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England and Wales High Court (King's Bench Division) Decisions


You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (King's Bench Division) Decisions >> Wilson v Stroud Green Housing Co-operative Ltd [2025] EWHC 1508 (KB) (19 June 2025)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/KB/2025/1508.html
Cite as: [2025] EWHC 1508 (KB)

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Neutral Citation Number: [2025] EWHC 1508 (KB)
Case No: KA-2024-000109

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
HIGH COURT APPEALS CENTRE
ROYAL COURTS OF JUSTICE
ON APPEAL FROM THE ORDER OF DEPUTY MASTER SKINNER KC
DATED 13 JUNE 2024
Claim No. KB-2023-004621

Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
19/06/2025

B e f o r e :

MRS JUSTICE HILL
____________________

Between:
DEJAUN WILSON
Appellant
- and -

STROUD GREEN HOUSING CO-OPERATIVE LTD
Respondent

____________________

The Appellant appeared in person
The Respondent did not appear and was not represented.

Hearing date: 17 June 2025

____________________

HTML VERSION OF APPROVED JUDGMENT
____________________

Crown Copyright ©

    Note: This judgment was produced and approved by the Judge, after using voice-recognition software during an ex tempore judgment in a remote hearing.

    This judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on 19 June 2025 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives.

    .............................
    MRS JUSTICE HILL

    Mrs Justice Hill:

    Introduction

  1. This is a renewed application for permission to appeal the order of Deputy Master Skinner KC dated 13 June 2024, by which she ordered that: (i) the application for a stay dated 12 April 2024 brought by the Appellant (as Claimant in the underlying proceedings) be dismissed; (ii) the Appellant file and serve particulars of claim by 4 pm on 5 July 2024; and (iii) the Appellant pay the Respondent (Defendant)'s costs of the application, summarily assessed at £4,000 by 4 pm on 27 June 2024.
  2. The application for permission to appeal was refused on the papers by Mrs Justice Eady in her order dated 14 March 2025. The Appellant has renewed the application at an oral hearing, as is his right.
  3. The Appellant, Mr Wilson, has represented himself before me this morning in person and has provided me with very comprehensive written and oral submissions. I thank him for his assistance. At his request the hearing took place via MS Teams. The Respondent has not been represented or appeared but there is no criticism of the Respondent for that given the nature of this hearing, which is essentially for the Appellant to satisfy the court that it is appropriate to grant permission to appeal.
  4. I have taken into account all of the material placed before me by the Appellant, namely (i) bundle A which was the bundle for the hearing before the Deputy Master; (ii) bundle B which is the bundle of appeal documentation; (iii) bundle C which comprises the two skeleton arguments that were before the Deputy Master; (iv) a skeleton argument prepared by the Appellant for this hearing; and (v) two authorities referred to by the parties at various points, namely Jalla v Shell International Trading and Shipping Co Ltd [2021] EWCA Civ 1559 and Hamon and others v University College London [2023] EWHC 1812 (KB). I am grateful to the Appellant for the impeccable way in which his bundles have been provided to the court.
  5. The factual background

  6. As I have indicated the Appellant is the Claimant in the underlying proceedings. They are proceedings for defamation arising from a letter sent by email on 2 December 2022 by the head of a committee within the Respondent organisation. It is a co-operative housing association run by its tenants. The email was sent to the local authority and on the face of things expressed concern about the Appellant and his relationship with his mother.
  7. The Appellant told the Deputy Master that the email led to police and safeguarding involvement. Having become aware of the email in April 2023, on 26 June 2023 he assisted his mother in making a detailed formal complaint about the contents of the email to the relevant complaints scheme. As at the time of the hearing before the Deputy Master the Appellant contended that there had been no response to the complaint from the Respondent.
  8. As the Deputy Master describes at [4] of her judgment, time "ticked by" and because he was aware of the one-year limitation period applicable to claims for libel, the Appellant filed his claim with the court on 1 December 2023.
  9. The Appellant issued his application for a stay shortly before the expiry of the four month period in which the claim form had to be served. He sought a stay of 12 months. The application was supported by a witness statement from the Appellant dated 10 June 2024 in which he made clear that the purpose of the stay was to enable him to explore settlement with the Respondent.
  10. The legal framework

