention rights and therefore contrary to section 57(2) of the Scotland Act. It is also alleged that by commencing the extradition process in the foregoing circumstances as he has done, the Crown Agent acted in a manner inconsistent with the appellant's Convention rights, and that the Lord Advocate is responsible for the Crown Agent's said actings which are accordingly contrary to section 57(2) of the Scotland Act. In relation to the Part 2 appeal, it is alleged that in issuing a certificate under section 70 of the 2003 Act et separatim ordering the appellant to be extradited the Scottish Ministers have acted in a manner inconsistent with the appellant's Convention rights and, therefore, contrary to section 57(2) of the Scotland Act 1998. It is also alleged that by conducting the extradition proceedings the Lord Advocate has acted and continues to act in a manner inconsistent with the appellant's Convention rights and therefore contrary to section 57(2) of the Scotland Act.
 For the reasons we have already given, the Crown Agent does not fall within the ambit of section 57(2) of the Scotland Act when he is performing functions under the 2003 Act, and we leave him out of account. The question therefore is whether the performance of their functions under the 2003 Act by the Scottish Ministers and the Lord Advocate is vitiated by being incompatible with the appellant's Convention rights. Those invoked by the appellant, the right to liberty and security provided by article 5, the right to a fair trial provided by article 6 and the right to respect for private and family life provided by article 8, are to be taken with article 14, prohibition of discrimination, which provides:
"The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status."
Submissions for the appellant
addressing us in support of these minutes, counsel for the appellant confined
his submissions to article 8 of the Convention taken with article 14. He submitted that the fact that the
legislature had chosen a mechanism which did not involve an appeal to the House
of Lords meant that there was a distinction between
submitted that a disproportionate number of persons arrested in
Submissions for the Lord Advocate
for the Lord Advocate submitted that sections 32(13) and 114(13) of the
2003 Act were the natural corollary to the fact that the High Court of
Justiciary was the court tasked with considering extradition. Apart from the possibility of a reference or
an appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council relating to a
devolution issue, this was the Supreme Criminal Court of Scotland. This had been stressed as recently as in Robertson v Frame 2006 SCCR 151, per Lord
Hope of Craighead at paragraph 6.
There was no disadvantage to the appellant. He had already had the benefit of two public
hearings, before the sheriff court and this court, about these issues. An appeal by the Lord Advocate to the
Judicial Committee was equally excluded.
The appellant was a
"The applicant's complaint concerns the differences in the penal
legislation of two regional jurisdictions within the
In Times Newspapers Ltd (supra) the Commission said:
"Furthermore, not all differences in treatment amount to discrimination, provided they have an objective and reasonable basis. In this connection, the Commission recalls that the mere existence of a difference in treatment between two jurisdictions does not constitute an arbitrary difference in treatment or discrimination."
The difference in treatment here, counsel submitted,
was a consequence of a territorial accident and not because of any
characteristic personal to the appellant.
He could have been arrested wherever he happened to be. He was in fact arrested in
 In our
consideration of this matter we take as our starting point that the separate
and distinctive identity of the Scottish legal system was preserved by the
Treaty of Union of 1707. There never has
been a right of appeal from the High Court of Justiciary to the House of Lords
or any other court, with or without leave.
The introduction of the possibility of a reference or appeal to the
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in respect of a devolution issue under
Schedule 6 to the Scotland Act 1998 was therefore a new departure. Although extradition proceedings before the
sheriff and before this court under the 2003 Act are best regarded as being sui generis, they nevertheless are more
akin to criminal than to civil proceedings.
It appears to us to be an inescapable consequence of acceptance of the
appellant's argument, though counsel sought to confine it to extradition
proceedings, that all persons accused of criminal offences in
it is impossible to see how the appellant could be described as a "victim." The fact that he is receiving different
(B) Grounds of appeal common to both appeals
Retrospectivity (Part 1, ground 7 and Part 2, ground 7)
Submissions for the appellant
 Counsel for the appellant submitted that
the 2003 Act did not apply to offences committed before it came into
force. The 2003 Act repealed the Extradition Act 1989 (2003 Act, s 220,
Sched 4). The commencement orders which brought the 2003 Act into force
(The Extradition Act 2003 (Commencement and Savings) Order 2003) (2003 SI No
3103); The Extradition Act (Commencement and Savings)(Amendment No 2)
Order 2003 (2003 SI No 3312)) could have saved the provisions of the 1989 Act
in relation to offences committed before the commencement date, but they did
not. There was nothing in the 2003 Act itself that applied it to offences
committed before that date. In R v Secretary of State for the Home
Department, ex p Hill  QB 886 it was held that the 1989 Act
applied to crimes committed before it came into force (cf Hooper J at p
900); but the 1989 Act was a consolidating Act. The 2003 Act
effected major changes. There was a presumption against retrospectivity
in legislation (
Submissions for the Lord Advocate
 Counsel submitted that the 2003 Act
applied to applications made after the commencement date, irrespective of when
the conduct in question occurred. The purpose of the 2003 Act was to
sweep away discredited and inefficient procedures. One would expect it to
apply to all new applications. According to Jones and Doobay, it could be
said with confidence that the 2003 Act applied to extradition offences
committed before the Act commenced (Extradition and Mutual Assistance
(2005), para 5.001-5.002). That interpretation was in keeping with the
Framework Decision itself, in which the point of reference was the date of the
request, and not the date of the conduct (Recitals 5, 6, and 11 and Article 32).
The court should prefer that interpretation of the Act that avoided the
absurdity of the submission for the appellant. The designation of
 The result for which counsel for the appellant contended is so absurd that we would accept it as the law only if it was inescapable. We can find nothing in the 2003 Act that suggests that that result was intended by the legislature. We agree with the approach of the Court of Appeal in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Hill (supra). Nothing in the statements of the judges in that case suggests to us that the fact that they were interpreting a consolidating statute was a decisive consideration. We agree with the opinion of Jones and Doobay to which counsel for the Lord Advocate referred. In our opinion, the 2003 Act does not change the offences with which it deals. It changes the procedures by which they will be dealt with. The key date, in our view, is not the date of commission of the alleged offence. It is the date of the request. That is the reference point in both of the commencement orders (supra).
Passage of time (Part 1, ground 8 and Part 2, ground 11)
The statutory provisions
 In terms of section 10(4) of the 2003 Act, if the appropriate judge decides that the offence specified in the Part 1 warrant is an extradition offence, he must proceed under section 11. Section 11(1) requires the judge proceeding under that section to decide whether the person's extradition to the category 1 territory is barred by reason of inter alia "(c) the passage of time". Section 14 provides as follows:
"A person's extradition to a category 1 territory is barred by reason of the passage of time if (and only if) it appears that it would be unjust or oppressive to extradite him by reason of the passage of time since he is alleged to have committed the extradition offence or since he is alleged to have become unlawfully at large (as the case may be)."
Submissions for the appellant
 In his Note of Argument counsel for the appellant set out a chronology of events as a foundation for his submissions in respect of the passage of time. It is convenient, however, to separate that chronology into events bearing on the Part 2 case and events bearing on the Part 1 case.
February 1998 - February 1999
Specific charges in the Part 2 request
The end of the period in charge 1 of the Part 2 request
The appellant left
Request for precautionary custody in respect of Part 2 charges
Precautionary custody order granted in respect of Part 2 charges
2003 Act comes into force;
Sentencing in respect of Part 2 charges
Part 2 extradition request
Part 2 extradition request certified by Minister of Justice
 The chronology of events bearing on the Part 1 case is as follows:
October - December 2001
European arrest warrant (EAW) offence
Precautionary custody order granted in respect of EAW charge
EAW sent to
Initial EAW hearing before the sheriff
 Counsel submitted that the
test set by sections 14 and 82, whether extradition would be unfair or
oppressive, covered all aspects of unfairness.
