This judgment was handed down in private but the judgment in the form in which it here appears may be reported either in full or in part. There is no restriction on identifying any person or organisation named in the judgment (including Torbay Borough Council) but attention is drawn to:
(a) the terms of the injunctions set out in paragraph ;
(b) the fact that those injunctions prohibit the identification of the children referred to in the judgment as X and Y;
(c) the fact that the injunction set out in paragraph 6(i) of the order has now expired and has not been extended: see paragraph .
Mr Justice Munby
Strand, London WC2A 2LL
(Postscript dated 4 December 2003)
B e f o r e :
In the Matter of Angela RODDY (A Minor)
In the Matter of X (A Minor)
In the Matter of Y (A Minor)
And in the Matter of an application by
ASSOCIATED NEWSPAPERS LIMITED
|TORBAY BOROUGH COUNCIL||Claimant|
|- and -|
|NEWS GROUP NEWSPAPERS||Defendant|
Associated Newspapers Limited
Mr Lee Arnot (instructed by Legal Services) for the claimant local authority
The defendant was neither present nor represented
Hearing date: 28 November 2003
Crown Copyright ©
Mr Justice Munby:
"The tragic story of this family, torn apart by social services and the legal process cannot be told in full: an injunction prevents the parents, who believe an injustice has been done, from speaking out. The future of three generations has been decided by the authorities behind a wall of silence. Social services, who took the girl into care last year, rightly insisted the young mother and teenage father should not be identified. But they have gone further, persuading a High Court judge to issue a draconian gagging order on everyone, including the girl's parents."
"It appears to be a shocking example of official arrogance. A case in which parents claim their daughter and granddaughter were taken from them because of their mainstream Christian beliefs.
But, equally disturbingly, the facts could never be aired publicly before today.
On Friday, The Mail on Sunday successfully contested a draconian gagging order, obtained by a council in the West of England, barring all public debate of this extraordinary story. The court victory has finally restored to the parents the basic right to express their anguish about the removal of their 13-year-old daughter and the baby she gave birth to in January.
The girl's father believes his family was broken up for ideological reasons: that social workers removed his pregnant daughter because, as a Catholic, he believes abortion is wrong.
But he has been unable to bring his plight to the attention of the public. Under the gagging order the media was banned from publishing anything he had to say. It meant the social workers' actions remained shrouded in secrecy.
The case of the family who cannot be identified is a complex one which cries out for public scrutiny. It raises crucial questions, including the role of Social Services, tolerance of religious beliefs and questions of choice.
But it is also a personal tragedy."
There was also a strongly worded editorial comment under the headline "Law that hides a cruel intolerance".
"our client has not sought to modify the substance of any of the injunctions in so far as they affect [X]. It is not our client's intention to publish anything which would infringe any of the existing orders in so far as they relate to him."
In a second letter the same day ANL's solicitors wrote:
"we considered whether notice should be given to anyone other than yourselves. We have concluded that as no other party is affected by the proposed variation that this is not necessary. If you disagree, we trust that you will inform us of this as soon as possible and explain your reasoning."
In a further letter sent later the same day ANL's solicitor wrote:
"to confirm that my client will not name [Y] or [X] and has no intention of including anything in its article which might lead to either individual being identified. The intention is for Angela to be permitted to tell her own story without identifying either of these two individuals."
That was confirmed in a witness statement dated 27 November 2003 of John Wellington, the managing editor of the Mail on Sunday. He said:
"The story we propose to run is about Ms Roddy, and not about her child. We have no intention of giving any description of the child or any indication of where the child lives or has lived."
i) So far as Angela was concerned the local authority's position was stated to be that, as she was no longer the subject of a care order, the local authority felt that it could consent to the proposed variation. This was subject to the suggestion that the article should not be published until after Angela's 17th birthday, that is, until after 4 December 2003.
ii) So far as Y was concerned, the local authority wished there to be a further injunction to protect her identity.
i) In relation to Angela the local authority's position was said to be that, having considered ANL's application, it was "satisfied that Angela is of an age and understanding where she is able to make decisions regarding herself". The local authority was therefore not opposed to my order being varied in that respect.
ii) In relation to Y, the local authority's position was said to be that it has a responsibility to Y to protect her identity and is very concerned that no steps are taken that lead to her identification. The statement indicated that the local authority was accordingly seeking what was described as an order preventing the publication of information identifying Y or any information which might lead to her identification.
