CASE OF MIĶELSONS v. LATVIA
(Application no. 46413/10)
3 November 2015
This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Miķelsons v. Latvia,
The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
Luis López Guerra,
Iulia Antoanella Motoc,
Armen Harutyunyan, judges,
and Stephen Phillips, Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 13 October 2015,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
1. The case originated in an application (no. 46413/10) against the Republic of Latvia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Latvian national, Mr Kārlis Miķelsons (“the applicant”), on 9 August 2010.
2. The applicant was represented by Mr E. Rusanovs, a lawyer practising in Riga. The Latvian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms K. Līce.
3. The applicant alleged that he had not been presented before an investigating judge within forty-eight hours of his arrest, in breach of domestic law. He also complained that the domestic courts had failed to establish that there was a reasonable suspicion that he had committed the offences alleged, and that he had been prevented from effectively challenging his detention as he had been denied access to the case file. He relied on Article 5 of the Convention.
4. On 10 July 2014 the aforementioned complaints were communicated to the Government and the remainder of the application was declared inadmissible pursuant to Rule 54 § 3 of the Rules of Court.
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
5. The applicant was born in 1959 and resides in Riga.
6. The relevant facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
A. The applicant’s arrest
7. The applicant was the chairman of the State-owned joint stock company L. On 14 June 2010 the Bureau for the Prevention and Combating of Corruption (Korupcijas novēršanas un apkarošanas birojs) opened a criminal investigation into suspected unlawful activity by the company’s officials.
8. On 15 June 2010 at 7 a.m. investigator A.R. ordered a search of the applicant’s apartment. It was possible that he was involved in the offences under investigation, and there was reason to believe that unlawfully obtained money and some other items were located there.
9. Between 7.40 and 10.40 a.m. officers from the Bureau carried out the search. The applicant was allowed to telephone his lawyer who, according to him, arrived at 9.38 a.m.
10. The applicant submitted that during the search he had not been free to leave the apartment.
11. The search record, however, stated that he and his wife had been informed of their right to remain present and make remarks about the investigators’ actions. They had attended the search. His lawyer had noted down in the record that the decision authorising the search did not comply with certain provisions of the Criminal Procedure Law (Kriminālprocesa likums). It was signed by all three of them.
12. At about 11 a.m. the applicant telephoned a security guard at company L. to ask that his driver place his briefcase in a car.
13. At 11.15 a.m. the officers informed the applicant he was under arrest.
14. Between 11.21 and 11.34 a.m. investigator G.B. drew up an arrest record specifying that the applicant had been arrested at 11.15 a.m. on suspicion of abuse of office with intent to obtain a material benefit and assisting money laundering, and that a witness had identified him as a perpetrator. He and his lawyer signed the record, noting also that his arrest was unjustified.
15. At 6.30 p.m. the applicant was interviewed.
16. The investigating authorities performed thirty searches in total that day and, according to the applicant, arrested seven other individuals. The Government submitted, without indicating when, that nine individuals had been arrested. They further drew attention to the large scale of the crimes under investigation and various investigative actions.
B. The applicant’s pre-trial detention
17. On 17 June 2010 at about 9 a.m. A.R. served on the applicant a decision declaring him a suspect and an application addressed to the Riga City Centre District Court (Rīgas pilsētas Centra rajona tiesa) for his pre-trial detention. His lawyer was present at the time.
18. According to A.R. there was a strong suspicion that, between 1 January 2006 and 15 June 2010 the applicant, in his position as chairman of company L., had secured decisions favourable to companies ANS and GGSMT for the reconstruction of hydro units and regarding a thermal power plant project. A sum of no less than 1,130,000 euros (EUR) obtained as a result of this unlawful activity had allegedly been laundered through companies registered in Latvia and abroad, by way of property transactions and investments in companies owned by the applicant and K.M. By doing so, the applicant had allegedly committed the offences of abuse of office with intent to obtain a material benefit and assisting money laundering.
19. The applicant, referring to his lawyer’s handwritten application, contended that at 9.20 a.m. that morning his lawyer had applied to A.R. for leave to consult, prior to the detention hearing, the documents in support of the application for detention. She had refused the request. The Government, however, submitted that neither the applicant nor his lawyer had made any complaints about access to the case file.