  11. CPR 52.6(1) provides that permission to appeal may be granted where (i) the court considers that the appeal would have a real prospect of success; or (ii) there is some other compelling reason for the appeal to be heard.
  12. The Appellant accepts that his appeal would be a challenge to the court's exercise of discretion in refusing his application for a stay; and that appeal courts are generally reluctant to interfere with exercises of discretion.
  13. He referred to the recent summary of the relevant principles by Saini J in Azam v University Hospital Birmingham NHS Foundation Trust [2020] EWHC 3384 (QB):
  14. "50. An appellate court will only interfere with a discretionary evaluation where an Appellant can identify one or more of the follows errors:
    (i) a misdirection in law;
    (ii) some procedural unfairness or irregularity;
    (iii) that the Judge took into account irrelevant matters;
    (iv) that the Judge failed to take account of relevant matters; or
    (v) that the Judge made a decision which was "plainly wrong".
    51. Error type (v)…means a decision which has exceeded the generous ambit within which reasonable disagreement is possible".
  15. Similarly, in Jalla, the relevant principles were reiterated by Coulson LJ (with whom Edis LJ and Underhill LJ agreed) at [27]-[28]. There, Coulson LJ emphasised that it is vital for appellate courts to uphold robust fair case management decisions made by first instance judges; and referred to the "high hurdle" for an appellant in a case of this nature to overcome.
  16. The grounds of appeal in overview

  17. The Appellant initially advanced grounds numbered 1 to 19. However in filing his skeleton argument the Appellant indicated a quite sensible refinement of his position. He is only now pursuing his original grounds 2, 5 and 6. However he applied by virtue of PD 23A, paragraph 2.8, i.e. by way of an oral application made at the hearing, to add a new ground.
  18. Under CPR 52.17 an appeal notice can only be amended with permission of the court. Having reviewed the written submissions and the way in which the proposed new ground was advanced, I took the view that it was in fact an amplification of the existing Ground 2 and very closely linked to it.
  19. I therefore indicated to the Appellant during the hearing that I was content to hear all of his arguments on both parts of the potential expanded Ground 2, on the basis that if I was satisfied that his new ground was arguable, I would be likely to grant permission for him to amend his appeal notice. The Respondent would suffer very limited prejudice by such a decision, given the very close link between the original Ground 2 and the proposed new ground.
  20. Ground 2

