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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Family Court Decisions (other Judges) >> FM v MK [2025] EWFC 161 (B) (02 June 2025)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWFC/OJ/2025/161.html
Cite as: [2025] EWFC 161 (B)

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Neutral Citation Number: [2025] EWFC 161 (B)

CASE No: LU22P00248

IN THE FAMILY COURT AT LUTON

Luton Justice Centre
Floors 4 & 5, Arndale House
Luton Point
Luton
LU1 2EN

Date: 2 June 2025

Before :

 

RECORDER PATEL

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Between :

 

 

  FM 

Applicant

 

 

- and –

 

 

  MK 

Respondent

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Applicant in person

Ms Manveet Chhina, Solicitor of Jung & Co Solicitors for the Respondent

 

Hearing dates: 9-10 April 2025

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JUDGMENT


Recorder Patel:

 

Introduction

  1. This has been a final hearing following FM's application in which MK is the respondent. Those applications concern D, a boy born in 2014 and A, a girl born in 2016. FM is the children's father, he represented himself and MK is their mother, she was represented by Ms Chhina, Solicitor. MK also has an older daughter, aged 12 but she is not subject to these applications.
  2. The mother has been assessed by an intermediary on two occasions and their reports are in the bundle for this hearing. It has been determined an intermediary was necessary to enable her fair participation at hearings involving evidence and she was supported by Ms Edita Ficzová, an intermediary, at this hearing.
  3. I reminded the parties of the participation directions as laid out in HHJ Newport's order of 19 April 2024. Throughout the father was behind a screen which prevented him seeing the mother and the mother seeing him.
  4. Both parties attended in person.
  5. Also at this hearing was Ms Suzanne Martin, a journalist who had notified the court of her intention to attend the hearing and the court sent her a remote link to do so. Ms Martin produced to the court her press pass which demonstrates she is a duly accredited representative of a news gathering and reporting organisation. Therefore, pursuant to Rule 27.11 of the Family Procedure Rules (FPR), she is permitted to attend. The mother did not object to her presence and when asked, Father stated "You will do whatever you want, so just get on with it". I considered none of the criteria detailed in Rule 27.11(3) FPR for excluding Ms Martin were met and she was therefore permitted to remain. I reminded the parties a transparency order had already been made on 2 September 2024 regarding publication and that remained subject to the limitations outlined in the order.
  6. At the outset of the hearing the father made applications for
  7. a.       Medical assessment

    b.      Adjournment

    c.       Time to consider the bundle.