20. Between 10.04 a.m. and 1.30 p.m. an investigating judge of the Riga City Centre District Court held the hearing.
21. The applicant’s lawyer requested A.R. to provide evidence in support of the application for detention. She refused to do so and the hearing continued.
22. The lawyer submitted that the officers had controlled the applicant’s movements in the apartment from the start of the search. He had therefore requested them to draw up a record of his client’s arrest. In this connection, he pointed out that no one could be held in custody for more than forty-eight hours.
23. The investigating judge granted A.R.’s application and ordered the applicant’s detention pending trial. With regard to the suspicion that he had committed the offences in question, the judge reasoned as follows:
“...search records, inspection records, statements [and] other material of the criminal proceedings give rise to grounds for suspicion that [the applicant] has committed the offences in relation to which the criminal proceedings have been instituted...”
24. As regards access to the case file, the judge stated:
“Section 375(1) of the Criminal Procedure Law provides that case material is a secret of the investigation ... material and evidence that justify [the applicant’s] detention contain secret information ... [the investigator] has the right to disclose this material ... only to officials involved in the criminal proceedings.”
25. On 21 June 2010 the applicant’s lawyer lodged an appeal against this decision. On 5 July 2010 he submitted his arguments in support thereof.
26. He requested the Riga Regional Court (Rīgas apgabaltiesa) to grant him access to the case file so as to be able to effectively challenge the applicant’s detention. It did not grant the request.
27. On 6 July 2010 an appeal hearing was held. The lawyer maintained that he had the right to access the documents upon which the applicant’s detention had been based.
28. The Regional Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the original ruling. With regard to the suspicion that the applicant had committed the offences in question, the judge stated:
“The court has had sufficient time to examine the case material furnished to it. The court, like [the lower court], concludes that information has been obtained ... giving rise to grounds for suspicion that [the applicant] has committed the accused offences. The court reached that conclusion having examined ... records of investigative actions [and] witness statements, and with special attention paid to information obtained by ... special investigative actions ... carried out long before the criminal proceedings were instituted.”
29. As regards access to the case file, the judge reasoned as follows:
“An official in charge of criminal proceedings presents case material to an investigating or higher judge for them to assess grounds of pre-trial detention. An investigating or higher judge examines the case material ... [which] is kept secret from the parties not conducting the proceedings.”
30. No appeal lay against this decision.
31. On 18 August 2010 the investigating judge released the applicant on bail.
C. The applicant’s complaint to the prosecution service
32. On 30 June 2010 the applicant’s lawyer lodged a complaint regarding his client’s arrest with the Office of the Prosecutor General.
33. On 8 July 2010 prosecutor V.J. dismissed it. Neither the applicant nor his lawyer had noted in the search record that the applicant’s freedom of movement or his liberty had been restricted during the search; they had not noted anything in the arrest record to say that he had been deprived of his liberty before this either. The applicant’s lawyer had not specified the manner in which his client had been deprived of his liberty. It could not therefore be established that he had been deprived of his liberty during the search.
34. By a final decision of 11 October 2010 chief prosecutor A.K. dismissed the complaint.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
35. Pursuant to section 268(3) of the Criminal Procedure Law, a suspect must be brought before an investigating judge within forty-eight hours of arrest.
36. Section 182(4) provides that anyone present at a search may be prohibited from leaving, walking around and speaking to others until its completion.
37. Under section 375(1), during criminal proceedings the case material is a secret of the investigation. Officials conducting criminal proceedings may familiarise themselves with it, as may persons presented with it in accordance with the Law.
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION
38. The applicant complained that he had not been presented before an investigating judge within forty-eight hours of his arrest at 7.40 a.m. on 15 June 2010, in breach of domestic law, and that the domestic courts had failed to consider his argument in that regard. He relied on Article 5 §§ 1 (c), 3 and 4 of the Convention.
