[752]         Munin 1 [35]; Suchart 1 [18]. See also the Thai Law Propositions document, paragraph 1.

[753]         As confirmed in their closing submissions at paragraph 900; see also paragraph 156 of the Claimants’ RAPOC.

[754]         Munin 1 [81]; Suchart 1 [84]

[755] See RAPOC, [160CC] (alleged ‘bribery’), and [160G.2] (alleged ‘inducing breach of contract’).

[756] Munin 1, [79]

[757] Munin 1, [79].

[758]         Munin 1 [198]; Suchart 1 [276]; Anurak 1 [81]

[759]         See also Suchart 1 [279(iv)]

[760]         Suchart 1 [277]

[761]         Anurak 1 [91]

[762]         Munin 1 [198]; Suchart 1 [276]; Munin 2 [117]

[763]         Suchart 1 [363]; Munin 2 [118]

[764]         Suchart 1 [278]

[765]         Thai Law Propositions document [62.5], Munin 2 [118]

[766] And paragraph 18 of his second report

[767] Day 37/138:19–24.

[768] Namely, a wrongful act. Dr Munin’s translation of this sentence is as follows: “The circumstance that the defendants deceived the consumers into misunderstanding and paying money as the two lower courts described in detail is considered not only breach of contract but also a wrongful act.”

[769]         Day 39/90: 8-14

[770]         Day 37/ 133-134

[771]         Suchart 1 [279(i)], [281]; Munin 2, [115]..

[772]         Suchart 1, [278]

[773]         Day 37/128:7–11.

[774]         Munin 1 [76]

[775]         Suchart 1, [89]

[776] Symphony’s request for arbitration was dated 26 January 2016  and NGI/DLV’s request for arbitration was dated 25 March 2016. See also Munin 1 [202]-[204]; Munin 2 [120]-[121], which confirm that submitting a claim to arbitration is sufficient for the purposes of s.350.

[777] RRRRAD D1/D17 [264(5)(vii)(a)]

[778] See Suchart 1, [278]; Munin 2, [113]. At Day 37/139: 1-2, Dr Munin agreed that this point simply calls for an interpretation of the legal provision, section 350.

[779] This also accords with the correct approach to interpretation of a statute as a matter of Thai law: see Munin 2 [121]: “Whilst it is correct that criminal laws will be construed restrictively, they will not be construed in a manner that defeats the clear effect of the law.”

[780]         Suchart 1 [279(i)], [281]; Anurak 1 [83]; Munin 2 [115]

[781]         Munin 2 [116]

[782]         Suchart 2 [294]

[783] Anurak 1 [83(b)]

[784] Munin 1, [82]; Munin 2, [35]; Day 37/91:1-95:4.

[785]         Day 37/92:4 to 95:4.

[786]         Munin 1, [96]; Suchart 1 [120]-[121]; Anurak 1, [112].

[787]         Day 37/103:3 to 105:11. Dr Munin also suggests that if the criteria for relief under s.237 were satisfied, that may give rise to a relevant unlawful act for the purposes of s.420 by way of his ‘second route’ of damage without legal justification. See at Day 37/102:15–18: “A: and 237 itself is an unlawful act, in opinion. This can be the second route. Q: Second route only? A: yes.” However, that ‘second route’ is not part of Cs’ pleaded case.

[788]         Day 37/104:7–10.

[789]         Suchart 1 [118]

[790]         Suchart 1 [376], [379(c)], [383]; Munin 1, [262(1)]; Anurak 1, [99]-[101]

[791]         Thai Law Claims Spreadsheet, rows 23 (REC’s accounts) and 24 (the REC Minutes).

[792]         Thai Law Claims Spreadsheet, rows 25 (the Kasem Transfer), 30 (transfers to the WEH Managers), 38 and 39 (the GML transfer), 45 (the Pradej transfers), 49 and 50 (the Cornwallis transfer), 55 (the WEH Management SPAs) and 67 (the Kasem Agency Agreement). It is not clear from that table, the Thai Law Claims Spreadsheet, or the relevant paragraphs of the RAPOC cited therein, whether in respect of certain of those transfers the Claimants also rely on documents said to be false in their contents, rather than forged. If so, they fall to be dealt with in the same way as those set out above.

