Author: McDonald, Natascha
Last saved by: BAILII

CO/3891/2014 
Neutral Citation Number: [2014] EWHC 4762 (Admin)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT 
Royal Courts of Justice 
Strand
London WC2A 2LL 

Friday, 28 November 2014
 
B e f o r e: 

MRS JUSTICE McGOWAN
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 

Between: 
THE QUEEN ON THE APPLICATION OF ROSSER 
Applicant

v 

WESTMINSTER MAGISTRATES' COURT 
Respondent 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 

Computer‑Aided Transcript of the Stenograph Notes of  
WordWave International Limited
A Merrill Communications Company 
165 Fleet Street  London EC4A 2DY
Tel No: 020 7404 1400 Fax No: 020 7404 1424
(Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 

Mr C Wells (instructed by O'Keefes) appeared on behalf of the Applicant
The Respondent did not appear and was not represented
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 

J U D G M E N T
1.	MRS JUSTICE McGOWAN:  This is a renewed application for permission to apply for judicial review, permission having originally been refused on the papers by the single judge.  
2.	The history of this matter is familiar to the parties and can be taken quite shortly.  The applicant in this case, Peter Rosser, was arrested on 31 October 2013 on suspicion of driving a motor vehicle with excess alcohol.  He was taken by the police officers to Hammersmith police station and fingerprints were taken from him at the police station on that occasion.  He was bailed by the police to return, which he did on 20 December 2013, but the matter was not ready to proceed and accordingly his bail was renewed, requiring him to return to the same police station, Hammersmith, on 14 January 2014.  Again, the police were not ready to proceed on that day. 
3.	A dispute as to what followed arises, because the police say that there was a return date of 29 January 2014, the applicant says that he was unaware of that date, but in the event he did not appear at the police station on that date.  He was arrested the next day, the 30th, by police officers for failing to attend the previous day.  He was taken to the police station, and in due course, arising out of incidents that took place no doubt on 30 January, he was charged with a number of criminal offences.  
4.	He was charged in slightly odd chronological order, with the offence of failing to surrender to police on 29 January first.  The second charge was driving a motor vehicle with excess alcohol on 31 October 2013.  There then followed six allegations of assaults on police officers, or others, in the execution of their duty, and in addition there was a offence of criminal damage, causing some sort of damage to a police officer's jumper.  
5.	In due course, the Magistrates' Court heard the matter and between 23 and 24 April 2014 the claimant was tried by District Judge Snow, sitting at the Westminster Magistrates' Court.  He was convicted at the end of that two day hearing and the matter was adjourned for sentence to 13 May 2014, when, for reasons which I do not understand but may not matter, he was sentenced by a different bench, a lay bench of Justices, to a term of three months' imprisonment suspended for 12 months, with an order that he perform unpaid work in the community of 160 hours.  He was ordered to pay £640 compensation and £750 costs.
6.	In due course, he sought to require the Magistrate to state a case.  Section 111 of the Magistrates' Court Act 1980 sets out the procedure which somebody wanting the Magistrates to state a case must follow.  Subsection 1 says:
"Any person who was a party to any proceeding before a Magistrates' Court, or is aggrieved by the conviction, order, determination or other proceedings of the court, may question the proceeding on the ground that it is wrong in law or is in excess of jurisdiction by applying to the Justices composing the court to state a case for the opinion of the High Court on the question of law or jurisdiction involved."
The rest of the section does not trouble us.  
7.	Subsection 2 states that that application shall be made within 21 days after the day on which the decision of the Magistrates' Court was given, but the important aspect of the statute for these purposes is subsection 3, when it defines what the day upon which the decision was given actually means.  For the purposes of these proceedings, it is clear that the 21 days runs from, "the day on which the court sentences or otherwise deals with the offender". 
8.	Within that 21 day period, on 2 June a letter was sent by the claimant, or by those solicitors acting on his behalf, to the Magistrates' Court, addressed to the Chief Clerk, City of Westminster Magistrates' Court.  It was delivered by hand.  It is a very short and fairly terse letter, and whilst it, as will become apparent in due course, satisfies the requirements placed upon it, in my view it might have been phrased a good deal more carefully.  But in any event it sets out a number of points which are numbered and includes also a number of points which are unnumbered, possibly adding to the confusion.  
