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No. 26.

The Lords found that Mr. Patrick could not clothe himself with the tercer's right, to cause the legal expire, but found the offer relevant; for, besides the favour of the cause, the case is not alike with an apparent heir, whose right, though not declared, yet he continues in his predecessor's possession, and none other hath any interest; but the fiar might possess the whole, and exclude the tercer till she were served.

Stair, v. 1. p. 417.

1667. February 9. Moncrief against Tenants of Newton.

No. 27.

The relict by her terce has no right to the teinds, unless where there is an infeftment of the teinds by erection; and therefore in a pursuit against a tenant who paid a duty jointly for stock and teind, a fourth part was deducted as the worth of the teinds, and the relict got the third of the remainder.

In the same case, alleged, That as the manor-place belonged to the fiar without division, so behoved the close, orchards, yards, &c. The Lords, in respect nothing was alleged or instructed that there was a tower, fortalice, or manor-place having a garden or orchard for pleasure rather than profit, found no necessity to decide what interest a tercer would have in such; but these being let by appearance as grass-yards, they repelled the allegeance, and found the tercer entitled to a third part of the rent paid upon that account.

Fol. Dic. v. 2. p. 450.

\*\* This case is No. 129. p. 15733. voce Teinds.

1675. February 2.

BARCLAY against Scot.

No. 28.
A terce was found no sufficient title to defend against removing upon apprising against the husband's heir.

John Barclay being infeft in the Barony of Cullernie, upon an apprising, pursues the tenants to remove. Compearance is made for Dame Marion Scot, who alleged that she had right to a terce of this Barony, as having been relict of the deceased Laird of Cullernie, and so having right with the pursuer pro indiviso, she will not suffer the tenants to remove. It was answered, That she produces no interest, unless her terce were kenned.

The Lords repelled the allegeance, and decerned, reserving her right of terce as accords, and found that she could not make use thereof till it were kenned.

Stair, v. 2. p. 315.