## APPENDIX.

## PART I.

1770. January 26. JOHN DONALDSON against WILLIAM DONALDSON.

THESE parties, on the 7th of May 1768, entered into a submission of mutual A decree-arclaims; the limiting clause of which was thus expressed: " And the said arbi-" ters are fully hereby empowered to fall about doing the business aforesaid, and "that betwixt and Whitsunday next; and to give forth their decree-arbitral " in a distinct manner, &c."

Upon the 24th May the parties submitters made up a minute, wherein "they declare this submission current till the 1st day of October next;" but the decree-arbitral was not pronounced or given forth till the 6th of that month; five days after the prorogation.

John Donaldson brought a reduction of this decree; on which the Lord Ordinary pronounced the following interlocutor: "Sustains the reason of reduc-"tion of the decree-arbitral, that the same was pronounced after the expiry of "the time limited in the submission and prorogation thereof."

William Donaldson reclaimed, and argued, that the clause recited related not to the decree, but to the period the arbiters were to fall about doing the business, viz. inspecting the lands, valuing the crop, stocking, &c. and doing other preliminary matters, which, it was to be presumed, never could be accomplished. within so short a time as betwixt the 7th of May and the term of Whitsunday; and as the submission therefore was unlimited as to time, it behoved, according to the general rule and practice, to stand in force for a year.

The pursuer answered, That the clause of limitation was express, and that it was triti juris, and had been often decided, that a decree-arbitral, pronounced: after the term limited in the submission, was null and void: 28th Feb. 1666, Freeland, No. 44. p. 646; Jan. 1608, Hamilton contra Hay, No. 35. p. 643;

No. 1: bitral, pronounced after expiry of the time limited in the submission, and prorogation thereof. set aside.

No. 1. 2d Dec. 1680, Pitcairn contra Rose, No. 45. p. 647; 18th Nov. 1696, Watson contra Milne, No. 47. p. 648.

The Lords adhered.

Lord Ordinary, Pitfour. Clerk, Kirkpatrick.

For John Donaldson, A. Fergusson. For William Donaldson, A. Lockhart.

R. D.

Fac. Coll. No. 14. p. 31.

1770. February 16. STEWART against EARL of GALLOWAY.

No. 2.

A party after bringing an action against a debtor, and raising inhibition on it, submitted the matter to arbiters. In the submission and decree-arbitral, the inhibition was not mentioned. The Court "found, that the sums awarded by "the decree-arbitral were not secured by the inhibition, without prejudice to "the Petitioner to insist in the depending process for decrees as accords."

R. H. Fac. Coll.

\* This case is No. 62. p. 7004. voce Inhibition.

1771. June 21.

RICHARD HETHERINGTON, and Others, Tenants on the estate of Killhead, against Thomas Carlyle, Factor on the sequestrated estate of Killhead.

No. 3.
Reduction of a decree-arbitral, attempted upon alledged falsehood in the decree.

An error calculi may be corrected without reducing the decree.

The pursuer brought a reduction of a decree-arbitral, pronounced in a sub-mission betwixt the above parties, upon the ground of falsehood, and as being defective and partial, as it had not determined the whole matters in dispute. The decree-arbitral set forth, "That the arbiters had considered the claims of both parties, and answers thereto, with the several processes specified in the submission, with the whole procedure, minutes, and interlocutor therein; and particularly the process of suspension of the said Thomas Carlyle's charge against the tenants for payment of their rents, and whole proofs led thereon, with the tacks granted by the said Sir John Douglas, upon which the said charge proceeded, and had met with and heard parties doers upon the premisses."

The pursuers affirmed that this averment could not possibly be true; and in a condescendence offered to prove, 1mo, That no memorial was laid before the arbiters but with respect to the case with one only of the pursuers; 2do, That the proofs, tacks, and other writings, were so extremely voluminous, that they could not, as stated, have been perused, or duly considered by the arbiters; 3tio, That instead of having heard parties or their doers, the arbiters had proceeded to pronounce their decree-arbitral, even after the pursuer's