The letter in which those various documents were enclosed indicated that the local authority would be applying for an adjournment of the hearing.
"Angela has emphasised to me that she wishes to tell her own story about her experiences of being a teenage mother in care and that this is her primary motivation for approaching the newspaper. Angela is a mature and articulate young person who states that she has given very careful consideration to this course of action and has decided that it is something she definitely wishes to take forward. In these circumstances the application for discharge of the existing Order and the substitution of a variation order in the proposed terms of the draft Order would seem to be appropriate."
The legal framework
"in relation to the media the exercise of the court's inherent parens patriae or wardship jurisdiction is divided into three parts: the first part, in which the jurisdiction is not exercisable at all and the child is left to whatever remedies against the media the law would give an adult in comparable circumstances; a second part in which the jurisdiction is exercisable, but in circumstances where, because the court is exercising only its "protective" jurisdiction, the child's interests are not paramount and where a so-called balancing exercise has to be performed; and the third part, in which, because the court is exercising its "custodial" jurisdiction, the child's interests are paramount. Well known examples of cases falling into the first category, where no injunction can be granted, are In re X (A Minor) (Wardship: Jurisdiction)  Fam 47; R v Central Television plc  Fam 192 and M v British Broadcasting Corpn  1 FLR 51."
I went on to suggest that a case would fall into the second rather than the first category:
"only where the proposed publication is directly about a child whose care and upbringing are already being supervised by the court and is such as might threaten the effective working of the court's jurisdiction or the ability of the child's carers to carry out their obligations to the court for the care of the child."
"Whatever the theoretical limit of the jurisdiction may be, the authorities suggest that the court should not even consider exercising that jurisdiction in cases where publicity is not directed at the child or the child's carers unless it could have an adverse affect on the court's ability to deal properly with the care proceedings in question. I prefer the view that the jurisdiction is, as Ward LJ said in re Z and Millett LJ said in R v Central Television plc, theoretically unlimited, but that as Waite LJ said in the latter case at page 207: "The courts have nevertheless found it necessary to set self-imposed limits upon its exercise." It seems, to me, however, that the limitations so far imposed on its exercise have to be reconsidered in the light of the Human Rights Act 1998. As there is a proper foundation for the court to exercise jurisdiction, the child's rights under Article 8 must be taken into account by the court if it is to comply with its obligations under section 6 of the Act. It follows that the court is at least entitled to consider the grant of an injunction in cases such as this even if publicity is not directed at the child or his carers and could not be shown to have an adverse effect on the care proceedings, although that will undoubtedly be a significant factor in deciding whether or not an injunction should ultimately be granted."
As Hale LJ said at para :
"If the existence of the jurisdiction is accepted, it may now be unnecessary to resolve the tension between the various statements made in the earlier decisions of this court. These cases all preceded the implementation of the Human Rights Act 1998. Now that the Human Rights Act is in force, the relevance of the jurisdiction may simply be to provide the vehicle which enables the court to conduct the necessary balancing exercise between the competing rights of the child under Article 8 and the media under Article 10."
Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers MR said much the same thing at para :
"The cases to which I have referred predate the Human Rights Act At the same time they reflect, to a large degree, an attempt to balance the rights conferred by Article 8 of the Human Rights Convention with the Article 10 right to freedom of expression I consider, however, that the principles to be derived from the pre Human Rights Act authorities cannot be rigidly applied. It is necessary in the individual case to balance Article 8 rights which are engaged against Article 10 rights."