  8. He stated it was necessary because he was not in the right state to deal with this hearing. He mentioned getting help, like having an intermediary or McKenzie friend.  The father could not identify the type of assessment he was seeking beyond a medical assessment. The mother opposed any adjournment and expert assessment because it was unnecessary and the delay caused by it would be detrimental to the children's welfare.
  9. I reminded myself of the applications the father has made recently and I considered that the only new information provided by him was that he did not take his new medication on 8 April because it made him drowsy and he feared not waking up for the hearing.
  10. Any application for an expert is pursuant to s13(6) of the Children and Families Act, Part 25 FPR and Practice Direction 25C. The court may only give permission for an expert if it is necessary to resolve the proceedings justly and the court must have regard to the factors in s13(7). The application must identify as a minimum the field in which expert evidence is required, the nature of assessment, the purpose of it, the questions it will assist the court to determine, the timeframe needed and the costs and who will pay them. None of these details were provided at all.
  11. I took into account the Practice Guidance on the use of intermediaries issued by the President of the Family Division; as well as the decisions in the cases of Re X and Y[2024] EWHC 906(Fam) and West Northamptonshire Council v KA and NH [2024 EWHC 79 (Fam). An intermediary is not an expert and the court must consider whether it is necessary for fair participation or evidence to allow an intermediary assessment or their presence at a hearing. It cannot just be because it would improve the process and the court must consider the other adaptations it could make. I reminded myself of the control the court has over the proceedings and the ability to vary arrangements for effective participation. The father has been able to participate in the previous hearings but owing to the decline in his mental health he says he is unable to fairly participate in this hearing.
  12. As already identified, there was a distinct lack of information about the father's circumstances from him directly. Given the descriptions given by his GP of the consultation I considered there would be a need for adjustments to allow for fair participation by allowing breaks in which to pause and escape the courtroom, think and reset. These adjustments were already in place for the mother and would not significantly impact the hearing. The father himself asked to be given the page numbers to see what was referred to and I directed that adjustment be made. The father also raised he was feeling sick and had been sick on his way to court so he would seek to sit closer to the door in case he needed to exit quickly and that was also permitted. Although at no stage did he leave for this reason.
  13. Any expert assessment under Part 25 or by an intermediary would have led to delay of an uncertain length. Delay in making decisions about a child's upbringing is detrimental to their welfare (s1(2) Children Act 1989 (CA)). The impact on the mother of delay would exacerbate her anxiety and that would potentially negatively impact the care she provides the children.
  14. In the circumstances I determined it was not necessary for any expert to be instructed to assess the father given the absence of the information essential to consider that question. I also did not consider it necessary for fair participation given the adjustments the court would be making to the process. An assessment of any sort would cause delay and was not proportionate given the length of the proceedings and issues to be decided. Having balanced those factors with the overriding objective (Rule 1 FPR), I determined the evidence was not necessary to resolve matters justly since it would cause delay and that was not proportionate. Therefore, the application for an expert or intermediary assessment and an adjournment were refused.
  15. I refused further time to consider the bundle. The bundle did not contain any document that had not been previously served or submitted by the father. It was clear the father was seeking an adjournment and not a short time to consider the documents. That delay would have been detrimental to the children and was unnecessary as it caused no unfairness to the father's participation.  
  16. The mother sought to rely on a second bundle of Cafcass policies and procedures, running to 110 pages, which had not been permitted in advance. Having heard brief representations and the fact that it had not been served before, noting that whatever procedure and policy might dictate, the welfare of the child was the court's paramount consideration taking into account all the circumstances and that the Cafcass officer could be asked about his considerations directly. It would cause delay in allowing the documents to be considered by the court and the father. If it became necessary then relevant parts could be extracted and referred to. Therefore, permission to rely on this bundle was refused.
  17. During the very early part of the s7 report writer, Mr Buckel's, evidence the father interrupted and made comments. I warned him that if he continued his participation would be changed to remote in order to allow the court to control the proceedings. He immediately expressed his wish to be remote. I continued with the father present in court but it became clear that his approach would not change. While Mr Buckel was describing his meeting with D, the father said he would not stay to hear that as he was not seeing his son. I appreciate the real impact that might have had on him. Given the further interruptions I offered the father the opportunity to either step outside and he would be invited back when this part of the evidence was over, no other questions would be put in his absence and the recording would be on. Or he could be remote at 2pm, should he not attend at 2pm then the court may proceed in his absence. The father sought to be remote and I considered this appropriate in order to ensure effective participation and control of the proceedings. I adjourned at 12pm to allow him time to reach home.
  18. At 2pm, the father joined the hearing remotely, with his camera off. He immediately stated that his door had been 'taken off it's hinges' in the shared accommodation he was occupying, he would turn on his camera to show this if required. As a result he could not guarantee he would not be disturbed or overheard. At my direction, the father made attempts to obtain headphones but that was not successful. When he rejoined music could be heard which the father stated was from another resident. Ms Chhina suggested the father could sit in the bathroom or his car. The father stated the Wi-Fi would be unlikely to reach to his car. I considered both to have difficulties in maintaining privacy of the proceedings and fair participation by the father. I therefore reluctantly adjourned until the morning of day 2 with direction for father to attend the court and his participation would be remote from a side room. While initially I had considered it appropriate for him to rejoin from the courtroom, before the end of the hearing I concluded that only remote attendance would prevent further disruption. At the time of adjourning the father asked if he would be provided with a device for joining the hearing, it was made clear he would need to join with his own device but Wi-Fi would be available.
  19. On day 2 of the hearing, the father attended with his laptop. The father informed the Clerk he would be coming into court as agreed and leave if necessary. When I was informed of that, I made it clear that I had made an order he join remotely. The father refused to join Gov Wi-Fi with his device. I made an order, that was then sealed and served on the father. The order outlined the history above and directed the father to join remotely by 11am and warned him the hearing may proceed in his absence if he did not do so. The father continued to object, attempted to present obstacles that his phone had no reception to obtain a username and password to join Gov Wi-Fi and demanding to join by phone. I was satisfied the father had the means by which to join the hearing and refused to do so. Ms Chhina submitted the court should proceed in the father's absence.
  20. I determined the father had been given ample opportunity to attend the hearing. I drew an inference that his actions on day 1 and on the morning of day 2 were a clear means of frustrating the proceedings. He attempted to control the proceedings and dictate the manner of his participation; he refused assistance from the Clerk and Ms Chhina; his actions caused significant delay. The court should not proceed in the absence of a party unless it was in the interests of justice to do so. I was satisfied, the father having been given ample opportunity to join the proceedings and effectively participate, he objected and had not done so. Instead, the father sought to frustrate and delay the hearing. I noted the interference with his Article 6 rights to a fair hearing but that interference was appropriate and proportionate given the delay and overriding objective. The father was also aware he had not been excluded and could join the hearing at any time having been sent the same link as Ms Martin, which was monitored by the clerk and would immediately show a person waiting in the lobby. Therefore, I concluded the hearing would proceed in the father's absence.
  21. Overnight the father made a further application for a Part 25 assessment by way of a C2 for an assessment by Oxford Health NHS Trust, Family Assessment and Safeguarding Service (FASS) as to the children's safety if contact is awarded and permission to share information with that service. The law in relation to this application is already outlined above.
  22. The application was accompanied by a leaflet from the service, titled 'Family Court Assessments, Information for Families'. It outlined the work undertaken by psychotherapists, nurses and psychologists, trained in adult and child mental health. The team's expertise being in parent-child relationships, infant mental health, trauma and family law. Their work primarily focusing on court assessments as to the concerns a court may have about the safety of children in the care of a parent and potentially treatment for the family thereafter. Ms Chhina submitted this service will not see families outside the care arena, it relates to the safety of a child in a parent's care, the care they can offer and the means by which risks to a child might be reduced or eliminated. There is no timeframe as to when any assessment could occur. As it is an NHS Service the likelihood is it would be at no cost to the parties. However, it is unclear what they have been made aware of and whether they will accept any referral.
  23. The impact of granting the application would cause significant delay of an uncertain length. It would also bring about intervention from professionals and expose the children to them as well because part of the assessment is an observation of the children with the parent. I note that at present there is no order for contact given the risks established following the fact finding hearing.
  24. Both Mr Buckel and Dr Ratnam have been able to provide evidence about those risks. Both are experts, as confirmed by The View from The President's Chambers [2013] Fam Law 816. Mr Buckel has given an assessment of how those risks might be managed and he would be giving oral evidence and could elaborate on that.
  25. I did not therefore consider it necessary to obtain evidence by way of an assessment from FASS given that is already available to the court in other ways, it would cause delay and that is not in the interests of the children for the same reasons I gave on day 1 about their welfare.
  26. The father also sought a mental health assessment from OFH Psychiatric Services, but no accompanying evidence was provided about them. The father quoted the cost of an assessment by them as to whether he is fit to participate in the hearing would be £672 +VAT and that cost should be borne by the mother's legal aid certificate to allow equality and because, I inferred, he would be unable to fund it himself.
  27. Firstly, it was unclear what the extent of the assessment would be - is it a fitness to participate assessment or one assessing the impact of his current mental health and circumstances. The father relied on both.
  28. The father asserted that the court owed him a duty of care under ss2 and 3 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005. There was a misunderstanding about the status of the act - s1 states a person is presumed to have capacity and not to be treated as unable to make a decision unless all practical steps to help them have been taken without success or they make an unwise decision. S2 defines the lack of capacity as unable to make a decision for himself because of an impairment of or disturbance in functioning of the mind or brain and that may be temporary. S3 defines the inability to make a decision as unable to understand the information, retain it, use or weigh it as part of a decision making process or communicate the decision.
  29. Therefore, the starting point is the father has capacity to litigate. He is suffering two mental health conditions as evidenced by his GP letter, detailed below, and medicated for both. It matters not whether they are temporary. I question whether or not they form an impairment of or disturbance of his functioning for the same reasons that I do not consider he is unable to make a decision. Ms Chhina gave the example of his knowing that proceedings needed to be private the day before and engaging in that. In my assessment the father was clearly able to understand the information presented. Having informed him of the need to make a Part 25 application he has done so, he retained that information, used it and weighed up whether to apply, albeit briefly and communicated that decision. He equally applied himself to other aspects of the litigation. I rely on the reasons I gave on day 1 as to the practical steps that can and are being taken to help the father's participation. Therefore, I did not consider there was a lack of capacity on his part.
  30. Even if the psychiatric assessment were to go beyond his ability to participate and address the issues as to impact and side effects of the medication, which I note the father did not take the night before last, I was not satisfied it was necessary to enable his participation or address the issues before the court. There remained a lack of information and certainty about the assessment, the delay that would be caused and therefore I did not consider it necessary as I do not consider there is any evidence that the father was unable to participate given the number of applications he had been able to coherently make including this one at incredibly short notice. I had no doubt that he is able to follow the proceedings, assimilate the material, make decisions and participate effectively, particularly with the adjustments that were already in place.
  31. As a result of the father's application the mother renewed her application to rely on additional documents from the policies and procedures bundle, a total of 6 pages. These had been sent to the father the day before at 5.26pm. Ms Chhina highlighted relevant aspects of what Mr Buckel might answer as questions. However, upon examination, these are factors to be considered which he could be asked about without reference to the documents. Whether Mr Buckel had followed a procedure or policy of Cafcass is not a matter for this court directly, I must assess his evidence in the context of my findings and relevant considerations. The paramount consideration remained the welfare of the children having taken into account all the circumstances. Therefore, I did not permit the additional pages to be admitted.
  32. The second day of the hearing proceeded. The father did not attempt at any stage to join the hearing but remained at court throughout. The hearing proceeded in his absence. The court heard the evidence of Mr Buckel and the submissions of Ms Chhina. Having done so, the court provided a short oral judgment with this written judgment to follow.
  33. Background

