THE HIGH COURT
JUDICIAL REVIEW
[2025] IEHC 187
Record No. 2025 316 JR
IN THE MATTER OF SECTION 5 OF THE ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS (TRAFFICKING) ACT 2000 (AS AMENDED)
AND
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION ACT 2015
BETWEEN
G.S.
APPLICANT
AND
THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION APPEALS TRIBUNAL AND THE MINISTER FOR JUSTICE AND EQUALITY
RESPONDENTS
RULING of Ms. Justice Siobhán Phelan, delivered on the 28th day of March, 2025
INTRODUCTION
1. In these proceedings the Applicant seeks to challenge the decision of the International Protection Appeals Tribunal (hereinafter "the IPAT") dated the 1st of February, 2025, (communicated by letter dated the 11th of February, 2025) made pursuant to s. 46 of the International Protection Act, 2015 (hereinafter "the 2015 Act") affirming the recommendation of the International Protection Officer under s. 39(3)(c) of the 2015 Act in finding that he was not entitled to subsidiary protection or refugee status.
BACKGROUND
2. The Applicant is a 31-year-old, single man from Georgia. He made a claim for international protection to the Minister on the 25th of August, 2022, on the basis that if returned to Georgia, he would face persecution for reasons of his religious faith, having converted to the Jehovah Witness faith, or a real risk of suffering serious harm.
3. The Applicant submitted an IPO 05 form and had a s.13 interview. He later completed and submitted an International Protection Questionnaire, dated the 6th of October, 2022.
4. Pursuant to s.35 of the 2015 Act, the Applicant attended for interview on the 20th of June, 2024, with an officer of the International Protection Office (hereinafter the "IPO"). During the course of interview, the Applicant's knowledge of the Jehovah's Witness religion was probed and his responses recorded.
5. By letter dated the 19th of August, 2024, the Applicant was informed that an IPO Officer recommended, pursuant to s.39(3)(c) of the 2015 Act, that he should be given neither a refugee declaration nor a subsidiary protection declaration, because the IPO reached negative credibility findings and found the Appellant had failed to establish a well-founded fear of persecution or a real risk of harm, in Georgia. This decision was supported by a detailed report pursuant to s. 39 of the 2015 Act. In this report, it was pointed out that Georgia is a designated safe country of origin pursuant to s. 72 of the 2015 Act. The various questions asked in relation to the Applicant's purported religion were set out together with the answers given and the basis upon which the IPO considered the answers given to be wrong. Specifically, the following questions and answers in relation to his faith were recorded:
(i) The Applicant was asked to describe how baptism takes place for Jehovah Witnesses, and he replied, that he is "not baptised yet" (s.35, p.11, q.55). When asked again what the ceremony is, he replied, "the procedure is that the person will tilt the person who is being baptised, tilt their head in the water" (s.35, p.11, q.56). However, according to the Jehovah Witness Organization website, baptism is a requirement for becoming a member, and baptism "is complete water immersion".
(ii) The Applicant was asked who "Michael the Archangel" is and he responded, "I haven 't heard of Michael. I know Johann" (s.35, p.10, q.48). According to information available, Michael the Archangel is, for Jehovah Witnesses, Jesus Christ.
(iii)The Applicant was asked who founded the Jehovah Witness religion, and he replied, "I don't have this kind of detail" (s.35, p.10, q.45).
(iv)According to information available (Ref 1), in the Jehovah Witness' faith, only 144,000 people, when they die, will be·with Jesus in the kingdom of heaven. However, when the Applicant was asked how many people will go to heaven, he replied, "As many as praise the lord. There is no such restriction" (s.35, p.10, q.52).
(v) The Applicant was also unaware of what "hell" is for Jehovah Witnesses ("it is hell, I don't know", s.35, p.10, q.51), when according to information (Ref 1), "hell" has a specific meaning for Jehovah Witnesses, and it is simply to be intended as "the grave" as the "dead are unconscious and so cannot feel pain".