" ... the court, in deciding whether to exercise its jurisdiction to restrain publication, whether under the inherent jurisdiction or under section 39 or any other statutory provision, has to consider both Article 8 and Article 10 as independent elements ... As Sedley LJ said in Douglas v Hello! Ltd  QB 967, at p 1005,
"Neither element is a trump card. They will be articulated by the principles of legality and proportionality which, as always, constitute the mechanism by which the court reaches its conclusion on countervailing or qualified rights. It will be remembered that in the jurisprudence of the Convention proportionality is tested by, among other things, the standard of what is necessary in a democratic society."
 In A v B plc  QB 195, Lord Woolf CJ observed at para 6:
"There is a tension between the two articles which requires the court to hold the balance between the conflicting interests they are designed to protect. This is not an easy task but it can be achieved by the courts if, when holding the balance, they attach proper weight to the important rights which both articles are designed to protect. Each article is qualified expressly in a way which allows the interests under the other article to be taken into account."
 This is the approach which should have been followed in this case. The concept of proportionality means that the proposed interference or restriction must be supported by 'relevant and sufficient grounds'; it must respond to a 'pressing social need'; and it must be no greater than necessary to meet the legitimate aim pursued.
 In considering the proportionality of the proposed interference with freedom of expression, a court must not only consider the importance of press freedom in principle: as Lord Woolf CJ also said in A v B plc, at para 11(iv), 'The existence of a free press is in itself desirable and so any interference with it has to be justified'. It must also consider those features which enhance its importance in the particular case.
 It would be so much easier if there were a trump card or governing principle, whether it be press freedom or the rights of the child, But there is in my judgment no escape from the difficult balancing exercise which the Convention requires the judge did not consider each Article independently, and thus did not conduct that exercise "
Lord Phillips MR and Latham LJ agreed. At para  Latham LJ described the exercise now required under the Human Rights Act as being:
"identifying the extent to which refusing to grant the relevant terms of the injunction asked for would be a proportionate interference with the private life of the child on the one hand and their grant would be a proportionate interference with the rights of the press under Article 10 on the other hand."
"The information in this case lies somewhere in between that in Re X and R v Central Television and that in Re M and N or Re W. The proposed publication will not relate directly to how CS is currently being brought up ... On the other hand, this is not the sort of remote and unconnected information about a deceased or long-absent parent with which the cases of Re X and R v Central Independent Television plc were concerned. The publication will relate to events within his recent family life in which he has been directly involved. These have already had and will continue to have a serious impact upon the way in which he is brought up."
In re X, it will be recalled, was the case in which, as I said in Kelly v British Broadcasting Corpn  Fam 59 at p 73,
"an ultimately unsuccessful attempt was made to invoke the wardship jurisdiction to suppress a book describing the aberrant private activities of a 14-year-old girl's dead father, publication of which would be 'psychologically grossly damaging' to the child and where the injury to her emotional psychological health would be 'very grave indeed'."
"(1) This section applies if a court is considering whether to grant any relief which, if granted, might affect the exercise of the Convention right to freedom of expression.
(3) No such relief is to be granted so as to restrain publication before trial unless the court is satisfied that the applicant is likely to establish that publication should not be allowed."
"the test is not that of the balance of probabilities but rather that of a real prospect of success, convincingly established."
"Press conferences held by those who wish to attract attention to their views, and interviews conducted by the media, are both essential mechanisms for facilitating the exercise of the rights guaranteed by article 10. Both the press conference and the interview are means by which those wishing to disseminate their views exercise their Convention right to 'impart' information and ideas and by which the media exercise their Convention rights both to 'receive' and in turn to 'impart' information and ideas."
So, in a case such as this, one is concerned with the Article 10 rights not merely of the press and of those who read newspapers but also of those who wish to tell or sell their stories to the press. And just as I stressed in Kelly at p 79 that I was concerned with the Article 10 rights not merely of the BBC but also of Bobby Kelly, so here I stress that I am concerned not merely with the Article 10 rights of ANL and the Mail on Sunday but also and every bit as important with Angela's Article 10 rights.
