SJ (Article 8 – Proportionality – PTSD - Bosnian Muslim - Medical Facilities) Bosnia CG  UKIAT 02819
Date of hearing: 29th April 2002
Date Determination notified: 18 July 2002
|Secretary of State for the Home Department||APPELLANT|
(5) he can no longer, because the circumstances in connection with which he has been recognised as a refugee have ceased to exist, continue to refuse to avail himself of the protection of the country of his nationality;
provided that this paragraph shall not apply to a refugee falling under Section A(1) of this Article who is able to invoke compelling reasons arising out of previous persecution for refusing to avail himself of the protection of the country of nationality. Paragraphs 135 and 136 of the Handbook, which, as is recognised before us, do not form part of United Kingdom law, refer, in paragraph 135, to what is meant by "circumstances" in Article 1C(5) and, in paragraph 136, to the nature of the exception to the cessation provision contained in the second paragraph of Article 1C(5). This contains, among other things, a reference to Article 1A(1) which indicates that the exception applies to "statutory refugees". It is clearly set out at Article 1A(1) that the term refugee applies to a person who has been considered a refugee under the arrangements of 12th May 1926 and to 30th June 1928 or under the Conventions of 28th October 1933 and 10th February 1938, the Protocol of 14th September 1939 or the Constitution of the International Refugee Organisation. Clearly this does not apply to the Appellant, as we shall continue to refer to him, before us. The point is made in paragraph 136 of the Handbook that the exception reflects a more general humanitarian principle which could also be applied to refugees other than statutory refugees and that it is frequently recognised that a person who, or whose family, has suffered under atrocious forms of persecution should not be expected to repatriate. This is so even though there may have been a complete change of regime in his country. The Adjudicator based his conclusions on medical evidence concerning the Appellant as regards his own medical problems which in particular involves him suffering from Chronic Post Traumatic Stress Disorder as is made clear in the report from a Dr Booya, a Consultant Psychiatrist. It appeared from the Appellant's evidence that his wife was also receiving treatment from Dr Booya, apparently for depression, and that their children had been sufficiently disturbed that the GP considered referring them to a specialist but considered that with stability and treatment of their parents that they would respond and it appears that this was increasingly the case.
D K ALLEN