(vi)When asked about family life or dating rules for Jehovah Witnesses, the Applicant responded, "There is no such restriction. They accept normal dating" (s.35, p.11, q.54). However, according to the Jehovah Witness Organization website, Jehovah Witnesses live by strict rules that encompass all aspects of family life, including dating.
(vii) The Applicant was asked why Jehovah Witnesses refuse blood transfusions, and he did not know (s.35, p.11, q.59).
6. As the Applicant could not answer basic questions on the faith he claimed to have converted to nine years previously and his answers were at variance with country of origin information (hereinafter "COI"), he was asked if he could offer an explanation for his lack of knowledge. However, he did not offer an explanation as he said:
"I don't know. I don't read the bible too often" (s.35, p.11, q.60).
As a result, the IPO found it not to be credible that he converted to the Jehovah Witness faith.
7. In addition, when the Applicant was expressly asked to provide a detailed account of the threats he received and of the assaults he was a victim of, he replied, "So there was verbal threats and physical threats. When my friends found out I was physically assaulted and beaten. There were verbal threats" (s.35, p.9, q.33). When asked again about specifics, he replied, "They were telling me that they would kill me" (s.35, p.9, q.34). When asked again how these people threatened him, he replied "I don't know how to respond to that. A threat is a threat" (s.35, p.9, q.36).
8. The IPO report noted that even though the Applicant was given several opportunities to provide a coherent and detailed account, he did not do so and it was therefore found that his account lacked reasonable specificity. As the Applicant failed to establish that he had converted and was a Jehovah's Witness, the IPO did not then consider a risk of persecution on religious grounds.
9. By Notice of Appeal dated the 30th of August, 2024, the Applicant appealed the recommendation of the IPO to the IPAT on the grounds that his account is credible and he is accordingly entitled to international protection. Further, within the Notice of Appeal, the Applicant sought that the Appeal be determined by way of oral hearing. Subsequently, detailed written submissions were lodged in support of the appeal. COI was submitted to support a claim that effective protection is not afforded to Jehovah's Witnesses in Georgia and that they are a marginalised group subjected to discrimination and hostility.
10. In a decision dated the 10th of February, 2025, which was communicated by letter dated the 11th of February, 2025, the Applicant was notified that pursuant to s. 46 of the 2015 Act, the IPAT had affirmed the recommendation that he should be given neither a refugee declaration nor a subsidiary protection declaration. In the same decision, the IPAT communicated its decision pursuant to s. 43(b) of the 2015 Act to refuse an oral hearing. The refusal of an oral hearing is reasoned in the IPAT decision and this aspect of the decision is not sought to be challenged in the within proceedings.
11. It is clear from the IPAT decision that all documentation submitted was considered but the Applicant's lack of knowledge in response to questioning in accordance with EUAA Guidance on Interviewing Applicants with Religion Based Asylum Clams (November, 2022) was considered fatal to his application and underpinned the IPAT's refusal to accept that the Applicant was a Jehovah's Witness as follows:
"The Appellant's substantial lack of knowledge as to a faith he states he embraced some nine years ago, and his lack of explanation as to why he does not have that knowledge is a strong factor against the credibility of his account of a sincere conversion to the Jehovah Witness faith. Accordingly, on the balance of probabilities, the Tribunal rejects the Appellant's assertion that he has converted to the Jehovah Witness religion."
12. The rejection of the Applicant's religious conversion was considered by IPAT to have a "material impact on the Applicant's claim that he was assaulted as a result of his religious conversion". In view of the lack of detail given in relation to the assaults and threats relied upon and whether they were connected to his religious faith (itself not accepted), the IPAT concluded:
"The Tribunal, as set out above, does not accept that the Appellant converted to the Jehovah Witness religion and in turn does not accept, on the balance of probabilities, that the Appellant was threatened and assaulted on account of his faith."