  34. These have been very long running proceedings. It is essential that this final judgment be read alongside the previous decision of the court to understand the courts evaluation and decisions contained herein. Any summary provided here cannot possibly replace the content of that judgment in terms of the findings, abuse and risks.
  35. I do not repeat the full history of the parents' relationship. I summarise they were in a relationship between August 2013 and January 2022. They have two children, D born in 2014 and A born in 2016. That relationship was characterised by domestic abuse by the father towards the mother as found and contained within the fact finding judgement. No summary can do justice to the full extent of those findings and that judgment should be read in full, but that abuse by the father included -
  36. a.       Verbal abuse on a regular basis, including "cunt" and "lazy tramp"

    b.      Physical abuse - placing a pillow over the mother's face and punching it while she was pregnant with D

    c.       Strangulation during an argument in Feb 2021

    d.      Threats to kill the mother and himself with a knife and gun in Dec 2021

    e.       Emotional abuse by accusing the mother of infidelity consistently, demeaning and belittling her; and threatening to leave the relationship

    f.        Coercive behaviour through persistence for engagement in his sexual desires

    g.      Emotional manipulation by threatening seeking out others to fulfil his sexual desires and doing so

    h.      Rape on one occasion

    i.        Isolating the mother through threats to leave; criticising her friends and restricting her ability for social interaction

    j.        Restricting the mother's ability to spend and access finances independently.