In Kakis v
"'Unjust' I regard as directed primarily at the risk of prejudice to the accused in the conduct of the trial itself, 'oppressive' as directed to hardship to the accused resulting from changes in his circumstances that have occurred during the period to be taken into consideration; but there is room for overlapping, and between them they would cover all cases where to return him would not be fair."
 In both the Part 1 case and the Part 2 case, the appellant
relied on the fact that between the date on which the offence was alleged to
have been completed and the date when steps were taken with a view to effecting
his extradition, the 2003 Act had come into force and had become applicable to
questions of extradition between the United Kingdom and Italy. The result was that the 2003 Act regimes came
to be applicable to offences alleged to have been committed when the superseded
extradition regime was in force (Jones and Doobay, op cit, p 126, para 5-002).
In principle, such a change of the legal regime was a relevant
consideration in determining whether it would be unjust or oppressive to
extradite the appellant (R v Governor of Brixton Prison, ex p Osman
 1 All ER 578, per Woolf LJ at p 590; Wilson
v First County Trust Ltd (No. 2),
supra, Lord Rodger of Earlsferry at paras 199 - 201.) Such an argument did not involve any value
judgment on the 2003 Act (the possibility of which was rejected in R (Bermingham) v The Director of the Serious Fraud Office  EWHC 167 (Admin), at para 99). Rather it involved an assessment of the
protections available to the individual whose extradition was sought. In the present case, during the period of
delay the 2003 Act (1) removed the right of appeal to the House of Lords, (2)
reduced the level of scrutiny of evidence by the court and (3) removed the
ministerial discretion not to extradite.
The designation of
 In relation to the Part 2 appeal, counsel submitted that the sheriff had erred in thinking that, in considering the question of whether extradition would be unjust or oppressive, he did not have to consider, as a period of inactivity on the part of the Italian authorities, the period during which the trial in absence was taking place. It was wrong to treat an invitation to a trial as equivalent to an extradition request, and to regard a trial in absence as being as satisfactory as a trial which the accused person attended. The passage of time while the trial in absence took place was in effect a period of delay on the part of the Italian authorities which was prejudicial to the appellant, and his extradition now would be oppressive.
Submissions for the Lord Advocate
 Counsel for the Lord Advocate characterised the first submission made by counsel for the appellant on delay as an abstract submission. It was no more than a general contention that it would be unjust or oppressive to extradite anyone whose extradition was sought after the commencement of the 2003 Act in respect of offences allegedly committed before that commencement. There was no attempt to identify that the appellant would suffer particular prejudice. The general approach was rejected in Bermingham, per Laws LJ at paragraph 99, where he said:
"Likewise a defendant cannot ordinarily complain of abuse on grounds that if only the prosecutor had acted more promptly the 1989 Act, and not the 2003 Act, would have governed the proceedings, and in that case he (the defendant) would have enjoyed the right to test the prosecutor's case and persuade the court, if he could, that there was no case to answer. We cannot entertain any kind of presumption that where in an extradition case the facts arose in the life of the 1989 Act, the defendant should ordinarily have the benefit of that Act and not be fixed with the effects of the supervening statute. Such a presumption would be unconstitutional: it would imply a value judgment by this court that the scheme of the earlier legislation was to be preferred to that of the 2003 Act. We have no authority to propound any such judgment."
Laws LJ went on, in paragraph 100, to recognise that the prosecutor was obliged to act in good faith, and that deliberate delay until the 2003 Act was in force in order to avoid the need to make out a prima facie case might be held to be abusive. There was no allegation of such abuse in the present case.
 So far as trial in absence was concerned, counsel submitted that it was not correct that the time occupied by that trial was to be treated as a period of unexplained inaction on the part of the Italian authorities. The appellant could not complain of a trial that took place in absence as a result of his own choice not to attend. In R v Jones  1 AC 1, Lord Bingham of Cornhill pointed out (at para 9) that:
"... the European Court of Human Rights has never found a breach of the Convention where a defendant, fully informed of a forthcoming trial, has voluntarily chosen not to attend."
(See also paras 10 and 11, and R (on the application of Durkin) v Governor of HM Prison Brixton  EWHC Admin 213.)
 In our opinion, the appellant's general submission, that it is unjust or oppressive to extradite a person under the 2003 Act in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed before that legislation was in force (or before a particular part of it was in force in relation to the requesting state), cannot be accepted. The reasons for rejecting it are those set out in Bermingham at paragraph 99. Counsel for the appellant maintained that he was not asking this court to make the value judgment there referred to, but instead asking us to assess the protections available to the appellant under the former legislation and under the present legislation, but we do not consider that that is a sound distinction. As was recognised in Bermingham at paragraph 100, a case of oppression might be made out if it could be shown that the requesting state, in bad faith, delayed its request in order to avoid a particular requirement of the former legislation, such as the need to make out a prima facie case. That was alleged in Bermingham, and rejected after consideration of evidence. It is not alleged in the present case.
 We do not consider that
there is any merit in the point made by counsel for the appellant in the Part 2
appeal that the sheriff erred in failing to regard the time occupied by the
trial in absence as a period of lack of legitimate activity on the part of the
Italian authorities. Trial in absence is
not equivalent to inaction, nor is it per
se unfair. To fail to hold that the
lapse of time while the trial in absence took place renders extradition now
oppressive is not to hold, as counsel suggested, that an invitation to an
accused person who has gone abroad to attend a trial is equivalent to an
extradition request, or that trial in absence is as satisfactory as one which
the accused attends. The trial in
absence took place because the appellant chose to decline to return to
(C) Grounds of appeal in the Part 1 appeal only
 It is convenient under this heading to deal with three aspects of the appellant's grounds of appeal in the Part 1 appeal. In his Note of Argument and submissions, counsel for the appellant drew these grounds together under the above general heading. The grounds in question are: (1) ground 10 (failure of the 2003 Act to give effect to the possibility contained in article 4(7)(a) of the Framework Decision of not executing the European Arrest Warrant); (2) ground 9 (failure of the 2003 Act to give effect to the possibility of imposing as a precondition of rendition that any custodial sentence be served in the United Kingdom); and (3) ground 6 (lack of clarity as to where the conduct constituting the offence took place).
 In advancing his submissions under grounds of appeal 10, 9 and 6, counsel referred to various provisions of the Framework Decision. He referred in particular to paragraphs (1), (11) and (12) of the preamble to, and articles 1, 2, 3, 4(7)(a), 5(3) and 8(1)(e) of, the Framework Decision. Article 4(7)(a) is in the following terms:
"The executing judicial authority may refuse to execute the European arrest warrant:
where the European arrest warrant relates to offences which:
are regarded by the law of the executing
Article 5(3) is in the following terms:
"The execution of the European arrest warrant by the executing judicial authority may, by the law of the executing Member State, be subject to the following conditions: ...
where a person who is the subject of a European arrest warrant for the purpose of prosecution is a national or resident of the executing Member State, surrender may be subject to the condition that the person, after being heard, is returned to the executing Member State in order to serve there the custodial sentence or detention order passed against him in the issuing Member State."
Article 8(1)(e) is in the following terms:
"The European arrest warrant shall contain the following information set out in accordance with the form contained in the Annex: ...
a description of the circumstances in which the offence was committed, including the time, place and degree of participation in the offence of the requested person".
" ... an arrest warrant which is issued by a judicial authority of a category 1 territory and which contains ―
the statement referred to in subsection (3) and the information referred to in subsection (4) ..."
