No 06 of 2006, No 01 of 2007, No 11 of 2007
Date:  31 July 2007
Before:

THE MASTER OF THE ROLLS
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IN THE MATTER OF THE SOLICITORS ACT 1974
AND IN THE MATTER OF THE MASTER OF THE ROLLS
(APPEALS AND APPLICATIONS) REGULATIONS 2001
AND IN THE MATTER OF:

Between:

	No 06 of 2006		
	(1) CHRISTIAN JIDEOFO		
	and		
	THE LAW SOCIETY		
			
	and		
			
	No 01 of 2007		
	(2) SUSAN MAIR EVANS		
	and		
	THE SOLICITORS REGULATION AUTHORITY		
			
	and		
			
	No 11 of 2007		
	(3) MANA BEGUM		
	and		
	THE SOLICITORS REGULATION AUTHORITY		
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Ms Evans in person
Mr Richard Colbey (of counsel) for Ms Begum
Mr Iain Miller (Solicitor/Advocate of Bevan Brittan, London, EC4M 7RF)  and Mr Mark Pardoe for the Respondents

Hearing date: 30 July 2007
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Judgment

Sir Anthony Clarke MR: 
Introduction
1.	Three appeals were listed for hearing yesterday 30 July 2007.  They were listed because they each raise the same question of principle which has not been determined before.  That question is what is the appropriate test for determining an individual’s character and suitability for admission as a student member of the Law Society and then as a solicitor.

2.	The three appeals were: Jideofo v The Law Society (No 06 of 2006); Evans v The Solicitors Regulation Authority (No 01 of 2007); and Begum v The Solicitors Regulation Authority (No 11 of 2007).  Throughout this judgment I shall for ease of reference refer to the respondent as the Law Society.  The difference in the respondents’ title simply reflects the alteration in regulation of the profession that has recently occurred and has no material bearing on the merits of the appeals.

3.	Jideofo v The Law Society is an appeal brought under Regulation 32(3)(ii) of the Training Regulations 1990 (‘the 1990 Regulations’).  Mr Jideofo appeals from a decision of Russell Wallman, the Senior Director (Regulation), dated 15 March 2006 to oppose his admission as a solicitor under Regulation 32(2)(vii) of the 1990 Regulations.  In opposing Mr Jideofo’s admission, Mr Wallman did so under authority delegated to him by the Law Society’s Regulation Board.  A review of the 15 March 2006 decision was rejected by a Law Society review panel on 11 July 2006.  In his appeal Mr Jideofo sought an order requiring the Law Society to withdraw its opposition to his admission and that he be admitted as a solicitor.  He has withdrawn his appeal, so that it is neither necessary nor appropriate to say anything about his case, save that I understand that it has been agreed that there is to be no order as to costs.  

4.	Evans v The Solicitors Regulation Authority is an appeal from a decision by a Law Society adjudicator, dated 11 September 2006, which refused her application for student membership of the Law Society.  That decision was communicated to her on 13 September 2006.  It was upheld on a review by a further adjudicator on 27 October 2006.  Ms Evans seeks an order in the present appeal that the Law Society be directed to issue her with a certificate of enrolment as a student member of the Law Society.

5.	Begum v The Solicitors Regulation Authority is an appeal from a decision of a Law Society adjudicator, dated 24 November 2006, to cancel her student membership of the Law Society and refuse admission as a solicitor.  That decision was upheld on a review by the Law Society’s review panel, on 21 March 2007.  Ms Begum now appeals pursuant to Regulation 32(3)(ii) of the 1990 Regulations.  She seeks an order either directing that she be admitted as a solicitor or, in the alternative, confirming her admission as a student member.

The principles
6.	There is no direct authority setting out the principles to be applied when an individual applies for student membership of the Law Society or for admission to the roll of solicitors. The Law Society submits that the authorities which establish the test for character and suitability for re-admission as a solicitor following a striking-off from the roll ought to apply, mutatis mutandis, to the assessment of character and suitability pre-admission.  The position at that later stage is not in dispute: see the decision of the Court of Appeal in Bolton v The Law Society [1994] 1 WLR 512 (‘Bolton’), where Sir Thomas Bingham MR set out the principles in detail.  I will return to the relevant authorities below. 
The statutory framework
7.	The starting point must be the relevant statutory provisions.  First, in order to be admitted as a student member of the Law Society and issued with a certificate of enrolment an unadmitted person must satisfy the Law Society as to their ‘character and suitability’ under Regulation 6 (1) of the Training Regulations 1990 (‘the 1990 Regulations’).  Following enrolment and satisfactory completion of the relevant vocational and practical training a student member can apply for admission as a solicitor.  Before a student member is permitted to proceed to admission he or she is required to satisfy the Law Society under section 3(1)(b) of the Solicitors Act 1974 (‘the 1974 Act’) that, amongst other things, they have they have the requisite ‘character and suitability to be a solicitor.’  The Law Society also has power to take various steps under Regulation 32(2) of the 1990 Regulations, such as cancelling enrolment and opposing admission, if it at ‘any time is not satisfied as to the character and suitability of an unadmitted person to become a solicitor.’ 