"Private life, in the court's view, includes a person's physical and psychological integrity; the guarantee afforded by Art 8 of the Convention is primarily intended to ensure the development, without outside interference, of the personality of each individual in his relations with other human beings."
" Not every act or measure which adversely affects moral or physical integrity will interfere with the right to respect to private life guaranteed by Article 8. However, the Court's case-law does not exclude that treatment which does not reach the severity of Article 3 treatment may nonetheless breach Article 8 in its private life aspect where there are sufficiently adverse effects on physical and moral integrity.
 Private life is a broad term not susceptible to exhaustive definition. The Court has already held that elements such as gender identification, name and sexual orientation and sexual life are important elements of the personal sphere protected by Article 8. Mental health must also be regarded as a crucial part of private life associated with the aspect of moral integrity. Article 8 protects a right to identity and personal development, and the right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings and the outside world. The preservation of mental stability is in that context an indispensable precondition to effective enjoyment of the right to respect for private life."
"As the Court has had previous occasion to remark, the concept of 'private life' is a broad term not susceptible to exhaustive definition. It covers the physical and psychological integrity of a person. It can sometimes embrace aspects of an individual's physical and social identity. Elements such as, for example, gender identification, name and sexual orientation and sexual life fall within the personal sphere protected by Article 8. Article 8 also protects a right to personal development, and the right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings and the outside world. Though no previous case has established as such any right to self-determination as being contained in Article 8 of the Convention, the Court considers that the notion of personal autonomy is an important principle underlying the interpretation of its guarantees."
"The very essence of the Convention is respect for human dignity and human freedom."
"True it is that the phrase [human dignity] is not used in the Convention but it is surely immanent in article 8, indeed in almost every one of the Convention's provisions. The recognition and protection of human dignity is one of the core values in truth the core value of our society and, indeed, of all the societies which are part of the European family of nations and which have embraced the principles of the Convention. It is a core value of the common law, long predating the Convention."
The Convention in the present case
i) X's rights under Article 8 (a) to keep his private life private and (b) to preserve and protect the family life he enjoys with his parents and other members of his family;
ii) Y's rights under Article 8 (a) to keep her private life private and (b) to preserve and protect the family life she is now enjoying with her adoptive parents;
iii) Angela's rights under Articles 8 and 10, as she wishes to assert them, to tell her story to the world through the medium of the Mail on Sunday;
iv) Angela's rights under Article 8, as Angela's parents or the court might wish to assert them on her behalf, (a) to keep her private life private and (b) to preserve and protect the family life she enjoys with her parents and other members of her family;
v) ANL's rights under Article 10 (a) to obtain the story that Angela wishes to tell and (b) to publish Angela's story in the Mail on Sunday.
The case of X
"unless there is a total ban ... someone somewhere may put the story to the person. That seems to me to be inevitable ... to those who know the facts any description, for instance from this judgment, will lead to identification."
But as Neill LJ said In re W (A Minor) (Wardship: Restrictions on Publication)  1 WLR 100 at p 103:
"It is to be anticipated that in almost every case the public interest in favour of publication can be satisfied without any identification of the ward to persons other than those who already know the facts. It seems to me, however, that the risk of some wider identification may have to be accepted on occasions if the story is to be told in a manner which will engage the interest of the general public."
"[a] striking fact ... that in In re W (A Minor) (Wardship: Restrictions on Publication)  1 WUR 100, 102, the Court of Appeal refused to prevent publication of a story which it was likely would be read by the ward himself in circumstances where there was cogent evidence that his placement might be jeopardised and that the article would have a "devastating effect" on the ward, who was likely to be seriously affected both by the article itself and by his fear of the reaction of others to it."
Moreover, in that case the court refused to prohibit publication of the name of the local authority. As Balcombe LJ said at p 105:
"the identification of Southwark London Borough Council as the local authority responsible for the placement in question may well increase the risk of identification of the ward and his foster parents. Nevertheless it is the action of this particular council which gives rise to the matter of public interest on which the newspaper wishes to comment, and for these reasons it seems to me that it would be imposing a greater degree of restraint than is essential to protect the interests of the ward to prohibit the newspaper from identifying the council."
