No 208. husband's consent, but as to which he had renounced his jus mariti. The husband's posterior ratification of the assignation, was found sufficient to validate it.

tur solutum. 2do, She had an assignation from Lady Margaret thereto, with the burden of sundry legacies, which the Dutchess had accordingly paid. Answered, The assignation was null, being granted by Lady Margaret when vestita viro, and married to Dr Burnet, now Bishop of Sarum, and he is not a consenter for his interest. Replied, In his contract of marriage, he renounced his jus mariti in this sum; likeas, after the assignation, he has granted a ratification thereof to the Dutchess, which two are sufficient to sustain the assignation. Duplied, A husband's concourse and consent to the legal-deeds of his wife, must be specific as to the thing, and interposed in ipso actu, and not a general confirmation ex intervallo, which does not integrate the act; just as a tutor's concourse with his minor must be in ipso actu, § 2. Institut. De auct. Tutor. Triplied, The husband may quandocunque consent, and in such cases ratibabilio comparatur mandato, et retrotrabitur; and though, by the old law, curators could not ratify ex intervallo, yet by the law of the Code they might, l. ult. C. Ad S. C. Macedon, and Bachovius is of the same opinion; and Sande, Decis. Fris. lib. 2. definit. 4. tit. 3. shews, that a husband's consent being only solemnitatis causa, sufficit si ex intervallo adhibeatur, and he cites Gomezius and others. THE LORDS found Lady Margaret's assignation sufficiently validated by the antecedent renunciation, and subsequent ratification of the husband.

Fol. Dic. v. 1. p. 402. Fountainhall, v. 1. p. 827.

No 209.

1729. June 21. BRIDGET BOLD against GEORGE MONTGOMERIE.

In a reduction, at a wife's instance, of a gratuitous disposition granted by herself, wherein was reserved her own and her husband's liferents; the Lords found, That the husband being furious at the time of granting the disposition, and continuing so till his death, the want of his consent to the disposition was not relevant to annul the same. See Appendix.

Fol. Dic. v. 1. p. 402.

1733. June 29. DALL against Countess of Southesk.

No 210.

A WIFE, after her husband's forfeiture, having granted her personal obligation without his concurrence, for a debt due by him, the question occurred, whether this obligation was ipso jure null or not? And it was argued for the creditor, That this nullity being introduced by our municipal law, could only be in force so long as the civil and municipal rights betwixt husband and wife subsisted, which were entirely dissolved by the forfeiture.—The Lords found the defence of being vestita viro not relevant, in regard the husband was attainted at the time of granting the obligation. See Appendix.

Fol. Dic. v. 1. p. 402.

The Subject HUSBAND and WIFE is continued in Volume XV.