8.	The Law Society is thus under a statutory duty to assess at a number of stages whether an unadmitted person has the requisite ‘character and suitability’ to become a solicitor. While there is no authoritative guidance as to the correct approach to be taken when carrying out these assessments, there is a well-established analogous jurisdiction, which arises where the question is whether a solicitor ought to be struck off the roll and what are the circumstances relevant to any application to be restored to the roll following a strike-off made on the grounds of the solicitor’s dishonesty. It is this jurisdiction which it is submitted ought to also govern the position pre-admission.
The test
9.	The leading authority is Bolton, in which Sir Thomas Bingham MR, with whom Rose and Waite LJJ agreed, said at pages 518 – 519:
“It is required of lawyers practising in this country that they should discharge their professional duties with integrity, probity and complete trustworthiness. That requirement applies as much to barristers as it does to solicitors. If I make no further reference to barristers it is because this appeal concerns a solicitor, and where a client's moneys have been misappropriated the complaint is inevitably made against a solicitor, since solicitors receive and handle clients' moneys and barristers do not.
Any solicitor who is shown to have discharged his professional duties with anything less than complete integrity, probity and trustworthiness must expect severe sanctions to be imposed upon him by the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal. Lapses from the required high standard may, of course, take different forms and be of varying degrees. The most serious involves proven dishonesty, whether or not leading to criminal proceedings and criminal penalties. In such cases the tribunal has almost invariably, no matter how strong the mitigation advanced for the solicitor, ordered that he be struck off the Roll of Solicitors. Only infrequently, particularly in recent years, has it been willing to order the restoration to the Roll of a solicitor against whom serious dishonesty had been established, even after a passage of years, and even where the solicitor had made every effort to re-establish himself and redeem his reputation. If a solicitor is not shown to have acted dishonestly, but is shown to have fallen below the required standards of integrity, probity and trustworthiness, his lapse is less serious but it remains very serious indeed in a member of a profession whose reputation depends upon trust. A striking off order will not necessarily follow in such a case, but it may well. The decision whether to strike off or to suspend will often involve a fine and difficult exercise of judgment, to be made by the tribunal as an informed and expert body on all the facts of the case. Only in a very unusual and venial case of this kind would the tribunal be likely to regard as appropriate any order less severe than one of suspension.
It is important that there should be full understanding of the reasons why the tribunal makes orders which might otherwise seem harsh. There is, in some of these orders, a punitive element: a penalty may be visited on a solicitor who has fallen below the standards required of his profession in order to punish him for what he has done and to deter any other solicitor tempted to behave in the same way. Those are traditional objects of punishment. But often the order is not punitive in intention. Particularly is this so where a criminal penalty has been imposed and satisfied. The solicitor has paid his debt to society. There is no need, and it would be unjust, to punish him again. In most cases the order of the tribunal will be primarily directed to one or other or both of two other purposes. One is to be sure that the offender does not have the opportunity to repeat the offence. This purpose is achieved for a limited period by an order of suspension; plainly it is hoped that experience of suspension will make the offender meticulous in his future compliance with the required standards. The purpose is achieved for a longer period, and quite possibly indefinitely, by an order of striking off. The second purpose is the most fundamental of all: to maintain the reputation of the solicitors' profession as one in which every member, of whatever standing, may be trusted to the ends of the earth. To maintain this reputation and sustain public confidence in the integrity of the profession it is often necessary that those guilty of serious lapses are not only expelled but denied re-admission. If a member of the public sells his house, very often his largest asset, and entrusts the proceeds to his  solicitor, pending re-investment in another house, he is ordinarily entitled to expect that the solicitor will be a person whose trustworthiness is not, and never has been, seriously in question. Otherwise, the whole profession, and the public as a whole, is injured. A profession's most valuable asset is its collective reputation and the confidence which that inspires.
Because orders made by the tribunal are not primarily punitive, it follows that considerations which would ordinarily weigh in mitigation of punishment have less effect on the exercise of this jurisdiction than on the ordinary run of sentences imposed in criminal cases. It often happens that a solicitor appearing before the tribunal can adduce a wealth of glowing tributes from his professional brethren. He can often show that for him and his family the consequences of striking off or suspension would be little short of tragic. Often he will say, convincingly, that he has learned his lesson and will not offend again. On applying for restoration after striking off, all these points may be made, and the former solicitor may also be able to point to real efforts made to re-establish himself and redeem his reputation. All these matters are relevant and should be considered. But none of them touches the essential issue, which is the need to maintain among members of the public a well-founded confidence that any solicitor whom they instruct will be a person of unquestionable integrity, probity and trustworthiness. Thus it can never be an objection to an order of suspension in an appropriate case that the solicitor may be unable to re-establish his practice when the period of suspension is past. If that proves, or appears likely, to be so the consequence for the individual and his family may be deeply unfortunate and unintended. But it does not make suspension the wrong order if it is otherwise right. The reputation of the profession is more important than the fortunes of any individual member. Membership of a profession brings many benefits, but that is a part of the price.”