"It is, in my view, contrary to the ordinary experience of mankind, at least in Western Europe in the present century, to say that a child or a young person remains in fact under the complete control of his parents until he attains the definite age of majority, now 18 in the United Kingdom, and that on attaining that age he suddenly acquires independence. In practice most wise parents' relax their control gradually as the child develops and encourage him or her to become increasingly independent. Moreover, the degree of parental control actually exercised over a particular child does in practice vary considerably according to his understanding and intelligence and it would, in my opinion, be unrealistic for the courts not to recognise these facts. Social customs change, and the law ought to, and does in fact, have regard to such changes when they are of major importance."
"The law relating to parent and child is concerned with the problems of the growth and maturity of the human personality. If the law should impose upon the process of "growing up" fixed limits where nature knows only a continuous process, the price would be artificiality and a lack of realism in an area where the law must be sensitive to human development and social change. ... The underlying principle of the law ... is that parental right yields to the child's right to make his own decisions when he reaches a sufficient understanding and intelligence to be capable of making up his own mind on the matter requiring decision."
"the law and practice in relation to infants ... have developed, are developing and must, and no doubt will, continue to develop by reflecting and adopting the changing views, as the years go by, of reasonable men and women, the parents of children, on the proper treatment and methods of bringing up children for after all that is the model which the judge must emulate."
"Accordingly the older the child concerned the greater the weight the court should give to its wishes, certainly in the field of medical treatment. In a sense this is merely one aspect of the application of the test that the welfare of the child is the paramount consideration. It will normally be in the best interests of a child of sufficient age and understanding to make an informed decision that the court should respect its integrity as a human being and not lightly override its decision on such a personal matter as medical treatment, all the more so if that treatment is invasive. In my judgment, therefore, the court exercising the inherent jurisdiction in relation to a 16- or 17-year-old child who is not mentally incompetent will, as a matter of course, ascertain the wishes of the child and will approach its decision with a strong predilection to give effect to the child's wishes."
"In considering the welfare of the child, the court must not only recognise but if necessary defend the right of the child, having sufficient understanding to take an informed decision, to make his or her own choice. In most areas of life it would be not only wrong in principle but also futile and counter-productive for the court to adopt any different approach."
"I ... accept that a boy of 15 may be sufficiently mature to be able to speak directly to, and be interviewed by, representatives of the press or broadcasting media."
In Kelly v British Broadcasting Corpn  Fam 59 I held that the BBC should not be prevented from broadcasting the interview it had obtained after being approached by 16-year-old Bobby Kelly.
"In my judgment any rule which made it a contempt of court, of itself and without more ado, for the media to interview a ward of court without first obtaining the leave of the court involves far too serious an invasion of the article 10 rights both of the media and, I stress, of the ward himself to pass muster under paragraph 2."
The case of Y
80. Now let it be assumed that this case was actually to be established at trial as a matter of fact. Even then, as it seems to me, the local authority would in all probability have a very uphill task making good the argument that the balancing exercise should be resolved in favour of Y. To grant Y the enhanced degree of protection suggested by the local authority would, as it seems to me, involve an interference with Angela's rights significantly greater than disproportionate to the interference with Y's rights that would be the consequence of a refusal to grant such relief.
81. Be that as it may, we are not even in that position, or anything remotely like it. There is at present simply no evidential foundation for the case at all. Looking not merely to the evidence but to all the material before the court there is, in my judgment, no basis, and certainly no convincing basis, for finding that there is any real prospect of such a case ever being made good. Lest it be thought that I have overlooked the points, I make clear that this applies as much to the points referred to in paragraph  above as to the other aspects of this part of the local authority's case.
