CASE OF YURIY RUDAKOV v. RUSSIA
(Application no. 48982/08)
15 January 2015
This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Yuriy Rudakov v. Russia,
The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska,
Dmitry Dedov, judges,
and Søren Nielsen, Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 9 December 2014,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
1. The case originated in an application (no. 48982/08) against the Russian Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Russian national, Mr Yuriy Ignatyevich Rudakov (“the applicant”), on 12 August 2008.
2. The applicant was represented by Mr Ye. Nazarov, a lawyer practising in Staryj Oskol, Belgorod Region. The Russian Government (“the Government”) were represented by Mr G. Matyushkin, Representative of the Russian Federation at the European Court of Human Rights.
3. The applicant alleged, in particular, that his detention pending the study of the case file had been unlawful and that his detention as a whole had not been based on relevant and sufficient grounds.
4. On 25 March 2011 the application was communicated to the Government.
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
5. The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Chernyanka, a village in Belgorod Region.
A. Criminal proceedings against the applicant
6. On 10 October and 16 November 2007 criminal proceedings were instituted against the management of the Kristall-Group holding (“the holding”) under Articles 176 § 1 (loan fraud) and 159 § 3 (fraud) of the Criminal Code.
7. On 18 November 2007 criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant, director general of the holding, on suspicion of fraud and loan fraud under Articles 159 § 3 and 176 § 1 of the Criminal Code respectively. On the same day the applicant was arrested in Kursk. Criminal cases against the management of the holding were joined to the criminal case against the applicant.
8. On the same day (18 November 2007) the investigator questioned witnesses L. and D., the applicant’s subordinates. L. claimed that the applicant had told him to temporarily leave Belgorod Region and not to divulge anything to the police. D. claimed that he feared the applicant, who was, in his opinion, capable of anything in order to evade criminal liability.
9. On 19 November 2007 Sverdlovskiy District Court of Belgorod (“the District Court”) decided to remand the applicant in custody. The court held as follows:
“... Substantiating the request [for application of a custodial measure], the investigator indicated that [the applicant] might try to flee from the pre-trial investigation and the court, as well as obstruct the administration of justice. Those arguments have been confirmed. The court came to this conclusion for the following reasons.
When the criminal cases were opened in respect of the unlawful actions of the management of the holding, investigative actions were carried out in the course of which it was necessary to question [the applicant] ... The suspect has a permanent place of residence, employment and a family. Nevertheless, for a long time the investigating authorities could not get hold of [the applicant] either through his work, his family, or his place of residence.
The arguments advanced by the prosecution to the effect that [the applicant], using his office, exerted pressure on the witnesses in the case, have also been confirmed ...
These circumstances counter the arguments to the contrary advanced by the defence ...
In view of the above, the court considers it impossible to impose on [the applicant] any other, more lenient, preventive measure, and deems the arguments by the prosecution to be substantiated and sufficient for applying the preventive measure of detention ...”
10. On 27 November 2007 the applicant was charged with two counts of fraudulently obtaining a loan under Article 176 § 1 of the Criminal Code.
11. On 28 November 2007 Belgorod Regional Court (“the Regional Court”) upheld the detention order of 19 November 2007 on appeal.
12. On 15 January, 4 March and 8 May 2008 the District Court extended the applicant’s detention until 10 March, 18 May and 18 July 2008 respectively. The court opined that the grounds for holding the applicant in custody were still valid. It considered that the risk of the applicant’s absconding or otherwise interfering with the proceedings had been supported by statements of witness L. (see paragraph 8 above) and the fact that when the police had identified the applicant’s whereabouts in Kursk he had tried to escape. The court considered and rejected other pertinent facts, such as the fact that since 8 December 2007 the applicant had no longer been director general of the holding, that the suspicion under Article 159 § 3 of the Criminal Code had been dropped, and that the applicant had a permanent place of residence, a family, and positive references. The court further held that the time spent by the applicant in detention had not exceeded the reasonable limits, that the proceedings were being conducted diligently and that less stringent preventive measures could not secure the applicant’s proper conduct during the preliminary investigation. On 22 January, 13 March and 19 May 2008 respectively, the Regional Court upheld the above extension orders on appeal.