  37. I also found that the father was abusive towards D by calling him a "little bastard" and involved A in an adult conversation that was emotionally manipulative and harmful. 
  38. Following the end of the proceedings that abuse continued, I found -
  39. a.    The father made false allegations about the mother.

    b.    Initiating and prolonging court proceedings, including making several applications within them; using them to exert control and pressure on the mother in particular by seeking protective orders against her.

    c.    Locating the mother through a caravan site, having likely followed the children after contact; and locating A's school by exercising his parental responsibility with the local authority at a time when the mother and the children had been accommodated in a refuge.

  40. I determined the children had been exposed to some of those abusive features of the relationship, in particular D - as demonstrated by him in play therapy when he play acted out aggressive and abusive behaviours, both physically and sexually, between a mummy and daddy doll.
  41. The impact on the mother of the relationship and the aftermath of the abusive and controlling and coercive behaviours was to cause significant emotional and psychological harm to her and the children, including culminating in a diagnosis of PTSD. It has impacted on the mother's ability to care for the children and participate in these proceedings. She had to have an intermediary at the fact finding hearing but one was not available on the day. The hearing proceeded and undoubtedly the mother's participation was diminished as seen by my evaluation of her oral evidence.
  42. These proceedings have been ongoing since the father made his application in July 2022. Following allegations of domestic abuse by the mother the court considered it necessary to have a fact finding hearing which took place between 15-19 July 2024 and judgment was handed down on 2 September 2024.
  43. Following which the court directed the parties to file responses to the findings and Cafcass to prepare a s7 report which appears in the bundle and is dated 30 January 2025. The father sought leave to appeal the factual findings which was dismissed as totally without merit by Jackson LJ on 30 October 2024.
  44. A Dispute Resolution Appointment hearing was held on 3 February 2025. At this hearing, the father sought to reopen the factual findings. That application was refused. I addressed the question of live evidence from an expert - Dr Ratnam, Consultant in Forensic Psychiatry. The father would not identify the issue for the expert to answer and therefore I determined it was not necessary for Dr Ratnam to give live evidence but additional written questions could be asked. The father submitted additional questions which I find were an attempt to revisit the findings again or undermine the mother. The court extracted the relevant considerations and approved questions for Dr Ratnam. Both the initial report dated 22 December 2024, and the addendum addressing the additional questions, dated 27 February 2025 appear in the bundle.
  45. During that remote hearing the father was disconnected. The court made attempts to contact him to no avail. He later claimed that he could not answer because his phone had been disconnected but I note he did not attempt to rejoin the hearing or contact the court either. The court proceeded in his absence and gave directions towards a final hearing.
  46. The father then embarked on a series of applications to both this court and the High Court. He applied to have more time to file his statement, appeal the case management directions of 3 February 2025, permission to appeal the refusal to the high court, revise or appeal the courts redrafting of the questions to Dr Ratnam, adjourn the final hearing, and permission to appeal the refusal to adjourn. Each of these applications has been refused. I am also informed of an application directly to the High Court to reopen findings and permission to appeal case management decisions. That application was dismissed, by Mr Justice Poole as totally without merit also.
  47. Each of those applications has had no merit and at each turn the father has not focused on engaging in the proceedings, including failing to file a statement for this hearing. I am therefore satisfied that the applications made by the father, the number and nature of them, the requests for assessments and his actions in attempting to control the proceedings are all a means of continuing the abuse of the mother.
  48. I note that there was supervised contact taking place between the father and the children from March 2023 but that ceased in Nov 2023 and did not restart despite the best efforts of HHJ Newport in attempting to resolve issues regarding transport of the children for contact. Given the serious findings made, the court suspended contact following the fact finding judgment being handed down. Therefore, there has been no contact between the father and the children since Nov 2023. I note that the contact notes demonstrate a positive, loving and engaged father who the children enjoyed spending time with.
  49. The father has never accepted the courts findings and even at this hearing he commented 'alleged' each time they were referred to until the courts attempts to resolve that disruption.
  50. These proceedings have been emotionally draining for both parents, but more so for the mother. That drain has been increased by the father's lack of engagement and acceptance of the court's findings and the impact of his behaviours on the mother.
  51. The father sought to have contact with D and A in the future.
  52. The mother sought an order that there be no contact between the father and the children because of the abuse of the father that she and the children have been exposed to; that it would continue and therefore it would be emotionally abusive to her and impact upon the care she can provide D and A; expose them to emotional harm directly.
  53. The mother also sought an order that the father's parental responsibility be revoked and a s91(14) order restricting applications without the courts permission; the mother stated that the father's involvement in the life of the children was not safe and that he would continue to perpetrate abuse, locate them and use his presence to apply pressure as he has done throughout the proceedings.
  54. The final order sought by the mother was a non-molestation order to underpin those orders and protect her and the children.
  55. The Legal Framework