82. Thus far I have focused on Angela's rights. But ANL's rights are also important. And there is a further important factor to be put into the balance. There is, in my judgment, a clear public interest in Angela's story, whatever the "angle" from which it may turn out to be written. In his witness statement Mr Wellington says:
"I ... believe it is in the public interest for Ms Roddy to be permitted to tell her story. Ms Roddy has a compelling story to tell about the experience of getting pregnant at a young age, and the consequences which resulted, which included her being put into care, and losing her child to adoption. Her story raises crucial questions of real public interest about young people's attitudes to underage sex and pregnancy, and how society and the authorities should deal with situations of this kind when they arise."
I emphatically agree.
83. In my judgment, the workings of the family court system and, perhaps most importantly of all, the views about the system of the children caught up in it, are, as Balcombe LJ put it in Re W (Wardship: Discharge: Publicity)  2 FLR 466 at p 474, "matters of public interest which can and should be discussed publicly" see further Kelly v British Broadcasting Corpn  Fam 59 at pp 77, 87, and Harris v Harris, Attorney-General v Harris  2 FLR 895 at para . So too, quite manifestly, are the wider social issues referred to by Mr Wellington. Too many young lives in our society are tragically blighted by pre-teenage pregnancies. I have just returned from Circuit where I had to deal with a mother who was even younger than Angela when she became pregnant. These are matters to be addressed with honesty and candour. They are not problems to be swept under the carpet in shame or embarrassment. These are issues that require open and public debate in the media. And what more important voice can there be in such a debate than that of a teenager who has gone through all that Angela has experienced?
"The court has seen a copy of the article to be published by the newspaper. It is not for me to comment on the style of the article. ... But I have no doubt whatever that the newspaper should be free to publish this story and to publish it in a manner which will engage the interest of their readers."
It is not the function of the judges to legitimise "responsible" reporting whilst censoring what some are pleased to call "irresponsible" reporting. The days are past when the business of the judges was the enforcement of morals. A judge, although it may be that on occasions he can legitimately exercise the functions of an aedile, is no censor. And as the Strasbourg jurisprudence establishes (see Harris v Harris, Attorney-General v Harris  2 FLR 895 at para ), the freedom of expression secured by Article 10 is applicable not only to information or ideas that are favourably received, or regarded as inoffensive, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb the State or any section of the community. Article 10 protects not only the substance of the ideas and information expressed, but also the form in which they are conveyed. It is not for the court to substitute its own views for those of the press as to what technique of reporting should be adopted by journalists. Article 10 entitles journalists to adopt a particular form of presentation intended to ensure a particularly telling effect on the average reader. As Neill LJ recognised, a tabloid newspaper is entitled to tell the story in a manner which will engage the interest of its readers and the general public. If there is no basis for injuncting a story expressed in the temperate or scholarly language of a legal periodical or the broadsheet press there can be no basis for injuncting the same story simply because it is expressed in the more robust, colourful or intemperate language of the tabloid press.
"IT IS ORDERED that:
1 The Order of Mr Justice Munby made herein on 7 July 2000 be discharged.
2 Until 4 December 2004 or further order in the meantime no person including the defendant (whether by himself', his servants or agents or otherwise howsoever or in the case of a company, whether by its directors, servants or agents or otherwise howsoever) shall do any of the following things except to the extent permitted by paragraphs 3 and 7 of this Order:
(i) publish in any book, magazine or newspaper or broadcast in any sound or television broadcast or by means of any cable or satellite programme services:
(a) the name and/or address of:
(1) Angela Roddy;
(2) any school or any other educational institution attended by Angela Roddy;
(b) any picture being or including a picture of Angela Roddy;
(c) any other matter calculated to lead to the identification of Angela Roddy as being the girl who became pregnant at the age of 12;
(ii) solicit any information relating to Angela Roddy (other than information already in the public domain):
(a) from Angela Roddy;
(b) from any natural person believed to have or have had day-today care of Angela Roddy;
(c) from her parents;
(d) from any other person who is believed to be a relative of Angela Roddy;
(e) from the staff and/or pupils of any school or educational institution that Angela Roddy is believed to attend or to have attended;
(iii) (notwithstanding the provisions of section 12(2) of the Administration of Justice Act 1960 as amended ...) include, in any publication of the text or a summary of the whole or any part of this Order, any of the matters referred to in paragraph 2(i) above;
(iv) give or seek information or conduct any negotiation for publication from the home in which Angela Roddy resides or in the presence of Angela Roddy;
(v) publish any information (other than information already in the public domain) relating to Angela Roddy that has been obtained directly or indirectly from Angela Roddy's father, Anthony Roddy.