[793]         “Whoever, in a manner likely to cause injury to another person or the public, fabricates a false document or part of a document, or adds to, takes from or otherwise alters a genuine document by any means whatever, or puts a false seal or signature to a document, if it is committed in order to make any person to believe that it is a genuine document, is said to forge a document”. Section 265 and 268 provide for offences parasitic on forgery contrary to s.264.

[794]         Thai Law Propositions document, [78].

[795]         Suchart 1, [327]. See also at [317]–[319].

[796]         Munin 1, [218]–[219].

[797] Day 40/99:14-102:1

[798] Day 40/102:2-8

[799] Day 40/102:9-104:7

[800] Suchart 1, [334]; Day 41/104:8-15

[801] Day 41/105:6-106:12.

[802] Day 41/109:6-22. There was subsequently some debate, during Professor Suchart’s oral evidence, as to whether the correct English translation of the relevant term in s. 265 is “official document” or “government document”: Day 41/110:3-116:25. However, the TPC simply defines “official document” as “a document drawn up or authenticated by an official in the course of his duty, and includes also a copy of such document authenticated by an official in the course of his duty

[803] Day 40/106:10-12

[804] Day 40/17:18-21

[805] Day 40/118:20-119:3

[806] Munin 1, [228]

[807]         Sections 1206 and 1207 provide for the duties of directors to, respectively, keep accounts and enter minutes.

[808]         or the shareholders or creditors under the derivative mechanism in s.1169 TCCC.

[809]         “Claims against the directors for compensation for injury caused by them to the company may be entered by the company or, in case the company refuses to act, by any of the shareholders. Such claims may also be enforced by the creditors of the company in so far as their claims against the company remain unsatisfied

[810]         Day 38/19:10 to 20:1.

[811]         See in particular Professor Suchart at Day 40/40:13–15.

[812]         See also Section J(1) of the Defendants’ Thai Law Document.

[813]         Suchart 1 [205]

[814] Munin 1, [91]-[93]; [130]-[134].

[815] Day 37/20:2–3.

[816] The 3rd edition of Professor Seni’s Civil and Commercial Code.

[817]         RAPOC, [156.4(a)]

[818]         See Munin 1, [137]–[139] (paraphrasing the sections); Suchart 1, [207]

[819]         Day 38/10:4–7.

[820]         Day 38/19:10-20.

[821] List of Agreed propositions of Thai Law, [4].

[822] Munin 1 [46]-[48], [50]; Suchart 1 [37].

[823] Anurak 1 [58]; Munin 1 [46]; Suchart 1 [37].

[824] Anurak 1, [75].

[825] Suchart 1, [58]

[826] Munin 1, [60].

[827] Munin 1 [57]; Suchart 1 [48].

[828] Munin 1 [59]; Suchart 1 [52]; Anurak 1 [75]; Munin 2 [15].

[829] Day 40/50:13-14; Day 40/52:17-23

[830] Day 38/39:3-7

[831] Day 38/40:18-24; Day 38/49:21-50:6

[832] Re-re-re-re Amended Defence of D1 and D17, [280(2)]. The Reply does not address it in terms.

[833]         Suchart 1 [422].

[834]         Anurak 1 [31].

[835]         Munin 1 [272]; Anurak 1 [29].

[836]         Munin 1 [242]; Suchart 1 [354].

[837]         Anurak does not opine on the elements of liability for ‘assistance’ (as opposed to ‘instigation’): see Anurak 1 [9(a)] & [10].  References to Anurak’s opinions below in this section should be read subject to that caveat.

[838]         Munin 1 [242]; Suchart 1 [354]

[839]         Munin 1 [240]; Suchart 1 [353].  The translation used here comes from a translation produced by the Office of the Attorney General (2013 Winyuchon Publication House).  It is linguistically clearer than the translation at Munin 1 [240], without appearing to differ in substance.

[840]         Munin 1 [243].

[841]         Anurak 1 [41], [44].

[842]         Anurak 1 [41]-[44].

[843]         Munin 1 [243]; Munin 2 [138].

[844]         Munin 1 [243], Munin 2 [138].

[845]         Munin 1 [244], Munin 2 [138].

[846]         Anurak 1 [41]-[45].

[847]         Anurak 1 [41]-[42].

[848]         Munin 1 [244], Munin 2 [138].