The information referred to in section 2(4) includes:
particulars of the circumstances in which the person is alleged to have committed the offence, including the conduct alleged to constitute the offence, the time and place at which he is alleged to have committed the offence and any provisions of the law of the category 1 territory under which the conduct is alleged to constitute an offence."
the conduct occurs in the category 1 territory and no part
of it occurs in the
a certificate issued by an appropriate authority in the category 1 territory shows that the conduct falls within the European framework list;
the certificate shows that the conduct is punishable under the law of the category 1 territory with imprisonment or another form of detention for a period of three years or a greater punishment."
The subsection (3) conditions are:
the conduct occurs in the category 1 territory;
the conduct would constitute an offence under the law of
the relevant part of the
the conduct is punishable under the law of the category 1 territory with imprisonment or another form of detention for a term of 12 months or a greater punishment (however it is described in that law)."
 In elaborating his submissions, counsel began with ground
6. He submitted that the sheriff erred
in holding that the warrant contained the information required in terms of
section 2(2)(a) and (4)(c). In
particular it was not in sufficiently specific terms to enable the sheriff to
conclude where the conduct took place.
That being so, the sheriff erred in concluding that the charge against
the appellant was an extradition offence in terms of section 64. Even where the framework list is used (s
64(2)) the offence must be accurately described in the warrant (R (Castillo) v Kingdom of Spain  1 WLR 1043, per Thomas LJ at paras 24 and
25). The need for accuracy of
description of the conduct was important, not only on first principles of
fairness (Government of Canada v Aronson  1 AC 579 per Lord
Griffiths at p 594D), but also in order that the rule of speciality (s 17) can
be given content (Aronson per Lord
Griffiths at p 595D). The warrant in the
present case did not fairly and accurately describe the offence of which the
appellant was accused. In particular,
(1) it did not identify who the victim was; (2) it did not make clear whether
the offence took place in
 Counsel then turned his attention to ground 10. It was based on the discretion given to the
executing judicial authority by article 4(7)(a) of the Framework Decision to
refuse to execute the warrant where it relates to offences regarded as having
been committed in whole or in part in the territory of the executing Member
State. The failure of the Act to reflect
that discretion rendered execution of the warrant a disproportionate
interference with the appellant's rights under Article 8 of the European
Convention on Human Rights. For this
argument to be maintained, it was necessary to show that part of the offence
"where (if at all) in the legislation before us do we find a provision or provisions by force of which the decision-maker is to reach a conclusion as to place of trial as the means of affording protection to the defendant's Convention rights ...?"
Counsel submitted that, in the context of a European Arrest Warrant, the answer to that question was article 4(7)(a) of the Framework Decision. In Wright (para 65) and Bermingham (para 121) the courts were right to recognise that concurrent jurisdiction could tip the balance against the proportionality of extradition. They were, however, wrong to set the standard as high as they did. In Bermingham Laws LJ said (at para 118):
"Where a proposed extradition is properly constituted according to the domestic law of the sending state and the relevant bilateral treaty, and its execution is resisted on Article 8 grounds, a wholly exceptional case would in my judgment have to be shown to justify a finding that the extradition would on the particular facts be disproportionate to its legitimate aim."
It was wrong, counsel submitted, to
apply to a European Arrest Warrant the test that its execution could only be
disproportionate in wholly exceptional circumstances. The courts in Wright and Bermingham
were wrong to place the reliance they did on decisions in "foreign" article 8
cases (R (Ullah) v Special Adjudicator  2 AC 323, per
Lord Bingham of Cornhill at paras 9 and 18) and on Launder v
 Counsel drew attention to the fact that in Wright (at para 67) the court regarded it as significant that no
authority had been cited for the view that extradition would be proportionate
only where it was demonstrated that prosecution in the jurisdiction in which
the subject lay would be impossible. He
submitted that such authority was to be found in D v City of
No German may be extradited to a foreign country. A different regulation to cover extradition
Article 19(4) secures access to the courts in the event of a basic right being violated by a public authority. Article 20(3) provides that the legislature is bound by the constitutional order, the executive and the judiciary by law and justice. Article 23 provides inter alia as follows:
With a view to establishing a united Europe, the Federal Republic of Germany shall participate in the development of the European Union that is committed to democratic, social and federal principles, to the rule of law, and to the principle of subsidiarity, and that guarantees a level of protection of basic rights essentially comparable to that afforded by this Basic Law."
The decision of the court in the light of those provisions is summarised (para 3 of the summary of the judgment) as follows:
"In enacting the measure transposing the Framework Decision on the European arrest warrant the legislature is under an obligation to transpose the purpose of the Framework Decision in such a manner that interference with the basic right to freedom from extradition is proportionate. In particular, in addition to observing the essential core of the guarantee the legislature is required to ensure that the interference in the area protected by Article 16(2) [of the] Basic Law is effected in the least burdensome manner possible ... "
Counsel sought to draw from that decision the more general proposition that domestic law must implement the Framework Decision so that interference with basic rights is proportionate to the legitimate aim being pursued, and effected in the least burdensome manner. In effect, he equated article 8 of ECHR with article 16(2) of the German Basic Law, on the basis that both were concerned with basic rights. He relied in particular on a passage in the dissenting opinion of Judge Lübbe-Wolff (para 6 of that opinion; para 181 of the case) in which it was said that:
"In order to prevent infringements of the constitution ... it is enough to declare that until a provision that complies with the constitution comes into force German nationals ... may not be extradited for acts for which extradition could be refused under Article 4(7a) or (7b) [of the Framework Decision] and to the extent that return for execution of any sentence is impossible under applicable law owing to the absence of double criminality."
That, counsel submitted, supported his contention that the absence from the Act of any provision reflecting article 4(7)(a) of the Framework Decision meant that execution of the European Arrest Warrant involved a disproportionate interference with his article 8 rights, and that the sheriff erred in not recognising that.
 Ground 9 has as its foundation article 5(3) of the Framework
Decision. Article 5(3) applies where the
person whose arrest is sought under a European Arrest Warrant is a national or
resident of the executing
 The circumstances which, in counsel's submission, engage
article 5(3) in the present case are that the appellant, although born in
 Although the 2003 Act makes no provision under which the
sheriff might have imposed a condition such as is contemplated in article 5(3),
arrangements are in place under which a
 In submitting that the absence of any provision permitting the imposition of a condition of the sort contemplated in article 5(3) rendered execution of the European Arrest Warrant a disproportionate interference with the appellant's article 8 rights, counsel again relied on D v City of Hamburg (supra). He acknowledged that nothing relevant was said in the opinion of the majority of the court, but referred again to the dissenting opinion of Judge Lübbe-Wolff (para 3(c) of the opinion; para 170 of the case), where the following observation is made:
"The interference [in basic rights] is significantly lessened if the person concerned need only undergo the criminal prosecution abroad and need not also serve the potentially long punishment there. On the other hand, at the moment there is no reason at all in terms of effective criminal prosecution within the European legal order against return following sentencing. In order to achieve the lawful purposes of the Framework Decision ... it is irrelevant in which country the convicted person serves his sentence. Accordingly, in relation to the category of persons who deserve special protection ... it must be a mandatory condition of extradition that there exists the possibility of return for serving sentence and that this possibility is subsequently utilised."
If that approach were adopted in the present case, the failure to make provision in the legislation for the imposition of an article 5(3) condition deprived the courts of a means of ensuring that execution of a European Arrest Warrant was proportionate to the legitimate aim. Execution of the warrant where the imposition of such a condition was impossible was disproportionate. The sheriff had erred in not so holding.