10.	That decision, which has been followed on many occasions, establishes that where a solicitor has committed proven acts of dishonesty he will almost always be struck off the roll.  Where there has been serious dishonesty, such as fraud or theft, only after a number of years during which the individual has redeemed his reputation will he be able to seek re-admission. Even then, only in rare cases will such a person be re-admitted. There must be exceptional circumstances justifying restoration to the roll. The reason for this stringent approach is the public interest in protecting the public and maintaining the reputation of the profession. 
11.	Bolton related only to conduct post-admission. The principles enunciated by Sir Thomas Bingham MR have been extended by the decision of the High Court in Re A Solicitor (Ofosuhene) (21 February 1997 unreported).  Mr Ofusehene was a solicitor whose conduct had been referred to the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal (‘the SDT’).  The SDT declined jurisdiction on the basis that the conduct complained of arose prior to his admission as a solicitor.  The Divisional Court allowed the Law Society’s appeal.  Rose LJ, with whom Nelson and Hooper JJ agreed, said:
“It seems to me to be plain that the whole purpose of (section 47) is to enable jurisdiction to be exercised over those presently practising as solicitors.  It is, as Sir Thomas Bingham MR pointed out in Bolton …, both in the public interest and in the interest of maintaining the reputation of the solicitors’ profession, that this should be so and that appropriate standards should be maintained by those who practise as solicitors.
To this end, it seems to me that if, in the past, one who is now a solicitor has behaved in a way which is incompatible with such standards, it is, and should be open to the tribunal to say so and to control the circumstances in which, if at all, he or she should continue to practice in the future. It is entirely consonant with this purpose, that the tribunal should exercise jurisdiction over one who is a solicitor by reference to past behaviour, whatever his or her status at the time of that behaviour. The tribunal’s jurisdiction over a person accused rests solely and entirely on the present status of an accused as a solicitor. Whether in a particular case past conduct is compatible with the accused continuing in practice will depend, plainly, on the nature of the conduct as proved before and assessed by the tribunal.”
12.	In that case the Divisional Court thus accepted that conduct which occurred prior to admission could be referred to the SDT for it to assess whether the solicitor should be subject to disciplinary sanctions, which would include an order striking the solicitor from the roll.  It so concluded by reference to the principles in Bolton and in particular to the public interest and the importance of maintaining the reputation of the profession.
13.	The decision in Ofosuhene establishes that if the Law Society had not become aware of the present appellants’ convictions before they became solicitors, it would have been able to file a complaint in respect of their pre-admission convictions and conduct with the SDT and seek an order striking them off the roll.  In carrying out that assessment the SDT would apply the test in Bolton.
14.	These considerations in my opinion point strongly to the conclusion that the same underlying principles apply to conduct both pre-admission and post-admission.  It would be irrational to hold that a different test applies where matters come to the Law Society’s attention pre-admission from the case where those same matters come to its attention post-admission.  Whether they are discovered pre or post-admission the question remains the same, namely whether the relevant evidence demonstrates that the person concerned is a fit person to be a solicitor.  It would make no sense for the Law Society to admit an individual whose conduct, if assessed by the SDT, would lead to them being struck off the roll as being an individual who was not a fit and proper person to be a solicitor.
15.	I note in passing that a similar approach was adopted by Newman J in the case of dentists Fleischmann [2005] EWHC 87 (Admin).  He said at [55] that, when assessing conduct and misconduct, the same standard should be applied to pre-admission and post-admission behaviour.  He put it this way:
“… the disciplining of a registered dentist involves subtly different considerations from those which apply to an applicant for registration. That said, I have no doubt that the differences should not be allowed to give rise to  the existence of a double standard in connection with those who are entitled to be in practice. The requirement that an applicant for registration be of ‘good character’ secures the need for the public to be protected by the maintenance of high standards and the high reputation of the profession which has to be served at the stage of an application for registration as well as in disciplinary proceedings. The protection of the public will not be served by the application of a different standard at erasure from that which is applied when considering registration.”
It is, however, fair to add that Newman J accepted in the same paragraph that there may be subtly different considerations to take account of in applying the standard to a dentist as opposed to an applicant for registration, but the standard remains the same.  I agree and to my mind the same considerations apply to solicitors.
16.	In his written submissions on behalf of the Law Society in both the Begum and and Evans cases Mr Mark Pardoe submits:
i)	that the test of character and suitability is a necessarily high test;
ii)	that the character and suitability test is not concerned with ‘punishment’, ‘reward’ or ‘redemption’, but with whether there is a risk to the public or a risk that there may be damage to the reputation of the profession; and
iii)	that no one has the right to be admitted as a solicitor and it is for the applicant to discharge the burden of satisfying the test of character and suitability.
17.	Neither Ms Evans on her own behalf nor Mr Colbey on behalf of Ms Begum submitted that those propositions were not correct.  They were, in my opinion correct to accept them.  The points made on behalf of both appellants were rather that each case must be considered on its own facts and that, on the facts of a particular case, different considerations may apply to a solicitor on the one hand and a young and inexperienced student on the other.  I accept the submission that the facts of individual cases are critical.  Much depends upon the nature of the wrongdoing, dishonesty or other untoward conduct and upon the particular part played in it by the person concerned.  This is I think especially so in considering whether the reputation of the profession would be damaged by admission or re-admission.  Thus offences of dishonesty have been correctly regarded as of the greatest importance.  The reputation of the profession relies upon the honesty and good faith of its members.  As Sir Thomas Bingham MR put it in Bolton, in cases of proven dishonesty the solicitor will almost always be struck off, however strong the personal mitigation.  Moreover, it was in this context that he used the striking phrase that the purpose of the strict approach in Bolton is to maintain the reputation of the profession as one in which every member of it, of whatever standing, may be trusted to the ends of the earth.  Thus, a solicitor who is struck off for dishonesty may well not be re-admitted however much he can show that he is no longer a risk to the public.