39. In so far as the applicant complained that he had been brought before the investigating judge after the expiry of the forty-eight-hour period allowed by domestic law, the Court notes that the primary question raised is whether his custody during the period before the investigating judge’s detention order was in compliance with domestic law. As this complaint concerns the “lawfulness” of his detention during that period, it falls to be examined under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention, the relevant part of which reads as follows:
“1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:
(c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so;
40. The Government argued that this complaint was manifestly ill-founded.
41. The Court, however, finds that it is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
1. The parties’ submissions
(a) The applicant
42. The applicant maintained that he had been taken into custody at 7.40 a.m. on 15 June 2010.
43. Firstly, the fact that the officers from the Bureau had informed him of his rights did not prove that he had not been deprived of his liberty. It had been presumed that he had had to stay at the apartment. The officers had not let him out of their sight and had controlled his movements while inside. They would have resorted to using force if he had attempted to leave. He had been forbidden from speaking to anyone present and from using any other means of communication except a telephone call to his lawyer, which was a right afforded to detainees. He had telephoned the security guard at company L. in secret.
44. Secondly, according to the decision authorising the search he had been suspected of the offences in question. The officers had told his lawyer that the task to be noted in his authorisation (orderis) was that of defending his client in criminal proceedings. In view of those circumstances, it had become apparent to his lawyer that he had in fact been arrested at 7.40 a.m. He had therefore requested the officers several times to draw up a record of the applicant’s arrest. They, however, had replied that a decision on his arrest had not yet been made.
45. Thirdly, he and his lawyer had not made any remarks in the search record with regard to the arrest as they had had no complaints about the duration of the search. He had indicated in the arrest record that his arrest had been unjustified. He and his defence had been busy at the time, but at the earliest opportunity, namely the detention hearing of 17 June 2010, they had complained about the arrest. They had also lodged a complaint with the Office of the Prosecutor General.
46. Lastly, the officers had remained in his apartment and he had not been permitted to leave until after the search. He had been informed of his arrest at 11.15 a.m., upon the instructions of A.R., who had been in contact with the investigators over the telephone and had not attended the search herself. At the same time, the items seized from his apartment had not pointed to his involvement in the offences under investigation. In view of the broad range and planning of the Bureau’s actions of 15 June 2010, a decision on his arrest had already been made prior to the search.
47. In view of the fact that he had been presented before an investigating judge at 10 a.m. on 17 June 2010, he had been held in custody for more than forty-eight hours, in breach of domestic law. Relying on the case of Benham v. the United Kingdom (10 June 1996, § 41, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-III), the applicant maintained that this failure to comply with domestic law entailed a breach of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention.
(b) The Government
48. The Government denied that the applicant had been deprived of his liberty during the search.
49. Firstly, the events in question had taken place at his apartment and not a police station or other premises with restricted access. At the start of the search he had been informed of his right to refuse to attend. Furthermore, unlike in the case of Creangă v. Romania ([GC], no. 29226/03, § 95, 23 February 2012), they were able to furnish a document, namely the search record of 15 June 2010 containing information about the events in question. They emphasised that neither the applicant nor his lawyer had noted in the search record that the applicant had been deprived of his liberty during the search; they had not made any such comments in the arrest record either.
50. Secondly, the applicant had not specified the manner in which he had been deprived of his liberty, either in his application to the Court or in his complaints to the domestic authorities. During the search he had been able to walk around the apartment and speak to those present. He had also telephoned an employee at company L. Furthermore, under section 182(4) of the Criminal Procedure Law an investigating authority could prohibit anyone present at a search from leaving or conversing with others, though such temporary restrictions would not amount to a deprivation of liberty.
51. Lastly, the applicant’s claim that his lawyer had requested the officers to draw up a record of his arrest lacked credibility, as such a request would have been contrary to his client’s interests. No such request had been noted by the lawyer in the arrest record, nor had he complained of any refusal of such a request to the investigating judge or prosecution service.
52. Having regard to the foregoing, the Government maintained that the applicant had been arrested at 11.21 a.m. on 15 June 2010. As he had been presented before an investigating judge at 10.04 a.m. on 17 June 2010, he had not been held in custody for more than forty-eight hours.
