THE HIGH COURT
JUDICIAL REVIEW
[2025] IEHC 185
Record No. 2025 295 JR
BETWEEN
G. L.
APPLICANT
AND
THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION APPEALS TRIBUNAL AND THE MINISTER FOR JUSTICE
RESPONDENTS
RULING of Ms. Justice Siobhán Phelan, delivered on the 28th day of March, 2025.
INTRODUCTION
1. In these proceedings the Applicant seeks to challenge the decision of the International Protection Appeals Tribunal (hereinafter "the IPAT") dated the 6th of February, 2025, made pursuant to s. 46 of the International Protection Act, 2015 (hereinafter "the 2015 Act") affirming the recommendation of the International Protection Officer under s. 39(3)(c) of the 2015 Act in finding that he was not entitled to subsidiary protection or refugee status.
BACKGROUND
2. The Applicant is a national of Georgia. He made a claim for international protection on the 19th of October, 2022, on the basis that if returned to Georgia he would face persecution and/or serious harm arising from his family members subjecting him to psychological abuse and death threats after he and his cousin were involved in a car crash occurring in 2017 in which his cousin died. The Applicant was driving the car at the time.
3. The Applicant completed his interview/application forms pursuant to the 2015 Act (ss.13(2) and 15) on the 19th of October, 2022, and his international protection questionnaire on the 24th of November, 2022. Of note, the questionnaire was completed in Georgian.
4. The Applicant's legal representatives made submissions to the IPO (hereinafter "IPO") by way of cover letter of the 22nd of January, 2024, providing documentation and COI. A Medico-Legal Report by Dr. Gillian Moore-Groake, Consultant Psychologist dated 22nd January 2024 was also provided to the IPO on the 24th of January, 2024.
5. In this report, it was confirmed that the Applicant suffered severe post-traumatic stress disorder and had ongoing suicidal ideation. Dr. Moore-Groake concluded that the Applicant would be "extremely vulnerable if he had to return to Georgia." The report records that the Applicant's father had asked him to leave the family home and alongside members of his family and community had called him a murdered and this played "heavily on his mind".
6. The Applicant underwent his s. 35 interview on the 9th of February, 2024. At the beginning of his interview, he confirmed that his questionnaire was correct and accurate.
7. The Applicant was refused international protection in the State at first instance by the IPO by way of s.39 report dated the 9th of February, 2024, as sent by way of cover letter of the 28th of February, 2024. In this report, the IPO accepted that the Applicant's identity and personal circumstances and accepted that the Applicant's cousin died in a car crash in July, 2017. Considering the Applicant's claim to have been verbally abused and oppressed by his family members as they blamed him for the death of his cousin, it was pointed out that there were inconsistencies in the Applicant's account. His claims of psychological abuse during interview were summarised to him and accepted by him as comprised only of verbal abuse and psychological pressure and it was put to him that in his Questionnaire (completed by him in Georgian) he stated that he had been physically assaulted (Questionnaire Part 4.1).
8. It is noted in the s. 39 report that when this contradiction was put to him for explanation, the Applicant replied, "I don't remember the Questionnaire what I said exactly. There was nothing life threatening or anything like that. Nothing happened'' (s.35 pg 10 Q.48). The IPO considered that his response failed to address the inconsistency which had been put to him.
9. It was also noted in the s. 39 report that in the s. 35 interview the Applicant based his claim mainly on the constant harassment he received from his cousin, stating that it was his cousin who he feared if he returned to Georgia as he suffered from substance abuse and is capable of doing anything (s.35 pg 6 Q.15, pg 7 Q.24, 27, 28, 29 & pg 8 Q.41). The IPO pointed out that the Applicant never mentioned his cousin in his Questionnaire. Instead, he stated that he was assaulted verbally and physically by family members and only referred specifically to his father (Questionnaire Part 4.1). He also stated that he himself suffered from alcohol addiction and again did not mention his cousin who had an addiction who he feared was capable of doing anything (Questionnaire Part 4.1).
