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England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Decisions


You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Decisions >> Humphreys, R. v [2025] EWCA Crim 743 (23 May 2025)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Crim/2025/743.html
Cite as: [2025] EWCA Crim 743

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Neutral Citation Number: [2025] EWCA Crim 743
Case No: 202501177 A1

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CRIMINAL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM
THE CROWN COURT AT STOKE-ON -TRENT
His Honour Judge Meegan
21GS1175124

Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
23 May 2025

B e f o r e :

LORD JUSTICE STUART-SMITH
MRS JUSTICE TIPPLES
and
MRS JUSTICE STACEY

____________________

Between:
REX

- and -

PHILIP HUMPHREYS


REFERENCE BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL UNDER S.36 OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT 1988

____________________

Mr Peter Ratliff appeared on behalf of the Solicitor General
Mr Martin Bloor appeared on behalf of the Respondent Offender

____________________

HTML VERSION OF APPROVED JUDGMENT
____________________

Crown Copyright ©

    Lord Justice Stuart-Smith:

  1.  His Majesty's Attorney General seeks leave to refer a sentence which he regards as unduly lenient. We give leave.
  2. The sentence was passed in the Crown Court at Stoke on Trent on 7 March 2025 by His Honour Judge Meegan after the offender had pleaded guilty to an offence of engaging in controlling/coercive behaviour in an intimate/family relationship, contrary to section 76(1) and (11) of the Serious Crime Act 2015.
  3. The sentence passed by the judge on the offender's plea of guilty was one of 18 months' imprisonment suspended for 2 years, with an unpaid work requirement of 200 hours and a rehabilitation activity requirement of 25 days. There were other ancillary orders made which we do not need to refer to.
  4. The facts

  5. This offence was committed between 1 May 2022 and 31 October 2022. The offender is 39 years of age, having been born on 21 July 1985. The victim (who we shall refer to as CY) met the offender online in April 2022 and the two started a relationship. They moved in together. The offender would often start arguments in relation to CY being friends with her former partners and so CY ended contact with them as a result.
  6. The offender would frequently call and message CY through the day to check where she was. The offender would degrade CY and once urinated on her in the shower.
  7. On 28 July 2022 the offender asked CY for money that she had set aside to repair her car. He wanted to spend it on drugs. The offender then told CY that he would take the car to the garage. He then used the money to buy the drugs instead.
  8. The offender made comments about CY's clothing. These included suggesting she was getting a fake tan to "pull" someone else.
  9. CY described how the offender would demand that she only wear underwear in bed, and he would become upset and argue with her if she tried to wear clothing in bed.
  10. CY described one occasion when the offender came into the kitchen when she was eating lunch, slammed his hand onto her plate and broke the plate.
  11. CY transferred about £6,000 to the offender during the indictment period. That left her in extreme financial difficulty. Whenever CY refused to send the offender money, he would start arguments and refer to her former partners.
  12. On 13 August 2022 the offender and CY took a taxi home after an evening out. The offender accused her of wanting to sleep with the taxi driver. They then argued and the offender referred to CY's fertility problems during the argument. The offender spent hours shouting at her and acting aggressively. During this, he clenched his fists and leaned over her. He threw a chair across the kitchen, pulled items out of drawers, pulled a baby gate off its hinges and threw clothes around. The offender left. He then messaged CY threatening to return if she was with another man.
  13. On 23 August 2022 the offender was at a casino and asked CY for £3,000. He threatened to leave her if she did not give him the money. When she said she would not, the offender started to make further comments about her former partners.
  14. The following day, 24 August 2022, the offender followed CY when she was driving because he did not believe where she said that she was going. The offender's driving was so erratic that CY thought he was going to cause an accident.
  15. The day after that, on 25 August 2022, the offender consumed a large amount of alcohol and then threatened to kill himself because CY had not given him the money he needed to pay his drug debt. The offender was disruptive, ran up and down the stairs, sang loudly, and did anything he could to create a disturbance. He then left the house with a bottle of gin and a photograph of him and his daughter. Out of concern, CY went to look for him, found him and persuaded him to return home. Later the offender tied a dressing gown cord around his neck and to the banister. CY found him and had to set him free.
  16. On 14 September 2022 CY and the offender were on holiday in Spain. They went out and the offender consumed a large amount of alcohol and (CY suspected) also cocaine. When they got back to their hotel room, the offender argued with CY about the taxi driver and referred to her former partners. He shoved her with his elbows and shoulders. She then turned around to face him, and he grabbed her arms and pushed her backwards. This caused her to fall to the floor. The pair then argued. He pulled her hair with enough force to rip out some of her permanent hair extensions. He then dragged her backwards. He grabbed her by the throat and strangled her, which caused a lot of pain and left deep red bruising. She struggled to swallow for a week following that incident.
  17. The strangulation was interrupted by the hotel receptionist coming to the room after other residents had complained about the noise. CY managed to run out of the room when the receptionist came to the door. She then went downstairs, and hotel staff offered to call the police, but she declined. She started looking at flights back home, but the offender kept coming down to the reception area and shouting at her. She later went back to the room and found that he had damaged some furniture and that there were drinks glasses all over the floor. There were further arguments between them before they eventually went to bed.
  18. The next morning the offender sharpened his toothbrush and threatened to shove it down his throat and then threatened to cut his throat with broken glass. CY described the rest of the holiday as being awkward and a blur as she tried to keep the peace before they came back to the UK.
  19. After this holiday, CY ended the relationship. The offender did not move out straightaway and remained at her house for two weeks.
  20. On 13 October 2022, the offender moved out of her house. The following day and later on several other occasions he drove past her house. The offender would do this when CY did not answer her phone.
  21. CY's niece and the offender's daughter, who were both under 18, were in the house and heard one of the incidents, but they were not physically present.
  22. The offender was interviewed by police on 4 February 2023. He answered 'no comment' to the majority of questions. He did ask the police why it had taken so long to be interviewed and stated that CY was making the allegations up because he no longer wanted to be in a relationship with her.
  23. Victim personal statements