13. In the meantime, on 8 February 2008 criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant under Article 199 § 2 of the Criminal Code (tax evasion), and on 4 May 2008 the applicant was charged with five counts of loan fraud and tax evasion under Articles 176 § 1 and 199 § 2 of the Criminal Code respectively.
14. On 23 May 2008 the prosecution discontinued the criminal proceedings on suspicion of fraud under Article 159 § 3 of the Criminal Code in the absence of constituent elements of the above offence.
16. On 7 July 2008 the investigator requested the court to extend the applicant’s detention. The investigator noted, in particular, that pre-trial investigation had been completed and that on 28 May 2008 the applicant had been given access to the case file, comprising one hundred volumes. However, by the end of a month he had only studied twenty-three volumes. Considering the case volume the investigator requested that the applicant’s detention be extended for at least two months.
17. On 11 July 2008 the District Court, reiterating the reasons which prompted the application of the custodial measure to the applicant and noting the considerable volume of the case file which the applicant had been unable to study in full, extended the applicant’s detention until 18 September 2008. The Court also noted that it had failed to establish any new circumstances warranting the alteration or termination of the custodial measure. On 23 July 2008 the Regional Court upheld the above decision on appeal.
18. On 17 September and 6 October 2008 the District Court extended the applicant’s detention pending study of the case file until 10 October and 18 November 2008 respectively, that is for a total duration of twelve months. The Court again noted the gravity of the charges against the applicant, the considerable volume of the case file, of which the applicant had read only eighty-two and ninety volumes respectively, and the absence of any grounds for altering or terminating the custodial measure. On 25 September and 20 October 2008 the Regional Court upheld the above extension orders on appeal.
19. On 11 November 2008 the Regional Court extended the applicant’s detention pending study of the case file until 10 January 2009. The court held, in particular, that upon completion of the investigation the applicant had been given access to the case file in compliance with the time-limit set out in Article 109 § 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure; that since the applicant had not finished reading the case file before the expiry of the maximum period of detention (he had read ninety-nine volumes of the case file and studied 1,300 additional pages of material evidence, and there remained one more volume of the case file and 15,600 additional pages of material evidence to read) the provisions of Article 109 § 7 of the Code of Criminal Procedure had allowed the investigator to request a further extension of the period of detention; that the grounds for application of the custodial measure persisted; that application of a less stringent preventive measure had not been possible despite the arguments put forward by the applicant; that the investigation had been particularly complex due to the volume of the case involving several episodes; that no evidence had been submitted to the effect that the applicant’s health prevented him from remaining in custody, and that the applicant had made no complaints regarding the conditions of his detention. On 23 December 2008 the Supreme Court of Russia upheld the above extension order on appeal.
20. On 30 December 2008 the Regional Court further extended the applicant’s detention for an unlimited period of time while the applicant and his defence counsel finished studying the case file. On 24 February 2009 the Supreme Court of Russia upheld the above decision on appeal.
21. On 16 March and 19 March 2009 respectively the applicant’s defence counsel and the applicant completed studying the case file.
22. On 7 April 2009 the case file was remitted to the trial court.
23. On 7 September 2009 the District Court convicted the applicant of setting up fraudulent loans and tax evasion under Articles 176 § 1 and 199 § 1 of the Criminal Code respectively and sentenced him to three years and six months’ imprisonment.
24. On 18 November 2009 the Regional Court upheld the applicant’s conviction on appeal.
B. Proceedings before the Constitutional Court
25. The applicant challenged the compatibility with the Constitution of the provisions of Article 109 §§ 4, 7 and 8 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in so far as they allowed the extension of detention “pending investigation” beyond the maximum time-limit and for an unlimited duration while the defendant read the material of the case file.
26. On 30 January 2009 the Constitutional Court declined to examine the applicant’s complaint, relying on its findings in the case of Mr Ye. (see Relevant domestic law and practice section below).
27. The applicant once again challenged the compatibility of Article 109 §§ 4, 7 and 8 of the Code with the Constitution. In addition to his previous concerns the applicant contended that he had been discriminated against in comparison with other detainees in respect of whom the investigation had not been completed within the authorised detention period and others who had been granted access to the case material less than one month before the expiry of the authorised detention period, and who could therefore benefit from immediate release.