Submissions for the Lord Advocate
 In relation to ground 6,
the critical requirement of the legislation, counsel for the Lord Advocate
submitted, was to be found in section 2(4)(c) of the 2003 Act, which contained
a direct transposition of article 8(1)(e) of the Framework Decision. In reliance on those provisions, counsel for
the appellant had desiderated specification of three matters, namely (1) the
identity of the victim or victims of the alleged offence, (2) the locus of the
offence to an extent sufficient to enable the court to determine whether the
conditions specified in section 64(2)(a) and (3)(a) were satisfied, and (3) the
capacity in which the appellant was alleged to have acted, whether as actor or
instigator. Counsel for the Lord
Advocate submitted that the authorities did not require such a high degree of
specification as that contended for by the appellant. Aronson
was concerned with the correct approach to determination of whether the
double criminality rule was satisfied (Lord Bridge of Harwich at 589C). The passages relied on by counsel for the
appellant in the speech of Lord Griffiths (at pp 594D and 595D) gave no
indication of the degree of specification required. In any event, what was said in Aronson had to be read in the light of Welsh and Thrasher v Secretary of State for the Home Department  EWHC 156 (Admin). In that case the
contention was that the 2003 Act required precise equivalence between the
foreign and the
"I do not accept that submission. It would be surprising indeed if, in an Act which was intended to simplify and streamline extradition procedures to EU and Category 2 countries, Parliament had introduced for the first time for extradition to those countries the language which led to what could be regarded as a somewhat technical approach in Aronson."
His Lordship went on to draw support for the avoidance of technicality from the speech of Lord Bingham in Armas.
 Dealing with the three matters on which the appellant complained of lack of specification, counsel for the Lord Advocate said first that neither section 2(4)(c) nor article 8(1)(e) contained any requirement that particulars be given identifying the victim or victims of the alleged offence. So far as the locus of the offence and the capacity in which the appellant was said to have acted were concerned, counsel accepted that they required to be specified, but maintained that they had been. The Warrant and accompanying documents, read together, made it clear that the attempted extortion was committed in Mondragone by others, and that the appellant's criminal liability for that attempted extortion was said to arise from his having issued, from Scotland, where he lived, orders to associates in Mondragone (Caserta). In the only respects criticised by counsel for the appellant, therefore, adequate specification had been given to comply with section 2(4)(c).
 In responding to the more
particular aspect of ground 6, namely that the information contained in the
European Arrest Warrant did not enable the sheriff to reach a conclusion as to
where the alleged offence was said to have occurred, so as to determine whether
it was an extradition offence in terms of section 64(2) or 64(3), counsel did
not seek to support the sheriff's conclusion that the offence was an
extradition offence in terms of both subsections. He accepted that an element of the conduct of
which the appellant was accused occurred in
 By way of preamble to his submissions in response to Grounds 9 and 10, counsel for the Lord Advocate made some observations about the nature and purpose of the 2003 Act. He pointed out that it involved a departure from the old treaty-based approach to extradition, and adopted instead a framework-based approach. That reflected a grading of the degree of trust reposed in foreign jurisdictions to deal appropriately with extradition. The highest degree of trust was reflected in the provisions relating to the European Arrest Warrant. The broad purpose of the Act was to facilitate extradition, while at the same time protecting the essential rights of the fugitive. Counsel accepted without reservation that extradition potentially engages the fugitive's Convention rights under article 8. He pointed out, however, that while the appellant's arguments based on article 8 were confined to the context of the European Arrest Warrant, all cases of extradition had the same potential for engagement of article 8. The engagement of article 8 was not something new that arose only in the context of the European Arrest Warrant. Although the European Convention on Human Rights does not guarantee a right not to be extradited, extradition may constitute interference with article 8 rights (Launder, p 74, para 3). In that case, the Commission expressed the view that:
"it is only in exceptional circumstances that the extradition of a person to face trial on charges of serious criminal offences committed in the requesting state would be held to be an unjustified or disproportionate interference with the right to respect for family life."
Counsel also referred to Ullah, in which Lord Bingham recognised that in extradition cases, in striking the balance between the rights of the individual and the wider interests of the community where reliance is placed on article 8, the extraditing state will ordinarily have strong grounds for justifying extradition in the desirability of honouring extradition treaties (para 24). That approach should be carried forward into cases to which the Framework Decision applied. Extradition should go ahead, unless there were exceptional circumstances. As Lord Bingham observed in Armas (at para 8):
"Part 1 of the 2003 Act did not
effect a simple or straightforward transposition, and it did not on the whole
use the language of the Framework Decision.
But its interpretation must be approached on the twin assumptions that
Parliament did not intend the provisions of Part 1 to be inconsistent with the
Framework Decision and that, while Parliament might properly provide for a
greater measure of cooperation by the
 Counsel for the Lord
Advocate submitted that the reliance which counsel for the appellant sought to
place on D v City of
 Counsel accepted as
correct the appellant's submission that in terms of article 4(7)(a) of the
Framework Decision the United Kingdom judicial authorities have a discretion to
refuse to execute the European Arrest Warrant where the law of the United
Kingdom regards the offence to which the warrant relates as having been
committed in whole or in part in the territory of the United Kingdom. He did not, however, accept the submission
which counsel for the appellant built on that foundation, namely that the existence
of article 4(7)(a) rendered the decision in Wright
distinguishable, and that accordingly the failure of the 2003 Act to make
provision for consideration of refusing extradition and proceeding with
domestic prosecution amounted to an infringement of article 8. As a practical matter, counsel asked how the
appellant's approach was to be carried into effect in a case such as the
present, where as well as a European Arrest Warrant, there was also a Part 2
application for extradition. The
submission of counsel for the appellant related only to the European Arrest
Warrant, and could have no effect on the Part 2 application. Moreover, the Act, although it did not
expressly reflect the Article 4(7)(a) discretion, did address the possibility
of giving priority to domestic prosecution over execution of the European
Arrest Warrant. Section 22 of the 2003
Act applies if at any time in the extradition hearing the judge is informed
that the person in respect of whom the Part 1 warrant is issued is charged with
an offence in the
"The judge must adjourn the extradition hearing until one of these occurs -
the charge is disposed of;
the charge is withdrawn;
proceedings in respect of the charge are discontinued; or
... the diet is deserted pro loco et tempore."
Thus, while article 4(7)(a) confers a discretion to refuse extradition
where the executing state regards the offence as having been committed in its
territory, thus permitting that state the opportunity of taking proceedings
itself in preference to executing the warrant, the Act concentrates on whether
the executing state has in fact taken proceedings itself, and in that case bars
execution of the warrant so long as those proceedings are extant. Equivalent provisions in relation to Part 2 applications
are to be found in section 97. It was
unrealistic to suppose that the Scottish prosecution authorities would ever
have regarded it as appropriate to take proceedings against the appellant in
the present case. Although he is alleged
to have instigated the offence from
 In responding to Ground 9,
counsel first made a practical point.
The Framework Decision had no application to the Part 2
proceedings. If the appellant were
ultimately convicted of the offences to which the Part 2 application related,
and also the offence to which the European Arrest Warrant related, how was it
conceived that a condition of the sort contemplated in article 5(3) of the
Framework Decision would operate? Would
the appellant serve the Part 2 sentence in
 Counsel's principal
response to Ground 9, however, was that the issue was dealt with by
legislation, albeit not in terms of the sort of condition contemplated in
article 5(3). The Repatriation of Prisoners
Act 1984 made provision for transfer of prisoners convicted abroad to the
 The starting point for
consideration of ground 6 is section 2(2)(a) of the 2003 Act which requires a
European Arrest Warrant to contain inter
alia the information referred to in section 2(4), which includes, at
paragraph (c), "particulars of the circumstances in which the person is alleged
to have committed the offence, including the conduct alleged to constitute the
offence, [and] the time and place at which he is alleged to have committed the
offence ...". That paragraph includes,
and expands upon, a transposition of the requirements of article 8(1)(e) of the
Framework Decision. We accept that the
conduct must be fairly and properly described (R (Castillo) v
"The purpose of the statute is to facilitate extradition, not to put obstacles in the way of the process which serve no useful purpose but are based on technicalities.".
