<u>ROYAL COURT</u> (Samedi Division)

35.

Spages.

24th July, 1996

<u>Before</u>: Sir Philip Bailhache, Bailiff, and Jurats Potter and de Veulle

The Attorney General

- v -

Hotel L'Oasis, Limited

1 count of contravening Article 14(1)(a) of the Housing (Jersey) Law, 1949, by failing to comply with a condition of a Housing Committee consent to the purchase by the Defendant Company of "Hotel L'Oasis", stipulating that private dwelling accommodation at the property be occupied by persons exempt from the need to apply to the said Committee for consent under the Housing (General Provisions) (Jersey) Regulations, 1970, or by persons specifically approved as occupiers by the said Committee.

Plea: Facts denied on 10th May, 1996; the action was sent to proof.

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C.E. Whelan, Esq., Crown Advocate. Mr. B. Shelton as a Director of the Defendant Company.

## JUDGMENT

THE BAILIFF: We desire to say first of all that we have accepted all the evidence given by the witnesses in this case as having been given honestly and impartially.

5 The question for the Court is whether the Crown has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the second condition attached by the Housing Committee to a consent granted to the Defendant Company in 1972 was broken by the act of permitting Mr. Gill to occupy the accommodation which he was found by the Housing Officials to have been occupying.

The second condition attached by the Committee to the consent provides:-

".... that the private dwelling accommodation at the said property .....should be occupied by persons exempt from the need to apply to the said Committee for consent under the Housing (General Provisions) (Jersey) Regulations, 1970, or by persons specifically approved as occupiers by the said Committee".

That condition was attached after some correspondence with 10 legal firms which sought to establish exactly what the private dwelling accommodation was.

Mr. Whelan for the Crown argued that the condition embraced the private dwelling accommodation at the property in the sense of any private dwelling accommodation. The argument was that, if the private dwelling accommodation existing in 1972 had been destroyed and reconstructed elsewhere on the site, the condition bound that new accommodation.

Having regard to the use of the definite Article and to the fact that in criminal proceedings any ambiguity must be resolved in favour of the subject, we cannot accept that submission. We have therefore asked ourselves whether we are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accommodation subjected to this condition by the Housing Committee in 1972 is that dwelling accommodation which was admittedly occupied by Mr. Gill and his family during the period in question. We are not so satisfied and it follows that the Defendant Company must, accordingly, be discharged. Mr. Shelton, you will be entitled to taxed costs.

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## <u>Authorities</u>

Housing (Jersey) Law, 1949.

A.G. -v- Glendale Hotel Holdings, Ltd (10th February, 1989) Jersey Unreported.

R. -v- Edwards [1974] 2 All ER 1085.

R. -v- Hunt [1987] 1 AC 353.

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Nimmo -v- Alexander Cowan & Sons, Ltd [1968] AC 107.