13. As for the COI considered by the IPAT, it is stated in the decision (at para. 32):
"In assessing the credibility of the Appellant's account, the Tribunal has given consideration throughout to the available COI listed above, (whether or not referred to expressly elsewhere in the body of this decision) in order to objectively assess the level of risk of persecution, if any, facing the Appellant in Georgia. The Tribunal is not satisfied that the Appellant faces a reasonable likelihood of persecution, in Georgia, based on any of the accepted material facts of the claim."
Substantial Grounds Threshold
14. In these proceedings, the Applicant seeks an order quashing the decision of the IPAT made under s. 46 of the 2015 Act. A challenge to this decision is subject to s. 5 of the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act, 2000 (hereinafter "the 2000 Act") and the higher threshold of "substantial grounds" applies to the decision to grant or refuse leave to proceed by way of judicial review.
15. The substantial grounds test for leave to proceed by way of judicial review which applies by virtue of s. 5 of the 2000 Act was as set out in McNamara v. An Bord Pleanála [1995] 2 ILRM 125 and approved in In Re Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Bill 1999 [2000] 2 IR 360 at 395, where the word "substantial" was interpreted as being equivalent to "reasonable", "arguable", and "weighty" and the Court held that such grounds must not be "trivial or tenuous" applies.
16. This is the test which I must now apply on this application.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
17. The Applicant advances several grounds of legal challenge in the Statement of Grounds upon which leave to proceed by way of judicial review is sought.
18. Firstly, it is contended that the IPAT erred in law by failing to consider material COI relevant to the treatment of Jehovah Witnesses when assessing the Applicant's credibility. In particular, it is complained that the Applicant submitted specific COI which the IPAT failed to consider in its decision.
19. Reliance is placed on O.M. v. The International Protection Appeals Tribunal & Anor [2025] IEHC 51 (Unreported, High Court, O'Regan J., 31st of January, 2025), it is stated at para. 9 under the heading "Breach of Fair Procedure/Section 28 of the 2015 Act":
"The applicant submits and the respondent accepts that based on the caselaw hereunder identified where documents have been submitted but not considered judicial review should be granted unless: - (i) the Court is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the missing documentation could have made no difference to the decision (SE v Minister for Justice & Equality [2022] IEHC 138, a judgment of Heslin J in the High Court); (ii) there is no arguable case that the missing documents are relevant to the matter (HA v Minister for Justice [2022] IECA 166 a judgment of Donnelly J in the Court of Appeal); (iii) the missing documentation does not achieve a minimum level of materiality (MTTK v The Refugee Appeals Tribunal & Ors. [2012] IEHC 155 a judgment of Cross J in the High Court)."
20. In similar terms, in Okito v. The Refugee Appeals Tribunal [2010] (Unreported, 16th of July, 2010), Ryan J. stated:
"If the material achieves a certain minimum level of materiality and credibility, then it should have been taken into account and the method by which it should have been weighed and considered and balanced out in the context of the case as a whole is a matter for the Tribunal. So in those circumstances, if the material does achieve this standard, then judicial review ought in general to follow. I say that it ought in general to follow, because there may be exceptions and qualifications, depending on the circumstances. On the other hand, if the material does not achieve this standard of relevance and credibility, then it is legitimate for the court to say that it is not sufficiently important to warrant the remedy of judicial review and the discretion is appropriately and properly exercised in refusing relief."
21. The Applicant also relies on A. (Albania) v. The Minister for Justice and Equality [2023] IEHC 692 (Unreported, High Court, Simons J., 15th of December, 2023), where Simons J. had regard to the Court of Appeal judgment in H.K. (Western Sahara) v. The Minister for Justice and Equality [2022] IECA 141. There, the Court of Appeal at paragraph 104 stated:
"[...] It is an inescapable corollary of the obligation to give reasons for an administrative decision that the question of whether the decision-maker has complied with his or her statutory remit must be determined by reference to the reasons that are actually offered in the determination."