28. On 19 March 2009 the Constitutional Court declined to examine the applicant’s complaint. Reference was again made to the case of Mr Ye.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE
A. The Constitution of the Russian Federation
29. Article 22 of the Constitution provides that everyone shall have the right to freedom and inviolability of person. It further provides that arrest, detention and remand in custody shall be allowed only by a court decision.
B. The Criminal Code of the Russian Federation
30. Article 15 of the Criminal Code provides that serious offences are premeditated offences for which the Criminal Code prescribes a maximum penalty of between five and ten years’ imprisonment. Particularly serious offences are premeditated offences for which the Code prescribes a maximum penalty of more than ten years’ imprisonment or a heavier penalty.
31. Large-scale fraud is punishable by up to six years’ imprisonment (Article 159 § 3 of the Code).
32. Loan fraud is punishable by up to five years’ imprisonment (Article 176 § 1 of the Code).
33. Large-scale tax evasion is punishable by up to two years’ imprisonment (Article 199 § 1 of the Code).
C. The Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian Federation
1. Arrest and preventive measures in criminal proceedings
35. The police may arrest a person suspected of committing an offence punishable by imprisonment if the person is caught in the act of committing an offence or immediately after committing it. No judicial authority is required for the arrest (Article 91).
36. Within forty-eight hours of the time of the arrest a suspect must be released if a preventive measure in the form of remand in custody has not been imposed on the person or a final decision has not been deferred by a court. When remand in custody is deemed necessary, an application must be lodged to that effect with a district court by a prosecutor or by an investigator with the consent of a prosecutor (Article 94).
37. “Preventive measures” or “measures of restraint” (меры пресечения) include an undertaking not to leave a town or region, personal surety, bail and detention (Article 98). If necessary, the suspect or accused may be asked to give an undertaking to appear (обязательство о явке) (Article 112).
38. When deciding on a preventive measure, the competent authority is required to consider whether there are “sufficient grounds to believe” that the accused would abscond during the investigation or trial, reoffend or obstruct the establishment of the truth (Article 97). It must also take into account the gravity of the charge, information on the accused’s character, his or her profession, age, state of health, family status and other circumstances (Article 99).
2. Time-limits for detention “pending the investigation”
(a) Initial detention and its extensions
40. After arrest the suspect is placed in custody “pending investigation”. The period of detention “pending investigation” must not exceed two months (Article 109 § 1).
41. If the investigation cannot be completed within the two-month time-limit, and in the absence of any grounds for lifting or altering the preventive measure, the period of detention pending investigation may be extended to up to six months. Further extensions to up to twelve months are possible only in relation to persons accused of serious or particularly serious criminal offences, in view of the complexity of the case and if there are grounds justifying detention (Article 109 § 2).
42. In exceptional circumstances detention pending the investigation may be extended to up to eighteen months in respect of detainees charged with a particularly serious criminal offence (Article 109 § 3).
43. Extension of detention beyond eighteen months is prohibited and the detainee must be released immediately, unless the prosecution’s request for an extension for the purpose of studying the case has been granted by a court in accordance with Article 109 § 8 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Article 109 § 4).
(b) Supplementary extension for studying the case file
44. Upon completion of the investigation, the detainee must be given access to the case file no later than thirty days before the expiry of the maximum period of detention indicated in paragraphs 2 and 3 (Article 109 § 5).
45. If access is granted on a later date the detainee must be released after the expiry of the maximum period of detention (Article 109 § 6).
46. If access is granted thirty days before the expiry of the maximum period of detention but the thirty-day period proves insufficient to read the entire case file, the investigator may request the court to extend the period of detention. The request must be submitted no later than seven days before the expiry of the detention period (Article 109 § 7).
47. Within five days of receipt of a request for an extension, the judge must decide whether to grant it or reject it and release the detainee. If the extension is granted the period of detention is extended until such time as will be sufficient for the detainee and counsel to finish reading the case file and for the prosecution to submit the case to the trial court (Article 109 § 8).
