No 183.

to allow it to take effect against any, but those who fall under the literal description of the statute; Snodgrass and Haldane against the Trustees of Beat's creditors, November 13, 1744, No 174, p. 1095.

The judgment of the House of Lords, in the case of Woodstone, was undoubtedly an extension of the statute, and there is no reason for extending that case to others which are not precisely similar. The two cases, however, are extremely different; for there Woodstone was not only apprehended, but he remained in custody during the remainder of that day, as also during the whole of the night, and part of the next day. His being confined so long in the custody of the messenger was understood, by the House of Lords, as equal to an actual imprisonment; his being confined through the whole of the night, during which time no transaction appears, nor can be presumed to have been going on, might be, with a good deal of reason, considered in the light of an actual imprisonment. But that is very different from the present case, where it would appear, from the proof, that Knowles was not above half an hour in the custody of one of the messengers, nor above an hour at most in the custody of the other; and, as for the rest of the time deponed to, it must have been consumed in drinking, as is always the case on such occasions, after the business is over.

Answered: It cannot furely be expected, that the Court will now go back upon a question which has received the solemn determination of the Supreme Court, and has been understood, ever since that time, to be indisputable. The act 1696 does not say that the bankrupt must be within the walls of a prison. The word imprisonment is another word for being in custody, and is put on the same footing with retiring, slying, absconding, or forcibly defending. An execution of search is undoubtedly sufficient to bring a bankrupt under the statute; and it would be unreasonable if actual custody, in consequence of ultimate diligence, should not have the same effect.

The Court were clear to adhere to the decision of the House of Lords, in the case of Woodstone, as establishing a rule that ought to be permanent, and not arbitrary; and that, for the same reason, there was no room for going into a distinction, as to the time or number of hours of a bankrupt's being in the messenger's custody; and, therefore, pronounced the interlocutor following:

' Find fufficient evidence, that, at the time of granting the disposition challenged, Francis Knowles was bankrupt, in terms of the act 1606.'

Act. Ilay Campbell.

Alt. M' Queen.

Clerk, Tait.

Fol. Dic. v. 3. p. 53. Fac. Col. No 121. p. 326.

No 184. An execution of fearch found to afford, per se, 1775. July 4. The CARRON COMPANY, against JAMES BERRIE and Others.

JAMES BERRIE and others, creditors of James Wright, merchant in Glafgow, having, in the course of a competition, taken exceptions to an heritable security

in the form of a wadlet, granted by him in favour of the Carron Company, upon the footing of the act of 1696, as having been granted within 60 days of Wright's being notour bankrupt in terms of that flatute; the Lord Ordinary, after hearing parties, pronounced the following interlocutor: 'Finds the execution of the

- ' fearch is sufficient evidence of Wright's absconding from the diligence of his
- ' creditors; therefore prefers the faid James Berrie, and the other creditors men-
- ' tioned in the interests produced for them.'

In a reclaiming bill, on the part of the Carron Company, it was infifted, that the execution of the fearch produced was not sufficient evidence to bring Wright within the description of a notour bankrupt in terms of the act 1696: That the purpose of the act would indeed be sadly desective, if an execution such as the present, (in many instances collusive, and a mere sham, as in fact it was in this very case), were to be held as sufficient evidence of a debtor's absconding from diligence: That he did not abscond, in the proper sense of the word: That there was no stop in carrying on his business: That the Carron Company, in particular, dealt with him afterwards, surnished him with goods, and received payments, never dreaming that they were all the while corresponding with a person notour bankrupt, and rendered incapable by law of granting any valid security.

'The Lords, before adviting the petition with answers, allowed the respondents, the said James Berrie and others, to prove that James Wright absconded from the diligence of the law, and all facts and circumstances material for proving the same; and allowed the Carron Company to prove that Wright continued his business without interruption at the time, and after the date of the search produced, and did not abscond from the diligence of the law.'

But the proof, when reported, not appearing such as to detract from the meffenger's returned execution, but rather tending to confirm it; while the burden of the proof in this case undoubtedly lay chiefly upon the party who sought to redargue it: After advising the proof, with the petition and answers,

' The Court adhered to the Lord Ordinary's interlocutor,'

Act. Blair. Alt. B. W. M. Leod. Clerk, Ross. Fol. Dic. v. 3. p. 54. Fac. Col. No 176. p. 92.

1782. June 25. Alexander Ross against James Chalmers.

LEARMONTH indorfed fundry bills to Chalmers, in fecurity of a prior debt, and foon after stopped payment. On the fixtieth day posterior to the indorfation, a messenger, possessed of letters of caption, searched the bankrupt's house between the hours of eleven and twelve at night, in order to apprehend and incarcerate him, though without success.

An action, for fetting afide the indorfations above mentioned, was brought by Mr Rofs, as truftee for Learmonth's creditors; in which the question occurNo 184. fufficient evidence of abfoonding, unless redargued by proof of very pregnant circumftances of a contrary tendency.

No 135. Found, in conformity with Carron Company against Berrie, supra.

A proof offered, that the debtor had left his house, not to avoid dillgence, but to