22. At para. 21 of his judgment, Simons J. observed that there:
"is almost nothing in the decision/report by way of engagement with or assessment of the submissions made by the Applicant".
Later, the learned Judge stated that it:
"is not sufficient simply to recite the submissions made without in any way engaging with same".
23. It is objected on behalf of the Applicant that in the decision on this application, there is not even a recitation of the submissions made concerning the situation of someone in the Applicant's position, which it is also contended to be in breach of the obligation to consider same, identified by the same Judge in K. (Zimbabwe) v. The International Protection Appeals Tribunal [2023] IEHC 6.
24. I am not satisfied that any of the authorities cited can support the Applicant's contention that there has been a failure to consider COI or documentation in the assessment of his application on the particular facts of this case. The Applicant has identified nowhere within his submissions what document he contends ought to have been given further consideration. True it is that COI submitted was relied upon to support the existence of difficulties for Jehovah's Witnesses in Georgia which in turn could support a claimant who reported difficulties consistent with those documented in COI. It is clear from the IPAT decision, however, that COI was considered but did not assist the Applicant where he failed to establish that he was a Jehovah's Witness. The IPAT supports its conclusions in this regard in a reasoned and rational way having regard to material before it, principally the Applicant's own responses in interview and objective COI in relation to the practice of a true Jehovah's Witness.
25. Given the clear and reasoned rejection of the claim that the Applicant was a Jehovah's Witness at all on a rational basis which was in turn tied to the material before the IPAT, it seems to me that there can be no further obligation on the IPAT to engage in a reasoned fashion in its decision with COI which documents difficulties encountered by real or accepted Jehovah's Witnesses in Georgia. One might rhetorically ask what the point of such engagement would be where it is rejected that the Applicant has demonstrated that he ever converted and is a Jehovah's Witness.
26. In addition to the complaint in relation to an alleged failure to consider COI and documentation, it is further complained that the IPAT erred in law at para. 27 of its decision by irrationally and/or disproportionately relying on the Applicant's motives for becoming a Jehovah Witness in a papers-only appeal where the Applicant was only asked a single question on this in his s.35 "personal interview" at Q. 40 of the record of his interview. At Q. 40, the Applicant was asked why he converted to a Jehovah's Witness. He replied:
"I had an interest. I attended multiple meetings and I decided to change."
27. In circumstances where this is but one of a series of questions to which there was an unsatisfactory response and where there is nothing in the IPAT decision about the Applicant's motives for becoming a Jehovah's Witness but instead this question and answer is identified together with a series of other questions, I am at a loss to understand the basis upon which the Applicant complains that there was a problem with this single question being relied upon together with others. It bears note that the IPAT makes no further comment about the Applicant's motives for becoming a Jehovah's Witness.
28. The contention that the IPAT erred in law at para. 27 of its decision by irrationally and/or disproportionately relying on the Applicant's lack of knowledge of the religion in circumstances where he had not yet been baptised and so had not yet gone through the three-step conversion process, culminating in the final step of baptism, lacks any merit having regard to the basis upon which the claim for international protection was advanced. It must be recalled that the Applicant claimed to have converted more than 9 years previously. The very fact that he then said he was not yet baptised when it was pointed out that his knowledge was unsatisfactory does not excuse his ignorance and does not detract from the fact that it was entirely reasonable for the IPAT to refer to his lack of knowledge in concluding that he had not in fact converted. It seems to me that it cannot reasonably be contended that this was a conclusion which the IPAT was not entitled to reach based on the information before it.
29. Similarly, I must reject the contention made on behalf of the Applicant that the IPAT erred in its "overtly literal reliance on the applicant's statement in his translated questionnaire to the effect that he "confirmed" his religious beliefs some years ago, in 2015, to make a finding on "the centrality of baptism," as per the document at https://www.jw.org/en/jehovahs witnesses/faq/how-to-become-jehovahs-witness/." The Applicant's complaint in this regard is non-sensical. It is unarguable that the IPAT was entitled to have regard to the Applicant's lack of knowledge about baptism and the fact that he claimed to not yet be baptised in assessing the credibility of the Applicant's claim.