2. The Court’s assessment
53. The Court reiterates that Article 5 of the Convention enshrines a fundamental right, namely the protection of the individual against arbitrary interference by the State with his or her right to liberty. In proclaiming the “right to liberty”, Article 5 § 1 contemplates the physical liberty of the person; its aim is to ensure that no one is deprived of that liberty in an arbitrary fashion. Sub-paragraphs (a) to (f) of Article 5 § 1 contain an exhaustive list of permissible grounds on which persons may be deprived of their liberty, and no deprivation of liberty will be lawful unless it is justified on one of those grounds (see Creangă, cited above, § 84).
54. Article 5 § 1 is not concerned with mere restrictions on liberty of movement, which are governed by Article 2 of Protocol No. 4. In order to determine whether someone has been “deprived of his liberty” within the meaning of Article 5, the starting point must be his actual situation, and account must be taken of a whole range of criteria such as the type, duration, effects and manner of implementation of the measure in question. The difference between deprivation and restriction of liberty is merely one of degree or intensity, and not one of nature or substance (see Austin and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], nos. 39692/09, 40713/09 and 41008/09, § 57, 15 March 2012, and Creangă, cited above, § 91).
55. Where the “lawfulness” of detention is in issue, including the question of whether “a procedure prescribed by law” has been followed, the Convention refers essentially to national law and lays down the obligation to conform to the substantive and procedural rules of national law (see Medvedyev and Others v. France [GC], no. 3394/03, § 79, ECHR 2010).
56. In the present case, the parties appeared to agree that the officers had commenced the search at 7.40 a.m. on 15 June 2010. They, however, were in dispute as to whether from that moment onwards the applicant had been deprived of his liberty, with him maintaining that he had been arrested at 7.40 a.m. and the Government arguing that it had been at 11.21 a.m.
57. The Court observes that it was likely that at the time the officers arrived at the applicant’s apartment, the investigator already had a suspicion about his involvement in the criminal offences under investigation. A witness had earlier pointed him out, and it appears that the investigating authorities had been in possession of information incriminating him long before the investigation was instituted (see paragraphs 8, 14 and 28 above). Investigative measures were being carried out and several individuals were taken into custody. Also, the applicant’s lawyer had been advised to act for him in the criminal proceedings.
58. At the same time, the Court notes that the Government were able to produce official documents in support of their position as regards the events that took place at the applicant’s apartment (see paragraphs 11 and 14 above) (contrast with Creangă, cited above, § 95; see also Baisuev and Anzorov v. Georgia, no. 39804/04, § 52, 18 December 2012).
59. According to the search record, the applicant had been informed of his right to attend the search and make remarks about the investigators’ actions (see paragraph 11 above). He and his lawyer had also had an opportunity to write remarks in the arrest record (see paragraph 14 above in fine). Neither of them, however, had noted in these records that the applicant had been deprived of his liberty during the search, or that the investigators had refused the lawyer’s request regarding the record of his arrest (see paragraph 44 above).
60. In view of the importance of the right to liberty for a person, the applicant’s assertions that he and his lawyer had not done so because they had had no complaints about the duration of the search or had been busy at the time (see paragraph 45 above) seem scarcely credible, particularly since they had raised other objections (see paragraphs 11 and 14 above).
61. In the circumstances of the case, and in view of the fact that the search took place at the applicant’s apartment, the Court is unable to exclude the possibility that he wished to remain present. Likewise, it cannot rule out that the officers might have controlled his movements and restricted his contact with others during the search in order to exclude the risk of his tampering with the evidence sought. He did not submit that he had been guarded by the investigators (compare and contrast with Iustin Robertino Micu v. Romania, no. 41040/11, § 89, 13 January 2015), nor was there a statement from his wife, who had been present (see paragraph 11 above), to the effect that her husband had been deprived of his liberty (compare and contrast with Venskutė v. Lithuania, no. 10645/08, § 73, 11 December 2012; Creangă, cited above, § 96 in fine; and Chitayev v. Russia, no. 59334/00, § 171, 18 January 2007).
62. Notwithstanding the applicant’s submissions, the Court therefore considers that the information noted in the search and arrest records signed by him and his lawyer was generally accurate, and it can rely on it in so far as the arrest is concerned.