We therefore think it proper to adopt a practical approach to the complaints of lack of specification made on the appellant's behalf under this ground of appeal.
 The first complaint made by counsel for the appellant was that the warrant did not specify the identity of the person said to have been the victim of the alleged offence. It is correct that the victim is not identified by name. He is referred to as "a local entrepreneur", and it is evident from the language of the warrant that he is or was engaged in the catering industry. Neither section 2(4)(c) of the 2003 Act nor article 8(1)(e) of the Framework Decision expressly requires identification of the victim by name. Counsel in his submissions did not identify any practical reason for requiring as a matter of fairness more specific identification of the victim. In our opinion the failure to name him is not fatal to the validity of the warrant.
 The other two complaints
can be taken together. They relate to
the locus of the offence and the capacity in which the appellant is alleged to
have acted. In our opinion there is, on
a fair reading of the warrant and the material provided with it, no real doubt
on these matters. So far as the locus is
concerned, the materials which we have quoted make it clear (1) that the
"various violent and threatening activities" against the "local entrepreneur"
were carried out in Mondragone, and (2) that the ordering of those activities
was carried out by the appellant "from
 The second aspect of
ground 6 relates to whether the particulars given are sufficient to enable the
sheriff to determine where the conduct occurred, so as to reach a conclusion as
to whether the charge against the appellant constituted an extradition
offence. Two cases require to be
considered, under section 64(2) and section 64(3). So far as section 64(2) is concerned, the
critical question is whether the particulars satisfy the requirement of section
64(2)(a), namely that the conduct occurred in the category 1 territory and no
part of it occurred in the
 Section 64(3) raises a
different issue. Under paragraph (a) of
that section, the requirement is that the conduct should have occurred in the
category 1 territory (
 Grounds 9 and 10 have in common the proposition that, for one reason or another, execution of the European Arrest Warrant would involve a disproportionate interference with the appellant's right to respect for his private and family life under article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. It is not disputed that the possibility of the execution of the warrant potentially engages article 8. As counsel for the Lord Advocate pointed out, the warrant is in that regard no different from other forms of extradition. That extradition may engage article 8 has been recognised in Wright (para 65) and Bermingham (para 121). However, in Launder (p 74, para 3) the Commission expressed the opinion that it would only be in exceptional circumstances that extradition in respect of serious criminal offences would be held to be an unjustified or disproportionate interference with article 8 rights. In Ullah, although it was not an extradition case, Lord Bingham (at para 24) recognised that in extradition cases the extraditing state would usually have strong grounds for justifying extradition on the ground of the desirability of honouring extradition treaties. In Wright (at para 59) it was recognised that the task undertaken by the reclaimer of demonstrating that the operation of salutary international arrangements should be inhibited on account of the limited interference which their operation would involve with the reclaimer's article 8 rights was a "formidable" one. In Bermingham, Laws LJ, after referring to Ullah and Launder, said (at para 118):
"In my judgment this statement [the passage from Launder referred to above] and the authorities in their Lordships' House are, with respect, entirely in line. If a person's proposed extradition for a serious offence will separate him from his family, Article 8(1) is likely to be engaged on the ground that his family life will be interfered with. The question then will be whether the extradition is nevertheless justified pursuant to Article 8(2). Assuming compliance with all the relevant requirements of domestic law the issue is likely to be one of proportionality: is the interference with family life proportionate to the legitimate aim of the proposed extradition? Now, there is a strong public interest in "honouring extradition treaties made with other states" (Ullah, paragraph 24). It rests in the value of international co-operation pursuant to formal agreed arrangements entered into between sovereign States for the promotion of the administration of criminal justice. Where a proposed extradition is properly constituted according to the domestic law of the sending State and the relevant bilateral treaty, and its execution is resisted on Article 8 grounds, a wholly exceptional case would in my judgment have to be shown to justify a finding that the extradition would on the particular facts be disproportionate to its legitimate aim."
There is thus strong authority to the effect that where article 8 is engaged in a properly made extradition application, exceptional circumstances will be required to justify a conclusion that the execution of the extradition would involve disproportionate interference with article 8 rights.
 Counsel for the appellant sought, however, to submit that in relation to interference with article 8 rights, a European Arrest Warrant fell to be treated differently from other forms of extradition. There is one respect in which we accept his submission. In Wright (paras 72 to 74) reference is made to according a wide margin of appreciation to the ministerial decision-maker. As counsel correctly pointed out, the primary decision-maker in relation to an individual European Arrest Warrant is the sheriff, and this court on appeal. No question of allowing a margin of appreciation therefore arises. We accept that that is correct. It is not, however, central to the main submission, which is that it is wrong, in the context of a European Arrest Warrant, to say that wholly exceptional circumstances are required to make a case of disproportionality. We do not accept that the fact that Ullah was not an extradition case detracts from the force of Lord Bingham's observations in that case which, while obiter, were made with express reference to extradition cases. The fact that Launder was not a case of concurrent jurisdictions does not, in our view, affect the force of the passage referred to. We therefore do not accept that the courts in Wright and Bermingham were wrong to place the reliance they did on Ullah and Launder. The existence of article 4(7)(a) of the Framework Decision, recognising a discretion to refuse extradition where there is concurrent jurisdiction in the executing Member State, does not, in our view, alter the importance of giving effect to international arrangements. We therefore do not accept that in approaching a claim under article 8 to resist execution of a European Arrest Warrant, the standard to be attained to make out a case of disproportionality is more relaxed.
 In Wright (at para 67) the court regarded it as significant that no
authority had been cited for the view that extradition would be proportionate
only if it was demonstrated that prosecution in the executing state was
impossible. Counsel for the appellant
sought to rely on D v City of
 Article 4(7)(a) of the Framework Decision confers on the judicial
authorities of the executing State a discretion not to execute a European
Arrest Warrant where the law of that State regards the offence mentioned in the
warrant as having been committed in whole or in part in its territory. The purpose of that discretion is to allow
the executing state to assert the priority of its own jurisdiction over that of
the requesting state. It is correct
that, as counsel for the appellant submitted, the 2003 Act does not directly
transpose that discretion into
 Section 22 of the 2003 Act obliges the extradition judge, where there are parallel proceedings in the United Kingdom, to adjourn the extradition hearing until the domestic proceedings have, in one way or another, been brought to an end. The domestic legislation thus applies, not (as is the case with article 4(7)(a)) by virtue of the mere existence of concurrent jurisdiction, but when that jurisdiction is actually invoked. That difference from article 4(7)(a) is not in our opinion important, because the only legitimate purpose for which the article 4(7)(a) discretion might be invoked is to enable the primacy of the domestic jurisdiction of the executing state to be asserted. Where that domestic jurisdiction is actually asserted, however, section 22 gives automatic priority to the domestic proceedings. The United Kingdom legislation therefore, in our view, cannot be regarded as inherently less protective of the appellant's article 8 rights than article 4(7)(a).
 If the article 4(7)(a)
discretion had been directly available for the sheriff to exercise, it could
only be said that the failure to prevent execution of the warrant involved
disproportionate interference with the appellant's article 8 rights if the
prosecuting authorities could and should have instituted domestic
proceedings. In the circumstances of
this case that condition is not satisfied.
