No 10.

No 11.

THE LORDS found, that Isabel, being conjunct fiar, had jus exigendi, and therefore might warrantably lead the comprising; which, being led by her and her fecond husband, did accresce to the heir of the first marriage, mentioned in the bond: And therefore, sustained the comprising against my Lord Pitsligo, albeit but a singular successor, likewise in the lands.\*

President Falconer, p. 56.

1691. July 8.

CREDITORS of LANGTON.

OLD Langton, having given a public infeftment to his fon, for relief of cautionry, not for the payment of creditors, without any enumeration of creditors; it was found, That the creditors have not the privilege and right of the infeftment; fo that young Langton might prefer some; or renounce the whole again to his father; or one creditor might prevent another by diligence; but young Langton being insolvent, could not grant voluntary rights, in prejudice of anterior diligence.

Fol. Dic. v. 1. p. 2. Harcarfe, p. 171.

1696. January 24. Earl of Cassillis against Montgomery of Lainshaw.

Phespo reported the competition betwixt the Earl of Cassillis, and James Montgomery of Lainshaw. The first point was, Having once produced his tack of the teinds in the process, he might not take it up again when he found the Earl, who had newly raised and cast in a reduction of the said tack, on this head, that it was set before a prior one had expired, was going to hold the production satisfied.—The Lords found a party might take up any writ, (not quarrelled as false,) before allegeances were proponed thereon, or litis-contestation made in the cause. The next point was; during Lainshaw's forseiture, Strathallan, donator thereto, had obtained a decreet of preference, on Lainshaw's tack of these teinds of Kirkmichell, before Cassillis's right; and Lainshaw, now founding on that decreet, as res judicata, to exclude Cassillis; still he alleged Lainshaw had no right to the same, the forseiture being funditus, rescinded, and all following thereon taken away.—Answered, That is only so far as the restored persons were lesed; but it

No 12.
Found that a person forseited and restored, fer modum justice, night use any benefit the donator had obtained, during the forseiture; such as a decree of preference, &c.

<sup>\*</sup> The same case is noticed by Lord Fountainhall, vol. 1. p. 262, under date 18th January 1684, thus:—In a case between Forbes Lord Pitsligo, and Robert and Alexander Milns; The Lords, in prasentia, find in an apprising, led by Mary Hillstains, my Lord Harcarse's mother, on a bond wherein she was only conjunct star of the sum, and her daughter, Mary Hog, was by the bond, per expressum, star, but led by the liferentrix, for the pricipal sum, as if she had been star; That the said apprising was effectual, and accresced to the star, as if it had been also led and deduced at her instance, for her interest and right of see; though her name was not in the comprising, but that the mother's security became her's, seeing she was conjunct star, and had power to uplist upon caution.—Nota, The Milns being paid off their debt, the benefit of this cause was for the behoof of Keith of Ludquhairn.

No 12.

were a very finister interpretation, to make a detorsion, of what is designed for a benefit, to my prejudice; for, put the case, that the donator had interrupted the prescription, which was running against the rebel, or set a prositable tack; would not these accresce to one restored, per modum justities? And, on the 13th of July 1664, between the Earl of Lauderdale and Bigger of Wolmet, (No 5. b. t.) a certification, obtained by Swinton, when donator, was found to belong to Lauderdale, that he might found on the same.—The Lords generally inclined to think, the forseited person might use any benefit the donator had obtained; even as the improvements of a tutor accresce to a minor; meliorem facere potest conditionem pupilli sed non deteriorem; but, salling to consider this decreet of preference, they found it not to be a preference in time coming, but only for some bygone year's teinds; and found it no sufficient active title to compete with Cassillis for subsequent years, without the tack itself were produced. (See Process.)

Fol. Dic. v. 1. p. 1. Fountainhall, v. 1. p. 704.

1702. November 25.
BOTHWELL of Glencorfe against SIR JOHN CLERK of Pennyeuick.

No 13. Found that infeftment of a mill carried the ancient thirlage along with it, as a confequence, although the purfuer did not connect his right with the party who first acquired the thirlage.

BOTHWELL of Glencorfe, pursues a declarator against Sir John Clerk of Pennycuick, that his lands of Cooking are thirled to his mill; and craves the bygone abstractions since 1685. Alleged for Sir John, That the pursuer had not sufficient title to feek or declare this thirlage; for he produced nothing but a base infeftment in the mill, proceeding upon a disposition, contained in his contract of marriage in 1657: and, though he likewise produced a feu-charter in 1611, of his mill, from the Lord Salton to one Abernethy, yet he shewed no progress nor connection from that feuer, Abernethy; and, if he did not derive right from him, he could not claim the multures of the defender's lands of Cooking; unless he could, in the fecond place, fay, that he prescribed it by forty years peaceable posfession; any of which, either a connected progress, or immemorial prescription, he was willing to find relevant to infer the aftriction of his lands to that mill; feeing, tantum præscriptum est quantum possessum, et non amplius.—Answered, Seeing you can pretend no right to the mill, I need produce no more than to fhew your lands were once thirled to that mill, (which the charter and fafine in 1611 instructs,) and that I stand infest therein; and I am not bound to produce a right from Abernethy, or a connected progress derived from him; as if I were pursued. in a reduction and improbation; but my infeftment in the mill carries the ancient right of thirlage, in consequence, as a part and pertinent; and, unless the defender can fay, he has prescribed liberation and immunity, by forty years going to other mills, and abstracting, and abstaining from coming to this, he says nothing.—Replied, Glencorfe having no right, but what his father conveys to him, in his contract of marriage, whereon he is infeft base; this can never sustain his title to the multures of the defender's lands, unless he shew that his father had a