30. I am satisfied that the Applicant was fully on notice that his knowledge of the Jehovah's Witness religion, including baptism, was considered inadequate as these issues were explored with him at some length in his interview and were documented in the s. 39 Report. In my view, he cannot reasonably claim in these proceedings to be surprised by the IPAT's conclusions based on COI disclosed to him in advance of its decision, in view of concerns already clearly signalled in the s. 39 Report. I see no proper basis for impugning the IPAT's conclusions in this regard on the Applicant's case as pleaded.
31. Similarly, I have not been persuaded that there is any merit even on arguable grounds to the Applicant's contention that the IPAT erred in law by failing to meaningfully engage with the Applicant's responses to what it categorises at para. 27 of the IPAT decision as:
"key elements as to the practice of the faith he has converted to, inter alia who founded the faith, what is the Watch Tower Bible and what hell is for a Jehovah witness. The Appellant's responses are generalised and non-specific".
32. The Applicant's responses on these issues are clearly documented and self-evidently generalised and non-specific. There is no legal requirement for the IPAT to repeat the responses given to illustrate its criticism. The basis for the criticism is entirely intelligible and clear. All that is required is to refer across to the record of the s. 35 interview. Notably, the Applicant does not identify what mitigating response he thinks should have been referred to by the IPAT and addressed before reaching this conclusion.
33. The reality in this case is that the Applicant answered a whole series of questions incorrectly. This is not a case where the Applicant displayed a breadth of knowledge through a host of correct answers but simply was unclear in a small number or answered one or two questions incorrectly. Nor, indeed, were the questions asked of a kind that would require some expert knowledge or theological knowledge removed from everyday practice. Where hardly any knowledge was displayed by the Applicant, it is difficult to afford any real weight to the Applicant's complaint of lack of "engagement with the responses themselves vis-à-vis any correct response to the specific question asked, however broad that correct response might be framed". I am not satisfied that an arguable basis for placing such an onus on the IPAT to address every response given is supported by law or principle identified on behalf of the Applicant.
34. Next it is contended on behalf of the Applicant that the IPAT erred in law by failing at para. 27 to apply the correct standard of proof and/or by its irrational consideration of the Applicant's claim that he was assaulted on account of his religious belief. Here, the Applicant relies on the fact that the IPAT states that:
"The Appellant is not clear that the assaults were connected to his religious faith, given no words were said during the assault and nothing was mentioned as to the Appellant stopping the practice of his faith".
35. The Applicant submits that on any reasonable reading of the Applicant's responses at interview in questions 21-25 inclusive, he had established on the balance of probability when coupled with the benefit of any doubt, that the attack on his person was motivated by religion, notwithstanding the Applicant's own evidence that no express reference was made to this during the assault. I cannot agree that the submission made on behalf of the Applicant in this regard supports a conclusion that an arguable basis for contending the IPAT decision is unlawful has been identified in this regard. Through the responses identified, the Applicant merely asserted that he was assaulted because of his religion but he did not identify any factual basis for his asserted belief.
36. It is impossible to ignore when considering the tenability of this last ground of complaint that fundamentally and for good reason that the IPAT did not accept that the Applicant was a Jehovah's Witness at all. In those circumstances, something more than the Applicant's assertion that his religion was why he was assaulted was required before it could be argued that the IPAT erred in the way it concluded that the Applicant had not satisfied it on applicable standards that he had been assaulted because of his religion.
CONCLUSION
37. For the reasons set out, I am not satisfied that the Applicant has discharged the burden on him at leave stage of demonstrating substantial grounds for seeking the relief claimed by way of judicial review. I do not consider the basis advanced meets a threshold of "reasonable" or "weighty". It seems to me that the complaint maintained is in the realm of "trivial" and "tenuous." Accordingly, I refuse leave in this case.