Although the appellant's instigation of the attempted extortion is
alleged to have taken place from
 The proposition advanced in
Ground 9 is that the failure of the 2003 Act to reflect the possibility of
imposing a condition, in executing a European Arrest Warrant, requiring that
any custodial sentence be served in the United Kingdom, rendered execution of
the warrant a disproportionate interference with the appellant's article 8
rights. In terms of article 5(3) of the
Framework Decision, execution of the warrant may, by the law of the executing
state, be subject to such a condition where the person who is the subject of
the warrant is a national or resident of the executing
 It is to be noted that
article 5(3) merely allows for the possibility that the law of a
 We are accordingly satisfied, for the reasons which we have set out, that grounds 6, 9 and 10 are all ill-founded, and that none of these grounds affords a basis for refusing to execute the European Arrest Warrant.
The validity of the European Arrest Warrant - Conformity with the Framework Decision (Part 1, ground 4) and Form of Warrant (part 1, ground 5)
 Although ground 6 of the Part 1 appeal bears on the validity of the European Arrest Warrant, counsel for the appellant dealt with it in the context of the issues relating to the proportionality of extradition, and we have accordingly discussed it in that context. The two remaining issues concerning the validity of the European Arrest Warrant are raised in grounds 4 (whether the Warrant was completed in accordance with the requirements of the Framework Decision and whether it adequately disclosed the purpose for which surrender of the appellant to Italy was sought) and 5 (whether the Warrant contained the statement required by section 2(2)(a) and (3) of the 2003 Act).
The statutory provisions
 Section 2(2) of the 2003 Act defines a Part 1 warrant as an arrest warrant which is issued by a judicial authority of a category 1 territory and which contains either the statement referred to in subsection (3) or the statement referred to in subsection (5). The statement referred to in section 2(3) is that -
the person in respect of whom the Part 1 warrant is issued is accused in the category 1 territory of the commission of an offence specified in the warrant, and
the Part 1 warrant is issued with a view to his arrest and extradition to the category 1 territory for the purpose of being prosecuted for the offence."
The statement referred to in section 2(5) is that -
the person in respect of whom the Part 1 warrant is issued is alleged to be unlawfully at large after conviction of an offence specified in the warrant by a court in the category 1 territory, and
the Part 1 warrant is issued with a view to his arrest and extradition to the category 1 territory for the purpose of being sentenced for the offence or of serving a sentence of imprisonment or another form of detention imposed in respect of the offence."
Submissions for the appellant
 It is convenient to take grounds 4 and 5 together, because they both arise out of the same features of the way in which the European Arrest Warrant form has been completed in respect of the appellant. The submission of counsel for the appellant in respect of ground 4 was that the form had been incorrectly completed, in respect that it did not make it clear whether it contained the statement mentioned in section 2(3) or the statement contained in section 2(5). In other words, it was not clear on the face of the terms of the Warrant whether the appellant was said to be a person accused of an offence whose surrender was sought for the purpose of prosecution (s 2(3)), or a person who was unlawfully at large after conviction whose surrender was sought for the purpose of being sentenced or serving a sentence (s 2(5)). It followed, in terms of ground 5, that the sheriff had erred in concluding that the Warrant complied with the requirements of section 2(2)(a) and (3).
"It is to be noted that the opening words of the form of arrest warrant set out in the annex to the Framework Decision refer to a request that
'the person mentioned below be arrested and surrendered for the purposes of conducting a criminal prosecution or executing a custodial sentence or detention order.'
It is presumably intended that the inapplicable alternative be deleted. The person in question is surely entitled to know which of the alternatives apply to him."
In paragraph 56 Lord Scott added:
"An arrest warrant which contains neither the section 2(3) statement nor the section 2(5) statement does not, it appears to me, comply with the requirements of the Act and, if that is right, would not constitute a warrant on which an extradition under Part 1 of the Act could be ordered."
 Counsel pointed to the terms of the Warrant (in the English translation). On page 1, it stated that the Warrant had been issued by the Judge for Preliminary Investigations of the Court of Naples, requesting that the appellant "be arrested and surrendered for the purpose of conducting a criminal prosecution or executing a custodial sentence or detention order". The deletion of the inapplicable alternative, as desiderated by Lord Scott, had not been effected. On page 2, in the section headed "Decision on which the warrant is based", paragraph 1, "Arrest warrant or judicial decision having the same effect", was completed in the following terms:
"OCC Type: Order of precautionary custody in prison No 47334/05 RG GIP and No 93/05 OCC issued by the Judge for Preliminary Investigations of the Court of Naples on Feb 11, 2005."
Paragraph 2, "Enforceable judgment" was completed in the following terms:
"Reference No Proc Penale No 7422701 RGNR - No 47334/02 [sic] RG GIP - No 93/05 OCC."
In the section headed "Indications on the length of the sentence", paragraph 1, dealing with the maximum length of custodial sentence which may be imposed, is completed with references to the Penal Code and mention of 20 years of imprisonment, while paragraph 2, dealing with the length of the custodial sentence imposed, is not completed. In the section headed "Decision rendered in absentia", the first alternative - that the person concerned has been summoned in person or otherwise informed of the date and place of the hearing which led to the decision rendered in absentia - is not completed. Against the second alternative - that the person concerned has not been summoned in person or otherwise so informed, but has the following legal guarantees after surrender - has the following guarantees specified:
"The order of precautionary custody in prison and the documents in support of said order have been lodged with the Clerk of the Court after notification to defence counsel [identified] following the issuance of the ... decree declaring him a fugitive from justice."
On page 6 at section (h) the introductory passage in the form - "The offence(s) on the basis of which this warrant has been issued is(are) punishable by/has(have) led to a custodial life sentence or lifetime detention order" - has inserted after it the words "from to 20 years of imprisonment". Neither of the other two passages in paragraph (h) of the form is deleted or expanded upon.
 Counsel noted that in Boudhiba the ambiguity as to whether the case fell within paragraph (a) or (b) of section 2(2) had been resolved by the absence of reference to an enforceable judgment, but submitted that that was not so here. By attaching significance to the fact that the warrant had been issued by a Judge for Preliminary Investigations the sheriff had speculated impermissibly about the Italian legal system (de Canha v Portugal  EWHC Admin 637, at paras 17 to 20). The sheriff had erred in taking into account the fact that the issue was only taken at the extradition hearing, and not at various hearings before that stage was reached. The issue was fundamental to the sheriff's (and this court's) jurisdiction, and was not waived by not being taken until the extradition hearing (Boudhiba, para 15).
 In these circumstances on a proper reading of the Warrant, the form in the annex to the Framework Decision had not been properly completed. It had not been made clear whether this was a section 2(2)(a) or a section 2(2)(b) case. It followed that the sheriff's finding that it contained the statement required by section 2(2)(a) and (3) was erroneous.