10. As set out in the s. 39 report, the Applicant was asked why he never mentioned his cousin in his Questionnaire despite him being the main reason why he did not want to return to Georgia on the account given at interview and he replied, "'In the Questionnaire I said I had a problem with alcohol.... The Questionnaire did not include the detail. I said there was a problem but it was not specific. I was living on a chair in Citywest for 45 days so I do not remember what I wrote. I was very tired" (s.35 pg 10. Q.49 - 50). The IPO concluded that given that the harassment he received from his cousin was the core aspect of his claim at interview; the Applicant would have been expected to mention him in his Questionnaire. This omission was considered to undermine his claim.
11. The IPO also considered the psychologist's report submitted which stated that he suffers from PTSD as a result of the accident and has been badly treatment by his family members, but noted that this report is based on the Applicant's own testimony and is therefore considered of limited probative value. Taking all of the above credibility issues into consideration, and in the absence of any supporting documentation, the IPO found that it was not credible, on the balance of probabilities, that the Applicant was verbally abused and oppressed by his family members as they blamed him for the death of his cousin. Accordingly, this material fact was rejected.
12. The Applicant appealed the decision to the IPAT by way of Notice of Appeal with submissions, documentation and country of origin information (hereinafter "COI"). The Applicant provided additional details in relation to his claim, set out the difficulties with the translations/interpreters provided to him during the IPO stage of his application and requested an oral hearing. The Applicant disputed adverse credibility findings made and contended that inadequate regard had been had to the medico legal report. It was contended that based on the Appellant's claim, he had "demonstrated a real risk of persecution and/or serious harm should he be returned to Georgia on the basis of his being a victim of domestic violence, his being the member of a particular social group as a person who has caused the death of a family member, and as a person who has diagnosed mental health issues". It was further contended that the Applicant had demonstrated sufficient grounds to surmount the rebuttable presumption arising from the designation of Georiga as a safe country of origin.
13. In requesting an oral hearing, the Applicant relied upon the nature and number of findings "as set out and contested here" which it was contended could not be justly resolved without an oral hearing. No specific findings were identified. It was, however, contended in general terms that an ability to provide vive voce evidence would have a material effect on the assessment of his credibility and a likely impact on the decision of the Tribunal.
14. The IPAT decided the Applicant's appeal without an oral hearing, by way of decision dated the 6th of February, 2025, with email and cover letters of that same date upholding the decision of the IPO, not to grant refugee status. or subsidiary protection to the Applicant. The Tribunal re-issued the said decision by way of email and letters dated the 13th of February, 2025, due to what appears to be an administrative issue with the recording of the Applicant's change of address.
15. In its decision, the IPAT noted that no new element of the claim had been advanced on appeal and that there was no specific detail that required to be probed in order to be addressed. It was satisfied that the claim and credibility findings were capable of objective assessment on the papers and were not based on subjective factors arising from interview. Reference was made in the decision to the medico-legal report, the inconsistencies in the Applicant's account (specifically as between claimed physical and verbal assault and verbal assault only) and the lack of detail as to what was said, by whom and when in response to questioning during interview. The IPAT concluded at para. 32 of its decision as follows:
"The Tribunal accepts the Appellant was involved in a road traffic collision, which caused the death of his cousin, and that he has mental health difficulties arising out of this accident. The Tribunal is not satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the Appellant was threatened and psychologically oppressed by family members and relatives over a 5 year period as claimed after his cousin was killed in the accident."
The Tribunal continued to consider whether on this basis the Applicant had established a well-founded fear of persecution concluding at para. 36 as follows:
"The Tribunal has accepted that the Appellant's personal circumstances as stated previously, including he is a 30-year-old single man without children from Akhmeta, Georgia. He is educated, worked in Georgia and has contact with friend and family there. The Appellant was involved in a road traffic collision, which caused the death of his cousin. The Appellant has mental health difficulties arising out of this accident. The Tribunal has considered the COI and finds while there are barriers to health treatment the Appellant has not been prevented from attending and receiving such treatment in Georgia. The Tribunal does not find that the issues put forward reach the degree of severity in order to amount to persecution or reach the high threshold set by Section 7 of the Act, and the Tribunal has no clear evidence before it to suggest that the Appellant would be at risk in the future."
Substantial Grounds Threshold
16. In these proceedings, the Applicant seeks an order quashing the decision of the Tribunal made under s.46 of the 2015 Act. This decision is subject to s. 5 of the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act, 2000 and the higher threshold of "substantial grounds" applies to the decision to grant or refuse leave to proceed by way of judicial review.