  24. CY made two personal statements. We have read them in full, as we have read all the other materials that are relevant to sentence. They explain eloquently how the offender took away her personality and subjugated her to his will in all aspects of life, emotional, financial and physical. Typical of the impact he had on her is that she now feels shame -- completely unwarranted -- for having allowed herself to love a man who could go ahead and do all things he did, culminating in strangling her while on holiday. CY could not understand how she had let it all happen to her. Before, she was a strong, independent, empowered woman. The whole experience had made her feel like a weak, vulnerable and damaged person who lacked in confidence. Her physical and mental wellbeing had been affected. She suffered migraines and felt unwell on three occasions. She had struggled to sleep or work, and was not eating properly. She had been prescribed medication and referred for complex trauma therapy to be followed by general counselling. When she reflected on the physical assaults she had suffered in Spain, she worried that she might have been killed if they had not been interrupted. She felt guilty that she had put herself and her family at risk. She experiences flashbacks. The emotional toll on her was immense. There has been a significant impact on her ability to concentrate at work, and she worries she could now lose her job. This is on top of the financial implications of the offence. The offending had a lasting and life-changing impact upon her. She struggles with anxiety, low mood and debilitating panic attacks. She has continued to need both medication and therapy. She can no longer go out with her friends and has become isolated following the offence. Her therapists have said that she has moderate to severe PTSD. She says that she has become settled with the fact that her mental health and life will never be as it was before the incident.
  25. The proceedings