[849]         Anurak 1 [45]-[47]. Professor Suchart is probably correct to state (in his first report at [356]) that it is not sufficient for a person merely to suspect that an offence will be committed by the principal; they must have actual knowledge of those facts.

[850]         Munin 1 [46]; Anurak 1 [48], [52].

[851]         Munin 2 [163].

[852]         Suchart 2 [422].

[853]         Munin 1 [242]; Munin 2 [137]

[854]         Suchart 1 [358#

[855]         Section 268 reads: “Whoever, in a manner likely to cause injury to another person or the public, makes use of … the document begotten from the commission of the offence according to … section 265 … shall be liable to the punishment as provided to such Section.”

[856]         Anurak 1 [49]-[51]

[857]         Anurak 1 [30]

[858]         Anurak 1 [79]

[859]         Anurak 1 [79]

[860]         Munin 2 [139]

[861]         Suchart 1 [360]

[862] D9/D12/D15 written opening at §78 {B1/4/20}; letter from WFG (Cs) {Q5/249.1} dated 3 March 2022; letter from Harcus Parker (D1/D17) {Q5/397} dated 25 March 2022; letter from CMS (then acting for D9/D12/D15) {Q5/389} dated 25 March 2022.

[863] RAPOC §151H.2; D9/D12/D15 RRAD §122ZI(i)(d). 

[864] Day 33/10:22-12:22

[865] Surat WS 1 [31]

[866] See [257] of D9, D12 and D15 Opening Submissions.

[867] Khun Kraivin was to act as an authorised person of Cornwallis in relation to the acquisition of the WEH shares

[868] Day 34/60:23-25

[869] Day 33/55:1-12; Surat WS 1 [46]

[870] RAPOC 13; D3, D7 Defence at [15].

[871] D2, D4-D6, D8 Defence [123.1]; D3, D7 Defence [15].

[872] D2, D4-D6, D8 Defence at [19].

[873]         Claimants’ Written Opening [408(a)]. See also RAPOC, [164B] (“The Claimants gained the requisite knowledge in respect of the Conspiracy, of which all of the wrongdoing set out herein formed part, no earlier than 7 May 2018, then NS’s Companies first obtained the updated 2018 WEH Register”) and [164F.1] (“Time began to run, in respect of all of those claims, not before the Claimants discovered the person liable, the damage and the fact that the relevant act amounted in Thai law to a wrongful act actionable under s.420. Alternatively, time began to run in respect of those claims, which formed part of a continuing wrongful act, upon discovered of the most recent infliction of damage, i.e. not earlier than 7 May 2018”).

[874]         Section 96 of the Penal Code provides that ‘… in [the] case of [a] compoundable offence, if the injured person does not lodge a complaint within 3 months … from the date of [the] offence and offender [being] known by the injured person, the criminal prosecution is precluded by prescription.

[875] In Black Case Aor 157/2561

[876] This should, it seems, likewise be a reference to “civil action” not penal action.

[877]         “… the Plaintiff shall submit his claims by filing a plaint in writing with the Court of First Instance. The plaint shall set forth clearly the nature of the plaintiff’s claims and the relief applied for, as well as the allegations on which such claims are based.”

[878]         Suchart 3, [22]; [24]­­–[29].

[879]         See Joint Thai Law Propositions, [178.2]: “the offence of the defendant must be described in detail to fully cover the elements which constitute the criminal offence. Any plaint that falls short of what is required by law is not a proper plaint. In the event that it is uncertain whether the act of the defendant is contrary to any criminal offence, or where the person is criminally labile jointly with the wrongdoer, then the longer period of the criminal offence is not applicable.

[880]         Suchart 2, [75]: “for s.51(2) to apply to the civil case brought in connection with a criminal case, it must be the plaintiff in the civil action who has also instituted criminal charges against the defendant in the criminal proceedings.

[881]         Suchart 2, [71]–[74].

[882]         See pages 5–8 of the complaint, which (i) recites alleged breach of the REC SPAS and the arbitral awards, and the discovery of the Kasem Transfer; (ii) contends that the named defendants “jointly processed” the Kasem Transfer with the intention to prevent NS’s Companies as creditors from receiving payments of debts or being paid from execution against NN’s Companies’ assets; and (iii) alleges that by jointly transferring or giving consent to the Kasem Transfer, the named defendants’ acts constituted “cheating against creditors”. No other allegations are made.