18.	The importance attached to dishonesty has recently been emphasized by the decision of the High Court The Law Society v Claire Wilson [2006] EWHC 1022 (Admin) (‘Wilson’). This was an appeal to the Administrative Court from a decision of the SDT which, while it found Ms Wilson guilty of conduct unbefitting a solicitor in that she had been convicted of six offences of false accounting by East Dorset Magistrates’ Court and sentenced to 80 hours community service, decided to suspend her from practise for 12 months. The Law Society appealed the decision and submitted that rather than a mere suspension her conduct warranted an order striking Ms Wilson from the roll. The Administrative Court allowed the appeal and ordered Ms Wilson to be struck off the roll.
19.	In his judgment Jack J, with whom Keene LJ agreed, noted at [4] that it was accepted by the Law Society that Ms Wilson in committing her offences had not done so for her own financial gain.  She had been placed under pressure from her practice principal who had refused to ease her workload and who insisted that she personally attend all immigration hearings and conferences. She made false accounting returns, in respect of travel expenses for attendance at conferences and hearings she had not attended, in order that he would not find out she had she had not attended them.  Jack J noted at [7] that the starting point for assessing Ms Wilson’s conduct was the decision in Bolton test.
20.	Jack J summarised a number of decisions where dishonesty had been dealt with by the SDT.  He said at [9], in my view correctly, that
“they emphasise the need to protect the reputation of the profession by expelling dishonest persons from it and emphasising that mitigation personal to the solicitor has little relevance . . .’ 
See his summary at [11] to [18].
21.	In the light of Bolton and the summary of its application in Wilson it is clear that, when assessing whether an individual has the requisite character and suitability to be admitted as either a student member of the Law Society or a solicitor, it will be rare for a person with convictions for dishonesty to be found to have the requisite character.  Personal mitigation, while a factor for consideration, will not weigh heavily in carrying out that assessment exercise.  Much depends, however, upon the nature of any dishonesty and rather different considerations seem to me to apply in the absence of dishonesty: see eg Shuttari v The Law Society [2007] EWHC 1484 (Admin).  I should also add that Bolton does allow for the possibility that exceptional circumstances might exist which would justify an individual being re-admitted to the profession following a strike-off, even after findings of dishonesty.
Ms Begum
22.	Ms Begum was born on 26 September 1978 and is thus nearly 29 years of age.  At present she works for a firm of solicitors called Ailia David & Co as a case-worker.  The firm supports her present appeal.  She does immigration and matrimonial work and there is every reason to think that she is a valuable member of staff.
23.	In July 2000 Miss Begum received a qualifying law degree from London Metropolitan University, having enrolled as a student member of the Law Society on 25 March 2000.  She successfully completed the Legal Practice Course at the College of Law in July 2001.  She was subsequently employed, apparently as a trainee solicitor, by Silvers.  She, and two other Silvers’ employees, were dismissed from their employment in September 2003.  After lengthy (and stressful) proceedings before an Employment Tribunal she was found to have been unfairly dismissed.
24.	During the course of those proceedings Ms Begum found employment with the Luton branch of Dixon’s as a part-time sales assistant, working only on Sundays.  During the course of that employment Ms Begum stole telephone credits to top up her mobile phone.  In total she stole £487.76, made up of seven thefts, four in March and three in April 2004.   On 24 September 2004 she pleaded guilty to seven counts of theft contrary to section 1 of the Theft Act 1968.   She was sentenced to 60 hours community service and ordered to repay the total amount stolen, which she did.
25.	In September 2004 Ms Begum began a two-year training contract with Dhillon & Co, who are solicitors.  Because her student enrolment as a member of the Law Society had expired by way of effluxion of time pursuant to Regulation 6(6) of the 1990 Regulations she was required to re-enrol in order to complete the training contract: see Regulation 5(iv) of the 1990 Regulations.  Ms Begum applied for re-enrolment on 30 December 2004, three months after her convictions.  Ms Begum failed to disclose her convictions on the re-enrolment form.  While the re-enrolment form does not refer to the exemption from the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974, it does require a declaration as to whether the applicant has ever been convicted of any offence in the UK and clearly states that previously undisclosed matters that could call into question an applicant’s character and suitability should be disclosed.
26.	On 17 August 2006 Ms Begum applied for admission as a solicitor. She did so in anticipation of her training contract being completed on 23 September 2006.  In this application she disclosed her convictions for the first time.  As a result the Law Society called her for interview in order to assess whether she could remain a student member of the Society and whether she should be permitted to proceed to admission as a solicitor.
27.	Ms Begum was interviewed by Ms Ceri Griffiths, a Law Society adjudicator, on 22 November 2006.  In the course of that interview, Ms Begum explained that the convictions arose at a time when she was under stress and subject to ‘severe financial difficulties’, which arose as a result of the length and nature of the Employment Tribunal proceedings against Silvers and her only having a part-time job.  She was not able to obtain financial help from her father, with whom she lived at that time, as he was supporting her brothers and sisters.  Nor was her then boyfriend, now husband, in a position to assist her.  She stole the mobile phone credit because she needed to use the phone to contact her legal team, who were conducting the employment proceedings.  She did not have access to another phone.  She told Ms Griffiths that she had been prescribed sleeping pills by her doctor during this period for the stress she was suffering.
28.	She said that she had not informed the Law Society of her convictions because she wanted ‘to start afresh’.  She explained that she had not told her employer Dhillon & Co of her convictions because she did not think that she had to do so in the light of the fact that she had carried out her community service.  She only disclosed it to them when she realised that she had to inform the Law Society, which was not until she came to apply for admission.  She said that she did not wilfully fail to disclose her convictions prior to this; she simply had not realised she had to do so.  She told Dhillon & Co in August 2006, just before she submitted her admission application.  In a written statement to the Law Society she explained that she had not disclosed the convictions to anyone because she ‘felt embarrassed, ashamed and upset’.  After that disclosure her training principal at her employers was happy to submit a reference in support of her admission, in which she stated that she believed the offences to be ‘out of character’.  It was also only at that time that she told her family of her convictions.
29.	After 22 November interview, Ms Griffith, by decision dated 24 November 2006 cancelled Ms Begum’s student membership of the Society and refused her application for admission.  Her reasons were stated as follows:
“The purpose of the interview was to establish whether Ms Begum could continue as a student member and proceed to admission given her conviction for an offence involving dishonesty. On 24 September 2004, having pleaded guilty, Ms begum was convicted of 7 counts of theft and sentenced to 60 hours Community Service.
Ms Begum told me that when working at Dixons she used a credit note to the value of £500 to top up her mobile phone. She said she had not been thinking straight and had told no-one of the severe financial difficulties she was experiencing brought about by her involvement in an Employment Tribunal case. She did not disclose the conviction to her employer or to her family at first but they are all aware of it now. She said she did not realise she had to disclose to the Law Society but did so when advised by NACRO.
Ms Begum appreciates that what she did is not the type of conduct expected of a solicitor. She said she had learned the hard way and if she were to find herself again in financial difficulty she would turn to her family, friends and her employer for help.
I have no doubt that Ms Begum sincerely regrets her behaviour. I must, however, refuse the application in light of the nature of the offence and the fact that it was committed just over two years ago – being too short a period for Ms Begum to establish that she has adequately rehabilitated herself.”
30.	On 12 December 2006 Ms Begum sought a review of Ms Griffiths’ decision.  The Law Society Review Panel dismissed the review on 21 March 2007.  It did so for these reasons:
“Miss Begum has requested a review of the decision made by the Law Society adjudicator to revoke her student membership of the Law Society and refuse her application for admission. The reason for that decision was that Miss Begum had disclosed a conviction from September 2004 for offences of dishonesty. We have considered Miss Begum’s application for a review, and she has taken us through her arguments that the decision was unduly harsh and that it was wrong to conclude that the period of rehabilitation of two years was too short a period. She also contends that there were exceptional circumstances which led to her committing the offences which led to the conviction, and that they were wholly out of character.
We have considered carefully all her arguments, but consider that the real issue in this case is whether, in accordance with the Law Society’s character and suitability guidelines, there can be confidence that Miss Begum is honest and trustworthy. Unless there are exceptional circumstances there will not be confidence if an individual has convictions for the offences of dishonesty. Our main concern is that a period of only just over two years has elapsed since the date of conviction, and we consider that that is too short a period to enable there to be confidence that Miss Begum has rehabilitated herself. We have no doubt that Miss Begum is genuinely, extremely remorseful for the actions which led to her conviction, but we consider that the interests of the profession and the interests of protecting the reputation of the profession are such that the decision should remain that she be refused membership of the Law Society as a student and should not be allowed to proceed to admission.”
31.	Miss Begum’s submissions can be summarised in this way:
i)	Her offences were committed at a time of exceptional stress, when her employment as a trainee solicitor with Silvers had been terminated and she (and others) were engaged in proceedings before the Employment Tribunal arising out of that termination.  She had very little money, had only managed to obtain part-time work and was unable to obtain financial assistance from her family.  Her phone was essential to her ability to fight the Employment Tribunal action.
ii)	Her remorse is sincere.  She is and was ashamed of her conduct, so much so that she was unable to inform her husband about her acts until the matter came to the attention of the Law Society.
iii)	She had to overcome considerable difficulties in qualifying as a solicitor. She came to England aged six from Bangladesh.  She learned English outside the family home, since her father has only ever had unskilled manual work and her mother has not worked outside the home.  She attained a good degree in law and passed the LPC at the first attempt despite there being no family background in higher education.
iv)	Because of her background she has a great deal to offer both the legal profession and the public.  It is in the best interests of both for more members of ethnic minorities to enter the profession.  In addition, given her experience whilst a trainee she is able positively to contribute to the profession through her ability to serve the needs of members of the public from the Asian community, by (among other things) conducting immigration and matrimonial work, especially where instructions are received from Asian woman, and by doing social security work, again largely for the Asian community.
v)	If doubts persist concerning her honesty, they can be met by appropriate conditions being placed upon her practising certificate.
32.	It should be noted that, in support of her case, Ms Begum also relies on a number of references which attest to her character.
33.	In response to Ms Begum’s substantive submissions, the Law Society’s submissions may be summarised in this way:
i)	While Ms Begum might have committed her offences during a stressful period in her life, those offences were for dishonesty, committed in breach of an employer’s trust and committed on seven different occasions.  
ii)	She failed to disclose her convictions to the Law Society by answering the question whether she had ever been convicted in the negative when she must have known that the answer to that question was untrue.  She thus further called her honesty into question.  A solicitor must be a person of integrity, probity and trustworthiness; the profession is one which places its members in positions of trust, and does so in often stressful and difficult situations. Her convictions for dishonesty and failure properly to disclose those convictions call into question whether she can properly be said to have the requisite integrity and trustworthiness to be a solicitor.
iii)	Ms Begum may well have overcome difficulties in seeking to qualify as a solicitor but her personal circumstances should be given little weight when contrasted with the need to protect the public and the reputation of the profession.
iv)	It is neither the role of the regulator nor that of the Master of the Rolls to permit an individual to be admitted to the roll who is not of the requisite character and suitability.  If an individual is not of the requisite character and suitability they cannot be admitted.  It is impermissible to admit them and then place them under regulatory conditions. 
Conclusions
34.	Ms Begum was convicted for offences of dishonesty.  Moreover she answered in the negative a question to which she must have known that the answer was yes.  I recognise that when she committed the offences she was under considerable stress.  I also accept that she was and is ashamed of her actions, that she sincerely regrets her behaviour, that she has worked hard whilst a trainee solicitor and that she has conducted herself appropriately during her employment since her conviction.  It is also of note that the magistrates imposed a community sentence in her case and I have little doubt that she will be able to provide very worthwhile services to the community, especially the Asian community in the future.