Submissions for the Lord Advocate
 Counsel accepted that, as a result of the terms of section 2(2) of the 2003 Act, a European Arrest Warrant, in the domestic law of the United Kingdom, was one which contained the statement identified in paragraph (a) or the statement contained in paragraph (b) of that section; otherwise it was not a Part 1 warrant within the meaning of the Act. He pointed out, however, that that strict dichotomy was not to be found in the form annexed to the Framework Decision. A purported European Arrest Warrant was therefore not invalid simply for the absence of an express statement in the warrant in terms that reflected one of subsections (3) or (5) of section 2. It was sufficient if it was clear, from the terms of the Warrant as a whole, that it fell into one or other of these categories. That was clear from Boudhiba, where Smith LJ (at para 21) said:
"The warrant states that the appellant is wanted for the purposes of conducting a criminal prosecution, sentencing following conviction or executing a custodial sentence or detention order. I accept that there is some ambiguity in those words in that they do not make clear whether the person sought has yet been convicted. However, they would not be applicable if the decision to prosecute had not yet been taken. In any event, such ambiguity as there was is removed on the following page where it is made clear that the decision on which the warrant is based is the Order of Commitment dated 18th May 2004 and that there is not yet an enforceable judgment in existence. On the page following, there is a statement that the maximum sentence that can be imposed for the offences is 15 years imprisonment. I would accept [counsel's] submission that that was enough in itself to make it plain that the appellant was an accused person and that proceedings had begun."
Counsel submitted that in the present case the Warrant, read as a whole, made it clear that the appellant was an accused person whose extradition was sought for the purpose of prosecution. He relied on the fact that the Warrant was issued by a Judge for Preliminary Investigations, that it was based on an order of precautionary custody, and that in relation to sentence a maximum rather than an actual sentence was stated. The warrant therefore complied in substance with the requirements of section 2(2)(a) and (3), and the sheriff was right so to hold.
 Whatever the form in the annex to the Framework Decision may require, it is in our opinion clear that section 2(2) of the 2003 Act requires that, if a Warrant is to constitute a valid Part 1 Warrant within the meaning of the Act, it must contain what can be regarded as constituting either the statement required by section 2(3) or the statement required by section 2(5) (Armas, per Lord Scott of Foscote at para 56). It is to be noted, however, that the form in the annex does not employ the same language as section 2 of the 2003 Act. The annex contemplates a request that the person concerned be surrendered "for the purpose of conducting a criminal prosecution or executing a custodial sentence or detention order". That does not draw precisely the same borderline as is drawn by section 2(3) and (5). The dichotomy between the terms of the annex to the Framework Decision and the terms of section 2 of the 2003 Act was noted by Lord Hope of Craighead in Armas at paragraph 26. Later, Lord Hope went on to observe (at para 44):
"It would be unduly strict in these circumstances to insist that a statement must appear in the actual words used in section 2(5) if a European arrest warrant is to qualify as a Part 1 warrant. The purpose of the requirement is to provide protection against an unlawful infringement of the right to liberty, so it is an important part of the procedure provided for by Parliament. But the court should be slow to construe those words in a way that would make it impossible to give effect to a warrant which is in the terms which the Framework Decision has laid down. The purpose of the statute is to facilitate extradition, not to put obstacles in the way of the process which serve no useful purpose but are based on technicalities."
Although Lord Hope was there dealing with section 2(5), the same applies to section 2(3). We therefore accept the submission of counsel for the Lord Advocate that, in judging whether the Warrant contains a statement bringing it within the scope of section 2(3) or section 2(5), what matters is not whether the language of the section is precisely reflected in the Warrant but whether it is made clear that the warrant is issued for one or other of the statutory purposes and, if so, which.
 The present case is not precisely on all fours with Boudhiba. In that case there was no reference to an enforceable judgment. Here a reference is inserted after the words "Enforceable judgment" in the part of the form headed "Decision on which the warrant is based".
 There are, however, other factors that seem to us to be relevant. While we note the warning against making assumptions about foreign systems voiced in de Canha, we are, we think, entitled to note (1) that the Warrant was issued by a "Judge for Preliminary Investigations"; (2) that the Warrant is said to have been based on an "order of precautionary custody"; and (3) that, where the form calls for a statement of (a) the maximum length of custodial sentence or (b) the length of custodial sentence and the remaining sentence to be served, part (a) is completed and part (b) is not. More generally, there is absolutely nothing in the way in which the form has been completed that suggests that the appellant is unlawfully at large after conviction. We should add that we have attached no weight to the stage at which the point was first taken.
 We are therefore satisfied that on a fair reading of the Warrant as a whole it can properly be regarded as containing the statement required by section 2(3). It follows that the Warrant is not defective, and the sheriff was entitled to hold that it satisfied the requirements of section 2(2)(a) and (3). Grounds 4 and 5 therefore fall to be rejected.
(D) Grounds of appeal in the Part 2 appeal only
Proof of service (Part 2, ground 6)
Submissions for the appellant
 Counsel for the appellant submitted that the
sheriff erred in holding that the requirements of service under section
78(4)(c) had been satisfied. The execution of service was ex facie
defective. In any event, the sheriff failed to give adequate reasons for
holding that the requirements of service had been satisfied. The Scottish
Ministers had to commence the proceedings in terms of section 70(9) by issuing
a certificate and by sending to the sheriff the relevant documents, namely the
request for extradition; a certificate that the request had been made in
the approved way and the relevant Order in Council. In terms of section
78(2)(a) the sheriff then had to decide whether the documents sent to him
consisted of or included the documents referred to in section 70(9) together
with the further documents required by section 78(2)(b)-(e). If the
sheriff decided that the documents sent to him did not consist of or include those
things, he was obliged to order the discharge of the appellant (s 78(3)).
In this case the execution of service on the appellant required by section
78(4)(c) related only to the documents mentioned in section 70(9). There
was nothing else attached to the execution of service. Accordingly, the
appellant could not tell what had been sent to the sheriff. The fact that
no complaint had been made about this at any stage was irrelevant. There
was no duty on the appellant's advisers to find out what documentation the
sheriff had received. In HM Adv
v Headrick (2005 SCCR 787) the sheriff had rejected this point on
the basis of section 144(8) of the Criminal Procedure (
Submissions for the Lord Advocate
 Counsel submitted that section 78 of the 2003 Act related to the copy documents that had to be served on the appellant. The documents in question were those specified in section 70(9). No specific form of proof was prescribed. The execution of service lodged in court had no copy documents attached to it; but it recorded that there were handed to the appellant "a copy of the documents sent to the Judge by the Justice Minister under section 70(9) of the Extradition Act 2003 which are attached to this execution of service." In the absence of any contention by the appellant that he did not receive a copy of any of the documents sent to the sheriff by the Scottish Ministers, it was unnecessary for the execution to say more than that copies of the relevant documents were served on him. The execution did this because it plainly referred to the correct documents, namely those referred to in section 70(9). Furthermore, although the execution referred to the documents "which are attached to this execution of service" and although when the execution was lodged there were no longer any documents attached to it, a plain reading of those words indicated that a copy of the relevant documents was originally attached to the form of execution of service and that the police officer who served them on the appellant detached them and, as the execution recorded, handed them to the appellant. The officer then made out the execution of service. The sheriff dealt with this point more than adequately (Report, pp 10-14). The matter was correctly dealt with by the sheriff in HM Adv v Headrick (supra, at paras 13-17).
 In our opinion this ground of appeal is entirely without merit. The infelicity of expression by which it is said that the copy documents served on the appellant are "attached to" the execution of service is irrelevant. On a plain reading, these words indicate that the copies of the documents sent to the sheriff, although originally attached to the form of execution of service, were handed to the appellant before the form of execution was itself duly completed by the police officer who effected service. Since the sheriff had no reason to think that the appellant had not been given copies of any of the documents that had been sent to him, he was entitled to proceed on the faith of the execution of service and on the presumption that the statutory requirement had been complied with. Moreover, it is perfectly obvious that copies of all of the documents that were sent to the sheriff by the Minister for Justice were served upon the appellant. As the sheriff records,
"[Counsel for the appellant] accepted that during several of the earlier hearings there had been discussion about the detailed content of the documents and in that discussion there was obviously an implied acceptance that service of them had been made ... My papers in this case suggest also that at a hearing on 25 April 2005, the appellant's solicitor ... confirmed that the documentation had been served and said that further time was required to peruse the large volume of paperwork involved in this case" (Report, pp 10-11).