  26. The offender was charged by postal requisition on 22 May 2024. On 23 July 2024 he consented to summary trial, having pleaded not guilty.
  27. On 5 December 2024 the offender pleaded guilty on the day of trial. A Newton hearing was conducted. The offender's account was rejected. The case was then committed to the Crown Court for sentence.
  28. When the case was listed for sentence in the Crown Court, the judge was not told that there had been a Newton hearing or that the offender's version of events had been rejected. We note in passing that being subjected to the Newton hearing was a feature that CY found particularly difficult as it demonstrated in her eyes that the offender was continuing to try to manipulate things without any hint of remorse. As it was, the judge initially passed sentence on the basis that the offender had pleaded guilty at the first possible opportunity and was entitled to one-third credit for his plea. Only after the judge had passed a suspended sentence of 15 months was he told that in fact the offender had not pleaded guilty until the morning of trial. In the light of that information the judge restated the sentence as one of 18 months suspended for 2 years. Even then the judge was not told of the Newton hearing or that its outcome had been adverse to the offender.
  29. That did not happen until some two weeks later, when at a slip rule hearing the judge was told that there had been a disputed basis of plea and a Newton hearing that had been resolved against the offender. Still the judge was not told what the substance of the Newton hearing had been. We have been told that it related to the allegation of strangling and that the offender's stance was that he had not at any stage assaulted CY. In the light of the limited information available to him at the slip rule hearing, the judge declined to make any further adjustment to the sentence he had passed.
  30. We are bound to say that the judge was not well served in this regard. It is obvious that this case has a different aspect for a judge who is asked to sentence on the basis of full credit for early plea than it does for a judge who is sentencing on the basis that the offender disputed the most serious of the allegations and that the issue had been resolved against him at a contested Newton hearing on the morning of trial.
  31. Antecedents

  32. The offender had five previous convictions relating to six offences. These included:
  33. i) in 2016 inflicting grievous bodily harm, an offence for which he was sentenced to 24 months' imprisonment suspended for 24 months;

    ii) in 2021 an offence of criminal damage, for which he was given a conditional discharge for 2 years.

    The grievous bodily harm offence in 2016 was committed against a former partner who was then his wife. The offender had been drinking and returned home intoxicated. He assaulted his partner, causing a fracture to her skull. As we have said, he received a suspended sentence of 24 months suspended for 2 years for that offence. According to the pre-sentence report, that sentence was completed successfully with no breaches.

    The PSR

  34. The judge had, and we have, read a pre-sentence report that was in general terms supportive of the offender's attempts to change. It was the writer's view that the offender, despite not accepting some details of the offending, accepted accountability for the offence. He acknowledged that drug use made him paranoid, which he took out on CY. He said that his time of service in the army, which included active service in Afghanistan, rendered him angry and volatile, particularly when intoxicated. He was thought by the writer to show significant insight into his risk factors and presented evidence that he had made efforts to address these risks by engagement with the community drug and alcohol services between 2019 and 2023, a period which included the period of offending against CY. The writer considered that these engagements with the health services in the community showed him to be remorseful and insightful of his offending. We note, however, that it is not clear that the writer was aware of the Newton hearing and that the offender's account had been rejected at that hearing, which we regard as clearly relevant to the formulation of any view about the offender's remorse and motivation to change.
  35. The PSR writer assessed the risk of further offending as low, save the offender was assessed as posing a medium risk of further domestic abuse and a medium risk of causing serious harm to known adults, namely ex-partners. His response to supervision was said to have been good. The writer noted that the offender was now in stable accommodation and employment, and while recognising the likelihood of a custodial sentence, recommended a community disposal including 25 RAR days, an alcohol abstinence monitoring requirement and an unpaid work requirement.
  36. The sentencing hearing

  37. The prosecution submitted that the case fell into category A1 of the guideline, category A culpability because of the use of multiple methods of controlling and coercive behaviour, and category 1 harm because his conduct engendered fear of violence on many occasions.
  38. The defence submitted that he was now a very different person from when he had committed the offending. In support of that submission the defence relied upon the PSR, his evidenced contact with the community medical services, and negative drug tests and certificates, all of which we have read and take into account.
  39. He also relied upon character references.
  40. i) One was from the offender's mother, who spoke of a troubled childhood, during which he had witnessed her being abused by her husband, and that he is now in a far better place with his addictions and getting help and is a doting stepfather who is kind and caring to his current partner.

    ii) One was from an old army colleague who had "witnessed terrible things which ... still plays on our minds to this day"

    iii) The third was from a psychologist, for whom the offender is a client, and who spoke of the steps taken by the offender to address his gambling and other addictive behaviour and of his willingness to change.