63. Given that according to the arrest record the applicant’s custody had begun at 11.15 a.m. on 15 June 2010 (see paragraph 14 above), the forty-eight-hour period permitted by domestic law had been respected because he had been brought before the investigating judge at 10.04 a.m. on 17 June 2010 (see paragraph 20 above). In the circumstances of the present case, the Court cannot therefore find the conclusions of the prosecution service in that regard unreasonable or arbitrary (see paragraphs 32-34 above).
64. Even assuming that the applicant’s custody had begun after completion of the search at 10.40 a.m. on 15 June 2010 (see paragraphs 9 and 46 above), the forty-eight-hour period had been complied with.
65. There has, accordingly, been no violation of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention on account of the observance of the forty-eight-hour time-limit.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 4 OF THE CONVENTION
66. The applicant complained that he had been denied access to the documents upon which his pre-trial detention had been based and could not therefore effectively challenge it, which had led to a violation of Article 5 §§ 2 and 4 of the Convention.
67. The Court deems that this complaint falls to be examined under Article 5 § 4 of the Convention which read as follows:
“4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.”
68. The Government argued that this complaint was manifestly ill-founded.
69. The Court, however, finds that it is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
1. The parties’ submissions
(a) The applicant
70. Referring to the cases of Nikolov v. Bulgaria (no. 38884/97, § 97, 30 January 2003) and Shishkov v. Bulgaria (no. 38822/97, § 77, ECHR 2003-I (extracts)), and other case-law of the Court, the applicant argued that, in view of the dramatic impact of deprivation of liberty on the fundamental rights of the person concerned, proceedings conducted under Article 5 § 4 of the Convention should in principle meet, to the largest extent possible under the circumstances of an ongoing investigation, the basic requirements of a fair trial. Equality of arms could not be ensured if counsel was denied access to the documents in the investigation file which were essential to effectively challenge the lawfulness, in the sense of the Convention, of his client’s detention.
71. The applicant maintained, in particular, that his lawyer had been refused access to the evidence upon which his detention had been based, and that no information about that evidence could be deduced from the other documents available. It had therefore been made impossible for his lawyer to defend him effectively.
(b) The Government
72. Relying on Čalovskis v. Latvia (no. 22205/13, § 201, 24 July 2014), the Government submitted that neither the applicant nor his lawyer had asked the investigating judge for additional time to prepare. Also, in view of their arguments made before him, they had been familiar with the facts of the case and had been able to challenge the application for detention.
73. Referring to the case of Svipsta v. Latvia (no. 66820/01, § 137, ECHR 2006-III (extracts)), the Government further argued that, in view of the early stage of the investigation, the confidentiality of the information obtained had to be ensured to avoid any obstruction to the proper conduct of the investigation. The applicant and his lawyer had been keen to find out the identity of a witness who had earlier testified against him.
2. The Court’s assessment
74. Article 5 § 4 has been consistently interpreted by the Court as providing certain minimal procedural guarantees to a detainee while the court decides on whether a preventive detention should be imposed, extended or cancelled (see Khodorkovskiy v. Russia, no. 5829/04, § 219, 31 May 2011).
75. The Court observes that the applicant’s detention in the present case falls within the ambit of Article 5 § 1 (c). In such situations, where the lawfulness of detention pending trial is examined, the proceedings must be adversarial and always ensure equality of arms between the parties (see Nikolova v. Bulgaria [GC], no. 31195/96, § 58, ECHR 1999-II, and Graužinis v. Lithuania, no. 37975/97, § 31, 10 October 2000). This means, in particular, that a detainee should have access to the documents in the investigation file which are essential for assessing the lawfulness of his detention (see Mooren v. Germany [GC], no. 11364/03, § 124, 9 July 2009; Lamy v. Belgium, 30 March 1989, § 29, Series A no. 151; and Schöps v. Germany, no. 25116/94, § 44, ECHR 2001-I).
76. The concept of lawfulness of detention is not limited to compliance with the procedural requirements set out in domestic law, but also concerns the reasonableness of the suspicion on which the arrest is based, the legitimacy of the purpose pursued by the arrest, and the justification of the ensuing detention (see Veretco v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 679/13, § 58, 7 April 2015).
