1680. February 25.

KINLOCH against the Earls of Southesk and Northesk.

DAVID GRAHAME of Fintry having disponed the lands of Glenprossin and Killiemuir, to Kinloch of Bandoch, with confent of his eldeft fon; but the father having died before Bandoch's infeftment, the fon was entered and infeft, and did also infest Bandoch in implement of his father's disposition; but there being a prior apprifing at the inflance of Walter Lyel against the fon, to whom these lands were disponed by his contract of marriage, to which apprising the Earls of Northerk and Southerk have right, whereupon there were mutual reductions:— It was alleged for the faid Earls, That their author having apprifed from Fintry, the disposition granted to Bandoch thereafter was inter conjunctos, Bandoch being Fintrie's fifter-fon, so that the narrative in the disposition will not instruct an onerous adequate cause; but the right is presumed to be without a cause onerous, in defraud of Lyel the anterior creditor. THE LORDS found, That Bandoch behoved to instruct the cause onerous.—It was further alleged for the said Earls, That albeit the onerous cause were instructed, yet by the act of Parliament 1621 anent bankrupts, after lawful diligence by horning, apprifing, &c. the debtor cannot by voluntary disposition, or other gratifications, prefer another creditor, not having done more timeous diligence.—It was answered, 1mo, That the clause alleged upon, relates only to disponing in favours of a creditor, in prejudice of the prior diligence of another creditor; but where the debtor dispones to a third party, who is no creditor, but buys bona fide for a competent price, and pays the fame, the buyer can never be questioned, or otherwise commerce of lands be. hoved to cease; for there is no record by which a buyer may know the diligence of creditors, except what appears by the register of hornings, inhibitions, and fasines, and this right is before the late act of Parliament, allowing apprisings to be registrated. 2do, The privilege of the act of Parliament in favours of creditors doing diligence, can only be understood where they perfift in their diligence, to the effect that while they are in cursu diligentia, the debtor cannot disappoint their diligence by voluntary dispositions; but if the creditor persist not, but prove negligent, it cannot be imagined that all inchoate diligences should be as valid as inhibitions; and that till forty years run, none might buy or take fecurity in the debtor's land; ita est, nothing followed upon this apprifing by charge, infeftment, or otherwife, for fome years before Bandoch's right, and therefore voluntary difpositions are preferable to apprisings, whereupon nothing follows within a year, as is observed by Spottiswood, p. 43, Hamilton contra M'Culloch, voce Bona et Mala Fides, where the Lords found the voluntary disposition preferable to the apprising, whereupon no diligence followed for several years before the right. There was also a reason ex capite inhibitionis; against which it was alleged, That the inhibition was null, not being execute at the head burgh of the regality wherein the lands lay. It was answered, That the execution was during the usurpation, when regalities

No 160. Where there has been an improper degree of mora, in following out diligence, alienation in prejudice of it will be suftained.

No 160.

were suppressed.—It was replied, That it was offered to be proven, that inhibitions used to be even then executed at the head burgh of the regality.

The Lords fultained the inhibition, albeit some persons, for the more security, inhibited at the head burgh of the regality, during the time of the usurpation.

See Inhibition.

Stair, v. 2. p. 762.

1686. January 27.

BATEMAN and CHAPLANE against Hamilton, &c.

No 161. A disposition omnium bonorum, by a person obæratus, reduced, in fo far as to the prejudice of creditors who had charged him with horning; although there was no denunciation nor registration at the time; and fome of the creditors

feemed in

mora, by not denouncing

for a month after.

See No 158.

p. 1067.

ALEXANDER CHAPLANE, writer to the fignet, having raised a reduction of a disposition omnium bonorum, granted by Sir George Drummond, late Provost of Edinburgh, in favours of Bailie Thomas Hamilton, and two or three more of his creditors, in prejudice of all the rest, and especially of the pursuer, who had charged him with horning prior thereto, on the act of Parliament 1621, and that he was then in meditatione fugæ, and could not preser one creditor before another. The Lord Castlehill, who heard the cause, reduced the said disposition.

But, on a bill, this being heard in presence on the oth of February, it was then alleged for the defenders, that the first branch of the act of Parliament does not reach them; because it only concerns dispositions made by bankrupts, to conjunct or confident persons without onerous causes; but ita est this disposition was for most onerous causes of debt and cautionry, and they were neither conjunct nor confident to the Provost. 2do, It was not dispositio omnium bonorum, but he had a real estate behind. 3tio, His shop being in commercio, they might bargain for the same, even as they might have bought 100 ells of cloth from him after these hornings, and paid for it, and it could not have been evicted, nor quarrelled, on this act. 4to, Non cessit foro, for some time after this disposition; and a naked charge of horning, without being denounced or registrated, did not incapacitate him. See Durie, 31st January 1627, Scougal, No 1. p. 870.; Paterson against Edwards, Durie, p. 471. voce Fraud; and 2d February 1632, Jack, No 25. p. 897.; Stair, 8th January 1669, Preston, No 26. p 897.; and 3d February 1672, Home, No 4. p. 881.; and the decifion, January 1682, Cunningham, &c. against Hamilton, No 30. p. 902.; where dispositions made by bankrupts, even that fame day they fled, were fustained, where no previous diligence was done against them. 5to, The actio revocatoria pauliana cannot be founded on, unless it were subsumed that the receivers of the disposition were conscii as well as the granter; but so it is they were not participes fraudis; and that the Roman law in edicto fraudatorio made two distinctions; 1mo, Between him who had got a right from a bankrupt ex titulo oneroso, whose right was valid even against other creditors, unless he was particeps fraudis; and him who had only right ex causa lucrativa, as by donation; and there fraus in concilio of the granter, and in eventu, (though the receiver was ignorant of his condition,) was fufficient to annul it. 2do, Vet bona erant possessa ex praetoris edicto, (which In the first case, the debtor could not any answered to our diligences,) vel non.