35.	All in all, I have considerable sympathy for Ms Begum.  However, this is a case of dishonesty.  It is not the worst case of dishonesty but it is a case in which, as Jack J put it in Wilson, personal mitigation carries little weight.  It does so because the issue in her case is whether in the light of the gravity of her offences her entry into the profession is both in the public interest and in the interest of the profession.  In my judgment, the Law Society was entitled to reach the conclusions that it did in the light of the principles to which I have referred.    Applying the principles set out by Sir Thomas Bingham MR in Bolton and in light of Ms Begum’s convictions for dishonesty I must uphold the Law Society’s decision to refuse her admission to the roll and to cancel her student membership.
36.	In these circumstances I must dismiss Ms Begum’s appeal.  It does not follow that Ms Begum will never be able to become a solicitor.  It is of course a matter for the Law Society but, while this is a case of dishonesty, there have been many worse cases over the years.  It seems to me that there is likely to come a time in the not too distant future in which it will be possible to say, both that Ms Begum is not a risk to the public and that the time has come when the reputation of the profession will be better served by the admission of Ms Begum with all that she has to offer both the profession and its clients than by her continued exclusion.  The Law Society was, however, entitled to conclude that that time has not yet come.
Ms Evans
37.	Ms Evans was born on 12 March 1977.  She is therefore just 30 years of age.  On 10 April 2006 she applied for enrolment as a student member of the Law Society.  The application form, amongst other things, requires applicants to indicate whether or not they have ever been convicted of any offence in any court in the United Kingdom or elsewhere, other than in respect of certain driving offences.  The form stresses that applicants must answer this question and that convictions classed as spent under the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 must be disclosed by virtue of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 (Exceptions) Order 1975.  The application form also requires applicants to sign a declaration that the information they have set out in it is true and correct to the best of their knowledge.  Ms Evans answered the question in the negative and signed the declaration.  Based on the information provided in her application form, she was granted student enrolment as a member of the Law Society.
38.	In or about April 2006 the Law Society publicised the fact that in future it would require all applicants for admission to the roll of solicitors to provide a full Criminal Records Bureau check, commonly known as a CRB check, with their applications.  This would have meant that, if Ms Evans proceeded to apply for admission she would have had to submit such a check.  On 1 June 2006 Ms Evans contacted Diane Faulconbridge at the Law Society to inform them that she had not disclosed the fact that she had convictions on her application form.  She followed that contact up with a letter to a Ms Bushell, of the Law Society, which was received on 05 June 2006.  In that letter Ms Evans apologised for failure to disclose her convictions on her application form.  Although she did not provide details of convictions, she provided a summary of events which gave rise to five convictions, all of which appeared to involve the consumption of excess alcohol.  She explained the position in this way:
“Firstly, I would like to begin by apologising to you with regards to my previous application form to join the Law Society, as did not declare my convictions through fear of being rejected, as being allowed to do the LPC means a great deal to me. I do not condone lying as am not one, which leads me to attempt to put right my previous application form, as that is the only way forward whether that might mean the outcome would entail me not being accepted within the Law Society.
I have been foolish with alcohol, as it appears to effect me quickly and is at the route of the convictions which I am deeply ashamed of and regret my past behaviour. When looking at the convictions I sometimes think they can’t be mine but unfortunately they are. I am a hard working, dedicated individual who is respect by the people in my life, therefore I would be grateful of an opportunity to put the past behind and prove to myself that these stupid instances do not occur again that would jeopardise my career”
39.	In July 2006 Ms Evans obtained a qualifying law degree from the University of Glamorgan.  Having obtained that degree and having been accepted for enrolment, other things being equal, Ms Evans would then have been able to embark upon the Legal Practice Course in October 2006.  However, in the light of Ms Evans’ admission as to her convictions and of her failure to declare them on her application form, the Law Society reviewed the question whether it should cancel her enrolment as a student member pursuant to regulation 32(2)(i) of the 1990 Regulations.  Because of delays encountered in obtaining extracts from the Police National Computer detailing her convictions, Ms Evans could not be interviewed by the Law Society until 8 September 2006. 
40.	Once obtained the police records disclosed the following: 
i)	in October 1996, Ms Evans was convicted of driving a motor vehicle with excess alcohol, disqualified from driving for 18 months and fined £200; 
ii)	in September 1998, she received a caution for disorderly behaviour or using threatening, abusive or insulting words likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress and for destroying or damaging property of an unknown value; 
iii)	in October 2001, she was convicted of being drunk in a public place, fined and given a 12 month conditional discharge; 
iv)	in February 2002, she was again convicted of being drunk in a public place and fined £50; 
v)	in September 2002, she was convicted of failing to provide a specimen for analysis, disqualified from driving for 36 months and fined £200; and
vi)	in January 2006, she was convicted of being drunk and disorderly and fined £75.
41.	Ms Evans was interviewed by an adjudicator on 8 September 2006.  By a decision made on 11 September, her application for student membership was refused.  The adjudicator’s reasons were these:
Miss Evans attended interview to determine her character and suitability for student membership of the Society due to having a series of convictions involving drinking and to not initially making disclosure of such convictions when completing form EN1. This was subsequently rectified when Miss Evans rang the Law Society but even then certain offences did not come to light until the full CRB trawl became available.
At interview Miss Evans appeared to be an articulate, pleasant and rounded individual who was remorseful for her actions. Miss Evans also clearly found the hearing to be an emotional event. However the discussions revealed (as do the convictions) that Miss Evans has an alter ego which emerges when she has taken alcohol. Hence not only is there a conviction for drink and drive, she also has convictions for drunk and disorderly behaviour which she admitted involved verbally abusing a policeman and scratching a police car. Whilst most of these convictions took place in the 1990s the latest was only in January of this year and in 2002 she was convicted of failing to provide a specimen of breath. . .
To add to an unfortunate situation Miss Evans did not disclose these matters on her application form despite a health warning on the form shat she was required to do so and that she did not have the benefit of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act.