3 The injunctions in paragraph 2 above shall not of themselves prohibit any person from publishing information falling within paragraphs 2(i), (iii) or (v) above if the publication is made:
(i) with the prior consent of Angela Roddy; or
(ii) at a time when the information is already in the public domain.
4 Until 4 December 2004 or further order in the meantime no person including the defendant (whether by himself, his servants or agents or otherwise howsoever or in the case of a company, whether by its directors, servants or agents or otherwise howsoever) shall do any of the following things except to the extent permitted by paragraph 7 of this Order:
(i) publish in any book, magazine or newspaper or broadcast in any sound or television broadcast or by means of any cable or satellite programme services, any matter calculated to lead to the identification of [X] as the putative father of Angela Roddy's child;
(ii) solicit any information relating to [X] (other than information already in the public domain):
(a) from [X];
(b) from any natural person believed to have had day to day care of [X];
(c) from his parents;
(d) from any other person who is believed to be a relative of [X];
(e) from the staff and/or pupils of any school or educational institution that [X] is believed to attend or to have attended;
(iii) (notwithstanding the provisions of section 12(2) of the Administration of Justice Act 1960 as amended ... ) include in any publication of the text or a summary of the whole or in any part of this Order, any of the matters referred to in paragraph 4(i) above;
(iv) publish any intimate medical or educational information or other confidential information (other than information already in the public domain) relating to [X] that has been obtained directly or indirectly from Angela Roddy's father, Anthony Roddy.
5 Until 27 January 2018 or further order in the meantime (but without prejudice to paragraph 3(i) above in so far as it relates to the information in paragraph 2) no person including the defendant (whether by himself, his servants or agents or otherwise howsoever or in the case of a company whether by its directors, servants or agents otherwise howsoever) shall:
(i) publish in any book, magazine or newspaper or broadcast in any sound or television broadcast or by means of any cable or satellite programme service:
(a) the name and/or address of [Y];
(b) any picture being or including a picture of [Y];
(c) any other matter calculated to lead to the identification of [Y] as being the child of Angela Roddy, or [X] (as the putative father of [Y]);
(ii) solicit any information relating to [Y] (other than information already in the public domain) from any natural person other than Angela Roddy believed to have or have had day to day care of [Y];
(iii) solicit any information within paragraph 5(i) above at any time from any person.
(i) Until 4.00 pm on Thursday 4 December 2003 or further order in the meantime no person including the defendant (whether by himself, his servants or agents or otherwise howsoever or in the case of a company whether by its directors, servants or agents otherwise howsoever) shall publish in any book, magazine or newspaper or broadcast in any sound or television broadcast or by means of any cable or satellite programme service any information which identifies [the local authority] as the Authority which has had responsibility for and has made decisions in respect of the care of Angela Roddy or [Y].
(ii) If the claimant wishes to apply for an extension of this injunction notice must be given to Associated Newspapers Limited by 12.00 noon on Wednesday 3 December 2003 together with, if possible, and if need be in draft, the evidence in support.
7. Nothing in this Order shall of itself prevent any person:
(a) inquiring of another person:
(i) as to whether that person is a person referred to in paragraph 2(ii) or 4(ii) or 5(ii) above;
(ii) whether any particular information is information within paragraph 5;
(b) publishing any particulars of or information relating to any part of the proceedings before any Court other than a court sitting in private,
(c) soliciting information relating to Angela Roddy or [X] or [Y] in the course of or for the purpose of the exercise by the person soliciting such information of any duty or function authorised by statute or by any Court of competent jurisdiction."
Postscript (4 December 2003)