    Facts

  56. The party that asserts a fact must prove that fact. There is no onus on an individual to disprove an alleged fact. The standard of proof is the civil standard, the balance of probabilities, no more and no less. Neither the seriousness nor the nature of the consequences of a fact being proved changes that standard.  The court must have regard to the inherent probabilities of events or occurrences.  The more serious or improbable the allegation, the greater the need for evidential cogency.
  57. Findings of fact must be based on evidence, including inferences that can be properly drawn from that evidence and not on suspicion or speculation.  The court must take into account the wide canvas of evidence that is available and not evaluate it in separate compartments. The evidence of the parties is obviously of the utmost importance.  It is essential that the court forms a clear assessment of their credibility and reliability. Credibility is wider than the demeanour of a witness to which little weight is likely attachable. The court must be mindful that human memory is fallible. The human capacity for honestly believing something that bears no relation to what actually happened is unlimited. Therefore, contemporaneous documents are significantly important and, in that respect, hearsay is admissible and the weight to be attributed to it is a matter for the court to evaluate.
  58. I bear in mind the possibility, especially in cases such as of this nature, that one parent or the other might be seeking to gain an advantage in a battle against the other.  That does not mean that those allegations are false.  It does increase the risk of misinterpretation, exaggeration, or fabrication.  It is not for either parent to prove a negative.
  59. It is not uncommon for witnesses to tell lies, but that a witness lies about something does not mean they have lied about everything.  Principles of criminal law have no function in the Family Court.  The resolution of disputes is fundamentally different in this arena.
  60. I remind myself of the Family Procedure Rules and, in particular, Practice Direction 12J, and what it says about domestic abuse, the definitions therein and the approach that this court must take.  Guidance was given in the case of Re H-N and Others (Children) (Domestic Abuse: Finding of fact hearings)[2021] EWCA Civ 448 and it has been followed by subsequent courts, and that is that the court must look at the totality of the relationship when considering domestic abuse and, in particular, controlling or coercive behaviour.  Behaviour may be directive, assertive, stubborn, or selfish.  It does not automatically make it controlling or coercive.
  61. Welfare

  62. The welfare of D and A is my paramount consideration pursuant to s1 CA 1989 and the welfare factors outline in s1(3) must be considered. I must consider each child separately and there is a presumption that the involvement of a parent in a child's life promotes their welfare unless the contrary is shown. I should only make an order about D and A if I consider it better than making no order at all.
  63. The right to a private and family life for D, A and each of the parents is engaged and any order interfering with that right must be considered necessary and proportionate.
  64. Parental responsibility

  65. The father's parental responsibility may only be removed by an order of the court (s4(2A) CA 1989). While the child's welfare is the paramount consideration the court is not required to consider the factors in s1(3) but that they do provide a helpful analytical framework having regard to the no order principle (Re D(Withdrawal of Parental Responsibility) [2015] 1 FLR 166). However, no single factor is to be given priority over another.
  66. Each case is to be considered on its own facts but the court should take into account how parental responsibility is used and the impact of it being held (Re P(Terminating Parental Responsibility)[1995]).
  67. S91(14) Children Act

  68. In considering whether to make a s91(14) order I remind myself of the contents of PD12Q and PD12J paragraph 37A.1. The children's welfare is the foundation of considerations of these orders but in the context of a holistic evaluation of the circumstances. An order would not bar applications but act as a filter, requiring permission before they would be processed, respondents notified and children exposed to professionals.
  69. Non-molestation order

  70. There is already a non-molestation order in place to protect the mother. The application is to extend that to include the children and a zonal restriction around their schools, as well as the mother, and remain in force until A is 16 years of age. The considerations for doing so are no different to that if the court were making an order for the first time. The mother seeks an order given the courts findings as to what the father has done and if the other orders sought are made, what he might do following the conclusion of the proceedings.
  71. In deciding whether to exercise my power to make a non-molestation order I must have regard to all the circumstances including the need to secure the health, safety and well being of the mother and the children. Molestation does not have to be violence or threats of it and includes harassment. The conduct, or contemplated conduct, must be of a nature or degree that justifies the intervention of the court.
  72. Evidence