Miss Evans claim is that she is very susceptible to the effects of alcohol even in quite small quantities. She claims that she is not a regular or heavy drinker. She stated that she now works very hard to ensure that she does not exceed her own self imposed level of intake but occasionally this does happen with fateful consequences for her. She also stated that she cannot control her intake and that such incidents will not occur again. She did not declare the convictions on EN1 because she was ashamed.
I feel sympathy for Miss Evans for she clearly has an alter ego which emerges when she has taken alcohol. However my task is to place her situation in the context of the rules and consider whether she is a fit and proper person for student enrolment. Is she honest and trustworthy? Is there anything in her character which indicates that she is unwilling to comply with regulatory requirements or which might diminish the public’s confidence in the profession. Is there anything which might cause harm to the public, profession or herself? Are there exceptional circumstances which explain such concerns?
In the case of Miss Evans I think that the answers to these questions are really self evident. Miss Evans’ inability to control her drinking over a long period does bring into doubt her trustworthiness and her statement that this will not happen again. Her failure to declare on the form indicates an unwillingness to comply with regulatory requirements. Her convictions reveal that she can cause harm to the public and possibly pose a threat to herself or members of the profession.
I do not say that she is dependent on alcohol but there must be a concern whether this is the case. Nor that she has been untruthful with me although I find [it] surprising that Miss Evans in he submission seemed to think that she is able to control her intake of alcohol (when the facts appear otherwise) and that there is no problem underlying such a long sequence of events involving alcohol.
If Miss Evans wishes to be considered for admission then she will have to demonstrate conclusively that alcohol is not a feature of her life and that there is no risk of it becoming so. That may require drastic measures on her part such as abstinence and counselling. That is however outside my remit. All I can do for the present is to declare her an unfit person and refuse her application for student membership.”
42.	It is evident that when the adjudicator referred to refusing Ms Evans’ application for student membership he or she was in fact terminating her student membership, given that the Law Society had already granted student membership and the adjudicator was considering the matter under Regulation 32(2)(i) of the 1990 Regulations, which provides the power to cancel student enrolment.  The Adjudicator was thus refusing membership by cancelling Miss Evans’ student enrolment.  This was made clear to Ms Evans by the Law Society in a letter sent by a Ms Kerrie Best (the Law Society’s Professional Competence Team Manager) dated 13 September 2006, in which she stated that Ms Evans’ application to remain a student member had been refused and refused by reference to Regulation 32.
43.	In the letter of 13 September, Ms Evans was also informed that as a result of the decision she must leave the LPC immediately, although if she chose to appeal the decision she would be permitted by the Law Society provisionally to remain on it.  If her appeal failed she would have to leave the course.  Without a valid certificate of enrolment, that is to say acceptance as a student member of the Law Society, no person is permitted to attend a Legal Practice Course: see Regulation 5(ii) of the 1990 Regulations.
44.	Ms Evans appealed the adjudicator’s decision, by a letter received by the Law Society on 26 September 2006.  In that letter she stressed, among other things, that since receipt of the adjudicator’s decision she had stopped drinking alcohol and begun to attend a support group and counselling sessions. As part of the appeal, which was by way of review, Ms Evans was interviewed by Mr Block, a further adjudicator on 27 October 2006, which was after she commenced the LPC.
45.	Mr Block, by a decision communicated by letter, again sent by Ms Best, dated 8 November 2006, upheld the original decision to cancel her student membership, although I again note that in the letter sent to Ms Evans the original decision was again inaccurately described as refusing her student membership.  Mr Block set out the reasons why he upheld the original decision in the following way:
“On considering the schedule of evidence and taking account [of] the oral testimony of the applicant, I refuse the application for review. I have read the decision of the Adjudicator at first instance dated 8 September 2006. I do not intend to repeat the history of the matter and consider the findings to be accurate on the evidence contained within the papers and heard by me today. Indeed Miss Evans does not dispute the findings made. Her appeal is on the basis that she should be allowed to continue with the LPC as she has started it and by definition be admitted as a student member of the Law Society. This in my opinion is ‘putting the cart before the horse’. The obligation on Miss Evans was to be granted student membership before enrolling on the LPC course. Her references recently produced are satisfactory, but no more than that as they merely attest to her as a person but not to her behaviour and criminal convictions. Since the refusal of her application, she has abstained from drink for 2 months: has attended 2 alcoholic anonymous meetings and has seen a student councillor. She is also undergoing in the future counselling with a specialist alcohol counsellor.
However, whilst her efforts are to be commended, it is too early to say whether they will have the desired effect. Given the serious nature of the offences and their number over the last 10 years, I find on the balance of probabilities at present that she is not a fit and proper person to be enrolled as a student member of the Law Society.”
46.	In the letter of 8 November 2006, Ms Best outlined the basis on which Ms Evans could appeal from the review decision. She did so, this time by reference to Regulation 6 of the 1990 Regulations, which deals with a decision of the Law Society to refuse to issue a certificate of enrolment. This was despite the fact that Ms Evans’ was originally informed that she needed to appeal the original adjudication pursuant to Regulation 32.
47.	As to jurisdiction, no doubt following the lead given by Ms Best in her letter of 8 November, Ms Evans submits in her petition that her appeal is brought under Regulation 6(4) of the 1990 Regulations.  She seeks to appeal a refusal to issue her with a certificate of enrolment, that is to grant her student membership. Mr Pardoe submits on behalf of the Law Society that the appeal is brought under Regulation 32(3)(ii) of the 1990 Regulations.  This jurisdiction only arises if an individual is an unadmitted person as defined by Regulation 32(1) of the 1990 Regulations.  Regulation 32(1)(i) defines an unadmitted person as someone who ‘holds a current certificate of enrolment’. That is to say it is an appeal of a decision to cancel enrolment, once it has been granted.