3. Time-limits for detention “during judicial proceedings”
48. Once the defendant has finished reading the file, the prosecutor sends the case to the trial court and from that date the detention is classified as “during judicial proceedings”). The period of detention “during judicial proceedings” is calculated up to the date the judgment is given. It may not normally exceed six months, but if the case concerns serious or particularly serious criminal offences, the trial court may approve one or more extensions of no longer than three months each (Article 255 §§ 2 and 3).
D. Case-law of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation
49. Examining the compatibility of Article 97 of the RSFSR Code of Criminal Procedure (now replaced by Article 109 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the sole difference between the two Articles being that Article 97, in contrast to the new Article 109, imposed a six-month limitation on the maximum period of detention for the purpose of studying the case file) with the Constitution, on 13 June 1996 the Constitutional Court ruled as follows:
“... affording the defendant sufficient time for studying the file must not result in ... his being detained indefinitely. Indefinite detention would amount to punishment of the defendant for exercising his procedural rights and thereby inducing him to waive those rights ...”
“3. ... the studying of the file [by the defendant and his counsel] is a necessary condition for extending the term of detention [beyond eighteen months] but it may not be taken on its own as a sufficient ground for granting such an extension... For that reason, in each case the prosecutor’s application for extending the period of detention beyond eighteen months (Article 97 §§ 4, 6 of the RSFSR Code of Criminal Procedure) must refer not to the fact that the defendant and his counsel continue to study the file... but rather to factual information demonstrating that this preventive measure cannot be revoked and the legal grounds for its continued application remain ...
6. ... Article 97 § 5 of the RSFSR Code of Criminal Procedure expressly provides that, on an application by a prosecutor, a judge may extend a defendant’s detention until such time as the defendant and his counsel have finished studying the file and the prosecutor has submitted it to the [trial] court, but by no longer than six months. Accordingly, the law does not provide for the lodging of repeated applications for extension of the defendant’s detention, even after an additional investigation [has been carried out] ... In the absence of an express legal provision for repeated extensions of detention on that ground, any other interpretation of [Article 97] would breach the prohibition on arbitrary detention within the meaning of the Constitutional Court’s decision of 13 June 1996.”
51. By its decision no. 184-O of 6 June 2003 the Constitutional Court declined to examine a complaint by a Mr Ye., in which he challenged the compatibility with the Constitution of Article 109 § 8 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in so far as it allowed the extension of detention pending investigation beyond the maximum time-limit and indefinitely while the defendant finished reading the material in the case file. The Constitutional Court held that such an extension was only possible if there still existed “sufficient grounds to believe” that the accused might abscond during the investigation or trial, reoffend or otherwise obstruct the establishment of the truth, as provided by Article 97 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In so far as the challenged provision did not set a specific time-limit for holding the defendant in custody while he studied the case file, the Constitutional Court considered that it allowed for the possibility of determining such a time-limit for each particular case, depending on its specific features, on condition that the grounds for detention established in Article 97 had been sufficiently confirmed. The court concluded that the challenged provision could not be interpreted as providing for superfluous or unlimited detention. Neither did it deprive the defendant and his counsel of the right to challenge before a higher court the lawfulness and validity of the extension order, as well as to make an application for lifting or altering the custodial measure.
52. By decision no. 352-O of 11 July 2006, the Constitutional Court confirmed its position, by reference to above-cited decision no. 167-O, that in the absence of an express provision to that effect, time-limits during a pre-trial investigation may not be repeatedly extended, particularly on the same grounds, in excess of the maximum time-limit set out in the Code of Criminal Procedure.
53. By its decision no. 271-O-O of 19 March 2009, the Constitutional Court declined to examine a similar complaint by a Mr R. With reference to its previous decisions of 13 June 1996, 25 December 1998 and 6 June 2003, the Constitutional Court held that even though Article 109 § 8 did not define the maximum period within which an extension could be granted for the purpose of studying the case file, it did not imply the possibility of excessive or unlimited detention because, in granting an extension, the court should not rely solely on a well-founded suspicion that the defendant had committed the offence, but should mainly base its decision on specific circumstances justifying the continued detention, such as his potential to exert pressure on witnesses or an established risk of his absconding or reoffending, as well as the importance of the subject matter of the proceedings, the complexity of the case, the conduct of the defendant, and other relevant factors.