  21. I dealt with all of the Appellant's arguments under the existing Ground 2 and his proposed new ground together.
  22. The factual context is that that at 12.45 pm and so 1¼ hours before the hearing at 2 pm on 13 June 2024, the Deputy Master emailed the parties attaching an extract from the well-known textbook Gatley on Libel and Slander (13th Edition). The extract related to limitation. In her email to the parties she said:
  23. "Please find attached a section from the above book dealing with the issue of limitation in a defamation context. I attach it because it is relevant to the issue of expedition in a claim to vindicate reputation".
  24. At paragraph 20–009, the extract notes authorities to the effect that:
  25. "It is normally anticipated that a victim of defamation will pursue, and will want energetically to pursue, the vindication of his good name. That is why the limitation period in actions for defamation is limited to one year".
  26. First, the Appellant contended that by sending this email it is apparent that the Deputy Master was focusing on the issue of limitation. His original Ground 2 contends that she erred in approaching his application as if it was an application for an extension of time under CPR 3.1(2)(a) rather than as an application for a stay under CPR 3.12(g).
  27. I do not consider that it is arguable that the Deputy Master mischaracterised the nature of the application in the way alleged. The Deputy Master made clear in [1] at the very outset of her judgment that she was dealing with an application for a stay. She fully understood the central nature of the application, albeit that she rightly observed that there was an ancillary application for an extension of time to serve the Particulars of Claim.
  28. Second, the Appellant argued that by relying on this passage from Gatley the Deputy Master misdirected herself; that reliance on the principles pertinent to limitation issues permeated the exercise of her discretion; and that this indicated that the discretion was exercised in a flawed way.
  29. However, the Deputy Master had to consider the context in which a stay of 12 months was being sought by the Appellant. The context included the fact that the proceedings involved a libel claim where the primary limitation period is 12 months, for the reasons given in Gatley at 20–009. She was therefore entitled to observe as she did at [11] of her judgment that to seek a stay of 12 months is extraordinary and to do so in the context of a libel claim where the limitation period itself is only 12 months is even more extraordinary. It is not therefore arguable that she wrongly took into account the nature of the limitation period as alleged.
  30. Third, the Appellant argued that there was then a "double whammy" because the Deputy Master not only wrongly applied the passages from Gatley dealing with limitation but failed to go on and apply other passages from the same textbook that were more relevant, namely those addressing the situations in which a stay will be ordered.
  31. The Appellant has perhaps understandably alighted on a passage towards the end of paragraph 32–044 in Gatley to this effect:
  32. "It is not unusual for defamation claims to be stayed pending mediation or some other form of alternative dispute resolution, as is common in other types of civil litigation: the policy of encouraging settlement supersedes even the imperative of progressing defamation cases to trial as expeditiously as possible".
  33. Pausing there, all this passage does is indicate what is "not unusual": it does not indicate what should, or will generally, happen.
  34. In any event the passage needs to be seen in the context of the full section addressing situations in which a stay will be ordered.
  35. The section begins with a narrative that is much less supportive of the Appellant's position. The beginning part of paragraph 32-044, for example, states in terms that:
  36. "…the need for swift progress in defamation litigation will be a matter of particular concern to the court"
  37. The passage goes on to say:
  38. "Much will depend on…how far the defamation action has progressed".
  39. This comment is made in the context of applications for stays when there are other proceedings running parallel with a defamation claim, but it is of general application: the overriding objective in CPR 1.1(2)((d) requires that courts ensure claims are dealt with "expeditiously".
  40. Accordingly, the passage on which the Appellant relies does no more than indicate what will happen in some cases where an application for a stay is made. However the whole section recognises that the general need for swift progress in defamation litigation will be taken into account as will the progress made in the litigation.
  41. The lack of progress made in this litigation was a factor to which the Deputy Master had particular regard, having been provided with a detailed chronology. She noted at [9] that the claim had been issued protectively in December 2023 and that the application had been made shortly before the expiry of the 4 month period for service of the claim form. She continued:
  42. "However, I also note that…there has been in the intervening period no letter of claim written or other opportunity for the defendant to respond. So, as things now stand, the position is that there is a claim form, there are no particulars of claim and the defendant has still not been informed of the parameters of the case to which it will be required to respond".
  43. This was entirely consistent with the section in Gatley on stays and indicates that contrary to the Appellant's position, the Deputy Master did take it into account.
  44. Fourth, the Appellant complains that at [11] the Deputy Master referred to the fact that a stay imposed for the purposes of settlement is often for a much shorter duration of 1 month. He contends that she misdirected herself by relying on this fact. I do not consider that this is arguable. The observation about a 1 month stay was merely illustrative and reflected the fact that under CPR 26.5(2), if the parties request a stay of the proceedings at the directions questionnaire stage, the claim is stayed for 1 month.
  45. Accordingly, I am not persuaded that the Deputy Master arguably erred in the ways alleged in the existing Ground 2 and the proposed new ground.
  46. Ground 5