    The sentencing remarks

  41. Having briefly outlined the circumstances of the offending, the judge accepted that the case was a category A1 offence, with a starting point of 2-and-a-half years and a category range of 1 to 4 years. The previous convictions, the context of the case, the history of domestic violence, the presence of a child on one occasion were all aggravating features which caused him to adjust the starting point to 3 years.
  42. Turning to mitigation, the judge referred expressly to the character references that we have mentioned above and to the offender having served his country in Afghanistan, which he held had impacted negatively on him.
  43. Having referred to the delay in the matter coming to court, he held that the mitigating features that he had identified lowered the notional starting point down to 2 years. He then referred to his mistaken belief that the offender had pleaded guilty right at the outset. Applying a full one-third discount led, he said, the notional sentence to be lowered to 15 months' imprisonment.
  44. The judge then addressed the question of suspension, saying:
  45. "Do I consider there is a realistic prospect of rehabilitation in your case, is what it comes down to, Mr Humphreys? I do, but it is just about, and from my say, Mr Humphreys, the court today has been rather lenient. I order you to undertake 200 hours' unpaid work, a rehabilitation activity requirement for 25 days. I'm not ordering the alcohol abstinence monitoring requirement because this is binge drinking, drinking to excess rather than as alcohol dependency daily."

  46. As we have said, on then being told that the offender had in fact pleaded guilty on the day set for trial in the magistrates' court, he adjusted the sentence he had just passed to one of 18 months' imprisonment. The slip rule hearing on 21 March then followed as we have set out above.
  47. The Attorney General's submissions

  48. The Attorney General submits, first, that the judge erred in his application of the guideline. There were multiple indicators of higher culpability: conduct intended to maximise fear or distress; persistent action over a prolonged period; use of multiple methods of controlling or coercive behaviour; and conduct intended to humiliate and degrade the victim.
  49. Turning to harm, there were again multiple indicators: fear of violence on many occasions; very serious alarm or distress which has had a substantial adverse effect on the victim; and significant psychological harm. The course of conduct constituting the offence included the incident of intentional strangulation, which only ended when they were interrupted by hotel staff. These features should have caused a substantial upwards adjustment to the starting point. Then the identified aggravating features, namely his previous convictions, including, most importantly, a section 20 offence against his previous partner, and the presence of others on one occasion should have led to a further upwards adjustment.
  50. Second, it is submitted that the judge erred in his approach to discount for plea. The plea of guilty was entered on the day of trial, which might have justified a 10 percent discount had it not been for the Newton hearing that was resolved against him, the effect of which is that the 10 percent credit should be halved: see the guideline on Reduction in Sentence for a Guilty Plea.
  51. The net effect of these first two factors should, the Attorney General submits, have led to a sentence well in excess of 2 years.
  52. Third, if a sentence of 2 years or less was appropriate, the Attorney General submits that this was not a case where the sentence should have been suspended. It is submitted that the offending amounted to serious domestic violence and abuse which was committed over a period of months; the conduct included an incident of strangulation, which left deep bruising, and which was preceded by the offender pushing the victim and pulling her hair with enough force to rip out permanent hair extensions.
  53. The offender's submissions

  54. On behalf of the offender, Mr Bloor accepts that this is a category A1 offence, and given the adverse result of the Newton hearing, the offender is not entitled to more than a 5 percent reduction for his plea of guilty. He emphasises the substantial efforts that the offender has made to turn his life around and reduce the risk he poses of further violence. Taking that mitigation into account, he submits that the final sentence reached by the judge was one that he was entitled to reach and which, even if lenient, should not be regarded as unduly lenient.
  55. Discussion and resolution