E. Case-law of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation
54. In its decision no. 22 of 29 October 2009 “On the Application by the Courts of Preventive Measures in the Form of Remand in Custody, Bail and House Arrest” the Plenum of the Supreme Court held as follows:
“18. ... Pursuant to Article 109 § 7 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, following a request by an investigator the court may extend an accused’s detention until such time as he and his defence counsel have finished studying the case file and the prosecutor has submitted it to the [trial] court, if upon completion of the pre-trial investigation the accused has been given access to the case file no later than thirty days before the expiry of the maximum period of detention indicated in Article 109 §§ 2 and 3 [six, twelve, eighteen months]. In that case the relevant extension order should indicate the exact period for which the extension is made.”
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION
55. The applicant complained under Article 5 § 1 (c) that his detention pending the study of the case file had been unlawful in so far as it exceeded the maximum detention period provided for by the domestic law. The relevant part of Article 5 provides as follows:
“1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:
(c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so ...”
56. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
1. Submissions by the parties
57. The Government submitted that the applicant’s detention pending investigation had not exceeded the time-limits set out in the domestic law. The provisions of the domestic law providing for the possibility of extending the applicant’s detention pending the investigation until such time as the file has been read in full and the case sent for trial were sufficiently clear and foreseeable in their application. Such an extension was only possible if, aside from the necessity for a defendant to study the case file, there remained relevant and sufficient reasons for continuing to hold him or her in custody, the end-date of the detention period in question depending solely on how soon the defendant would finish studying the case file. The Government further noted that the applicant had been provided with an opportunity to study the case file in full, and that he had not been restricted in the time available to him for doing so. The fact that the applicant needed seven months to complete studying the case file is explained not as much by the volume of the case as by the applicant’s own conduct, since sometimes the applicant studied the case file for only two hours a day.
58. The applicant maintained his complaint. He claimed that the provisions of domestic law governing the extension of detention for studying the case file by a detainee were not sufficiently clear and foreseeable in their application, and that they were discriminatory depending on whether the investigation had been completed or not within the authorised detention period and on whether, in the case where the investigation had been completed, a detainee was granted access to the case less or more than one month before the expiry of the authorised detention period (Article 109 §§ 5-8). As a result the domestic law put detainees belonging to the same category in different positions vis-à-vis the possibility of release after the expiry of the maximum permitted period of detention pending investigation. The applicant contested the Government’s argument to the effect that he had been deliberately delaying familiarising himself with the case file material. He submitted in this connection that none of the requests filed by the investigation authority to the court for extension of his detention mentioned a deliberate delay in studying the case file on his part. On the contrary, in order to accelerate the studying of the case file the applicant even agreed to receive the case file at weekends and in his cell in the remand prison.
2. The Court’s assessment
(a) General principles
59. The Court reiterates that the expressions “lawful” and “in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law” in Article 5 § 1 essentially refer back to national law and state the obligation to conform to the substantive and procedural rules thereof. However, the “lawfulness” of detention under domestic law is not always the decisive element. The Court must in addition be satisfied that detention during the period under consideration is compatible with the purpose of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention, which is to prevent individuals from being deprived of their liberty in an arbitrary fashion (see, among other authorities, Khudoyorov v. Russia, no. 6847/02, § 124, ECHR 2005-X (extracts)).
60. The Court must moreover ascertain whether domestic law itself is in conformity with the Convention, including the general principles expressed or implied therein. On this last point, the Court stresses that where deprivation of liberty is concerned it is particularly important that the general principle of legal certainty be satisfied. It is therefore essential that the conditions for deprivation of liberty under domestic law be clearly defined and that the law itself be foreseeable in its application, so that it meets the standard of “lawfulness” set by the Convention, a standard which requires that all law be sufficiently precise to allow a person, who is given appropriate advice if necessary, to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail (see Jėčius v. Lithuania, no. 34578/97, § 56, ECHR 2000-IX, and Baranowski v. Poland, no. 28358/95, §§ 50-52, ECHR 2000-III).