 The submission for the appellant is particularly far-fetched because it is no part of the appellant's case that he did not receive a copy of any of the documents that were sent to the sheriff. When the point was put to him, counsel for the appellant refrained from making any such suggestion.
Extradition offence (Part 2, ground 8)
Submission for the appellant
 Counsel for the appellant submitted that it
was the duty of the sheriff to decide if the offence alleged was an extradition
offence (s 78(4)(b)). In this case, the sheriff had to be satisfied that
each of the offences alleged was an extradition offence. He could not
grant the application made to him in respect of part of the extradition
request. Section 78(4)(b) was to be read as meaning that it required that
each and every offence alleged was in itself an extradition offence. If any
one of the offences alleged was not, the appellant must be discharged.
The first charge in this case was that of being a member of a criminal
association of a camorra-type, the so-called La Torre Clan. The essence
of the offence was mere membership of a camorra-type organisation. While
Submission for the Lord Advocate
 Counsel submitted that the 2003 Act referred
to conduct rather than to the nomen iuris of the offence. The
court had to look at the conduct for which extradition was sought and decide if
that conduct would amount to a crime according to domestic law (In re
Neilson  2 WLR 737; USA v McCaffery  1 WLR
867). In this case the conduct relating to membership of the camorra-type
organisation could readily be libelled in the law of
 In our opinion, counsel for the Lord Advocate was right in submitting that the 2003 Act looks at the conduct for which extradition is sought rather than to any specific nomen iuris. We are concerned to see whether the substance of the alleged acts for which extradition is sought would amount to a crime in our law. The fundamental flaw in the submission for the appellant is to regard the crime alleged as being mere membership of a certain association. It is not. It is membership of an association whose purpose is to conspire to commit certain specified crimes. That is the nature of the Italian crime (cf art 416 bis of the Italian Penal Code) and it is in essence no different from the Scottish crime of conspiracy to further the purpose of an association by criminal means (cf Sayers v HM Adv, 1981 SCCR 212). In our opinion, the principal offence for which extradition is sought in this case is clearly an extradition offence. There is no substance in this ground of appeal.
Whether the appellant is an accused person (Part 2, ground 9)
Submission for the appellant
 Counsel for the appellant submitted that the
sheriff's conclusion on the question whether the appellant was a person accused
of or convicted of an offence was based on a misunderstanding of the material
before him. He had misread the affidavit of Avv Busatto. The
sheriff himself implied that there had been a trial (Report, p 25). There
had been a negotiated reduction of the sentence. The accused was
therefore a convicted person and the sheriff should have proceeded to deal with
the matter under sections 85 and 86, and not, as he did, under section
84. The sheriff said that both Magistrate Misiti and Avv Busatto were
agreed that the judgment of
Submission for the Lord Advocate
 Counsel submitted that the distinction made
on behalf of the appellant between an accused person and a convicted person was
a false one. The distinction used in Part 2 was between an accused person
and a person unlawfully at large after conviction. Section 70(1) required
the making of a "valid" request for extradition. To be valid, the request
had to contain a statement in terms of section 70(4) (s 70(3)(a)), that is to
say a statement in either of two forms, namely (a) that the person was accused
in the category 2 territory of an offence specified in the request or (b) was
alleged to be unlawfully at large after conviction. If the sheriff
decided that the person in question was accused but not unlawfully at large
after conviction, he had then to proceed under section 84. If it was
alleged that he was unlawfully at large after conviction, the sheriff must
proceed under section 85. It was obvious that the statement in this case
did not proceed on the basis of section 70(4)(b) by alleging that the appellant
was unlawfully at large after conviction. He was not unlawfully at large
after conviction because his sentence was not yet enforceable. Therefore,
he must be an accused person in terms of section 70(4)(a). There was no category other than these
two. The categorisation had to be made as at the date of the request, even
if the appellant's status later changed. It was not alleged that at the
date of the request he was unlawfully at large after conviction. For the
resolution of this ground of appeal, that was all that mattered. The
whole system depended on taking the statement made in the request on
trust. It was the allegation of the requesting State that mattered.
That determined the category into which the appellant would be put for the
purposes of proceedings in this country. (R Guisto) v Governor of Brixton Prison (supra) was
distinguishable. It was decided under different legislative language that
distinguished between an "accused" person and a "convicted" person. It
had no bearing on the 2003 Act. In In re Ismail ( 1 AC 320)
the appellant alleged that he had not been charged with any offence. It
was held that the expression "accused" was not a term of art. It could be
interpreted flexibly to accommodate differences between the common law and
civilian systems. Extradition treaties should be given a broad and
generous interpretation in order to facilitate extradition. The court
should adopt a cosmopolitan approach to the term "accused". The court
should take the approach that was taken in Migliorelli v
 In our opinion, the submission on behalf of the appellant is misconceived. The key provision in relation to this argument is section 70(4). It does not distinguish between an accused person and a convicted person. It distinguishes between an accused person and a person alleged to be unlawfully at large after conviction. Since it is agreed that the accused is not alleged to be unlawfully at large after conviction, it follows, in our view, that he has to be categorised as an accused person within the meaning of section 70(4)(a). That was the basis on which the sheriff dealt with the matter. He was right in proceeding under section 84. In any event, even on the information before the sheriff it was apparent that the sentence passed upon the appellant had not yet become final. We agree that Guisto (supra) is distinguishable from the present case, for the reasons given by counsel for the Lord Advocate, and has no bearing on the interpretation of section 70(4). The view that we have reached can be founded on a straightforward reading of section 70, and in particular section 70(4). But should it be necessary, we consider that the approach that was urged by Lord Steyn in cases of this kind (In re Ismail, supra) amply justifies the conclusion which the sheriff drew. As in Migliorelli v Italy (supra; cp Migliorelli v Italy,  EWHC Admin 861, Rose LJ at para 2)), the key consideration is the fact that the accused's sentence is still subject to appeal and his conviction cannot be said to be final.
Double jeopardy (Part 2, ground 10)
Submissions for the appellant
 Counsel for the appellant relied on section
79(1)(a) under which extradition may be barred by reason of the rule against
double jeopardy. Double jeopardy was defined in section 80. It was
in essence the plea of tholed assize (Dunlop v HM Adv 1974 JC 59).
This submission stood or fell with ground 9. In R v Thomas (
1 QB 604) the accused pled double jeopardy in relation to his having been
convicted in absence in Italy and sentenced to imprisonment and to a
fine. Since no extradition agreement then existed between
Submissions for the Lord Advocate
 Counsel for the respondent submitted that the double jeopardy referred to in section 79(1) applied both to persons accused and to persons unlawfully at large after conviction. The proper interpretation must be that there was a bar to extradition only if, leaving out of account the foreign proceedings in respect of which extradition was sought, the fugitive had tholed his assize. If he had been prosecuted here in respect of those charges, there would have been no foundation for a plea of tholed assize. The appellant had not been tried for these offences in any other proceedings. It made no sense to apply the interpretation put forward on behalf of the appellant. That would bar the extradition of anyone who had been convicted, and would make redundant the specific provisions in section 79(1) relating to persons unlawfully at large after conviction.
 We agree with counsel for the appellant that
this ground of appeal stands or falls with ground 9. Since we consider
ground 9 to be misconceived, we reject this ground of appeal too. In our
view, the fundamental flaw in this ground is the reliance of counsel for the
appellant on section 80. Section 80, in effect, merely says that the
court must judge the risk of double jeopardy occurring in