[883] Claimants’ Written Closing Submissions [1094 (d)] 9

[884] Day 41/44:23-25

[885] Day 38/113:5-9 (Munin)

[886] Munin 3 [23]–[24]

[887] Munin 4 [28] .

[888] HP Defendants’ Thai law Closing Submissions [330.3]

[889] Suchart 3 [18]-[19] 8

[890] Suchart 3 [20]

[891] Munin 3 [22]

[892] Munin 4 [26]

[893] Claimants’ Written Closing Submissions [1094]

[894] Suchart 3 [18]

[895] i.e. s. 18 TCPC provides that: “If the Court is of the opinion that the pleading … is not legible or is drawn up unintelligibly or with excessive prolixity, or does not contain or bear all such particulars or signatures … the Court may issue an order returning it for redrafting, amendment, or duly paying or laying the Court fees …

[896] Munin 3 [12]; Day 38/96:3-4

[897] Claimants’ Written Closings [1094 (a) and (e)(b)]

[898] Day 38/96:16-23

[899] Day 38/98:25-99:4

[900] Munin 4 [23]–[25]

[901] Claimants’ Written Closings [1094(b)]

[902] Claimants’ Written Closings [1094(c)]

[903] Day 41/44:12-22.

[904] Munin 4 [26].

[905] Claimants’ Written Closings [1092] citing Munin 2 [213]

[906] Suchart 2 [72]

[907] RAPOC [160H]-[160K].

[908] Dicey at fn. 426 to §30-135).

[909] 7th edn, 2021, at fn 129 to Ch. 7, s. 7.

[910] 25th edn, 2022, Part XVI.

[911] 6th edn, At §30-013 and fns. 37 and 38 thereto.

[912] I note in this respect that at the first CMC in these proceedings, Butcher J heard argument on the significance of the fact that the s.423 claims arise in the context of much wider English proceedings, holding, at [75] of his judgment (emphasis added):“the existence of litigation in this jurisdiction between the same parties and which is related to the s. 423 claim is itself a connecting factor”. For the reasons set out below, I take a different view where the parties have agreed that Thai law applies to the asset stripping claims. Butcher J did not of course, have the benefit of full argument and citation of caselaw on this point, unlike me.

 

[913]         Similarly, Jyske Bank Gibraltar Ltd v Spjeldnaes [2000] BCC 16 was a case involving enforcement of an English judgment.

[914]         Day 6/58:3–10.

[915]         Day 6/16:19–25 and Day 6/17:1–8 (“I’m pretty confident that I should get justice from the Supreme Court …”).

[916]         Praphan Second Report, [69(b)]

[917]         Day 36/66:9.

[918]         Day 6/58:24–59:1.

[919]         Day 36/23–39.

[920]         See Praphan Second Report, [27] and his further written answers to questions 2 and 3.

[921] RAPOC, [162.7(d)]

[922] The focus is upon Fullerton and KPN EH as the relevant parties to the REC SPAs, and not upon Khun Nop personally (who was not a party to the REC SPAs).

[923] The Tribunal also awarded costs of all the arbitration proceedings (including the First Partial Award Proceedings) in Mr Suppipat’s Companies’ favour. That amounted to EUR 3,057,484.12 plus GBP 226,765.00 ([352] of the 17 March 2023 Judgment). The claimants do not however claim for this sum in these proceedings.

[924] Caldwell First Report, [90].

[925] ibid

[926] Schumacher First Report, [6.3]

[927] Ibid, [6.4].

[928] Ibid, [6.5].

[929] Appendices to Schumacher 2 A5.1.3

[930] See Schumacher 1 Exhibit KFS 10

[931] T11/20:7-14

[932] Suppipat WS [38]-[39]. See also Day 11/164:4-167:18

[933] Day 14/139:6-24

[934] Cited at [1196] of the Claimants’ written closing.

[935] [394] of their written closing submissions

[936] A relationship of agency is probably not necessary: see Wood (infra)

[937] No money at all was paid in respect of these transfers: WS1/EC §268 {E1.3/1/62}; Day 22/45:1-3 {I/22/13} (Ms Collins).