  73. I had the benefit of a bundle running to 660 pages containing the applications and orders of the court. The party's responses to the fact finding and the mother's statement responding to the s7 report. The father failed to file his statement claiming he was unable to do so owing to his mental health, possibility he might lose his job and become homeless. No evidence was supplied of any of these circumstances, save for a GP letter two days before the final hearing. From that letter it is noted his GP diagnosed depressed mood on 23 February 2022 and the diagnosis of reactive depression was made on 3 April 2025. The father was prescribed medication for both conditions. The GP letter did not indicate the impact of the diagnosis, any adjustments that could be employed, whether the father could participate in proceedings or how long he might need for his mental health to stabilise. Having balanced the delay in these proceedings, the impact on the mother the children and the father, the latter's application to adjourn was refused.
  74. The bundle contained the reports of Dr Ratnam and the intermediaries. Also contained in the bundle was information from the children's schools seen at previous hearings and the appeal documents.
  75. It is not necessary to mention all the evidence in the decision I come to. I have taken into account all the documents that have been placed before me in evidence, together with the oral evidence and submissions. I will only refer to evidence that is necessary to explain the conclusions that I have reached.
  76. I heard oral evidence from Mr Buckel only. The father having failed to file his statement. The mother having filed a statement that took issue with Mr Buckels' assessment. I considered oral evidence from the parents would not assist the court in the determination of the issues, it would lengthen the time needed for the hearing and subject the parents, the mother in particular, to the burden and stress of giving evidence; the evidence that each would have given did not relate to the factual matrix which had been settled in the fact finding judgment.
  77. Dr Sumi Ratnam, Consultant in Forensic Psychiatry

  78. Dr Ratnam undertook a thorough evaluation of the mother and concluded she presents with Complex PTSD. Her symptoms include intrusion, avoidance and hyper-arousal. These are directly linked to trauma and personal traits of the mother. She presents with auditory and somatic flashbacks and nightmares. The mother avoids reminders that will trigger re-experiencing of these traumatic experiences. She is also hypervigilant as a result.
  79. Dr Ratnam concluded the mother's early childhood experiences, including sexual abuse, will have contributed to her vulnerability but it is likely that the abuse within the relationship and trauma therein is what led to the development of complex PTSD.
  80. Dr Ratnam diagnosed the mother as suffering complex PTSD, depression, generalised anxiety with panic attacks which present as palpitations, sweaty hands, hyperventilation, feeling light headed and pins and needles. These are likely associated with complex PTSD.
  81. Dr Ratnam was clear that there is no grading to be applied to the severity of these conditions but they result in varying responses from the mother including at the extreme end losing awareness of her surroundings. The mother is rarely not anxious and continuously feels under threat from the father. The facilitation of contact, in Dr Ratnam's opinion, would present an ongoing source of threat for the mother and impact her mental health; and her condition would not likely improve. Dr Ratnam goes further to state the mother does not possess the psychological resilience to cope with any level of involvement in contact with the father; that CBT and medication have had limited impact given the ongoing nature of the proceedings. It is more likely that her symptoms would deteriorate and treatment effectiveness will be limited. Dr Ratnam outlined the three phases of treatment for Complex PTSD and stated that while the father remains in the mother's life, she is not able to enter the first stage of treatment.
  82. In her addendum report Dr Ratnam is clear that it would not have been possible for the mother to have exaggerated her symptoms or misled her given the length and depth of the interview. Dr Ratnam is an experienced psychiatrist in assessing these conditions. I am therefore satisfied the assessment and conclusions are robust and reliable. I am satisfied these are genuine and long lasting difficulties for the mother, originating from her experiences in the relationship with the father; and for which she is not able to obtain treatment until the proceedings end. Her recovery will likely be long and it is impossible to know how long given she has not been able to begin the work at all.
  83. Mr Marc Buckel, Cafcass

  84. Mr Buckel, Cafcass Assistant Service Manager completed a welfare analysis under s7, which is contained in the bundle. Within it he balanced the impact and risks of contact between the children and their father on the mother against the benefits to the children of that contact. There were some difficulties in the way his report and assessments were presented. However, those were clarified in his oral evidence and in my assessment he was clear about the risks.
  85. He concludes the risks to the mother from the father's continued abusive behaviours is high and the children have been exposed to that. They, and the mother, will be exposed in the future to a high risk of harm because of a lack of insight on his part. Since the father does not accept the findings there is no means by which to reduce the risks, supervised contact might reduce some risk but is not viable because there must be a mechanism for contact to move outside that setting and there would be none without acceptance by the father. Therefore, there is also no timescale by which this could occur either.
  86. The continuation of these proceedings has been immensely harmful to the mother and continues to impact her functioning, although it is noted that she has been able to continue to care for D and A, that is unlikely to be sustained long term if these proceedings continued. In particular because the mother would not be able to begin treatment and that would mean her mental health and ability to cope would not improve. It would be further compounded if she had to be involved in contact arrangements.
  87. In oral evidence, Mr Buckel stated he was concerned by the father's behaviours he had observed over the 2 day hearing and the risks of that behaviour continuing would be significantly harmful to the mother, her mental health, presentation and the adjustments to her own life would mean a significantly detrimental impact on the parenting she could afford D and A.
  88. Mr Buckel considered the risks of harm and impact to the mother and by extension the children too great for contact to take place while there is no insight from the father and no meaningful work can be undertaken to address those risks. One of the most significant risks being homicide which he took as an indicator from the father's threats of suicide. Therefore recommending, there should be an order that there is no contact between the father and the children.
  89. In his written report, Mr Buckel did not consider the circumstances to warrant removal of the father's parental responsibility, stating that was usually reserved for cases such as adoption and where there is a serious risk of harm from the parent directly to the child. He took into account that D and A themselves are victims of domestic abuse because they have been exposed to that from their father towards their mother. Mr Buckel also balanced the fact that the father has used his parental responsibility to locate A's school and that indicates a significant risk. However, the issues that arise in relation to decisions for the children could be addressed by restricting the exercise of parental responsibility rather than it being necessary to remove it. That included by the imposition of a prohibited steps order, an order under s91(14) given the use of proceedings to abuse the mother and a non-molestation order to protect against the risks of harm in the future until A is 16.
  90. In his oral evidence, Mr Buckel was clearly conflicted about taking the least interventionist approach against the risks that unfolded before him, finally settling on a conclusion that parental responsibility did need to be revoked because the risks could not be addressed.
  91. Discussion and Analysis