  47. Under Ground 5, the Appellant argues that the Deputy Master misdirected herself by not adequately assessing the Pre-Action Protocol for Media and Communication Claims and paragraph 17 of the Practice Direction for Pre-Action Conduct. This provides that:
  48. "If proceedings are started to comply with the statutory time limit before the parties have followed the procedures in this Practice Direction or the relevant pre-action protocol, the parties should apply to the court for a stay of the proceedings while they so comply".
  49. The Appellant is highly critical of the Respondent for not engaging with the complaints process. He contends that the Respondent had deliberately "run down" the limitation period. He understandably submits that by his application for a stay, he was following the guidance in paragraph 17. He perceives it to be distinctly unjust that the decision the Deputy Master made did not take into account the Respondent's culpability in this regard. He argues that the Deputy Master's discretion was exercised in a manner that was flawed because she failed to have regard to the guidance in paragraph 17.
  50. However, the Deputy Master's judgment makes clear that she was well aware of the terms of the relevant protocols, emphasising at [5] and [13] that they apply at the pre-action stage and that their purpose is to enable the parties to negotiate with a view to settlement. Importantly though, the contents of paragraph 17 do not generate any principle to the effect that a stay must always be granted in the circumstances described therein, namely where a claim has been issued before the pre-action processes have been completed.
  51. The Deputy Master was also well aware that the Appellant was frustrated by the Respondent's failure to deal with the complaint: see [6] of her judgment. However, the weight to be attached to the Respondent's conduct was ultimately a matter for her. As Eady J noted, having regard to the overriding objective, the Deputy Master appropriately took into account the need to avoid delay and the interests of the Respondent in being informed of the parameters of the case to which it will be required to respond.
  52. In my judgment the Deputy Master was fully entitled to conclude as she did at [13] that, given the lack of progress in the litigation, "the time" for use of the pre-action processes had "gone" and that the "appropriate way" forward was for the Appellant to "set out his stall" in a Particulars of Claim.
  53. The fact that the Deputy Master did not accept the Appellant's submissions with respect to the pre-action protocols does not provide any basis for her approach to be interfered with on appeal.
  54. The Deputy Master also emphasised at [13] of her judgment that despite refusing the application for a stay there was nothing to stop the parties continuing to negotiate in parallel with the litigation proceeding, or indeed coming back to court and applying for a stay to allow time for mediation or some other form of Alternative Dispute Resolution ("ADR").
  55. I do not therefore consider that it is arguable that the Deputy Master erred in the manner alleged in Ground 5.
  56. Ground 6

  57. Under Ground 6, the Appellant argues that the Deputy Master failed to give sufficient weight if any to the judgment in Hamon and/or to the ADR that had "begun" in the form of the Appellant's complaint to the Respondent.
  58. Hamon involved a group litigation order. The then Senior Master of the King's Bench Division, Master Fontaine, permitted an 8 month stay in the litigation for the purposes of the parties engaging in ADR.
  59. The Deputy Master had been taken to Hamon by the Appellant and referred to it in terms at [3] of her judgment. I therefore agree with Eady J that it is not arguable that the Deputy Master failed to take Hamon into account.
  60. The Appellant is right that at [45] of Hamon the Senior Master emphasised the guidance given in many authorities demonstrating that the courts will encourage the use of ADR to resolve disputes; and that at [65]-[66] she provided a detailed explanation of why in that particular case she was content to allow the parties time to negotiate.
  61. He is also correct that both his case and Hamon involve "statute-backed" ADR mechanisms; and that in one sense his case is more stark than Hamon because, unlike in that case, he has already commenced the internal complaints process.
  62. However, none of those general principles or factual comparisons assist the Appellant in showing that the Deputy Master arguably erred.
  63. The Deputy Master understandably noted at [3] of her judgment that Hamon was a breach of contract claim. This is a key factual difference between the two cases, given the much longer limitation period that applies to such claims, as is the fact that Hamon involved large group litigation. As Eady J noted, these factors explain why it would have been of limited assistance to the Deputy Master's task in the present case.
  64. More fundamentally, and with all due respect to the Senior Master, Hamon is a first instance judgment applying general principles to the particular facts of that case. It is not authority for the granting of a lengthy stay in all cases, let alone in defamation cases, let alone in cases involving this lack of progress in the litigation.
  65. It is also apparent from the Deputy Master's judgment at [4] and [6] that she was aware that the Appellant was trying to use the internal complaints procedure and felt frustrated by the delay in that process.
  66. She was nevertheless entitled to conclude that it would be wrong to allow yet further time to pass, the complaint having been filed around a year before, in June 2023, without the filing and service of the Particulars of Claim.
  67. I do not therefore consider that Ground 6 is arguable.
  68. Conclusion

  69. Accordingly, despite the very attractive way in which the Appellant has made his submissions, I do not consider that the appeal would have a real prospect of success or that there is some other compelling reason for the appeal to be heard. I therefore refuse this renewed application for permission to appeal.

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