9.	The matter was complicated, it would seem, by the fact that once the letter had arrived at the Magistrates' Court, it seems not to have been allocated to anybody with the requisite knowledge or authority to deal with it.  In due course, the combination of an email from Mr Todhunter on 24 June and from Miss Watt on 25 June amounted to an apology for the delay in being able to deal with the matter and the acknowledgement by the District Judge that he had only had the matter brought to his attention on 24 June, and on that occasion was able to say the following day, the 25th, that the letter was not a proper application and does not comply with Part 64 of the Criminal Procedure Rules.
10.	I am told and accept that if that view had been communicated to those who acted for Mr Rosser at the time, that the letter could and would have been redrafted.  I accept that, because it is clear that once the view of the Magistrate that the letter did not in his view accord with the rules was known, a second attempt at requesting the Magistrates to state a case was sent to the court, this time, it has to be said, in what was clearly a more formal way, set out albeit not in a template but in a recognisable form as an appeal from the Magistrates' Court by way of case stated.  That was submitted to the court on 1 August, so within a week of the solicitors being put on notice that the District Judge was purporting not to accept the first letter as being in the proper form.  I therefore accept that if the Magistrates' Court had dealt with the letter of 2 June properly, the solicitors would have been put on notice as to the complaint about the form of the letter, and it would have been altered.
11.	That being said, I also accept that the second document is an amplified and amended form of the first.  I do not agree with the District Judge, who subsequently took the view that the second document was effectively the first application and was therefore out of time, again, making the point that if the first document is properly to be criticised, it should have been criticised much closer to the time, thereby enabling the solicitors to put it right.
12.	Turning to Part 64 of the rules, and how and why the District Judge purported to say that the original document was not in proper form, I turn to Rule 64.2 subsection 2, which says:
"The application must: (a) specify the decision in issue [well there can be no question that this document does that]; (b) specify the proposed question or questions of law or jurisdiction on which the opinion of the High Court will be asked; (c) indicate the proposed grounds of appeal."
And moving on to subparagraph 3:
"The party who wants to make representations about the application must serve the representations on the court officer and each other party and do so not more than 14 days after service of the application."
The rest of the rule deals with other procedural matters which do not affect this application.
13.	It seems to me that if one does the exercise of comparing one document to the other, there are at least six points in common.  They may not be expressed precisely in the same way, in fact they are not, they are clearly amplified by counsel in the second document, and as I have already said it might be said that the original letter could be described as terse.  But in any event, the points were made in the letter.  It clearly sets out the questions of law upon which the court was invited to state a case.  
14.	The procedural problems, namely the time and/or the form of the application to state a case having been resolved, there is ‑‑ and the applicant must be very well aware of this, of course ‑‑ a power in the magistrates to refuse to state a case because the application is frivolous, I hear what is said about that, but I know nothing about the state of the evidence in the case and the only complaints I have seen are those set out in the application itself.  
15.	That being said, this seems to me a matter that should be dealt with in the way applied for, and I quash the order and order that he state a case.
16.	MRS JUSTICE McGOWAN:  Mr Wells, I do not know whether I need to make time provision for that order?
17.	MR WELLS:  I'm not aware of any, but I'll ‑‑
18.	MRS JUSTICE McGOWAN:  Well if I do, then I'm content to approve such directions in an order if the order comes before me at some stage on Monday.
19.	MR WELLS:  So be it.
20.	MRS JUSTICE McGOWAN:  If not this afternoon.
21.	MR WELLS:  I'll take instructions, I have a full team here today, so if need be I will lodge something today.
22.	MRS JUSTICE McGOWAN:  But if that can't be done, then Monday.
23.	MR WELLS:  So be it.
24.	MRS JUSTICE McGOWAN:  Thank you very much, Mr Wells.

SMITH BERNAL WORDWAVE