77. In the present case, the applicant was informed in general terms of the grounds for suspicion. The investigator, however, dismissed his lawyer’s request to consult the investigation file and, in particular, the evidence in support of the application for detention. The investigating judge and Riga Regional Court, for their part, reached their conclusion that there was a suspicion that the applicant had committed the offences in question on the basis of the contents of the investigation file (see paragraphs 23 and 28 above).
78. The contents of that file thus appear to have played a key role in the investigating judge’s and Regional Court’s decisions on the applicant’s detention; however, while the investigator, investigating judge and Regional Court were familiar with them, their precise content had not at that stage been brought to his or his lawyer’s knowledge. This was not the situation in the Čalovskis case (cited above, §§ 192 and 201) relied upon by the Government (see paragraph 72 above). Neither the applicant nor his lawyer therefore had adequate opportunity to challenge the findings referred to by the domestic authorities, notably by challenging the evidence they had relied upon.
79. It is true, as the Government pointed out, that the applicant had been provided with some details about the facts on which the suspicion against him had been based; however, the information provided was only an account of the facts as construed by the domestic authorities on the basis of the evidence contained in the investigation file. In the Court’s opinion, it was hardly possible for him to challenge the reliability of such an account properly without being made aware of the evidence on which it had been based.
80. The Court acknowledges the need for the criminal investigation to be conducted efficiently, which may imply that part of the information collected during it is to be kept secret in order to prevent suspects from tampering with evidence and undermining the course of justice. This legitimate goal cannot, however, be pursued at the expense of substantial restrictions on the rights of the defence. Information which is essential for the assessment of the lawfulness of a detention should therefore be made available in an appropriate manner to the suspect’s lawyer (see, among other authorities, Lamy, cited above, § 29, and Garcia Alva v. Germany, no. 23541/94, § 42, 13 February 2001).
81. In these circumstances, and given the importance in the investigating judge’s and Regional Court’s reasoning of the contents of the investigation file, which could not be effectively challenged by the applicant since it was not communicated to him, the procedure before the investigating judge and Regional Court did not comply with the guarantees afforded by Article 5 § 4 (see Lamy, cited above, § 29, and Garcia Alva, cited above, §§ 40-43).
82. This provision has therefore been violated.
III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 §§ 3 AND 4 OF THE CONVENTION
83. Relying on Article 5 §§ 1 (c), 3 and 4 of the Convention, the applicant complained that the domestic courts had not established the existence of a reasonable suspicion that he had committed the offences in question. He could not understand the facts underlying the suspicion against him so as to be able to challenge his detention. The investigating judge had not verified the investigator’s allegations, and the Riga Regional Court had not provided grounds for suspicion.
84. The Government contended that both the investigating judge and Regional Court had examined the case material and had found that it gave grounds for suspecting the applicant. In his decision the appeal judge had explicitly referred to it.
85. The Court observes that this complaint concerns to a substantial extent the fact that the applicant had been unable to consult the evidence referred to by the investigator, investigating judge and Regional Court as regards the suspicion against him. As this complaint, falling under Article 5 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention, is linked to the one examined above it must therefore likewise be declared admissible.
86. The Court has already concluded that the procedure before the investigating judge and Regional Court was manifestly deficient, having regard to the requirements of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention (see paragraphs 81 and 82 above). It thus considers that no separate examination of this complaint is required (see, mutatis mutandis, Ignatenco v. Moldova, no. 36988/07, § 91, 8 February 2011).
IV. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
87. Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
88. While the applicant submitted to have suffered damage as a result of the alleged violations, he did not wish to submit a claim for just satisfaction, as the finding of a violation would constitute sufficient just satisfaction for him. Accordingly, the Court considers that there is no call to award him any sum on that account.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,
1. Declares the complaint under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention concerning the forty-eight-hour time-limit, and the complaints under Article 5 §§ 3 and 4 concerning the proceedings before the investigating judge and the Riga Regional Court admissible;
2. Holds that there has been no violation of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention;
3. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention;
4. Holds that there is no need to examine separately the complaint under Article 5 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 3 November 2015, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Stephen Phillips Luis