17. The substantial grounds test for leave to proceed by way of judicial review which applies by virtue of s. 5 of the 2000 Act was as set out in McNamara v. An Bord Pleanála [1995] 2 ILRM 125 and approved in In Re Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Bill 1999 [2000] 2 IR 360 at 395, where the word "substantial" was interpreted as being equivalent to "reasonable", "arguable", and "weighty" and the Court held that such grounds must not be "trivial or tenuous" applies.
18. I must now decided whether the claim advanced in these proceedings on behalf of the Applicant meets this test.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
19. The decision of the IPAT is sought to be impugned on a variety of grounds. Complaints are advanced based on a failure to convene an oral hearing, the treatment of the medical report, the assessment of the claim and the treatment of COI. I proposed to address each of these in turn.
20. Firstly, insofar as the complaint in relation to the absence of an oral hearing is concerned, it is accepted on behalf of the Applicant that detailed consideration was given to the request for an oral hearing between pages 5 and 12 of the IPAT decision. Objection is taken to the statement that the only purpose of the oral hearing was to give the Applicant an opportunity to repeat his evidence, however, in circumstances where the Notice of Appeal did not identify any specific factual matter which the Applicant wished to address in further evidence or outline what further evidence he might be in a position to give, it seems to me that this was fair comment. While it is true that the Applicant sought an oral hearing, the grounds advanced were generic and not focussed on any matter particular to his case. The Notice of Appeal and accompanying submissions did not identify any area of factual contention upon which an opportunity to give further evidence was necessary because the Applicant had additional information not already given or could clarify answers already given.
21. Even in the Statement of Grounds, no particular factual area is identified as warranting an oral hearing. No specific findings in the IPAT decision are identified as having been made in breach of the requirements of fair procedures because the Applicant could have said something in response, had an opportunity been afforded. Furthermore, no new factual matters are identified as underpinning the IPAT decision when compared to the earlier IPO decision such as might have warranted an oral hearing on appeal. The mere fact that a claim is rejected on credibility grounds does not warrant the grant of an oral hearing. The IPAT's reasoning in concluding that an oral hearing was not necessary is clear, intelligible and rationally related to the facts and circumstances of this claim. I am not satisfied that the Applicant has demonstrated substantial grounds for challenging the refusal of an oral hearing under s. 43(b) of the 2015 Act in this case.
22. Insofar as complaint is made regarding the treatment of the medico-legal report, it is to recall the terms in which the medico-legal report was expressed. It is significant that the IPAT accepted that the Applicant has mental health issues arising from the death of his cousin in a car crash, as confirmed by the medico-legal report. The Applicant's claim was not rejected because those mental health issues were disputed or trivialised or were not caused by the death of the Applicant's cousin in a car crash, being the primary import of the medico-legal report, but because it was not accepted that the Applicant had been subjected to threatening behaviour from family members in a manner which constitutes persecution.
23. Although the medico-legal report summarises a history given by the Applicant in which he refers to his father and family members calling him a murderer and asking him to leave and records a reported fear of assault if he returns to Georgia, it reaches no conclusions and offers no opinion as to whether the Applicant's symptoms of mental health issues are consistent with persecutory treatment alleged. The report is not couched in terms typical of reports prepared in accordance with the Istanbul Protocol, summarised in relevant part in A.S. v. IPAT [2023] IEHC 53, an authority handed into court by counsel in moving the application for leave. Most importantly, the report does not purport to substantiate a claim of ill-treatment or to establish a correlation between the mental health sequelae identified and the alleged ill-treatment.
24. Whilst the medico-legal report confirms the extreme vulnerability of the Applicant if returned to Georgia in view of previous suicide attempts and ongoing suicidal ideation, it does not seek to correlate this risk of harm with the ill-treatment he alleges to ground his application or confirm that his treatment at the hands of others is causative. The mental health sequelae described against the history given by the Applicant might equally result from the trauma of being a driver involved in a fatal car accident. In the circumstances, little support may be derived from the decision in A.S. v. IPAT.
25. It is striking that the medico-legal report in this case is not expressed in terms addressed to the credibility of claimed verbal assaults and psychological pressure other than the extent to which a summary of the history given by the Applicant is contained therein. Unlike the position in A.S. v. IPAT, in this case there has been no discounting of the medical evidence in assessing the claim. In its terms the content of the report makes no relevant findings in this regard.