48.	Mr Pardoe submits it is such an appeal because the decision of 11 September 2006 was one under which Ms Evans’ student enrolment was cancelled under Regulation 32(2)(i).  The appeal must have been brought under this Regulation as she had in fact been granted student membership prior to her phone call to the Law Society of early June 2006, as is conceded by Mr Pardoe in his written submissions.  The review of that decision, heard by Mr Block, was thus brought under Regulation 32(3)(i).  In support of this interpretation of the jurisdiction under which Mr Block’s review took place it is clear that the submissions prepared by Ms Bowater, of the Law Society, which were forwarded to Mr Block in respect of the review were drafted on the basis that it was a Regulation 32 review: see the heading of the summary of offences included in the submissions, paragraph 4.1 of the submissions and, most clearly, paragraph 6.2 of the submissions where Regulation 32 and Regulation 32(3) are explicitly referred to in the context of the review.
49.	It appears from this that, whether or not Ms Evans has physically been issued with and sent a certificate of enrolment, she had in fact been issued with one as far as the Law Society is concerned.  Absent the issue of such a certificate, the Law Society could not have taken steps against her under Regulation 32, nor could it, a fortiori, cancel her enrolment under Regulation 32(2)(i).  It appears therefore that Ms Best misunderstood the basis on which Mr Block’s review took place. In the circumstances, it seems to me that Mr Pardoe’s submission as to jurisdiction is correct.  I therefore hold that this appeal is brought under Regulation 32(3)(ii) of the 1990 Regulations.  I think Ms Evans accepted in her oral submissions that this is correct.  In any event I should stress that this simply a procedural point of no real importance which does not affect the substance of her appeal, to which I now turn.
50.	In support of her case that her appeal should be allowed and that the Law Society be directed to issue her with a certificate of enrolment, Ms Evans’ submissions may be summarised in this way:
i)	If the Law Society is not directed to issue a certificate of enrolment she will not be able to make a fresh application for enrolment until November 2007, pursuant to Regulation 6(5) of the 1990 Regulations. This would mean that she would be unable to commence an LPC until September 2008.
ii)	The original decision, as she puts it, to refuse student membership was made based on the convictions and cautions she received, which arose out of alcohol abuse. She however attended an LPC for two months before the failure of her appeal before Mr Block.  In addition, she has abstained from alcohol since September 2006 and continues to attend AA meetings and specialist counselling. 
iii)	She is deeply ashamed and remorseful of her actions and is determined to continue to abstain from alcohol in the future, which she recognises (and submits) was at the root of her previous behaviour. 
iv)	She relies on number of references from, among others, university tutors, the Glamorgan University LPC Course Director, and a Ms Worsley, who is a student counsellor.
51.	By contrast, the Law Society’s submissions may be summarised thus:
i)	Ms Evans has neither the requisite character nor the requisite suitability to be admitted as a solicitor, as set out in section 3(1)(b) of the 1974 Act and Regulations 6(1)(i) and 32(2) of the 1990 Regulations, by reason of her criminal record and her failure to disclose it on her application for student membership of the Law Society: see eg Bolton and Ofosuhene.
ii)	Critically, Ms Evans’ claim that she is continuing to abstain from alcohol is unsubstantiated and her criminal record demonstrates that the problems which arise from her drinking alcohol are longstanding and encompass long periods of time when no adverse consequences arose.  In those circumstances her claim to now be fully rehabilitated after only short period of abstinence cannot be substantiated, at any rate not in the absence of independent evidence.
iii)	Even if it could be established that her enrolment was in the public interest in the sense that there is no risk to the public, there remains a clear risk to the reputation of the profession if an applicant were considered to be of suitable character to be admitted when he or she not only has a number of convictions, but more importantly has failed to disclose them on application to the Society.  At best, her failure to disclose them demonstrates unreliability on Ms Evans’ part and at worst it demonstrates dishonest conduct.
Conclusions
52.	The starting point for an assessment of character and suitability in Ms Evans’ case is her convictions. They are not convictions for dishonesty.  Her offences arose out of her consumption of alcohol.  They are convictions for offences which do however call into question her integrity, probity and trustworthiness. On their own her offences do not fall into the same category as those offences of dishonesty that Bolton  shows would call for a solicitor to be struck off.  Applied to this case, they fall into a category of conduct which would not necessarily lead to an individual being refused admission or having their student membership cancelled.
53.	Ms Evans did not however draw these offences to the attention of the Law Society when she applied for student membership.  On the contrary, she ticked the box marked ‘no convictions’.  Although, it is right to say that she did inform the Law Society of her non-disclosure at an early opportunity only some two months later, her misleading answer on the form calls into question her honesty.
54.	Ms Evans made heartfelt submissions to me on her own behalf.  I accept that she is taking steps to ensure that behaviour such as that which has given rise to her convictions in the past will not happen again.  I also have regard to her references.  However, the Law Society was in my judgment entitled to cancel Ms Evans’ enrolment as a student member.  While her consumption of alcohol would not in and of itself necessarily call into question her character and suitability to be a student member of the Law Society, her offences committed after the consumption of alcohol do so.  Equally, and more seriously, her non-disclosure of her offending to the professional regulator calls into question her character and suitability. Taken together these two factors justify the Law Society’s decision to cancel her student enrolment.
55.	In arriving at this conclusion I have taken account of Ms Evans’ submission that she will suffer hardship, through not being able to attend an LPC until September 2008 at the earliest, if she is not granted student membership.  This is not simply a procedural point.  It is one based on the type of hardship to the individual identified by Sir Thomas Bingham MR in Bolton at page 519.  That  must be balanced against the interests of the public and the reputation of the profession.
56.	I therefore uphold the Law Society’s decision to cancel Ms Evans’ student membership.  However, this is not to say that Ms Evans can have no hope for the future.  One of the factors which has persuaded me that it would not be right to allow Ms Evans’ appeal is that there is no independent professional evidence that she is free of the risk of taking alcohol which has led to her problems in the past.  It appears to me that before applying to the Law Society in the future, Ms Evans would be well advised to seek and obtain such evidence so that the Law Society can satisfy itself that Ms Evans’ problems really are behind her.  
CONCLUSIONS
57.	For the reasons I have given, I dismiss the appeals of both Ms Begum and Ms Evans but draw the attention of both the Law Society and the appellants to what I have said about the future.  I understand that, as in the case of Mr Jideofo, the parties have agreed that there be no order for costs in either case.  I therefore make no order for costs.