  56. This was a serious example of coercive and controlling behaviour over a period of nearly 6 months which has had a devastating effect on CY both at the time and in the long term. As she puts it in her statement, because of the offender's manipulative, coercive, humiliating and violent behaviour over the course of their relationship, she has been reduced from being a strong, independent and empowered woman to feeling weak, vulnerable and damaged, and to be someone who is now entirely lacking in confidence. Furthermore, the conduct included a significant incident of strangulation that only stopped when they were interrupted by hotel staff. Even when interrupted and CY had fled downstairs, the offender continued his aggression towards her, coming down to reception and shouting at her. The Attorney General is right to point to multiple indicators of both culpability and harm. All of this was done by a man with a previous conviction for a section 20 offence against a previous partner.
  57. On the other side of the coin, we recognise the offender's troubled background, both domestic and as a result of serving his country. We also acknowledge that he has made significant efforts to change, as evidenced by his various certificates and supportive character evidence. There are solid submissions that Mr Bloor can make and has made on the offender's behalf, even if his persistence with the Newton hearing strongly suggests that at least at that time remorse formed no part of his thinking. In our judgment some of the observations made in the pre-sentence report must be seen in that light.
  58. There are two aspects to the Attorney General's submissions, namely whether the custodial term was too short and whether the offender's sentence should have been suspended. We choose to address them in the reverse order, asking first whether, assuming that the length of the custodial term imposed by the judge was within reasonable bounds, he was right to suspend the sentence.
  59. It appears from his sentencing remarks that the judge's decision to suspend the sentence was driven by the hope of rehabilitation (see above). That, however, was only one aspect to be taken into account before reaching a decision. We have had regard to the factors on either side that are required to be taken into account by virtue of the imposition guideline.
  60. On the offender's behalf it may be submitted that there is at least some prospect of rehabilitation. His personal mitigation is not strong and there is no evidence that immediate custody will result in significant harmful impact upon others, although we understand he is now in a stable and happy relationship. On the other hand, we are not remotely satisfied but that the offender still presents a risk or danger to the public. We leave on one side any question of history of poor compliance with court orders, which leaves the question whether appropriate punishment can only be achieved by immediate custody.
  61. From whatever angle we approach the question of suspension, we return time and again to the seriousness of the offending over a protracted period, culminating in the incident of intentional strangulation by a man with the offender's antecedents and with the catastrophic impact on CY that we have outlined. In our judgment, even taking into account the offender's personal mitigation, this offence was so serious that appropriate punishment could only be achieved by immediate custody. In our judgment the judge's decision to suspend the sentence he imposed was unjustifiable and of itself rendered the sentence unduly lenient. We note in passing that it seems to us entirely likely that had the judge been given full information about the Newton hearing, the substance of the dispute and how it was resolved against the offender at the outset, his attitude to this case may well have been different.
  62. We turn to the question of the length of custodial term. We are in no doubt that a significant upward adjustment had to be made to the starting point to reflect the multiple indicators of culpability and harm and the aggravating features that have been identified. It must also be borne in mind that the persistent action over a prolonged period included the incident of strangulation which stands out as the most significant single episode in the whole sorry story. It must also be borne in mind that, as the judge put it, he had had his chance when he received a suspended sentence for his previous infliction of grievous bodily harm upon his then partner. Put another way, his previous record is a seriously aggravating feature, even if simply viewed in isolation.
  63. The judge made an upward adjustment of just 6 months from the starting point of 2 years and 6 months. In our judgment that is unjustifiably lenient and an upwards adjustment to 3-and-a-half years was the minimum that could reasonably be justified. The modesty of the uplift applied by the judge is thrown into sharp relief by his subsequent downwards adjustment of a year for the offender's mitigation. In our judgment there is an imbalance between the two adjustments that it is impossible to justify, even taking the most generous view of his personal mitigation. It seems to us impossible to justify a conclusion that, placing the seriousness of the offending and the aggravating features of the case on one side and the offender's personal mitigation on the other, the appropriate notional sentence could be less than the original starting point of 2-and-a-half years before reduction for the offender's late guilty plea.
  64. We should make it clear that the judge could have arrived at a notional sentence significantly in excess of two-and-a-half years before there might be any risk of the sentence being criticised as being manifestly excessive.
  65. A reduction of 5 percent would equate to a reduction of about one-and-a-half months, reducing a notional sentence of 30 months to one of 28-and-a-half months.
  66. For these reasons, we consider that the judge's valiant attempt to bring the length of the sentence down to a level where he could suspend the sentence was plainly wrong by a significant margin. It contributed to the imposition of a sentence that was unduly lenient, both as to the length of the custodial term and as to suspension. As it happens, the difference between the sentence of 18 months that the judge imposed and the sentence of some 28 months that we consider to have been the absolute minimum that could reasonably have been ordered, spans the cut-off point beyond which the sentence could not be suspended, but for the reasons we have given, that should not drive the selection of the appropriate custodial term.
  67. For these reasons we quash the sentence of 18 months suspended for 2 years that was imposed by the judge and substitute an immediate custodial sentence of imprisonment of 28 months' imprisonment.

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