(Extinction.)

were any furplus of mails and duties, for which the compriser was to be accountable, he might retain, off the first end of the same, such as were profitably expended, not only in relation to his own, but the pursuer's right.

Newbyth, Reporter.

Fol. Dic. v. 1. p. 21. Dirleton, No 458. p. 222.

No 11.
furplus in his hands, expence of supporting the right, by which the competing compriser was benefited.

1680. March YEOMAN of Dryburgh against Gray of Innerichty.

THE heir of an apprifer of ward-lands, having paid 4000 merks as the avail of a marriage which fell by his predecessor's death; his intromissions with the mails-and duties were ascribed to it; at least he was found to have right to repete the same off the debtor, before the apprising could be extinguished.

Fol. Dic. v. 1. p. 21. Harcarfe, (Comprising.) No 307. p. 75.

No 12.

1681. January 14.

Schaw against Muir.

Schaw of Grimmat having apprifed the lands of Sheill, purfues John Muir, a prior apprifer, for declaring his apprifing extinct and fatisfied, in fo far as he had, upon his apprifing, taken a decreet of mails and duties, against all the tenants for certain years, and in all time coming; and by virtue thereof had uplifted the mails and duties.—The defender alleged, That he was only accountable for his actual intromission, at least for the rental of such parts of the lands, as he once entered in possession of by unlifting of the duties; for it is a known principle, that apprifers are not obliged to intromit, and are only liable to account for the rent of those rooms that once they begin to possess.—It was answered, That this ground. is not controverted, where apprifers attain no possession; but, where they take decreets for mails and duties for all time coming, they thereby attain a civilpossession, and no other apprifers being posterior, have any remeid, but are as effectually debarred by the decreet, as if they had been in possession, and had competed and been excluded; for no law nor reason can oblige any person to pursue the tenants, where he knows he cannot prevail; and whatever might be pretended as to diffinct tenements, and diffinct lands, that one apprifer taking decreet against the whole tenants, and lifting the rents only of fome baronies and tenements, and abftaining from the rents of other whole tenements diffinct and distant, where posterior apprisers might have pursued the tenants of these distinct tenements, and thereby forced the first appriser, either to possess that he might be satisfied, or to suffer them to possess; yet here there is but one small tenement contiguous, and if the first appriser, possessing the most part, omitting any of the tenants, the purfuers were not obliged to enquire therein, but might warrantably

No 13. An apprifer, taking a decree of mails and duties, against the whole tenants of an estate. lying contiguous; found liable to account for the whole rents, whether he actually levied them or not, unless he: could fliew be had been pre. vented.

(Extinction.)

No 13.

prefume that he hath lifted from all, by his decreet, and that he was not impeded; and if, by fraud or collusion, he hath neglected some of the tenants, or suffered the common debtor to lift the rents, shi imputet, he must account for them as if he had lifted them.

Which the Lords found relevant, and found the defender liable to account for all the tenants contained in his decreet, unless he instruct how he was excluded; but as for the common debtor's possession by his own labourage, which the possession apprisers might visibly know, there was nothing alleged to be in the decreet concerning the common debtor, and so nothing was determined as to that point, but that the defender was to be accountable for all the tenants contained in his decreet, lying contiguous in one tenement, whereof the possession of the greatest part was acknowledged.

Stair, v. 2. p. 833.

1720. January.

WALKER against MACPHERSON and FORRESTER.

No 14. An adjudication, through an formalities, being reduced to a fecurity, the intromissions had, medio tempore, are imputed in extinction thereof.

An adjudication of a tenement, by progress in the persons of Macpherson and Forrester, having been restricted to a security, at the instance of John Walker, merchant in Edinburgh, because more was adjudged for than was due; the pursuer contended, That the adjudication was extinguished by the desenders and their authors intromissions, even those had after the legal reversion of ten years; because the adjudication having been found only a right in security, and the legal still open, it must be extinguishable by intromission, whether the original creditor intromit, or his singular successor; for such is the nature of rights in security and payment.

The defenders pled, That possession having been attained after the legal was expired, the fructus bona side precepti et consumpti, while they had reason to believe themselves proprietors unaccountable, could not be imputed to extinguish the principal sums in their adjudication; which, in this case, would be particularly hard, because if they be bound to account, it must be by a rental; and, mean time, possession tanquam domini, they have neither preserved vouchers nor documents of public burdens, reparations, wastes, bankrupt tenants, &c. to diminish the same. If, then, the pursuer's plea obtain, no man shall ever possess quietly or securely upon an adjudication; for it will not be said, that the law ties an adjudger to keep accounts of his actual intromissions, dead, waste and poor for ever; and yet no man can be secure, but minorities may interrupt for a long time beyond the course of prescription, during which, an adjudger, or purchaser of an estate from an adjudger, (and many estates in Scotland, have no other foundation,) shall not know whether he is master of an opulent estate, or if he is not worth a shilling in the world.