26. The absence of findings in the medico-legal report which might be considered probative of the Applicant's claim of persecution, this being the basis for rejecting his claim and not a conclusion that he did not suffer mental health difficulties, is significantly undermining of the Applicant's claim in these proceedings that there has been a failure to have proper regard to the medico-legal report. In these circumstances, I have not been persuaded that the Applicant identifies substantial grounds for contending that the treatment of the medico-legal report by the IPAT was legally flawed such that the decision of the IPAT might be amenable to being quashed on this basis.
27. As for the complaint made regarding the assessment of the claim, it appears from the outline submissions prepared that the focus of complaint in this regard is that concerns regarding vagueness and lack of detail had been contained in the s. 39 report such that the assessment by the IPAT was flawed because these matters were not put to the Applicant prior to the decision issuing. The authorities identified in this part of the submissions made on behalf of the Applicant do not support a conclusion that the Applicant could have a reasonable prospect of succeeding on this complaint. It is incontrovertible that questions of vagueness and lack of detail were raised with the Applicant during his interview. The questions and his responses are recorded in black and white.
28. No authority has been identified which supports a contention that there is a necessity for the IPO to rely on a finding of vagueness for the IPAT to be able to do so where the Applicant had been afforded an opportunity to address an assertion that the claim was vague and lacking in detail. Indeed, while detailed written representations were made on behalf of the Applicant in support of his appeal to the IPAT, no attempt was made to elaborate in any way on the detail of his claim, even though issues of vagueness and lack of detail were manifest on the face of the record of the s. 35 interview. I cannot conclude that the Applicant meets the substantial grounds threshold for leave to challenge the IPAT decision by reason of an alleged failure to assess the claim on the various grounds advanced in the Statement of Grounds on the basis of the material facts and information on the facts and circumstances of this case and having regard to the terms of the decision.
29. Finally, in relation to COI, it is contended that the IPAT failed to consider the Applicant's credibility in the context of available COI and the material submitted (10 items submitted). It is complained that the IPAT refers only briefly and generally to COI at paragraphs 36, 38, 44 and 46. In this regard, it is true that reference was made to COI on behalf of the Applicant in submissions advanced to the IPAT. The COI was general in nature relating to the situation in Georgia, a designated safe country of origin, with regard to matters such as law enforcement abuses and lack of accountability, political polarisation, lack of media freedom, human rights abuses, domestic violence and inadequate response from the police and ineffective investigation of violence. It is striking that in the appeal submissions made on behalf of the Applicant, no real attempt is made to demonstrate how the COI relied upon should be considered relevant to the Applicant's claim. Afterall, the Applicant never made a complaint to the police because, as he said during interview, he was not physically beaten.
30. Although a complaint regarding the treatment of COI is advanced, neither the Statement of Grounds nor written submissions filed on behalf of the Applicant identify any item of COI which ought to have been addressed in the light of the conclusions reached. I am not satisfied that any aspect of COI has been identified as supportive of the Applicant's particular claim in a manner which arguably requires that it be addressed in the decision. In my view, no reasonable basis for maintaining that the decision is flawed because of a failure to properly assess the claim having regard to relevant COI has been demonstrated.
31. While some COI is identified in submissions in relation to difficulties in accessing mental health services, it was not part of the Applicant's claim that he had any such difficulties and in consequence no obligation on the IPAT to consider COI in this regard. Indeed, it bears note given that complaint is advanced in the Statement of Grounds in relation to a failure to "put the matter of the Applicant being able to receive mental health treatment in Georgia to the Applicant", that not only was it never claimed by the Applicant that he had a difficulty accessing services in any manner relevant to his claim but the medico-legal report records that the Applicant reported attending a psychologist on a number of occasions for trauma and PTSD counselling following the death of his cousin and took anti-depressant medication for a time following the accident. Accordingly, the complaint advanced in this regard is not stateable.
CONCLUSION
32. For the reasons set out, I am not satisfied that the Applicant has discharged the burden on him at leave stage of demonstrating substantial grounds for seeking relief by way of judicial review. I do not consider the basis advanced meets a threshold of reasonable or weighty but are in the realm of trivial and tenuous. Accordingly, I refuse leave in this case.