(b) Application of these principles in the present case
61. The Court observes that the applicant was arrested on 18 November 2007 and remanded in custody the following day. On 27 November 2007 he was charged with loan fraud under Article 176 § 1 of the Criminal Code, and on 4 May 2008 - with loan fraud and particularly large-scale tax evasion under Articles 176 § 1 and 199 § 2 of the Criminal Code respectively. The Court notes that under Russian law particularly large-scale tax evasion is categorised as a serious offence (see paragraphs 30 and 34 above).
62. The Court further observes that the applicable provisions of domestic law permitted up to twelve months’ detention during an investigation (hereinafter “the maximum detention period”) in respect of individuals accused of serious offences (Article 109 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, cited in paragraph 41 above). The domestic law further provided that the period in question could be extended if the defendant was granted access to the case file no later than thirty days before the expiry of the maximum detention period and if the thirty-day period proved insufficient for him or her to read the entire case file (Article 109 §§ 5, 7 and 8, cited in paragraphs 44, 46 and 47 above).
63. In the present case the maximum twelve-month period of the applicant’s detention during the investigation was to expire on 18 November 2008 (see paragraph 18 above). The applicant was granted access to the case file on 28 May 2008, over five months before the expiry of the maximum detention period (see paragraph 15 above). His detention was subsequently extended within the maximum twelve-month period, - on 11 July, 17 September and 6 October 2008 until 18 September, 10 October and 18 November 2008 respectively, to enable him to finish studying the case file. However, this time proved insufficient for him to read the entire case file comprising hundred volumes and thousands of additional pages of material evidence. For that reason, at the request of the investigator the District Court further extended the applicant’s detention beyond the maximum twelve-month period on 11 November 2008 - until 10 January 2009, and on 30 December 2008 - for an unlimited period of time until the applicant and his defence counsel read the case file in full (see paragraphs 17 and 20 above).
64. The Court reiterates that it has previously examined the issue of extension of detention pending study of case file by a defendant in a number of Russian cases, and has arrived at the conclusion that the relevant provisions of Russian law were not foreseeable in their application and fell short of the “quality of law” standard required under the Convention, in so far as they did not contain any express rule regarding the possibility of repeated extensions of a defendant’s detention pending study of the case file (see Tsarenko v. Russia, no. 5235/09, §§ 59-63, 3 March 2011; Suslov v. Russia, no. 2366/07, §§ 75-79, 29 May 2012; and Pyatkov v. Russia, no. 61767/08, §§ 86-91, 13 November 2012).
65. In the present case the Court sees no reason to depart from its previous conclusion. It considers, therefore, that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention on account of the applicant’s detention pending the investigation from 18 September 2008 to 7 April 2009 in the absence of any express provision in Article 109 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for repeated extensions of the detention period in order to allow the defendant to study the case file.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 3 OF THE CONVENTION
66. The applicant complained that his detention had not been based on relevant and sufficient grounds and that the domestic court had failed to consider a more lenient preventive measure notwithstanding the non-violent nature of the criminal offences with which he had been charged and other pertinent factors. He relied on Article 5 § 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be ... entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.”
67. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
1. Submissions by the parties
68. The Government submitted that the applicant’s detention had been based on relevant and sufficient grounds. The applicant was charged with five counts of loan fraud and tax evasion, which is a serious crime. His conduct after the opening of the criminal case against him gave grounds to believe that he might abscond from justice or exert pressure on witnesses. According to the case file material the applicant, being director general of the holding, forced his subordinates (witnesses L. and D.) to abscond from the investigation, refuse to testify or give false testimony. It has also been established that after the opening of the criminal case and the beginning of checks at the holding, the applicant had absconded from the investigation and left Belgorod Region, that for over a month he had been in hiding, and that he had been finally arrested in Kursk where he had also attempted to escape. At the examination of the issue of extension of the applicant’s detention the applicant’s lawyer repeatedly requested the court to release the applicant on bail. The proposed bail was, however, disproportionate to the damage caused by the crimes charged against the applicant and could not secure his appropriate behaviour during the investigation and his participation in the trial. The Government further submitted that the applicant’s detention between 28 May 2008 and 30 March 2009 (over ten months) had been attributable to the applicant, who had been deliberately delaying the studying of the case file. The circumstances of the case and the applicant’s conduct, relied on by the domestic court it the extension orders, did not leave any doubts that the applicant’s release prior to the delivery of the judgment had not been possible. At the same time the domestic court gave due consideration to the conditions of the applicant’s detention, his state of health and other factors which could have had an impact on the court’s decisions as to the preventive measure. The proceedings were conducted in compliance with the “special diligence” requirement. The Government concluded, therefore, that the length of the applicant’s detention did not breach the requirements of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention.