  92. The risks of significant harm to the mother and the children are well outlined in the fact finding judgment; summarised above; and in my finding are ongoing because of the father's continued lack of insight; actions since the fact finding judgment; and controlling and coercive behaviours leading up to and during this hearing of which additional findings are made in this judgment. I am satisfied the father will continue to use control and coercion to abuse the mother.
  93. The impact of those risks are significant emotional and psychological harm to the mother as described by Dr Ratnam and Mr Buckel. Her ability to function and provide a reasonable level of care to D and A is threatened because the mother is under constant threat from the father, it causes her anxiety and prevents her undertaking any form of therapy that would address those difficulties.
  94. There is also a risk of physical harm as a consequence of the findings about the relationship. I consider those to have not reduced, in particular in light of the father's loss of control over the mother. I take note of the stark reality that those risks are likely to have increased if not remained the same in those circumstances.
  95. The risks of harm cannot be reduced because the father demonstrates no insight and therefore will not engage in any work, even if he were to do so, I have grave concerns as to the veracity of that work at this time and the length of time it would take.
  96. I am satisfied that any contact by the father with the mother or the children would bring about significant harm to the mother, including contact in a supervised setting and indirect contact. I am satisfied the father would use any means of contact to continue to abuse and harm the mother.
  97. Throughout these proceedings the father has shown little interest in the children. I presided over a hearing early in the proceedings and granted interim contact supervised in a contact centre. While the contact notes demonstrate positive contact with the children, the father used that contact as a means of locating where the mother was on holiday with the children. Given my other findings about locating A's school and the father's lack of insight, I am satisfied he would carry out similar actions in the future. The clear consequence of that would be anxiety and fear in the mother and, as Dr Ratnam describes, exacerbation of the mother's symptoms. Dr Ratnam goes further that the mother's treatment would be ineffective, not because there would be a set back or it would take longer but because treatment could not even begin. The likelihood is that the mother's treatment will take a very long time.
  98. Within these proceedings the father has made a number of applications. In those applications, he has not sought any information about the children via the court. Ms Chhina has had conduct of these proceedings throughout and submitted that in all the correspondence there was not a single request for an update. I conclude that the father's focus has been entirely on battling the mother, prolonging the proceedings and ensuring the mother felt the maximum level of impact from that. This has continued throughout the proceedings. Again, I have no doubt that this course of conduct would continue in the future for the same reasons I have already given.
  99. The children were exposed to harm by their father. Those risks have not altered. The children remain at risk of emotional abuse by their father. They remain at risk of harm from their needs not being met because of the impact on their mother of the father's continued abuse via his attempts to control.
  100. The children did not mention their father when interviewed by Mr Buckel. Quite properly he asked them about their father. They responded largely positively, although A expressed some fears. Given their ages, and D's learning difficulties, I do not consider they would properly understand the risks and consequences of their choices. They are clearly not aware of the details of their parents' relationship and the risks of contact therein. There is a clear emotional and psychological risk of harm that would have a detrimental impact on their welfare.
  101. I also note that the mother intends to undergo treatment when these proceedings end. That is unlikely to be with the giving of this judgement given the father's proclivity to appeal all decisions and the ongoing civil proceedings. Therefore, her treatment is going to be delayed. During the course of that treatment there is likely to be a reliving of events and that will be a burden on the mother. I agree with Dr Ratnam, any contact with the father will exacerbate that and prevent the treatment being effective. The mother has been able to cope to an extent in these proceedings but I note that her experiences have taken a toll on her as observed by Dr Ratnam, my own observations of her and the findings I have made. Mr Buckel was also of the opinion that any contact from the father would have a significantly detrimental effect on the children's welfare. I conclude that any further proceedings in the future are likely to re-traumatise the mother and directly impact her ability to care for D and A.
  102. The children have experienced change in their parents' relationship, moving from home to a refuge and home again, the absence of their father from November 2023, A changing schools in that time and owing to her age, likely to do so again in September 2026 and a very likely home move given the mother's fear of the father. I note the father was asked about a change of school for A and commented on by Mr Buckel that father interfered in it. I am satisfied that this is the case and there is a high risk it would reoccur.
  103. The children know who their father is and while it appears his absence has not had a significant impact upon them, it is likely that his absence will have an impact on their future identity. In time they may come to know some of the things their father did, this will undoubtedly have to be in a child friendly way, but will call into question his role in their lives in their minds and they may require support for that. There would also be a loss of paternal family relationships given their animosity towards the mother. However, those relationships do not appear to be well established.  
  104. A change for them in their living circumstances would be harmful. Their mother has cared for them alone for the last 3 years. I note the father's current living accommodation would not be suitable for children and he is about to be evicted. Any change brings instability and uncertainty for the children's living situation.
  105. The mother's parenting ability is not questioned albeit that there may be some impact on that from her treatment, there is nothing to demonstrate that she would not be able to meet the children's needs. In fact, there is positive evidence that the mother has met the children's needs from the therapy D has been engaged in and the positive reports of the children from their schools. The most significant risk to the mother's parenting ability is the interactions with the father and, in my assessment, the high risk that it would render her incapable of affording D and A the parenting that they require.
  106. As shocking as it might be given the findings in this case, there is nothing to demonstrate the father could not meet the children's basic needs. However, I have very real concerns that he would be able to meet their emotional needs. The father has verbally abused D and emotionally manipulated A. The abuse of the mother extended to the children and the risks have not been addressed. I also consider that the father would not promote any relationship between the children and their mother or not speak negatively of her to the children.
  107. Conclusion