69. The applicant maintained his complaint. He challenged, first of all, the validity of the grounds advanced by the domestic court in the choice of the custodial measure. The applicant submitted, in particular, that he had acquired the status of a suspect in the criminal case on 18 November 2007 and therefore his business trips prior to that date could not have been viewed by the domestic court as an attempt to abscond from the investigation and trial. Besides, on 1 November 2007 he gave an explanation to detective officer of the 1st Interdistrict Investigation Department of Tax Crimes Investigation Unit of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for Belgorod Region, and supplied samples of his handwriting, which disproved the assertion of the domestic authorities to the effect that he had been hiding from the investigation. The applicant explained his failure to appear for questioning as a witness on 12 November 2007 by the fact that the competent authorities omitted to properly notify him of the scheduled questioning. Indeed, no proof to the contrary can be found in the case file. There had also been no credible evidence that he had in any way interfered with the investigation for the court to opt for a custodial measure. The applicant further challenged the validity of the grounds for subsequent extensions of his detention. In particular, the domestic court had failed to take into account the fact that the suspicion of fraud had been abandoned and that no relevant charge had been brought against the applicant on 27 November 2007, and that from 8 December 2007 the applicant was no longer the Director General of the holding and could therefore not put any pressure on his former employees. The domestic court also remained reluctant to take into consideration the fact that the applicant had positive references, no criminal record, a permanent place of residence, and so on. Finally, the applicant believed that the proceedings had not been conducted with “special diligence” as required by Article 5 § 3 of the Convention.
2. The Court’s assessment
(a) General principles
70. In determining the length of detention during judicial proceedings under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention, the period to be taken into consideration begins on the day the accused is taken into custody and ends on the day when the charge is determined, even if only by a court of first instance (see Panchenko v. Russia, no. 45100/98, § 91, 8 February 2005; Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772/95, §§ 145 and 147, ECHR 2000-IV; and Wemhoff v. Germany, 27 June 1968, § 9, Series A no. 7).
71. Under the Court’s case-law, the issue of whether a period of detention is reasonable cannot be assessed in abstracto. Whether it is reasonable for an accused to remain in detention must be assessed in each case according to its special features. Continued detention can be justified in a given case only if there are specific indications of a genuine requirement of public interest which, notwithstanding the presumption of innocence, outweighs the rule of respect for individual liberty (see, among other authorities, W. v. Switzerland, 26 January 1993, § 30, Series A no. 254-A, and Pantano v. Italy, no. 60851/00, § 66, 6 November 2003).
72. The persistence of a reasonable suspicion that an arrested person has committed an offence is a condition sine qua non for the lawfulness of the continued detention, but after a certain lapse of time it no longer suffices. In such cases, the Court must establish whether the other grounds given by the judicial authorities continued to justify deprivation of liberty. Where such grounds are “relevant” and “sufficient”, the Court must also ascertain whether the competent national authorities displayed “special diligence” in the conduct of the proceedings (see Labita, cited above, §§ 152 and 153). Justification for any period of detention, no matter how short, must be convincingly demonstrated by the authorities (see Shishkov v. Bulgaria, no. 38822/97, § 66, ECHR 2003-I). When deciding whether a person should be released or detained, the authorities are obliged to consider alternative measures of ensuring his appearance at trial (see Jablonski v. Poland, no. 33492/96, § 83, 21 December 2000).
(b) Application of these principles in the present case
(i) Period to be taken into consideration
73. The applicant was arrested on 18 November 2007. On 7 September 2009 he was convicted. The total length of the applicant’s pre-trial detention amounted, therefore, to almost twenty-two months.
(ii) Grounds for continued detention
74. The Court observes that on 19 November 2007 the domestic court took a decision to remand the applicant in custody, referring to the risk of his absconding and interfering with the investigation. The court took into consideration that for a certain time before the applicant’s arrest the investigating authorities could not get hold of him either though his work, his family or his place of residence and that the applicant, using his office, had exerted pressure on witnesses in the case.
75. The applicant’s detention pending investigation was subsequently extended on three occasions, - on 15 January, 4 March and 8 May 2008. The domestic court considered that the risk of the applicant’s absconding or otherwise interfering with the establishment of the truth persisted, and relied in this connection on statements by witness L. (see paragraph 8 above) and the applicant’s attempt to escape during his arrest. The court further considered and rejected the applicant’s arguments in favour of application of a more lenient preventive measure, assessed the overall period spent by the applicant in detention and found it reasonable, and found that the proceedings were being conducted diligently.
76. Afterwards, on 11 July 2008 the District Court, reiterating the grounds which prompted application of the custodial measure to the applicant and noting considerable volume of the case file, extended the applicant’s detention until 18 September 2008 to enable the applicant to finish studying the case file in its entirety.
77. Having regard to the foregoing, the Court is willing to accept that up until 18 September 2008 the applicant’s detention was justified by relevant and sufficient reasons.
78. As regards the subsequent period of the applicant’s detention pending the investigation, however, the Court reiterates that it has found that the applicant’s remand in custody between 18 September 2008 and 7 April 2009 had been in contravention of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention (see paragraphs 61-65 above) making unnecessary further examination of whether the applicant’s detention during the period in question was justified under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention (see Chuprikov v. Russia, no. 17504/07, § 67, 12 June 2014).
79. Furthermore, as to the applicant’s continued detention for five months pending trial between 7 April 2009 and 7 September 2009, the Court observes that the Government have failed to demonstrate, by submitting relevant documents, the existence of relevant and sufficient grounds which justified the applicant’s detention during that period.
80. In the light of the foregoing the Court concludes that although there existed relevant and sufficient grounds for the applicant’s continued detention at the earlier stage of the investigation, the unlawfulness of the applicant’s subsequent detention between 18 September 2008 and 7 April 2009 and failure of the domestic authorities to provide relevant and sufficient grounds for the applicant’s continued detention pending trial lead the Court to the conclusion that the domestic authorities failed to justify the applicant’s continued deprivation of liberty in its entirety. In these circumstances it is not necessary to examine whether the proceedings were conducted with “special diligence”.
81. There has therefore been a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention.
III. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION
82. Lastly, the applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention about the outcome of the criminal proceedings against him and under Article 1 of Protocol No. 4 to the Convention about having been convicted of failing to comply with a contractual obligation.
83. However, having regard to all the material in its possession, and in so far as these complaints fall within its competence, the Court finds that there is no appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols. It follows that this part of the application must be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.
IV. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
84. Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
85. The applicant claimed 1,000,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
86. The Government considered the applicant’s claim to be excessive and submitted that if the Court were to find a violation, the finding of such a violation would in itself constitute sufficient just satisfaction.
87. The Court notes that it has found violations under Article 5 §§ 1 and 3 of the Convention. It considers, therefore, that the applicant’s distress and frustration cannot be compensated for by a mere finding of a violation. Making its assessment on an equitable basis, the Court awards the applicant EUR 20,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable to him on this amount.
B. Costs and expenses
88. The applicant also claimed 100,000 Russian roubles for legal costs and expenses incurred before the Court. In support of his claims the applicant submitted a copy of his agreement with Mr Ye. Nazarov dated 8 August 2008 and a statement of the amount due dated 12 September 2011.
89. The Government considered the applicant’s claim to be excessive and not reasonable as to quantum.
90. According to the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 2,100 for legal costs and expenses incurred by the applicant in the proceedings before the Court.
C. Default interest
91. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,
1. Declares the complaints under Article 5 §§ 1 and 3 of the Convention admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;
2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention;
3. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention;
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following amounts, to be converted into Russian roubles at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:
(i) EUR 20,000 (twenty thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;
(ii) EUR 2,100 (two thousand one hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
5. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 15 January 2015, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Søren Nielsen Isabelle