  108. Any contact between the father and the children carries a high risk of serious emotional, psychological and physical harm to the mother and the children. There is no mechanism for reducing those risks. I conclude in my judgment the detriment to the children's welfare is such that there can be no contact between the father and the children.
  109. These proceedings have taken far too long to resolve, they have been emotionally draining on the mother and the father. However, the father has prolonged the process and exacerbated the harm on the mother from his conduct in the relationship being perpetuated through the proceedings. The father has completely failed to accept his behaviour towards the mother has been abusive. I do not yet see the stage at which the mother would be able to cope with any involvement of the father in the children's lives. I do not consider the father will change his approach to the mother and therefore it will continue to harm her and the children. If the mother were to undergo treatment and effect some degree of recovery, the lack of change by the father is certain to set her back and de-stabilise her recovery. This would include by virtue of having to be included in decisions about the children. The mother needs a lengthy period of time without the father in her life to be able to begin and ensure her recovery can start, be maintained and sustained.
  110. I am mindful that restricting a parent's contact is a significant interference with an individual's Article 8 rights. However, this is a case in which I am satisfied it is necessary and the only proportionate means by which the children's welfare can be safeguarded. The harm to the children is phenomenal from the effect of their father's abuse on their mother and to them directly. I am satisfied any order for contact would be used by the father to continue the abuse perpetrated in the relationship and these proceedings, upon the mother in the future. I refuse the father's application for the children to live with him. I grant the mother's application for the children to have no contact with him.
  111. The removal of the father's parental responsibility, a s91(14) order and a non-molestation order, in my assessment are necessary and form a protective framework to safeguard the children's welfare. Whilst the children's welfare may not be the court's paramount consideration in these applications, I do consider it ranks high in the matters I must consider.
  112. I am satisfied if the father was to retain his parental responsibility, he would use it as a means to continue his abuse against the mother. He has already done so during the course of these proceedings, effectively weaponizing it to obtain information and further his abuse. I have no doubt he would use parental responsibility to obtain information about the children and the mother and seek to undermine the mother. If the father is permitted he will make any application he can and pursue it regardless of the merit as he has demonstrated in the weeks before the final hearing. It is clear that there is no possibility that the father will co-parent with the mother.
  113. Without parental responsibility, the law in relation to the making of specific issue orders and prohibited steps orders would not apply. Those orders would not have any effect and therefore the father would be free to make contact with the children. That would create a new avenue of risk. The children's welfare is intrinsically linked to their mother's emotional and psychological well being. I take into account that if the father did not currently hold parental responsibility, any application seeking it would likely be refused. I have considered whether it would be possible to limit his parental responsibility but in my assessment there is a lack of interest and commitment to the children, he has no interest in co-parenting and that would be incredibly fear and anxiety inducing to the mother. D and A will unlikely understand parental responsibility, their mother takes those decisions on a day to day basis and they will not see a difference. Taking those collective factors together, it is appropriate in this case that parental responsibility is revoked.
  114. I am satisfied as a result of the father's conduct thus far, it is necessary to limit any applications about D and A by him until A is 16 years old because otherwise future applications would bring about emotional and psychological harm to both the mother and the children.
  115. I am satisfied that a non-molestation order in the terms sought is necessary to safeguard the health, safety and well-being of the mother, D and A for the reasons I have discussed above. It reinforces the orders for no contact and the s91(14) order. It is necessary to prevent the serious harm identified to safeguard the mother and the children. I make that order until A is 16 years old. An order of such a length is unusual but necessary as a direct response to the level of ongoing risk of harm posed by the father, including that of homicide identified by Mr Buckel. The order is amended to remove the 'except via solicitors' means of indirect contact with the mother as he has continued to abuse her through the proceedings and applications to and through her solicitors.
  116. Any government agency or others involved in the welfare of the children should be aware of the orders of this court and the judgments made, permission is given to disclose the same for those purposes. There is permission to disclose this judgment and the final order into the civil proceedings providing the children remain anonymous.
  117.  

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